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Abstract 
Understanding the opportunity identification process represents a core 
entrepreneurship domain research focus.  Many studies focusing on traditional firm 
performance outcomes neglect the entrepreneurial human and social capital drivers that are 
linked to opportunity identification.  Research on Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) has 
explored different dynamics associated with the formation of firms emanating from HEIs (e.g. 
from the perspective of the individual firm; by exploring support and influence offered by the 
parent organisation; and through analysis of the spinout process).  The contribution from the 
individual entrepreneur in identifying an opportunity for commercialisation has not been fully 
explored.   
 
This study looks at how academic entrepreneurs from HEIs and non-academic 
entrepreneurs, from the same industrial sector, identify opportunities and accumulate 
resources for commercialisation during the formation of life-science firms in a geographical 
life-science cluster in Scotland.  Entrepreneurship, studied from a human and social capital 
perspective, identifies how lead entrepreneurs and other team members use their individual 
and accumulated experiences to leverage resources.  The Resource-Based View (RBV), 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\XVHGWRH[DPLQHWKHOLQNEHWZHHQILUPV¶LQWHUQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGFRPSHWLWLYH
advantage, is extended to explore entrepreneurial behaviour during opportunity identification.  
Emerging themes from extant literature identify entrepreneurial team formation and the 
external environment as potential resource pools which aid the formation of firms.   
 
Using a process-based, case-study research approach, entrepreneurs and team 
members were interviewed to gather information about the identification of life-science 
opportunities.  A OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V general human capital, in the form of educational 
achievement, was found to be a key factor shaping the opportunity identification process.  
Further, a specific entrepreneurial and scientific human capital was leveraged to circumvent 
resource barriers.  Social capital also facilitated the identification and leverage of scarce 
resources.  Lead entrepreneurs with narrower resource profiles selected a resource munificent 
sponsored environment to gain access to additional resources.  However, a dynamic, yet 
unreported in empirical research, was revealed from the data.  Over time, lead academic 
entrepreneurs were encouraged to exit sponsored environments to enhance their independence 
whilst industry entrepreneurs generally sought sponsored environments for physical resources.  
Theory building ensued during the process of gathering data and analysing the data through 
comparison and iterating between existing theories. 
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Chapter 1: The Entrepreneur, Entrepreneurship and 
the External Environment 
1.1 Introduction 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  Section 1.2 offers a general 
background to why the commercialisation of HEI life-science generated knowledge is 
important.  Past emphasis on the firm as the unit of analysis is questioned by a call 
from literature to appreciate the resource requirements and actions of the individual 
lead entrepreneur (Scott and Rosa, 1996; Westhead and Wright, 1998).  This 
longitudinal study will explore WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶DFWLRQVDQG
behaviours at several points in µUHDO¶ time (Fletcher, 2006).  To assist, the following 
four themes will be explored: the individual human and social capital resource profiles 
brought by the lead entrepreneur(s) and team members; the entrepreneurial process 
pursued for firm formation; the context in which commercialisation takes place; and 
the interactive play between these themes over time.   
 
The individual lead entrepreneur and the benefits of studying the entrepreneur 
as the unit of analysis are presented in Section 1.3.  Entrepreneurial ownership team 
development is discussed in section 1.4.  Section 1.5 outlines the entrepreneurial 
process in general, and scrutinises definitions of what opportunity identification entails 
and what resources are needed for this particular phase.  The importance of linkage to 
the external environment for resource accumulation is raised in section 1.6.  Section 
1.7 deals with the development of the research questions motivating this study.  
Reasons for focusing on the life-science-based sector in Scotland are discussed in 
section 1.8.  Questions explore aspects of opportunity identification, the individual 
lead entrepreneur, team formation and the external environment.  An outline of the 
thesis is presented in section 1.9.   
 
1.2 Commercialisation of HEI Knowledge 
Over the last decade, studies have concluded that new high-technology and 
life-science firms within the European Union have been founded by relatively senior, 
highly qualified personnel coming from existing firms who have a familiarity with the 
industrial context in which they have been working (Storey and Tether, 1998).  A 
 2 
relatively smaller proportion of these firms have emanated from universities and other 
research institutes founded by academics whose skill sets are fostered in a traditionally 
non-commercial environment and geared towards the needs of the educational or 
research institute (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a).  In a non-commercial environment 
VXFK DV WKH +LJKHU (GXFDWLRQDO ,QVWLWXWH +(, RQH TXHVWLRQV µKRZ¶ DFDGHPLF
entrepreneurs accumulate resources and experience to create new ventures relative to 
their industrial counterparts (Kirkby, 2006).  The general research problem associated 
ZLWKµKRZ¶LQGLYLGXDOHQWUHSUHQHXUVDFFHVVUHVRXUFHVWRH[SORLWWKHLULGHDVE\IRUPLQJ
DILUP$UGLFKYLOLHWDODQGµKRZ¶WKH\LGHQWLI\WKHLURSSRUWXQLWLHs in the first 
place (Baron and Ensley, 2006) has not been fully explored.  Comparisons between 
entrepreneurs identifying commercial opportunities from existing firms and 
entrepreneurs identifying commercial opportunities from the HEI sector are also 
limited (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000).   
 
There has been increased interest in the role that HEIs play in the 
FRPPHUFLDOLVDWLRQ SURFHVV RI DFDGHPLFV¶ UHVHDUFK HVSHFLDOO\ ZLWKLQ WKH OLIH-science 
sector, in North America (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Shane 2004), Europe (Chiesa 
and Piccaluga, 2000; Franklin et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2004 a, b), Australia 
(Phillimore, 1999; Upstill and Symington, 2002; Galbreath, 2005) and the Nordic 
countries (Klöfsten and Jones-Evans, 2000; Löfsten and Lindelop, 2002; Rasmussen, 
2007).  The increasing interest in firm formation from academic research emanating 
from HEIs has been sparked for a number of reasons.  First, historically it has been 
viewed as a specific type of entrepreneurial activity (Samson and Gurdon, 1993; 
Jones-Evans et al., 1999).  Second, firm formation is recognised as a special case of 
technology transfer for the commercialisation of HEI research (Radosevich, 1995; 
Wright et al., 2004a).  Third, the presumed linearity of the commercialisation process 
has come under scrutiny (Tait and Williams, 1999; Bower, 2002; Forbes and Low, 
2004).  Fourth, the perceived important future role of HEIs in innovation and wealth 
creation is dictating more attention (Bray and Lee, 2000; Lambert, 2003) encouraged 
by policy-makers who have made the commercialisation of HEI knowledge an 
important governmental objective (Lockett et al., 2003a).  The specific institutional 
HEI context influencing the firm formation process has merited the greatest attention 
(Roberts and Malone, 1996; Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Lockett et al., 2003a, b).  Despite 
growing research interest (Zucker et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2002, 2003; Lockett and 
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Wright, 2005; Mosey and Wright, 2007), there is limited information surrounding 
µhow¶ commercial opportunities are identified in a traditional non-commercial 
environment compared to the volume of research covering commercial sectors.   
 
The entrepreneurial process encapsulates components associated with 
identification, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 
  (QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS IURP D VFKRODUO\ SHUVSHFWLYH ³VHHNV WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ
RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR EULQJ LQWR H[LVWHQFH ³IXWXUH´ JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV DUH GLVFRYHUHG
FUHDWHGDQGH[SORLWHGE\ZKRPDQGZLWKZKDWFRQVHTXHQFHV´9HQNataraman, 1997 
p120).  The discovery of a life science entrepreneurial opportunity may be dependent 
RQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SULRU NQRZOHGJH VLQFH LW LV OLNHO\ WR LQYROYH VSHFLDOLVW
LQIRUPDWLRQ HJ µVFLHQWLILF¶ DQG VRPH NLQG RI VWLPXOL WR LGHQWLI\ WKH YDOue of it 
(Shane, 2000).  This study explores whether lead academic and non-academic 
entrepreneurs possess the human and social capital to fulfil both these criteria (e.g. the 
specialist information required to identify the opportunity and the specialist 
information required to value their entrepreneurial opportunity).  In addition, the 
nature of the opportunity, the human capital characteristics and social capital bonding 
of the individuals involved in the entrepreneurial opportunity may also influence the 
future exploitation of the opportunity (Venkataraman, 1997).  The thesis uses an 
opportunity-based conceptualisation of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2000; Chandler et al., 
2000).  It centres on the development process of entrepreneurship for opportunity 
identification leading to firm formation, identifying the individuals involved and 
exploring the external environmental context in which it happens.  Comparing lead 
academic and non-academic entrepreneurs in the life-science sector allows for 
behavioural patternV WR HPHUJH FRQFHUQLQJ µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ WKH\ LGHQWLI\
opportunities.   
 
Entrepreneurs are being encouraged to accumulate and leverage skills and 
knowledge (DTI, 2004) to identify and exploit innovative opportunities which may be 
associated with wider societal contributions (Verhaeghe and Kfir, 2002).  
Governments are prompting academics to commercialize knowledge generated within 
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) (Scottish Enterprise, 1996; Lambert, 2003).  The 
importance of the transfer of knowledge from the HEI to the commercial sector is 
measured by increasing official attention (Delivering the Commercialisation of Public 
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Sector Science, HC 580) both from the perspective of government (Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), 2000; Department for Employment and Learning (DEL), 
2004; Scottish Executive, 2004) and HEIs (HECE, 2002b; Lambert, 2003).  The 
relationship is two way.  From one perspective, the commercial sector looks to 
academia as a source of scientific novelty, and for solutions to emerging technological 
challenges.  An alternative perspective views the academic institution as the source of 
potential economic activity fuelled by research efforts.  Recent industry / academic 
linkage has been concentrated in the fields of biotechnology and biomedicine 
(Faulkner et al., 1995; DTI, 2000; Wright et al., 2002, 2003).  The study of life-
science is of particular interest because it is expected to provide future industrial 
growth and make university/ industry linkage more visible (Forbes and Low, 2004) 
and, ultimately, improve life styles (Tait and Williams, 1999).   
 
Interaction between the HEI and the life-science based industrial sector is also 
valuable for economic development and wealth creation (Gibbons et al., 1999; 
Lambert, 2003).  HEIs are forging stronger links with industry and initiating spinout 
firm formations not only to foster the transfer of technology between HEI and industry 
(Martin et al., 1996; Salzar and Georghiou, 2002) but also to generate income for the 
HEI (Franklin et al., 2001; DiGregorio and Shane, 2003).  HEIs, prompted by 
government, are encouraging academic entrepreneurs to commercialise their 
university created knowledge (Breton and Lambert, 2003).  If policy-makers wish to 
continue to support the commercialisation of knowledge from HEIs, through the 
formation of firms, a comparison between the resource profiles of the entrepreneurs 
(Brush et al., 2001) may help answer research concerns questioning µKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶
lead entrepreneurs identify opportunities for commercialisation, DQG µKRZ¶ µZK\¶
µZKHQ¶DQGµZKHUH¶WKH\FRQGXFWWKHHQWUHSUHQHXULDOSURFHVV.  Emphasis is placed on 
recommendations for HEI policies and strategies that might enhance or inhibit 
technology transfer to spinout firms (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003; Locket et al., 2003; 
Clarysse and Moray, 2004).   
 
Previous empirical studies of the science-based sector have included large 
proportions of firms from the HEI sector (Radosevich, 1995; Carayannis et al., 1998; 
Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) many of which were shown to have better survival rates 
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than their industrial counterparts (Mustar, 1997; Shane, 2004).  The formation of HEI 
spinout firms, involving the direct commercialisation of HEI created knowledge 
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a), is, however, only one possible process fostering the 
transfer of technology between the HEI and industry (Etzkowitz, 2000; Salazar and 
Georghiou, 2002).  Other recognised routes to commercialisation include contract 
research, collaborative research, industrial consultation and licensing (Scottish 
Enterprise, 1996; Shane, 2002).   
 
In both consultancy (Siegel et al., 2001) and contract research the co-operation 
is between industry and the HEI as an institution.  For income generation, the 
dominant modes of commercial transfer are HEI independent spinout firms and 
licensing (Bray and Lee, 2000; Siegel et al., 2001; Lockett et al., 2003a).  If the HEI, 
or indeed the individual entrepreneur, is unable to appreciate the full value of 
technology transfer through a licensing agreement then the formation of a HEI spinout 
firm may be sought (Powers and McDougall, 2005).  On one hand, licensing is seen as 
less resource-intensive than spinning out new firms, both in terms of funding and 
people.  The advantage with licensing is that it uses existing business expertise to 
quickly get the knowledge to market (Oakey, et al., 1990; Lambert Review, 2003).  On 
the other hand, spinouts are a potential source of economic growth that can return 
significantly higher revenues to HEIs than licensing (Bray and Lee, 2000).  Whilst 
speculative financial and reputation returns are the outcome of spinout firms, the 
chances of failure are also increased, particularly with technologies in the life-science 
sector which have long incubation times and require large investment in R&D (Powers 
and McDougall, 2005).  Licensing, however, like consulting, reflects a relationship 
between the HEI and industry and does not necessarily involve a lead entrepreneur in a 
process of opportunity identification leading to firm formation. 
 
Extant research covering the HEI spinout firm formation process has explored 
WKH G\QDPLFV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ILUP IRUPDWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR SDUWLFXODU µSKDVHV¶ LQ WKH
identification and development of commercial opportunities (Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2001; Vohora et al., 2004).  The latter studies have generally emphasised a stage-
bound approach.  Gaps within the knowledge base relate to µKRZ¶ DQG µZK\¶ WKH
identification and development of opportunities for commercialisation occur (Mustar 
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et al., 2006).  For opportunity identification, the influence of resource profiles held or 
built by lead entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2001) and the impact of their profiles on the 
entrepreneurial process over time have also not been given due consideration (Jones 
and Coviello, 2005; Fletcher, 2006).  Understanding opportunity identification 
represents a central and vital research focus in entrepreneurship (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Gaglio and Katz, 2001).  The resource base required for firm 
formation from the perspective of the individual entrepreneur, specifically at the 
opportunity identification phase of the entrepreneurial process has not been fully 
explored (Venkataraman, 1997).  Any future enterprise development may also be 
determined by how effectively the entrepreneur deals with opportunity identification 
and evaluation choices made at the start of the entrepreneurial process (Ardichvili et 
al., 2003).   
 
Studies focusing upon the firm (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2001) and those 
focusing upon the contribution made by their parent organisation (Franklin et al., 
2001) have neglected the key potential roles played by lead entrepreneurs.  Many 
studies have neglected the role of the entrepreneurial human capital drivers linked to 
opportunity identification (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004).  Typologies for identifying 
and describing HEI spinouts are static and have solely focused on one specific 
moment in time.  They generally fail to consider the changing composition of actors 
involved in the entrepreneurial process DQG µKRZ¶ DQG µZKHUH¶ WKHse actors were 
sought over time (Radosevich, 1995; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a; Pirnay et al., 2003).  
This study will compare the human and social capital resource profiles of academic 
and non-academic entrepreneurs and their team members operating in the life-science 
sector.  Insights will be sought from the lead entrepreneurs with regard to µhow¶ they 
identify opportunities and accumulate resources for commercialisation.  Ideally the 
entrepreneurs heading firms will be involved in the direct commercialisation of HEI 
created knowledge (DeGroof, 2002; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003a) and show evidence 
of being members of staff (or part of a team) who are or were employees of the parent 
HEI organisation.  Non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are individuals 
associated with the life-science-based sector but who have no direct relationship with 
an HEI as an employee. 
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1.3 The Individual Lead Entrepreneur 
A growing body of literature supports a team approach rather than an 
individual approach to the entreprenHXUVKLS (QVOH\HW DOhoEDúDUDQD
However, although the entrepreneurial process may culminate in a team effort, there is 
URRPWRFRQVLGHUWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUWR³FODULI\WKHILUP¶VYLVLRQDQG
craft the dream and strategy foU WKH UHVWRI WKH WHDP WR IROORZ´ (QVOH\HW DO
p.60).  At its simplest, the lead entrepreneur may be the individual who heads a group 
or team of people who may be fellow entrepreneurs, equity holders or outside 
investors or business advisers.  Whether these people differ from the ones they lead in 
terms of entrepreneurial characteristics, drive, propensity to risk taking and visionary 
traits is open to debate (Ensley et al., 2000), but the fact remains that leadership is 
shown by a member of each team.  In this study the lead entrepreneur will be defined 
as the individual who was responsible for the identification of the commercial 
opportunity (this may include invention or discovery through research); who was 
involved in the identification of the market potential for the opportunity; who was 
involved in the evaluation and eventual exploitation of the opportunity through the 
formation and ownership of a firm; and who knew or recruited the other team 
members, whether equity holders or not.  The definition holds for both academic and 
non-academic lead entrepreneurs.   
 
The contributions from lead entrepreneurs, specifically in the opportunity 
identification phase of the entrepreneurial process, has also not been fully explored 
(Venkataraman, 1997).  During opportunity identification the lead entrepreneur must 
access resources to process the registration and identification of a potential 
commercial opportunity.  Further, the entrepreneur may have to rely on past 
experience (e.g. human capital) and call on a network of personnel (e.g. social capital) 
for technical and commercial assistance accessed from their immediate environment 
(Mosey and Wright, 2007).  Considering that the academic entrepreneur may enter the 
commercial arena with a set of human and social capital prerequisites better suited to 
academia than commerce, an investigation into what mechanisms they adopt to 
circumvent these limitations is pertinent.   
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The working definition of the lead academic entrepreneur will be an academic 
or researcher whose occupation, prior to playing a lead role in an enterprise start-up, 
and possibly concurrent with that process, was that of an academic, clinician or 
researcher, affiliated with an HEI (Samson and Gurdon, 1993).  Their proposed firm 
will be centred on a codified product, technology or service which originated at the 
parent organisation and was then transferred to the new (Rogers 1986; Carayannis et 
al., 1998; Smilor et al., 1990).  The non-academic entrepreneur is defined as a person 
who has previously been employed in the same industry sector and who uses their 
knowledge of that sector to identify opportunities.  If the lead entrepreneur of a new 
firm has worked in the same industry sector then the entrepreneur will have a current 
familiarity with the sector (Oakey, 1995; Aldrich, 1999).  The academic entrepreneur, 
on the other hand, may enter the business environment with a set of skills fostered 
from and for the requirements of an HEI.  The barriers they face are created because 
they are disadvantaged by not having the appropriate commercial human and social 
capital to leverage resources associated with business acumen.  Lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, may have had previous opportunities to build up 
knowledge, networks and skills culminating in potentially more diverse human and 
social capital than lead academic entrepreneurs.  However, limited research has been 
conducted looking at the relationship between human and social capital and the 
behaviour of entrepreneurs at the initial phase of the entrepreneurial process (i.e. at 
opportunity identification).  Human and social capital may, therefore, be viewed as an 
µLQSXW¶LQIOXHQFLQJWKHGHVLUHGEHKDYLRXUDOµRXWSXW¶RIRSSRUWXQLW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQ7KH
entrepreneur in this study is viewed in terms of their human capital profile (Brush et 
al., 2001), where the entrepreneur may be the key resource (or key restraint) to an 
emerging organisation (Castanias and Helfat, 1991).  Firm development and survival, 
for example, has been attributed to the human capital of entrepreneurs (Brüderl et al., 
1992; Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997).  Social capital may be reflected in ties to 
actors who are potential resource providers and these ties may be different for 
academic and non-academic entrepreneurs (Granovetter, 1973).  Lead entrepreneurs 
may not work in isolation.   
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1.4 The Entrepreneurial Ownership Team 
Research to date has been involved in exploring the potential effect of a team 
of people on new ventures (Ensley et al., 1999); the composition of team members 
(Roure and Madique, 1986; Lechler, 2001) and team formation, member entry and exit 
.DPPHWDO.DPPDQG1XULFNhoEDúDUDQHWDOD9DQHDOVWHWDO
hoEDúDUDQ et al., (2003a) highlighted a gap in the literature with regard to the 
entry and exit of members to new venture teams.  In the context of life-sciences, the 
firm formation process may involve individuals who appreciate the technical 
significance of the technology, individuals who appreciate the commercial value of the 
technology, individuals involved in raising capital, individuals searching for potential 
markets, individuals identifying and recruiting future team members to further skills 
levels within the team and individuals involved in administration as well as potential 
customers and suppliers etc.  The list is not definitive but offers an insight into 
probable tasks and needed resources.  The entrepreneur who wishes to form a firm will 
also need to deal with tasks such as identifying business opportunities as well as 
accessing human, physical, financial and organisational resources (Druilhe and 
Garnsey, 2001).  If the individual lead entrepreneur does not possess all these 
resources then the lead entrepreneur may choose a team start.  By choosing a team 
start the entrepreneur may increase access to resources (Forbes et al., 2006).   
 
Existing research implies that new member entry to an entrepreneurial team 
should increase team capacity.  Empirical research about entrepreneurial teams 
hoEDúDUDQHWDOa; Clarysse and Moray, 2004), however, fails to sheds light on 
the process and development of entrepreneurial team formation.  The identification of 
entrepreneurial team members is not readily discernable.  Generally, in past research, 
entrepreneurial teams have been recognised once they have been passed through 
formative stages (Gartner, 1985; Katz and Gartner, 1988) but this makes the 
identification of members difficult and a retrospective procedure.  This study follows 
nine lead entrepreneurs and maps the formation of their teams in real time from the 
identification a potential idea for commercialisation through to firm formation.  The 
focus on entrepreneurial team members will also fulfil a call from the literature to 
further investigate the building of entrepreneurial teams for the formation of firms 
with restricted knowledge, resources and skills (Ensley et al., 1999; Brush et al., 2001; 
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Shane and Stuart, 2002; Chandler et al., 2005).  Lead academic entrepreneurs may 
have superior access to technical resources but understand less about the resources 
connected with the commercialisation of the technology.  The choice to add or 
subtract a new member may be important because it alters the human capital status 
held by the original team and may open the door WRQHZUHTXLUHGUHVRXUFHV µ:K\¶
DQG µKRZ¶ DQG IURP µZKHUH¶ the addition is made and whether the original team 
instigated the recruitment is of importance because new membership may represent an 
identifiable event in team formation as could dismal and / or replacement (e.g. entry 
DQGH[LWRIPHPEHUVhoEDúDUDQHWDOThe composition of an entrepreneurial 
team is unlikely to remain static.  In certain circumstances, where human capital is 
lacking, the contact and knowledge brought by other entrepreneurial team members 
may be of particular importance given the reported lack of business acumen amongst 
high-technology founders (Roberts, 1991; Vanaelst et al., 2006).   
 
Within the entrepreneurial team literature the definition of team membership 
has been inconclusively debated (Cooper and Daily, 1997; Ensley, et al., 1999; 
hoEDúDUDQ HW DO  6WXGLHV IRFXVLQJRQ HQWUHSUHQHXULDO WHDPV JHQHUDOO\GHILQH
team members in terms of status at start-up, ownership and control (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Watson et al., 1995; Cooper and Daily, 1997).  Others have 
defined entrepreneurial ownership team members as those with an equity stake in the 
venture and who also have a key role in the strategic decision making of the venture at 
WKHWLPHRIIRXQGLQJhoEDúDUDQHWDOD&RRQH\.DPPHWDO
defined an entrepreneurial team according to the people who had responsibility for 
forming the firm and who also had a financial interest in the firm.  Gartner et al., 
(1994) broadened this definition to include members who had strategic influence in 
firm formation.  Ensley et al., (1990) added to this definition by including three other 
prerequisites.  In order to be a fully fledged entrepreneurial team member each 
member had to have jointly established the firm; have a financial interest and have a 
direct influence on strategic choice in the firm.  These definitions were considered too 
limiting for the research at hand because they did not take account of important non-
equity¶RXWVLGH¶RUQHWZRUNplayers.   
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(QVOH\HWDOUHYLHZHGWKHUROHµRXWVLGHUV¶SHUIRrmed and the profound 
LQIOXHQFH WKH\ KDG RQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI ILUPV  7KHVH ³RXWVLGHUV´ RU ³SULYLOHJHG
ZLWQHVVHV´ )UDQNOLQ HW DO  Vanaelst et al., 2006) included paid professionals, 
consultants, outside directors, surrogate entrepreneurs and business advisors who 
offered support systems and brought needed information and skills to the venture (e.g. 
they provided skills not available to the individual entrepreneur).  The human and 
social capital they brought to the firm included a network of contacts offering 
specialised support (e.g. advisors for giving business advice, funding financial 
expertise, and marketing connections).  This suggests that the team should form 
connections with those most able to reduce resource acquisition uncertainties but that 
these members need not necessarily be recruited as new equity holding members.  The 
definition adopted for this research acknowledges the importance and significance of 
equity holding and strategic decision making as prerequisites for membership but also 
explores the value of network members during the dynamic entrepreneurial process.   
 
Forbes et al., (2006) offered two explanations in the entrepreneurial team 
literature explaining the recruitment of team members.  One views recruitment as a 
rational process where consideration is given to economic benefits.  The other sees 
addition as being driven by interpersonal attraction intertwined in social networks.  In 
the rational process, the new members are recruited in response to a particular resource 
need.  Kamm and Nurick (1993) speculated that, through a decision-making process, 
existing team members sought new members on the basis of the perceived needs of the 
team (Table 1.1).  The decision-making model assumes that the team performs on 
DVVHVVPHQWRQ µSRVVHVVHG¶DQG µUHTXLUHG¶ UHVRXUFHVPDWFKLQJ WKHPDJDLQVW DNLQGRI
ideal inventory of resources.  The identification of needed resources is then followed 
E\DSURFHVVRIGHFLGLQJµZKHUH¶WRILQGµKRZ¶WRFKRRVHDQGµKRZ¶WRFRQYLQFHQHZ
members to participate.  However, the literature on HEI spinout firms indicates that 
the logic of this approach is not adhered to.  Often recruited team members displayed a 
similar human capital resource profile to that of the recruiting members (Clarysse and 
Moray, 2004).   
 
Clarysse and Moray (2004) noted homogeneity of technical resource profiles 
amongst engineering team members to guard against potential interpersonal conflict.  
7KHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQPHPEHUVZLWKWKHULJKWµFKHPLVWU\¶SOD\HGDSDUWLQQHZ 
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Table 1.1 Explanation for new member entry 
General explanation for new 
member addition 
Resource seeking 
1HZ PHPEHU LV DGGHG WR HQKDQFH WKH WHDP¶V SUHVHQW RU IXWXUH
inventory of resources 
Implied sequence of team actions Problematic search 
Team identifies a resource problem and then undertakes a search 
for a new member intended to solve problem 
Representative theoretical literature 
linked to new member addition 
entrepreneurial teams 
Kamm and Nurick (1993); Larson and Starr (1993) 
Representative empirical studies 
literature linked to new member 
addition entrepreneurial teams 
hoEDúDUDQ/RFNHWW:ULJKWDQG:HVWKHDG 
Adapted from Forbes et al., (2006, p232) 
 
PHPEHU LGHQWLILFDWLRQ DQG HQWU\  +DYLQJ WKH ULJKW µFKHPLVWU\¶ GLG QRW QHFHVVDULO\
mean having the right access to required resources.  Human capital resources were 
often duplicated.  Despite rational decisions to add members with human capital 
defined as necessary for venture success, searches were found to be affected by 
relationships, social networks and human capital profiles of individuals that made 
them similar to the existing members.  The initial indication is that their social capital 
access to alternative networks was limited (Anderson et al., 2007).  The nature and 
FRPSRVLWLRQ RI WKH µHQWUHSUHQHXULDO WHDP¶ did not always alter in response to the 
changing needs of the new firm (Clarysse and Moray, 200hoEDúDUDQ, et al., 2003a).  
The literature does not indicate µwhy¶ µhow¶ DQG DW ZKDW SKDVH RI GHYHORSPHQW LQ
firm formation lead entrepreneurs recruit entrepreneurial ownership team members to 
access, compensate and complement their own human capital endowment to assemble 
resourcesµ:hy¶ members exit, if their skills become redundant or inappropriate for a 
particular phase in the entrepreneurial process, has also not been given due attention.  
Exit from teams has been well documented from large established firms where under 
performing members have been replaced due to conflict (Ensley, et al., 2002) but not 
well documented for smaller firms or for firms in development.  This study will 
therefore explore the entry and exit of entrepreneurial ownership team members from 
a human capital perspective during the entrepreneurial process.   
 
1.5 The Entrepreneurial Process 
In this study, entrepreneurship will be defined DVWKH³VFKRODUO\H[DPLQDWLRQRI
how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services 
DUH GLVFRYHUHG HYDOXDWHG DQG H[SORLWHG´ 6KDQH DQG 9HQNDWDUDPDQ  S 
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The entrepreneurial process is one which involves all functions, activities and action 
associated with the identification of an opportunity and the creation of organisations 
thereafter to pursue it (Bruyat and Julien, 2001).  This study focuses on the internal 
human capital drivers influencing social capital leading to the accumulation of 
resources to make that process happen.  Links are explored between a lead 
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V KXPDQ FDSLWDO SURILOH DQG WKH DFFXPXODWLRQ RI UHVRXUFH µLQSXWV¶ E\
LQYHVWLJDWLQJ µZKHUH¶ DQG IURP µZKRP¶ WKHVH µLQSXWV¶ DUH VRXJKW ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH
RSSRUWXQLW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQµRXWSXW¶  Entrepreneurship is viewed as a dynamic process 
enacted by people and influenced to different degrees by their prior knowledge and 
experience within the context in which entrepreneurship is carried out (Gartner, 1989).  
The main body of the study is concerned with actions of lead academic and non-
academic entrepreneurs who respond to stimuli exposed during information search, or 
by alertness, imagination and innovation whilst they accumulate resources to 
commercialise an identified opportunity through the formation of a firm.   
 
Entrepreneurs have to combine different resources for opportunity 
identification either by exploiting their resource profiles and / or from their external 
environment in order to organise these resources into a firm (Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001).  The process involves the entrepreneur, as an individual or as part of a team, 
prior to and during firm formation.  It could be argued that the role of the lead 
entrepreneur is that of an architect (Makadok, 2001).  Schumpeter (1936) postulated 
WKDWHQWUHSUHQHXULDODELOLW\PD\EHGHILQHGDVWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VIXQFWLRQRIFRPELQLQJ
productive factors or resources.  As such, entrepreneurial µoutput¶ may be seen as the 
result of combining existing assets and skills to become new resources.  Examples of 
relationships between specific types of resources on entrepreneurial behaviour such as 
human capital (Bates, 1995; Cooper et al., 1994; Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Mosey 
and Wright, 2007), financial capital (Cooper et al., 1994) and social capital (Anderson 
and Jack, 2002; Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Mosey and Wright, 2007) have indicated 
WKDW WKH OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V KXPDQ FDSLWDO SURILOH FDQ VKDSH WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO
process.  Penrose (1972) clearly demarcated entrepreneurial ability, which links to 
human capital, from other physical and organisational resources of the firm.  Penrose 
(1972) defined entrepreneurial ability as the capacity to identify and bring to fruition 
new combinations of existing resource bundles or to develop new resource 
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configurations.  The starting block in this essential Resource Based View (RBV) of a 
firm is opportunity identification. 
 
1.5.1 Opportunity Identification 
Bruyat and Julien (2001) consider that the opportunity identification process 
should be thought of as a process which occurs over time, rather than a single moment 
of inspiration.  Opportunity identification is the result of a mixture of personal, social, 
cultural and technological forces which merge together and lead to the perception of a 
possible market opportunity.  The idea is then evaluated and refined.  This process of 
elaboration is considered to be central to the process which involves searching and 
previewing mechanisms prior to and during translating the idea into a reality within a 
contextual setting (Bruyat and Julien, 2001).  If the idea is viable it is then launched.  
There is an acknowledged process of iteration during opportunity identification.  In the 
early phase especially, there is a reliance on the human capital resources available to 
the individual through experience, knowledge and training (Galglio, 1997).  The 
opportunities are identified through a creative process by combining individual 
experience, networking for further experience, subjective understanding and current 
information.  Human capital and social capital, reflected in these traits, can facilitate 
access to information, or people who hold that information.  However, access to 
information by itself does not guarantee utilisation of information towards the 
development of an opportunity.   
 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) stated that the connection between 
information and the exploitation of information must be accompanied by an 
understanding of a new means-ends relationship.  Prior business experience may, for 
example, allow for an increased state of alertness to opportunities.  The facilitation of 
ideas may be prompted by prior experience based insights which may direct the 
LQGLYLGXDO HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ H[SHFWDWLRQV DQG LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI PDUNHW VWLPXOL *DJOLR
1997).  Sarasvathy et al., (2003) offer a market outlook on opportunities by defining 
them according to uncertainties.  They are labelled as opportunity recognition, 
opportunity discovery and opportunity creation in which the market status of supply 
and demand play a part of the identification process (Table 1.2).  In the life science 
sector it is anticipated that the former two interpretations of opportunity are more 
relevant.  The entrepreneurs in this study were either dealing with potential products 
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for which there was a known market (e.g. opportunity recognition) or were feeding a 
demand for which there was no present supply (e.g. opportunity discovery).  In 
addition, because there is time and resource costs involved with search and 
identification processes, entrepreneurs with more resources are presumed to be 
involved in more detailed search processes.  Accordingly, opportunities may be seen 
as solutions to specific problems expressed in terms of dissatisfaction with the 
performance of present activities (e.g. a reactive search) which might reflect a 
situation when resources are not abundant, whilst other opportunities are recognised 
when there are sufficient resources around for the search and discovery to be made 
(e.g. proactive search) (Chandler et al., 2002).  Access to resources and networks for 
opportunity identification is not only restricted to people but may be influenced by the 
external environmental context.  
 
Table 1.2 Typology of entrepreneurial opportunities 
1. Opportunity Recognition 
If both sources of supply and demand exist rather obviously, the opportunity for bringing them together 
KDVWREH³UHFRJQLVHG´DQGWKHQWKHPDWFK-up between supply and demand has to be implemented either 
through an existing firm or new firm.  This notion of opportunity has to do with the exploitation of 
existing markets e.g. arbitrage and franchises. 
2. Opportunity Discovery 
If only one side exists ± i.e., demand exists, but supply does not, and vice versa then, the non-existent 
VLGHKDVWREH³GLVFRYHUHG´EHIRUHWKHPDWFK-up can be implemented.  This notion of opportunity has to 
do with the exploration of existing and latent markets e.g. cures for diseases (Demand exists; supply has 
yet to be discovered); and applications for new technologies such as the personal computer (Supply 
exists, demand has to be discovered). 
3. Opportunity Creation 
,IQHLWKHUVXSSO\QRUGHPDQGH[LVWLQDQREYLRXVPDQQHURQHRUERWKKDYHWREH³FUHDWHG´DQGVHYHUDO
economic inventions in marketing, financing, etc. have to be made, for the opportunity to come into 
existence.  This notion of opportunity has to do with the creation of new markets e.g. Federal Express, 
Face-book. 
Adapted from Sarasvathy et al., 2003, p 145. 
 
1.6 Location and the External Environment  
Resource leverage may be internally constructed, from the human capital 
reserves of the lead entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial ownership team, and influenced 
as a result of adaptation to the external environment.  A recent body of research has 
focused upon firm formation and the relationship between environmental conditions 
DQGWKHQDWXUHRIHQWUHSUHQHXULDODFWLYLW\hoEDúDUDQHWDO8VLQJWKH5%9DVD
theoretical framework, several investigations of the creation of HEI spin-off firms 
have given credence to the relationship between exogenous conditions and 
endogenous, or internal, features as being important for firm formation (Druilhe and 
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Garnsey, 2001; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Vohora et al., 2004; Lockett and Wright, 
2005; Powers and McDougall, 2005).  However, what these studies have failed to 
explore are the benefits entrepreneurs gain from different types of external 
environment or if, indeed, the lead entrepreneur changes location to access resources 
during the entrepreneurial process.  This study addresses this gap by exploring the 
differences in access to resources in two types of external environment (e.g. sponsored 
and non-sponsored environments) and maps changes of environment.   
 
A sponsored environment may provide the entrepreneur access to tangible 
resources such as laboratory facilities and equipment (Steffenson et al., 2000) as well 
as intangible resources such as access to human capital pertaining to scientific and 
business knowledge (Rappert and Webster, 1997; 1998) and social networks 
pertaining to actors and organisations providing resources (Hoang and Antoncic, 
2003).  An example of external actors with relevant human capital may comprise of 
Technology Transfer Officers (TTOs) (Jones-Evans, et al., 1999; Carlsson, 2002) 
employed by HEIs to promote the commercialisation process or the potential 
H[SORLWDWLRQRIµVXUURJDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶)UDQNOLQHWDOZKRFDQSURYLGHOHDG
academic entrepreneurs, deficient in experience and knowledge, with information 
about commercialisation relating to their past entrepreneurial experiences.  The 
environment is seen as a pool of resources in which the firm enters a transactional 
relationship.   
 
Policy-makers and practitioners are aware that some entrepreneurs need to deal 
with resource barriers and certain types of entrepreneurs may find difficulties gaining 
access to sufficient resources to pursue a business opportunity.  The British 
government (and Scottish Executive) directly (and indirectly) seeks to provide 
resources (i.e., information, advice, training, finance, premises, etc.) to increase the 
flow of entrepreneurs, particularly knowledge and technology-based entrepreneurs 
(Westhead and Batstone, 1999; Anon, 2004).  For example, property-based Science 
Park initiatives adjacent to HEIs and HEI incubator units (Lockett et al., 2003a; 
Clarysse et al., 2005) are forms of sponsored environment (Flynn, 1993) which can be 
selected by entrepreneurs to reduce risk, uncertainty and resource issues faced by 
inexperienced entrepreneurs with limited specific human capital.  Sponsored 
environments can provide inexperienced and experienced entrepreneurs with broader 
 17 
pools of technical, managerial, financial and network resources and they increase the 
legitimacy of the lead entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial team (Mustar, 1997).  The 
latter resources, however, may not be required by entrepreneurs who can lever 
resources and knowledge from an industry rather than a HEI context.  In this study, a 
sponsored environment is specifically defined as one which will foster the creation 
and growth of life-science firms and promote formal and operational links between 
firms and HEIs (Siegel et al., 2003).   
 
1.7 Development of Research Questions 
Building on the previous sections reviewing the lead entrepreneur, team 
members, the entrepreneurial process and the external environment, the following 
section develops research questions associated with each theme (e.g. the individuals 
involved and the influence of human capital on opportunity identification; team 
membership and the role of social capital; and access to resources through location 
choices in the external environment).   
 
The initial human capital resource pool embedded in the lead entrepreneur(s) 
(Miller and Shamsie, 1996) may shape the opportunity identified.  Resources such as 
education, reputation, experience, knowledge of industry and network contacts exist 
within the entrepreneur prior to the creation of a new venture (Brush et al., 2001).  
Entrepreneurs with greater human capital exposure may identify more opportunities 
whilst the µinnovativeness¶ may VXJJHVWDµTXDOLW\¶RSSRUWXQLW\6KDQH.  What 
is unclear from the literature is what W\SH RI KXPDQ FDSLWDO LQIOXHQFHV µTXDOLW\¶ DQG
does it reflect in the technical or the commercial opportunity?  Some lead academic 
entrepreneurs may face barriers at the opportunity identification phase because they 
have insufficient specific commercial human capital resources to leverage.  Lead 
industry entrepreneurs, on the other hand, may have had previous opportunities to 
build up knowledge, networks and skills culminating in potentially more diverse 
human capital than lead academic entrepreneurs.  The former may start the 
opportunity identification process with smaller and narrower initial resource bases 
(Brush et al., 2001).  As previously stated, the inability to acquire appropriate 
resources may shape choices made relating to later evaluation and exploitation of 
opportunities (Vohora et al., 2004).  Djokovic and Souitaris (2006) proposed that there 
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is scope for focusing on the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis because it allows for a 
linkage between the firm formation phenomenon with entrepreneurship theory on 
opportunity identification (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Ardichvili et al., 2003).  
These observations lead to the following research question: 
 
Research Question 1: µ+RZ¶ GLIIHUHQW DUH lead academic and lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs¶ initial resource profiles? 
 
Failing to access the required resources, lead entrepreneurs may turn to others 
who possess experience and skills better suited to commercialisation.  Entrepreneurs 
that perceive resource gaps may recruit team members to compensate for their own 
human capital deficiencies.  However, little research has centred on the entrepreneur 
as the unit of analysis, and µZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶WKH\UHFUXLWDQ entrepreneurial team with 
reference to opportunity identification (Westhead et al., 2005).  Evidence suggests that 
HEI spinout firms are much more likely to be team based (Birley, 2002; Vanealst et 
al., 2006).  Further, teams are significantly more likely to achieve success than 
individual entrepreneurs (hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2003a).  The network contacts and 
complementary skill sets brought by team members, students, academics and surrogate 
entrepreneurs to develop technologies may be particularly important in the 
technological sector given the lack of business acumen of certain entrepreneurs.  To 
address resource deficiencies, lead academic entrepreneurs may recruit additional 
entrepreneurial ownership team members who have the requisite human capital 
profiles with regard to technical, managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities, business 
ownership experience, product / process and market knowledge, legitimacy and 
contacts (hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2003a).  Motivationally, having an equity stake in the new 
venture may incentivise members to identify, pursue and exploit opportunities.  The 
human capital of each entrepreneurial ownership team member may, therefore, be 
leveraged to address issues relating to the opportunity identification process.  These 
observations and insights lead to the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 2 µ:K\¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
Research Question 3 µ+RZ¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
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Research Question 4 µWhere¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
An opportunity involves the identification of a new idea, which others have 
failed to recognize, or have chosen not to pursue for the creation of economic value 
(Sarasvathy et al., 2004).   7KHHQWUHSUHQHXULDORSSRUWXQLW\³FRQVLVWVRIDVHWRILGHDV
beliefs and action that enable the creation of future goods and services in (the presence 
of or) WKHDEVHQFHRIFXUUHQWPDUNHWVIRUWKHP´6DUDVYDWK\HWDOS In this 
study, the opportunity identification process relates to the identification of the product 
and the identification of the potential market.  This leads to the following research 
questions: 
 
Research Question 5 µ+RZ¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities for creating a firm? 
 
Research Question 6 µ:KDW¶ W\SHV RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-
academic entrepreneurs identify?  
 
Past studies, and those focusing on traditional firm performance outcomes, 
neglect the entrepreneurial human capital drivers that are linked to the opportunity 
identification that creates venture wealth (Busenitz et al., 2003).  To help answer 
µKRZ¶ GLIIHUHQW HQWUHSUHQHXUV LGHQWLI\ RSSRUWXQLWLHV human capital theory, 
traditionally associated with productivity, is extended to explore tacit resources held 
by the individual entrepreneur (Becker, 1993a, b).  The opportunity identification 
phase of the entrepreneurial process has been under researched from an empirical 
perspective even though it is recognised as one of the principal questions in the 
domain of entrepreneurship (Gaglio and Katz, 2001).  The ability of the entrepreneur 
to identify opportunities, seek resources and combine resources may be embedded in 
human capital, accumulated over a period of time through general and specific 
experiences (Brush et al., 2001).  Recent studies have enhanced our understanding of 
the links between aspects of human capital and opportunity identification (Davidsson 
and Honig, 2003; Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005), but they have generally focused on 
a narrow array of human capital variables (e.g. upon the responses from students or 
nascent entrepreneurs rather than practicing entrepreneurs).  Many of the latter studies 
KDYH IDLOHG WR H[SORUH WKH µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ TXHVWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR RSSRUWXQLW\
identification.  Some studies simply ask respondents if they think they will recognize 
opportunities in the future (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  Consequently, there is a 
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GHDUWK RI HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH UHODWLQJ WR WKH OLQNV EHWZHHQ SUDFWLFLQJ HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
human capital profiles and the actual opportunity identification process.  In this study, 
existing literature is extended by suggesting that the way in which human capital is 
acquired may be linked to the context in which and where an opportunity is identified.   
 
Human capital, as an intangible resource giving rise to the ability to lever 
resources in the process of opportunity identification, has been given insufficient 
attention relative to tangible resources.  The developing literature using the RBV of 
the firm indicates that there is a link between intangible resources and sustained 
competitive advantage (Hall, 1993).  However, people centred, competence based, 
intangible resources are difficult to observe and describe.  They may be differentiated 
from firm assets because they are not necessarily owned by the firm and they are not 
easily transferred (Chandler et al., 2005).  This is particularly important in the case of 
a life-science firm.  Human capital related to a specialised education about a certain 
technology may generate a tacit resource profile which is not possible to express 
explicitly.  A distinction is, therefore, PDGH EHWZHHQ DQ HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V JHQHUDO DQG
entrepreneurship-specific human capital profile in regard to its influence on 
opportunity identification and exploitation (Becker, 1993a, b).  If there exists an 
opportunity for productive economic activity, then individuals with quality human 
capital should be better at perceiving and organising the opportunity.  It is thus the 
human capital embedded in the individual entrepreneur which is the important 
resource (Hall, 1993).  The challenge, at first, is how entrepreneurs, not the firm, 
construct a resource base.  It is the quality and diversity of human capital in terms of 
experience and know-how which may influence the identification of a commercial 
opportunity.  This discussion leads to the following research question: 
 
Research Question 7: To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation 
activities related to the actual and perceived human capital characteristics of the 
lead entrepreneur / entrepreneurial team? 
 
Social capital, as another intangible resource, which may be influenced by 
human capital (or vice-versa) has also been identified as a component which gives rise 
to the leverage of other resources (Bozeman and Mangematin, 2004).  Social networks 
lead entrepreneurs, lacking in resources, to recruit other entrepreneurial ownership team 
members, source potential investors culminating in the establishment of a firm and the 
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creation of a reputation.  How social networks are established and developed by lead 
entrepreneurs is less understood within the HEI context than the commercial context 
(Mosey and Wright, 2007).  Past literature indicates that the establishment and 
development of social capital is challenging within the HEI environment, especially if 
the entrepreneurs stay within the HEI environment (Mustar et al., 2006; Nicolaou and 
Birley, 2003).  Vohora et al., (2004) recognise that academic entrepreneurs are 
confronted by barriers to transition from scientific to commercial networks because 
they need to seek and develop a broader legitimacy within commercial networks 
through accessing social capital (Delmar and Shane, 2004).  As already stated, 
academics tend to have weak ties with actors located outside of their immediate 
department (Granovetter, 1973).  These initial observations lead to the following 
research question: 
 
Research Question 8: To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation 
activities related to the actual and perceived social capital characteristics of the lead 
entrepreneur / entrepreneurial team? 
 
A factor which may influence both human and social capital and access to both 
is the external environment.  External environmental conditions can shape the creation 
and discovery of opportunities, as well as access to resources required to pursue and 
exploit opportunities.  Two external environmental alternatives are explored e.g. the 
sponsored and the non-sponsored external environment.  To circumvent attitudinal, 
resource and operational obstacles to the creation of new life-science-based ventures, 
stakeholders in the wealth creation process may provide sponsored environments 
(Westhead and Batstone, 1999).  Sponsored environments can provide an institutional 
context that increases the legitimacy of inexperienced entrepreneurs who are seeking 
to reduce the liabilities of newness and smallness (Delmar and Shane, 2004).  
Sponsorship, by definition, involves planned environmental control by different 
government bodies and agencies to assist the creation and survival of new firms.  In 
this study, sponsored environments are specifically identified as providing access to 
critical human, social and physical capital (Siegel et al., 2003a, b).  Resource deficient 
entrepreneurs may choose more resource munificent external environments to benefit 
from resources offered in that environment (Mustar, 1997; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978).  
Sponsored environments can reduce uncertainty for inexperienced entrepreneurs, 
support flows of resources to entrepreneurs, and encourage entrepreneurs to make 
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network bridges with a broad spectrum of actors (Mosey et al., 2006) who can provide 
skills, capabilities and knowledge required to address barriers and critical incidents 
(Vohora et al., 2004) relating to the opportunity identification process.  A novel 
contribution of this study is an analysis of the human capital profiles and behaviour of 
lead entrepreneurs who have selected sponsored and / or non-sponsored environments.  
Relating to the external environment as a pool of influence and tangible and intangible 
resources, the final research question is: 
 
Research Question 9 µ+RZ¶ GRHV WKH H[WHUQDO HQYLURQPHQW LPSDFW RQ WKH
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V / HQWUHSUHQHXULDORZQHUVKLSWHDP¶VDFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHV?   
 
1.8 The Life-Science Sector in Scotland 
The definition of life-sciences in this study encompasses all researchers and / 
or firms in the field of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, biomedical technologies, 
medical devices, food processing, environmental and biomedical devices (Smith, 
2004).  Life-science firms are attracting attention because they are becoming 
increasingly important for industrial employment in many countries (Storey and 
Tether, 1998).  New technology-based firms (NTBFs), which include the life-sciences, 
in Europe have been found to constitute only a small proportion of new firms, but 
have displayed a significantly higher survival rate and show a capacity to grow faster 
than the average firm (Storey and Tether, 1998).  As stated already, founders are 
typically highly educated and have long work experience within the life-science 
sector.  Recent studies have also shown that a proportion of these firms are created 
from the HEI sector.  Two out of five high technology firms started in France were set 
up by HEI researchers (Mustar, 1997) whilst four percent of high technology and 
medium technology firms in Flanders were also research based start-ups (Heirman and 
Clarysse, 2004).  In the context of this study, entrepreneurs leading life-science firms 
within one European country, Scotland, and governed by a one policy initiative are 
LQWHUYLHZHG WRH[SORUHµKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶ WKH\ LGHQWLI\RSSRUWXQLWLHV WRH[SORLWZLWKLQ
the life-science sector.  Justification for the choice of the life-science sector and 
country follows outlining forces shaping the sector at the time of the fieldwork.   
 
The life-science-based sector in Scotland was given official attention after the 
SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH ³1HWZRUN 6WUDWHJ\´ 6FRWWLVK (QWHUSULVH ; 1996) when high 
technology, and in particular biotechnology, was earmarked for potential economic 
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growth based on a substantial reputation for existing quality scientific, technological 
and medical research and education within the HEI sector.  Promoting innovation with 
entrepreneurship is a recognised benefit to the economy and employment policy 
(OECD, 2001; 2002).  The supply of the technology, technological skills and 
knowledge is affirmed by the proven quality of 6FRWODQG¶Vbasic research base.  This is 
a recognised critical factor in the commercialisation of basic research (Audrecht, 2001; 
OECD, 2002; Zucker et al., 2002; Scottish Executive 2002b).  Historically, Scotland 
has experienced several prominent, potentially successful large scale projects which 
have ended in commercial failure.  These included the cloning technology made 
famous by Dolly the sheep and the development of pharmaceutical agents for treating 
cystic fibrosis.  Although Scotland is renowned internationally for the quality of 
scientific education and research and has dedicated centres of research excellence, as 
well as a number of growing life-science companies, there is not, as yet, a sufficient 
range of investors and supporting services and networking between companies and 
researchers for it to be considered a fully functioning cluster (DTI, 1999a).  There are, 
for example, fewer larger companies, restricting access to expertise.  Whilst 
recognising a proven research base, specific barriers, market and systemic failures 
have been identified which impede the commercialisation of basic research.  Scottish 
political and economic development policy recognises that the rate of exploitation of 
research in the market place is not being fully utilized.  Reducing barriers to 
entrepreneurship and enabling the creation and growth of life-science firms is under 
scrutiny.   
 
1.8.1 Barriers to Entrepreneurship in the Life-Science Sector 
The degree of entrepreneurial culture is expressed as being less in Scotland 
compared to the UK.  GEM (2005) and MORI / Scottish Enterprise (1999) survey 
findings suggest that Scotland lags behind the UK in terms of positive attitudes to 
entrepreneurship.  Historically, the gap in appreciation for entrepreneurial activity has 
been dominant and may, therefore, have an influence on the uptake of entrepreneurial 
activities in general.  In addition to cultural differences, specific identified market and 
systemic failures to entrepreneurship within the life-science sector in Scotland are 
framed around ongoing concerns.  A lack of access to technological / market 
opportunities relevant to the exploitation of basic research for economic productivity 
gains is exaggerated because of the immaturity of the support structure.  There is 
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uncertainty and risk-averse behaviour leading to sub-optimal activity in corporate 
venturing, entrepreneurship and investment (Graham, 2002).  A recognised deficiency 
in managerial and commercial expertise and a lack of combined forces involving both 
managers and technologists with a mixture of science and business knowledge also 
acts as a barrier (Forbes and Low, 2004).  This translates as a lack of a specific type of 
human capital to secure patent rights (Bower, 2002) or to oversee regulatory 
procedures and develop social networks with partners to obtain the financial resources 
to support technology development (Baum, 2004).  The incentive structure of the HEI 
system does not reward firm formation and the lack of knowledge transfer success has 
lead to a negative perception of entrepreneurs from the investment sector (Higher 
Education Review, 2004).  The life-science sector has also been hindered by a lack of 
concerted and consistent co-operation and collaboration between industry and 
academia (and vice-versa).   
 
Additional barriers may prove to have a negative impact for both lead 
academic and non-academic entrepreneurs due to the uncertainties about future 
prospects within the life-science market (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  The 
conceptualisation of a technological discovery and how it can be applied to the market 
place may prove problematic.  In the life-science market place there are some 
inventions and basic technologies developed for which no market has been defined (or 
indeed some markets for which no technology has been developed) (Ardichvili et al., 
2003).  New technology and new markets are unpredictable.  Emerging markets may 
change, incompatible technological products compete for market acceptance and 
technical hurdles routinely derail projects (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992).  
(QWUHSUHQHXUV¶ LQH[SHULHQFH LQ PDQDJLQJ ORQJ H[SORUDWRU\ GHYHORSPHQW SKDVHV also 
increases risks.  Kakati (2003), on interviewing venture capitalists financing high-tech 
firms, found that the development of a new technology was not in itself a guarantee 
for commercial success.  Investors have been traditionally very sceptical about new 
start-ups led by academic entrepreneurs and only participate when they feel there is a 
fully functioning balanced (business/technical) professional team in situ (Roure and 
Keeley, 1990; Cyr et al., 2000).  Lead entrepreneurs with academic or research 
backgrounds have also found it difficult persuading financiers that they possess 
managerial competencies to run a business (Storey and Tether, 1998).  Mason and 
Harrison (2002), however, offered an opposing view of available finance for start-up 
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and argued that the problem is not a supply side issue (i.e. from business angels) but 
one based on poor quality in the form of proposals, business plans and negotiating 
skills on the part of the academic entrepreneurs.  On this specific point, it has also 
been recognised that the evaluation of life-science firms by investors is inherently 
difficult and so it has been suggested that investors cannot evaluate such firms in 
traditional ways (Audretsch, 2001).  The alternative offered is to evaluate the human 
capital embedded in the entrepreneurial ownership team which are overviewed in the 
next section.  This is justification for studying human capital as a resource and team 
membership as a possible access to needed resources.  From a social capital 
perspective, Shane and Stuart (2002) speculated that new ventures with founding 
teams that had pre-established network relationships with venture investors would be 
more likely to acquire external funding because their relationship was based on trust, 
prior knowledge of each other and feelings of obligation.   
 
1.8.2 Life-Science Provisions 
Notwithstanding, commercialisation activities in the UK HEI sector have 
increased over the last five years (Carlsen, 2000; Lambert Review, 2003; Scottish 
Executive, 2004).  This can be measured by the growth in the number of Technology 
Transfer Offices opening in UK universities, including HEIs in Scotland, especially 
during the late 1990s (UNICO, 2002; 2003).  The need for better technology transfer 
has been recognised by a number of industry sectors.  A report on the UK 
biotechnology sector concluded that UK universities need to do more to promote best 
practice in technology transfer (Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research 
Council (BBSRC), 2004/2005).  There is, for instance, a strong reliance on academia 
for the promotion and stimulation of new knowledge for the life-science sector.   
 
In Scotland, however, there exists an imbalance between the strength in the 
VL]H DQG SHUIRUPDQFH RI 6FRWODQG¶V SXEOLF UHVHDUFK EDVH DQG UHODWLYH ZHakness in 
terms of the number and size of companies with significant technological capability.  
Public sector interventions aim to increase the probability of promising companies 
being created.  A deliberate targeted investment programme was launched in 1999 to 
expand and strengthen the life-science-based sector in Scotland to encourage the 
development of a life-science community with greater competitive advantage both 
nationally and internationally (Forbes and Low, 2004).  The sector also benefited from 
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the support of the governmental business development body, Scottish Enterprise and 
especially a group, Biotech Scotland, supported by its regional partners (Scottish 
Enterprise, 2003).  Promotion of businesses has been significantly enhanced in recent 
years, and a wide range of support measures are now in place in terms of 
accommodation for firms, training, business advice and investment opportunities.  
Policies include the Scottish Co-investment Fund, a programme of co-investment in a 
range of new and existing private sector led equity funds; and the Business Growth 
Fund, a debt and equity vehicle for investment in new and early stage growth 
businesses.  Grants are being provided through the SMART and SPUR programmes 
supporting small to medium sized firms (SMEs) to develop new, highly innovative 
and commercially viable products or processes.  The Proof of Concept Fund aims to 
address a gap in the commercialisation market between scientific discovery and 
prototype or proof of concept stage and is targeted at HEIs.   
 
The Royal Society of Edinburgh fellowship scheme offers training for post-
doctoral students to give them an opportunity to decide whether to continue in 
academia or to pursue a commercialisation route.  Co-operation between Scottish 
firms and the science base is also promoted through the Scottish Executive, Expertise, 
Knowledge and Innovation Transfer Programme (SEEKIT) and SCORE programmes, 
which encourages knowledge transfer between the Scottish public sector science base 
and Scottish SMEs.  The Scottish Funding Council's Knowledge Transfer Grant 
(KTG) was introduced in 2002.  KTG funds a wide variety of knowledge transfer 
activity.  Three market-based Intermediary Technology Institutes, one specifically for 
life-sciences, were set up in Scotland in 2004 with the aim of identifying future 
emerging markets and developing the technology required to exploit these 
commercially.  Overall, public sector funding for R&D and product/process 
development increased from £5.3m in 2000-2001 to £11.8m in 2004-2005.   
 
Selecting lead entrepreneurs from a one country perspective, all governed by 
the same policy initiative, highlights the forces shaping the sector at the time of the 
fieldwork and lends itself to potential theoretical development.  The proportion of lead 
academic to non-academic entrepreneurs within the sector, in Scotland, at the time of 
the study, was unknown but an email survey identified differences between lead 
entrepreneurs in the life-science sector.   
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Accommodation for firms in the form of supported environments (e.g. HEI 
incubator units and science parks / technology parks) has drawn attention due, in part, 
to the growth in the numbers of high technology firms around Stanford University and 
MIT in Boston which provided the model for science parks in the UK (Saxenian, 
1985).  Importing and establishing a similar philosophy to the development of life-
science cluster formation in the UK has resulted in the establishment of Oxford and 
Cambridge as centres of excellence and fully functioning clusters encapsulating the 
critical factors leading to recognition (e.g. an exploitation of an established research 
base; the prospect and infrastructure to support company development; access to large 
mature companies and a skilled work force) (DTI 1999a,b,c; Cooke, 2001; Ernst and 
Young, 2004).  Advancement of similar clusters in Scotland has been slower to 
materialise despite governmental initiatives.  Cluster development in Scotland, 
between Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee, the latter being cited as the most active 
centre of its kind outside Oxford and Cambridge, is still considered to be at earlier 
stages than Cambridge (UK).   
 
Mature life-science companies are mainly located in clusters around 
Cambridge and Oxford, London and the South East.  The bulk of UK business 
expenditure in Research and Development (R&D) is also undertaken in those areas of 
(QJODQG¶V6RXWK(DVWDQG(DVW,QWKRVHWZRparts of the country R&D 
expenditure per employee in 2000 was over £1,000 whereas in Scotland it was £246 
for the same period and £592 for the UK (Scottish Executive, 2000a).  United 
Kingdom R&D expenditure in pharmaceuticals, for example, is £2.7 billion whereas 
Scottish R&D spending is £114 million, 4.3% of the UK total.  The sector employs 
5,000 people in Scotland and spends £22,500 per employee on R&D whilst in the UK 
£43,500 is spent per employee.  These figures indicate the life-science sector in the 
institutional context of Scotland as being associated with not only low expenditure on 
R&D but also a sector in a state of transition.  Reasons for late adoption in Scotland 
may be attributed to factors specific to the life-science sector and to wider external 
environmental factors.   
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter Two begins with a review of the theoretical perspectives guiding this 
study.  A literature review follows examining the entrepreneur, entrepreneurial 
 28 
ownership team formation (the individuals), the context in which they behave 
entrepreneurially (the external environment) and their affect on opportunity 
identification (the dynamic entrepreneurial process).  The themes explored in the 
conceptual framework touch on the individuals involved (i.e. the lead entrepreneurs 
and their team members).  As they amass resources, the RBV of the firm helps to 
understand and explore the resource requirements for firm formation and a critical 
junctures model (Vohora et al., 2001) exploited to identify phases in the 
entrepreneurial process.  Finally, drivers influencing firm formation in the external 
environment are explored.  Drivers may originate from the resources held within the 
external environment.  The literature review provides the basis from which the 
research questions are developed.   
 
In Chapter Three a theoretical route map is introduced.  Human capital theory 
and the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm are expanded to include 
entrepreneurship prior to and during the process of firm formation.  Whilst the RBV of 
the firm helps identify resources internal to the organisation resources are also sourced 
from the eternal environment.  Social capital theory is explored for its role in resources 
accumulation.  A conceptual framework is created and major themes identified. 
 
Methodological issues are discussed in Chapter Four.  The phenomenological 
paradigm is justified and qualitative (or interpretive) methodology guided data 
collection and analysis.  Underpinning methodological choices were the nature of 
µZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶research questions (Gephart, 2004).  Initially an exploratory survey 
was conducted to identify life-science firms and to distinguish the difference between 
academic and non-academic entrepreneurs.  A novel typology was created 
distinguishing lead academic to non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-
sponsored environments.  Information was collected thereafter from a theoretical 
sample of entrepreneurs within the typology over a period of time.  Novel themes 
arising from the data were associated with changes in team membership, changes in 
location and changes in access to resource requirement and leverage over time.  Team 
membership was monitored over the research period and the entry and exit of 
members mapped.  The movement of firms between sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments was also monitored over the same time.  Explanation is offered for the 
choice of a multiple case-study approach.  Data was collected from in-depth follow up 
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interviews with multiple respondents relating to each lead entrepreneur and their 
influence on access to accumulation and leverage of resources recorded.  The 
transcription process and the subsequent coding of data to search for additional 
themes, patterns, similarities and differences, was aided by a computer software 
package (i.e. NVivo) which stored the data and allowed for cross referencing.   
 
In Chapter Five, entrepreneurs (Theme 1), and team members (Theme 2), on 
sponsored and non-sponsored environments are compared.  Triangulated respondent 
data highlighted human capital characteristics which influenced opportunity 
identification.  Social networks were exposed giving access to governance and 
relationships (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003).  Chapter Six explores the opportunity 
identification process (Theme 3) during Information Search leading to Opportunity 
Identification (e.g. discovery); Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management 
(e.g. evaluation) and Firm Creation (e.g. exploitation) (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  
In Chapter Seven the choice and influence of the external environment (Theme 4) on 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶DELOLW\WROHYHUUHVRXUFHVLVVXEMHFWWRVFUXWLQ\There was a consistent 
movement between different sponsored environments by academic entrepreneurs and 
a move from non-sponsored environments to sponsored environments by non-
academic entrepreneurs.  In each chapter propositions are derived from the data and 
material extracted to build on theory. 
 
Chapter Eight offers a summary of the key findings and an assessment of the 
research data whilst suggestions and recommendations are made for future academic 
research and implications for policy-makers.  The movement of firms between 
different environments revealed itself to be the most novel contribution as was the 
simultaneous exploitation of two environments by academic entrepreneurs.  A revision 
of the provisional theoretical framework is discussed and findings used to build 
theory.   
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Insights  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the literature which influenced the formation of the 
research questions set out in Chapter One.  Themes explored in past literature with 
regard to the identification, creation, evaluation and exploitation of ideas from HEIs 
are identified.  Existing empirical literature related to resource accumulation for firm 
formation relying on human capital, social capital, team formation and external 
environmental influences is presented.  Theories guiding previous studies are outlined.  
Gaps in the knowledge base are identified and used to justify the multilevel theoretical 
approach of this study.   
 
The structure of the following sections includes a justification of a multilevel 
theoretical approach in Section 2.2 which will enable the exploration of themes in the 
conceptual model set out in Chapter 3.  A resume of the theoretical perspectives 
guiding this study are outlined in Section 2.3.  A review of human capital theory is 
presented in Section 2.4 as is prior research relating to the influence of human capital.  
This includes a separation of both general and specific human capital as presented in 
Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.  Social capital is explored in Section 2.5.  A summary of the 
Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm is offered in Section 2.6.  The importance of 
the external environment and access to resources in different locations is discussed in 
Section 2.7.  A general critique of the theoretical approaches is presented in Section 
2.8.  Finally, a summary is offered in Section 2.9.   
 
2.2 The Multilevel Theoretical Approach: A Justification  
A failure of past research has been characterised by a static and cross sectional 
approach to the study of opportunity identification, evaluation and exploitation relying 
on stage models of growth and development (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Scott and 
Bruce, 1987).  The phase or stage approach has been extended to include firm 
formation from HEIs (Shane, 2004).  Within the HEI spinout firm sector stage studies 
have been criticised for being too rigid, prescriptive, predictive and formulaic (Mustar 
et al., 2006).  Stage models take a positivist position assuming that the external 
environment is a constant pre-given.  At their simplest, they describe a predictable 
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process moving from one pre-given state to the next.  Such processes are seen as 
manageable and the next step predetermined because the steps of the process are 
known.  Because of this high level of prediction, stage models seem better suited to 
the study of incremental change, such as growth (Galbraith, 1982) rather than the 
unpredictable study of newly forming entities.  The strength of the stage approach is 
that it provides a clear view of the start and finish of the entrepreneurial process, albeit 
pre-determined.  Stage studies compartmentalise and separate different aspects of the 
commercialisation process and are complicated by and adjusted through feedback 
loops and overlaps and do not necessarily take into account the heterogeneity of skills 
and past experiences and networks brought to firm formation by the individual(s) 
involved (Ndonzuau et al., 2002; DeGroof and Roberts, 2003; Clarysse and Moray, 
2004; Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Vohora et al., 2004).  
There is a start and finish point and it is believed that all firms start from the same 
stage.  The existence of a firm is assumed as the starting point of the process.  
Explanations about moving from one stage to another are not always well explained.   
 
In contrast, this study offers a dynamic opportunity-based approach exploring 
several layers of the process, the individuals involved, the context in which they 
operate and their interaction with each other to capture how opportunity identification 
leading to exploitation unfolds.  Exploring the interaction between these elements has 
been a failure of past research.  Levels of exploration will involve the relationship 
between human capital and the opportunity identification behaviour of lead academic 
and non-academic entrepreneurs; the relationship between the external environment 
and access to resources at different phases and at different locations during the 
opportunity identification process; the relationship between the dynamic 
entrepreneurial process and changing resource requirements following a resource 
based view perspective; and the relationship between lead entrepreneurs and recruited 
team members following a human capital and social capital perspective.  The 
theoretical stance of this study is multilevel.  To explore and capture influences of 
resources, the effect human and social capital and the µSXOOV¶DQGµSXVKHV¶RIORFDWLRQ 
µLQ UHDO WLPH¶, a qualitative methodology was chosen.  From a qualitative 
methodological research standpoint the chosen theoretical perspectives complement 
the interpretivist paradigm where the interest is in understanding phenomenon from 
within (e.g. from the perspective of the involved social actors) (Gephart, 2004).   
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A qualitative methodology, using a multiple case study method for data 
gathering and analysis, outlined in Chapter 4, allows for an inductive process of 
discovery rather than testing for justification (Guba and Lincoln, 2000).  A multiple 
theoretical stance enables exploration of the internal construction of resources (Zahra, 
2007).  Such an approach prompts theory building and the formulation of propositions 
for future verification.  The use of a longitudinal study is spurred by the traditional 
static nature of previous studies and answers a call from literature for a process and 
multilevel approach to studying entrepreneurship (Low and MacMillan, 1988; Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000; Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000; Mustar, et al., 2006).  A 
longitudinal study allowed a focus on events that described how processes and 
subsequent events changed over time.  Instead of seeking causal explanations for 
events, the progression of processes leading to events became the focus which allowed 
an exploration of how the opportunity identification process evolved over time.  This 
approach explored µZK\¶ DQG µhow¶ resources were configured by the individuals 
involved, µZK\¶DQGµhow¶ DQGIURPµZKHUH¶these individuals knew each other, µZK\¶
and µhow¶ the opportunity developed and µZK\¶DQGµhow¶ the external environment 
influenced access to resources. 
 
The application of a multiple theoretical position was influenced by two 
distinctive types of theory aimed at social research which Aldrich (2001) distinguishes 
DV WZR IRUPVRI µSURFHVV UHVHDUFK¶  7KHUH LV outcome driven explanations that start 
with an observed out-come and move backwards to search for events that explain the 
outcome.  The other is events-driven explanations that start with observed events and 
move onto outcomes or changes in processes.  The former is backwards looking whilst 
the events driven explanations are built forward from events towards outcomes.  The 
first definition features a category of concepts or variables that pertain to actions and 
DFWLYLWLHVZKLFKDUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK³YDULDQFHWKHRU\´0ohr, 1982) of change where 
outcome driven explanations examine the degrees to which a set of independent 
variables statistically explain variations in outcome criteria (e.g. the dependent 
variables).  The causal process that generates the outcome is presumed to operate 
continuously over time and the variables are assumed to remain constant over time 
(Van de Ven and Engleman, 2004).  The event driven approach is more often 
associated with a process theory where explanation for change is embedded in 
temporal order and subsequent changes in events occurs based on a story of historical 
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narrative (Langley, 1999).  Change, therefore, unfolds and cannot be untangled unless 
a narrative is elicited from participants (extracted in this study from case studies) 
about their perceptions of events leading to the outcome.  The process events driven 
approach employs narrative explanation to give insight into the contribution actions 
and events make to a particular out-come.  Where variance theory draws on variables 
and causality, process theory encompasses the discrete states and events where time 
ordering is critical to the outcome.  According to Van de Ven and Engleman (2004), 
the process approach is necessary to address questions about how the entrepreneurial 
process unfolds and evolves over time.  Pettigrew recommended that research 
investigating change, or an unfolding process, should encapsulate the context, the 
content and the process of change longitudinally (Pettigrew, 1990).  In this study the 
opportunity-based conceptualisation of entrepreneurship, emphasising the opportunity, 
the individuals and the context are used to capture different components of the process 
in real time (Bruyat and Julien, 2001).   
 
An unfolding process of opportunity identification requires thHRULHVZKLFKµILW¶
with the evolution of the phenomenon and with the research paradigm.  The 
perspective of this study is that the process is emergent, rather than prescriptive 
asserting that processes leading to firm formation are not fully predictive and are open 
to influence.  To capture the unpredictability this study draws on several theoretical 
perspectives.  First, from a human capital perspective a link is drawn between the past 
relevant experiences of lead entrepreneurs, such as prior business ownership, and their 
opportunity identification behaviour (i.e. a process).  Second, lead HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ 
social capital, related to who they know rather than what they know, might be 
enhanced by past network experiences associated to past relevant practices associated 
to commercialisation (i.e. a network).  Third, the RBV perspective is related to the 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DELOLW\ WR GUDZ RQ QHZ UHVRXUFHV OHDGLQJ WR ILUP IRUPDWLRQ LH DQ
event).  Fourth, the external environmental context is seen as an influencing factor 
giving access to network resources, specialist personnel and physical resources (i.e. a 
milieu) (Jack and Anderson, 2002; Etzkowitz, 2002).  The aim is to generate and build 
on theoretical insights emerging from the data gathered from lead entrepreneurs and 
team members and to analyse that data through comparison.  This approach will also 
address observations made about entrepreneurship literature in general that there is a 
ODFNRIWKHRULVLQJRQSURFHVV'DYLGVVRQDQG:LNOXQGhoEDúDUDQHWDO2001).   
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Some conceptions of organisational development emphasise internally 
constructed processes which are not only the result of adaptation to the external 
environment (i.e., they offer an inside-out view).  Brush et al., (2001) and Bergmann 
Lichenstein and Brush (2001) have addressed the entrepreneurial challenge of setting 
up a resource base, studying the human capital components of what individual 
entrepreneurs bring to the entrepreneurial process (e.g. the resource base).  These 
individuals may need to accumulate broader legitimacy through accessing social 
capital (Delmar and Shane, 2004; Mosey and Wright, 2007) which in turn may be 
influenced by their human capital (or vive versa).  The resource based view (RBV) of 
the firm (Barney, 1986) also assumes that change is not necessarily dependent on the 
external predictable environment, but based in organisational and human resources 
that are built over time and are adaptable to the changing environment.  The RBV 
assumes that the process leading to firm formation cannot be influenced by exogenous 
conditions alone and that endogenous factors are important for the out-come.  Since 
the process starts with an individual, then human and social capital become the first 
and most important resources.   
 
2.3 The Multilevel Theoretical Approach: A Guide to this Study 
The opportunity identification process leading to potential firm formation starts 
with the individual entrepreneur.  Results of empirical investigation suggest that not 
all identified opportunities are pursued (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).  The extent 
to which an entrepreneur identifies an opportunity and in turn evaluates the 
opportunity for potential pursuit may be a function of their human capital influenced 
in turn by their social capital.  In this study it is suggested that the resource profile 
brought the individual may be associated with their opportunity identification 
behaviour.  Human capital theory relates to Themes 1 and 2 in the conceptual model in 
Chapter 3 (i.e. people).  However, although the individual entrepreneur may provide 
the impetus for the opportunity which, in the case of life sciences may be activity 
based on leading edge technology, the creation of a resource base for potential firm 
formation may be out-with the capability of that individual.  Academic entrepreneurs, 
for example, may lack business exposure and lack access to investment capital to 
bring their potential products closer to market.  The entrepreneur must, therefore, 
match up the technological opportunity with other resources encompassing 
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commercial dimensions such as access to financial, physical, social and human capital.  
6RPH RI WKRVH UHVRXUFHV PD\ EH PRELOLVHG RXWVLGH WKH UHDOP RI WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V
experience and others may be VRXUFHGUHO\LQJRQWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶V access to networks 
of social contacts.  The human capital of lead entrepreneurs and how they accumulated 
this experience may have a direct bearing on how they developed their social capital 
(Delmar and Shane, 2004).  However, academic entrepreneurs may face constraints 
compared to their non-academic counterparts because the non-commercial 
environment of an HEI may restrain their development of social capital (Mustar et al, 
2006; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).  Social capital, therefore, also relates to Themes 1 
and 2 in the conceptual model in Chapter 3.   
 
To circumvent resource barriers entrepreneurs may recruit team members from 
their immediate external environment.  Earlier team formation research focused on top 
management teams (Eisenhardt et al., 1990) whilst only a cursory amount of recent 
empirical research has dedicated itself to the study of entrepreneurial team formation 
emanating from HEIs and industry (Bergmann Lichenstien and Brush, 2001; Clarysse 
and Moray, 2004).  The heterogeneity of human capital, encapsulated within a team, 
may be important for a new firm because as it evolves, certain human capital attributes 
PD\EHFRPHPRUHHVVHQWLDOWKDQRWKHUVhoEDúDUDQHWDO+XPDQFDSLWDOand 
social capital theory, in relation to team membership, is extended in Theme 2 to the 
entrepreneurial ownership team members and important non-equity holding members, 
who have been often ignored in past research.  The RBV perspective will relate to 
Theme 3 which explores resource accumulation during the process of information 
search and opportunity identification leading to firm formation.  Entrepreneurs may 
chose to bridge resource gaps by seeking resources in different external environments, 
some of which are richer in resources than others.  This encapsulates Theme 4 in the 
conceptual model.  A dynamic rather than a static view of opportunity creation and 
exploitation will be presented.  The theoretical frameworks guiding this research are 
now presented.  
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2.4 Human Capital Theory 
Change in the development of a firm is a highly complex and iterative process 
involving resource inputs from other sources, not always including the lead academic 
entrepreneur (Bower, 2003).  By concentrating only on the entrepreneurial process 
there has been a tendency to overlook the diversity of the individual entrepreneur and 
their input to the process (hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2001).  Prior to the initiation of an 
organisation, there has to be an individual or group of individuals who have 
responsibility for the identification of the opportunity leading to the creation of the 
venture (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000).  The entrepreneurial process is seen as the 
result of actions of key individuals, the entrepreneurs or surrogate entrepreneurs 
(Franklin et al., 2001), the entrepreneurial team (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; 
hoEDúDUDQHWDODRUµSULYLOHJHGZLWQHVVHV¶9DQHDOVWHWDO Each may 
bring different experiences, legitimising their human capital, to the process.   
 
The rudiments of human capital theory have been attributed to the economist 
Gary S. Becker (1993a) who calculated that human activities have an effect on 
productivity and consumption.  According to human capital theory, individuals 
increase their productivity as a result of formal and informal education, work 
experience as well as exploiting network relations (e.g. social capital).  A distinction is 
made between general human capital (i.e., education and work experience) and 
specific human capital (i.e., managerial capabilities, entrepreneurial capabilities, 
technical capabilities and business ownership experience) (Becker, 1993a, b).  The 
RXWFRPHRISURGXFWLYLW\ LV FDOFXODWHGDV WKH UHVXOWRI LQYHVWPHQW LQ µLQSXW¶DFWLYLWLHV
like education and training.  The sum of the inputs governs human capital.  Human 
capital may be seen as the combined intelligence, skills and expertise (i.e. intangible 
resources) that are embedded in individuals or the members of the organisation or seen 
as a type of capital which is people dependent (Fernandez et al., 2000).   
 
Human capital has been viewed as consisting of a hierarchy of skills and 
knowledge with varying degrees of transferability across firms (Castanias and Helfat, 
1992).  Some skills are specific to a firm and some are transferable because they are 
generic.  General human capital is applicable to many economic activities and includes 
aspects such as education, age, gender and managerial understanding (Table 2.1).  
Specific human capital is more limited in its application (Gimeno et al., 1997) and can 
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relate to prior business ownership, attitudes towards entrepreneurship, parental 
business ownership and entrepreneurial capabilities (Gimeno et al., 1997; hoEDúDUDQ
2004) (Table 2.1).   
 
Table 2.1 Types and Components of Human Capital 
Type of Human Capital Components 
 
General Human Capital 
Education 
Gender and age 
Managerial human capital 
Managerial and technical capabilities 
 
Specific Human Capital 
Business ownership experience 
Parental business ownership 
Entrepreneurial capability 
Adapted from hoEDúDUDQ (2004) p 44. 
 
The HQWUHSUHQHXU¶VKXPDQFDSLWDOHYLGHQWIURPKHUSDVWH[SHULHQFHVVNLOOVDQG
competencies, is generally viewed as influencing business development (Storey, 
  0RUH VSHFLILF WR WKLV VWXG\ LV WKH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ RI WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V KXPDQ
capital influence on opportunity identification and exploitation thereafter rather than 
on business development.  Past literature has inferred the importance of cognitive 
processes (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001), the role of social networks (Hills et al., 1997), 
and the effHFW RI SULRU NQRZOHGJH DQG H[SHULHQFH 6KDQH  RQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
ability to identify, evaluate and exploit opportunities for commercialisation.  In this 
study it is speculated that the ability to do so may be a joint function of the nature of 
the opportunity, the human capital characteristics of the entrepreneur(s) and their 
social capital networks.  The ability to make the connection between the specific 
knowledge and the commercial opportunity requires special skills, insights and 
circumstances (Venkataraman, 1997), which may be enhanced though social networks 
(Mosey et al., 2006). 
 
2.4.1 General Human Capital 
Past studies representing a range of results demonstrate the relationship between 
education, entrepreneurship and firm success (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Robertson 
and Sexton, 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Reynolds, 1997).  However, few studies have 
looked at the relationship between general human capital and the propensity to 
identify an opportunity and set up a firm.  One stream of thought suggests that lead 
entrepreneurs with greater knowledge and skills create firms with bundles of unique 
and difficult to imitate competences (Grant, 1991).  The competences are seen to be 
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closely related to the skills of the founders, attributed to what the founder has learned 
through formal education and prior professional experience.  Colombo and Grilli 
(2005) used this premise to study the relationship between the growth of new 
technology based firms (NTBFs) and the human capital characteristics of their 
founders (Table 2.2).  General human capital, in this case, referred to the lead 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ IRXQGHUV years of educational and work experience.  In previous 
empirical work general human capital has been proxied by educational attainment and 
by years of work H[SHULHQFHEHIRUHIRUPLQJDQHZILUPDQGE\ WKHRZQHU¶VDJH  ,Q
relation to education, most work has concentrated on the positive effect of survival of 
new firms rather than on observations which encompass observations about human 
capital at the earlier phases of the entrepreneurial process (Bates 1990; Brüderl et al., 
1992; Gimeno et al., 1997).  Some studies have been inconclusive about the effect of 
education on entrepreneurship (Greene, 2000; Liao and Welsch, 2003) whilst others 
have found that better educated people are the most likely to become entrepreneurs 
(Bates, 1995).  Storey (1994) indicated that less than half of the 17 studies he cited 
VKRZHGDSRVLWLYH HIIHFW RI WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V HGXFDWLRQ  ,Q FRQWUDVW&RRSHU HW DO
(1994) showed that high growth firms were more usually formed by highly educated 
individuals.  Westhead and Cowling (1995) also found similar results for UK NTBFs.  
However, for more insight into the general human capital which may be more 
influential at the earlier and emergent stages of the entrepreneurial process, less 
empirical evidence is available.  One exception is Davidsson and Honig (2003).  Their 
study investigated tacit and explicit types of knowledge leveraged through education.  
Explicit human capital as measured by years of schooling had a small significant and 
positive effect of entrepreneurial discovery (Table 2.2).   
 
Lead entrepreneurs in the life science sector may introduce products for which 
there is a demand but, as yet, no supply (e.g. a new medical product) or they may be 
introducing something revolutionary for which demand and supply is an unknown 
entity (Sarasvathy et al., 2004).  Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) address this topic by 
FRQVLGHULQJµKRZ¶KXPDQFDSLWDO UHODWHV WRDQHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VDELOLW\ WRFUHDWe radical 
innovations.  They examined the effects of both general (i.e. experience depth, 
experience breadth, and formal education) and specific human capital (i.e. knowledge 
of ways to serve markets, knowledge of customer problems, knowledge of markets 
and knowledge of technology) on their ability to deliver radical products, processes  
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and services.  Their results indicate that both general and specific human capital is 
related to the delivery of radical innovations.  They countenanced a priority on 
developing both types of human capital over time for a successful breakthrough (Table 
2.2).   
 
2.4.2 Specific Human Capital 
6SHFLILFKXPDQFDSLWDOUHVXOWVIURPSHRSOH¶VH[SRVXUHWRHGXFDWLRQWUDLQLQJRr 
experience that has a more limited scope of applicability (Gimeno et al., 1997).  
Specific human capital, applicable to the entrepreneurial process, may include 
business ownership experience, parental business ownership experiences and 
entrepreneurial capabilities (Gimeno et al., 1997).  It may refer to entrepreneurial 
specific human capital or years of experience in a specific industry related to an 
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶VFXUUHQWEXVLQHVV,QGXVWU\VSHFLILFNQRZOHGJHIRUH[DPSOHLQFOXGLQJ
information about customers and suppliers yields knowledge about the sector in 
JHQHUDO DQG PDUNHWV LQ SDUWLFXODU ZKLFK PD\ PLQLPLVH WKH ³OLDELOLW\ RI QHZQHVV´
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Gimeno et al., 1997; Fernandez et al., 2000; Brush et al., 2001).  
Firm founders with industrial experience have tacit knowledge of effective strategies, 
customer preferences and an array of contacts with customers, suppliers and other 
industrial players (Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997; Brush et al., 2001).  
Additionally, Brüderl et al. (1992) found that firms started by individuals with 
previous start-up experience (i.e., specific human capital) had an advantage relative to 
firms created by first time entrepreneurs.  Davidsson and Honig (2003) stressed the 
importance of specific human capital for exploitation of an initial nascent opportunity 
but concluded that general human capital became more important as the venture 
PDWXUHG$VWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUDQGWKHILUPPDWXUHGRYHUWLPHOHDUQLQJµZKHQ¶WRUHO\
on specific and general human capital became crucial.  On the one hand, specific 
human capital was used for predicting entry into nascent entrepreneurship but was 
found to have only a weak predictive quality for carrying the start-up process towards 
successful completion (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  General human capital became 
much more important to the lead entrepreneur and his investors during exploitation of 
the venture (Shepherd and De Tienne, 2005).   
 
3DFNOHQ  VWXGLHG WKUHH PDLQ IDFWRUV RI IRXQGLQJ WHDP PHPEHU¶V
background in the biotechnology sector (Table 2.2.).  These related specifically to 
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industry status, entrepreneurially relevant experience and other general human capital 
features.  Packlen suggested that there is a counterbalance between human capital 
features (e.g. as the status of founding members increased, the ability to leverage 
external resources increased).  A manifestation of this result is seen in the positive 
effect of industrial status on the ability to network with resource providers and also a 
perceived increase in firm legitimacy.  Self employment experience is also an 
indicator of entrepreneurial specific human capital on two counts.  First, it generates 
general know-how about the act of entrepreneurship and second, generates experience 
about the leadership role in entrepreneurship i.e. experience in managing and directing 
employees.  Similarly, entrepreneurs with previous venture start-up experience may be 
endowed with human capital useful to the new venture (Fernandez et al., 2000; 
hoEDúDUDQ HW DO E Table 2.2.).  Another indicator of entrepreneurial human 
capital is linked with parental self employment (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Brüderl et 
al., 1992).  Self employed parents may act as a role model.  Those growing up in such 
environments may perceive entrepreneurship as a viable career whereas those who 
have not had this family experience may not.   
 
Resource barriers encountered at opportunity identification and exploitation 
and how they were overcome was central to the study conducted by Mosey and 
Wright (2007) studying technology-based entrepreneurs from HEIs (Table 2.2).  In 
their longitudinal study Mosey and Wright (2007) drew attention to how differences in 
KXPDQFDSLWDO FRQWULEXWHG WR WKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DELOLW\ WRGHYHORS VRFLDO FDSLWDO LH
contact with other resource providers).  It was found that those entrepreneurs with 
prior business ownership experience (i.e., specific human capital) had broader network 
ties to equity finance and managerial resource providers.  The academic reputation, 
gained through education (i.e., general human capital), of lead academic entrepreneurs 
acted as compensation to counterbalance a lack of reputation within the business 
community (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).   
 
Table 2.3 summarises specific human capital categorisations using empirical 
evidence from previously mentioned studies.  Management know-how capital, 
reflecting management specific skills and knowledge, is gleaned from past experience 
or is made available through advisors, mentors or partners.  Industrial specific know-
how reflects specific experience in the same business sector whilst financial capital 
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and the ability to raise it is considered a visible resource allowing the pursuit of more 
capital intensive strategies (Cooper et al., 1994; Westhead et al., 2001).   
 
Table 2.3: Specific Human Capital Categorisation 
Management 
Experience 
 
Management know how can be utilised to identify partners, investors, advisors to 
nurture the firm with necessary resources (Carter et al., 1996) 
Management know how can be accumulated from family background where parents 
owned a business and acted as a role model (Becker, 1993a). 
Skills and knowledge accumulated during previous business ownership is beneficial to 
entrepreneurs (Gimeno et al.1997; Cooper et al. 1994). 
Types of entrepreneurs show differences in their characters, motives and attitude (e.g. 
novice, serial and portfolio) (Westhead and Wright, 1998). 
Team starts have more human capital available to them and therefore more expertise 
and greater access to financial resources.  External investors prefer team starts because 
they offer more credibility (Bruton and Rubanik, 2002; Roberts, 1991). 
External advisors/mentors can bring to the attention of the entrepreneurs a variety of 
opportunities (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). 
Industry 
Experience 
 
Pre-ownership experience in the same industry offers detailed knowledge about that 
sector pertaining to customers, suppliers, shareholders (Chandler and Hanks, 1991; 
Brush et al, 2001). 
Financial 
Experience 
 
)RXQGHU¶VDELOLW\WRJDWKHU IXQGVDFWVDVDEXIIHUDJDLQVW³QHZQHVV´DQGDFWVDJDLQVW
premature mortality (Brüderl et al. 1992). 
 
+RZHYHU D TXHVWLRQ UHPDLQV RYHU WKH µYDOXH¶ RI different types of human 
capital at different phases in the entrepreneurial process (e.g. for an event or a 
process).  A further criticism of the literature is that it fails adequately to take into 
account the role of social structure on human capital outcomes and what kind of 
learning experiences could be helpful at what phases in the entrepreneurial process 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  One conclusion of the Davidsson and Honig (2003) 
study was that during the entrepreneurial discovery phase specific human capital, 
pertaining to tacit knowledge, gained from previous start-up experience, was 
particularly influential.  However, as the entrepreneurial process unfolds, other types 
of general human capital appear to increase in importance.  A speculative reason for 
this phenomenon explores the differences between discovery and exploitation.  
Perhaps new forms of activity for discovery are based on more tacit forms of human 
capital whilst the skills for exploitation are based in more explicit forms of human 
FDSLWDO/DFNLQJQHFHVVDU\VNLOOVWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VRSWLRQVWRJDLQLQJDFFHVVWRYLWDO
resources and additional skills may be sought from either learning (Corbett, 2007), 
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from the external environment through networking with known resource providers or 
from the direct recruitment of other people (e.g. through the exploitation of social 
capital).  Either way, human capital profiles can also be manipulated and changed over 
time (Sarasvathy, 2001).   
 
An entrepreneur with previous entrepreneurial experience (e.g. specific 
entrepreneurial human capital), for example, may learn to acquire unique resources 
more quickly than the entrepreneur with no past experience (hoEDúDUDQ, 2004).  In 
other words, the entrepreneur with experience may have a better ability to combine 
sets of resources to create new ones (Brush et al., 2001).  Experience thus provides 
episodic knowledge (Corbett, 2002), that is, experientially acquired knowledge 
developed through direct experience (Blackler, 1995).  Episodic knowledge acquired 
through business ownership experience can be used to identify future opportunities 
(Shane and Khurana, 2003).  Shane (2000) stated that because information and 
NQRZOHGJHLVJHQHUDWHGWKRURXJKSHRSOH¶VLGLRV\QFUDWLF OLIHH[SHULHQFHVµNQRZOHGJH
FRUULGRUV¶DOORZSHRSOHWRVHHDQGUHFRJQLVHRSSRUWXQLWLHVGLIIHUHQWO\9HQNDWDUDPDQ
1997) and thus identify a utility for resources and attach different values to different 
resources.  Opportunity identification may thus EH D IXQFWLRQ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
capacity to handle complex information using their prior knowledge (Venkataraman, 
1997; Shane, 2000).  People with higher human capital endowment may be in a 
stronger position to set up larger firms and attract investment because they have more 
access to business knowledge (Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997; Bates, 1995) 
or experience (Brüderl et al., 1992; Evans and Leighton, 1989).  Experienced 
entrepreneurs may also use their entrepreneurship-specific human capital to gain 
access to a predictable uninterrupted supply of financial and social capital (Cooper et 
al., 1994).   
 
2.5 Social Capital Theory 
Anderson et al., (2007) offer a comprehensive overview of the diversity of 
GHILQLWLRQVDVVRFLDWHGWRWKHZRUGVµVRFLDOFDSLWDO¶.  In recent studies social capital has 
been defined as the expectations of social interactions traded through 
interdependencies (Anderson et al., 2007); as resources embedded in relationships 
(Burt, 1992; Johannisson et al., 1994); as resources derived from networks of 
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relationships (Nahapiet and Gholshal, 1998); as a cumulative capacity for social 
groups to work together (Leana and Van Buren 1999); as the norms which govern 
relationships; and as a function (Anderson et al., 2007).  From these recovered 
definitions social capital does not appear to be an outright resource in itself, like cash 
or information, but rather acts as a catalyst within a system of relations and social 
belonging in which individuals are embedded (Barbieri, 2003).  It is a catalyst because 
it facilitates relationships in order to gain access to resources and its presence 
encourages social interactions.  Social capital is, therefore, probably better termed as a 
µVRFLDO FRQGLWLRQ¶ $QGHUVRQ HW DO   To have a catalytic effect WKLV µVRFLDO
FRQGLWLRQ¶FDQQRWZRUNLQLVRODWLRQEXWKDVDUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKKXPDQFDSLWDO/HVWHU
et al., 2008).  Research has suggested an interactive relationship between human 
capital and social capital (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  It could be the case that human 
capital may be enhanced by an elevated µsocial condition¶ and that WKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
position within a network of resource providers enhances their embedded human 
capital.  Entrepreneurship is a process set in a milieu of past, present and future 
relationships.  Entrepreneurs may be products of their social environments (past and 
present) and identify opportunities influenced by their social background.  Social 
capital theory determines networks of relationships as a valuable resource for 
conducting the entrepreneurial process and for potentially sourcing other resources 
(Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998).   
 
In terms, however, of identifying and exploiting opportunities, the role of 
social capital is less known (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  Past research argues that 
high levels of social capital allow entrepreneurs to gain access to resource holders 
such as venture capitalists and market information providers.  Social capital is seen as 
one of the necessary components of the entrepreneurial process in line with human and 
financial capital (Liao and Welsch, 2003).  Davidsson and Honig (2003) suggest that 
social capital may assist by providing access to actors with critical information and 
essential resources.  Mosey and Wright (2007) speculate that human capital may be 
influential in developing social capital.   
 
An important source of support for the lead entrepreneur may, therefore, be the 
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶VQHWZRUN EULGJHV 0RVH\HW DO RU VRFial networks (Hills et al., 
1997; Lockett et al., 2003a; Grandi and Grimaldi, 2003).  Academic entrepreneurs are 
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dependent on a wide network of actors within the HEI context (Mustar, 1997).  With a 
shortage of resources and expertise, networking can be crucial to the ability of the 
entrepreneur to gather information about market conditions and the development of 
new techniques (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003b).  Social networks encompass the people 
that the individual entrepreneur knows and can be a significant resource for the new 
firm (Johannisson et al., 1994; Hills et al., 1997; Johannisson, 1998; Mosey et al., 
/LPLWDWLRQVLQWKHOHDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VNQRZOHGJHIRUH[DPSOHPD\
be addressed using their social network to extend boundaries and levels of 
information.  Academic entrepreneurs may lack the more refined abilities of acquiring 
resources and information processing functions necessary for firm development which 
established entrepreneurs might already have developed.  If, however, the academic 
entrepreneur discusses the business idea with social contacts then it is more likely that 
access to resources such as financial backing, psychological support, physical goods, 
technical expertise and business information will be sought.  Since no firm is self 
sufficient, the need to acquire resources creates dependencies between individuals 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).   
 
Within the realms of this research it has been recognised that new ventures in 
the life science sector are rarely initiatives taken by individuals acting in isolation 
(Aldrich, 1999).  The actualisation of an idea allows for observation of the nature and 
influence of networking capital.  Liao and Welsch (2003) differentiated between the 
nature of social capital in high-technology ventures and non-high-technology ventures.  
They suggested that the nascent technology entrepreneur is more focused in the forms 
of information they exchange compared to non-technology entrepreneurs. Non-
technology entrepreneurs engage in less discrete and more expensive social 
QHWZRUNLQJ ZKLOVW WHFKQRORJ\ EDVHG HQWUHSUHQHXUV EHQHILW IURP µUHODWLRQDO
HPEHGGHGQHVV¶$QGHUVRQHWDOEHFDXVHRIDQHHGWRH[FKDQJHQRQ-redundant 
information.  The exchange, however, does not always occur by formal means.  Some 
capital (social and human) is generated from prior employment experiences and is 
utilised in future entrepreneurial ventures.  Not only do past experiences influence 
human capital, the individuals¶ social capital impacts on their embeddedness in the 
wider community.  Prior work related experiences play a role in developing 
knowledge, experience and network connections for future opportunities (Johannisson 
et al., 1994).  If not a resource but a network, or a µsocial condition¶, social capital 
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may be influential in gaining access to required resources IRU µYDOXHFUHDWLRQ¶ LQ WKH
opportunity identification process. 
2.6 The Resource-Based View of the Firm 
The foundations of the RBV of the firm are attributed to Edith Penrose and her 
seminal work on the growth of the firm (Penrose, 1972).  The traditional stance of the 
RBV offers a framework for understanding growth and sustainable competitive 
advantage within mature firms (Penrose, 1972; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  
Competitive advantage is attributed to organisational resources and has emerged as an 
influential framework in the study of strategic management research (Barney, 1991).  
Sustainable competitive advantage, in this study, focusing on opportunity 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQ UHIHUV WR WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI µvalue creation¶ UDWKHU WKDQ µvalue 
appropriation¶1RQHRIWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUVXQGHUVWXG\JHQHUDWHGUHQWV7KURXJKWKH
OHQV RI WKH 5%9 WKH ILUP LV FRQVLGHUHG WR EH D ³FROOHFWLRQ RI SURGXFWLYH
(heterogeneous) UHVRXUFHV´ 3HQURVH  WLHG VHPL-permanentO\ WR WKH ILUP¶V
management (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991).  The firm is seen as an evolving entity 
balancing existing internal and external resources and developing new ones.   
 
The RBV of the firm concentrates attention on resources held by the firm and 
postulates that processes and events are governed by the unique resources owned and 
controlled by the firm.  This view lies contrary to theoretical stances which view the 
market or industry forces as being the controlling feature (Teece et al., 1997).  The 
market forces view maintains that firm strategy is constrained by industry structural 
forces and as such, internal independent managerial action can be ignored (Porter, 
1980).  Focus lies with explaining and evaluating industry, not the internal working of 
the firm.  However, in this study, prior to firm formation, lead entrepreneurs may not 
XQGHUVWDQGLQZKLFKµLQGXVWU\¶WKHLUSRWHQWLDOSURGXFWEHORQJVDQGHPSKDVLVLVSODFHG
on internal resources rather than the opportunities or threats offered by industrial 
analysis.  Internal resources are more valuable than externally acquired or bought 
UHVRXUFHV VLQFH VXFK UHVRXUFHV PD\ EH WUDGHG LQ WKH PDUNHW  ³,QVWHDG FULWLFDO
resources are those that are built and accumulated within firm boundaries, their non-
imitability and non-substitutability hinging on specific traits of their accumulation 
SURFHVV´6SDQRVDQG/LRXNDVS5HVRXUFHHQGRZPHQWEHFRPHVWKHNH\WR
firm heterogeneity, as a result of barriers to resource imitation.  Firm development is 
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thus dependent on resources which are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(Barney, 1991).  Resources may be seen as input factors, controlled and used by the 
entrepreneur to develop their opportunities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  Valued 
resources may thus be built up through cumulative firm experiences.  These new 
forms of resources may encompass organisational and managerial process (i.e. co-
ordination / integration, learning and reconfiguration), specific asset positions (i.e. 
technological, financial, reputation assets) and path dependencies (i.e. the ever 
changing history of the firm) (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001).   
 
However, although the RBV gives insights into the planning process of new 
ventures it is pre-occupied with content rather than process and does not explain how 
resources are developed.  The strengths and weaknesses associated with using the 
RBV of the firm in analysis are outlined in Table 2.4.   
 
Table 2.4 : Strengths and Weaknesses of the RBV 
Strengths Weaknesses 
x Performance is a return from unique assets owned 
and controlled by the firm (Barney, 1986; 1991; 
2001a).  The emphasis is on the internal workings 
of the firm.  In this study firm formation rather 
than performance will be the return from unique 
assets held by the founder or founding team. 
x RBV sees the firm as a bundle of unique 
resources (Barney, 1991) not as a bundle of 
activities (Porter, 1980). 
x RBV places emphasis on the impact of 
idiosyncratic firm attributes on firm 
performance/formation. 
x Firms are seen as heterogeneous based on the 
resources on which they establish their strategies. 
x Resources are assets that are owned or controlled 
by the firm and can be tangible or intangible. 
x Some resources are socially complex procedures 
which gives firms the ability to exploit and 
combine resources through organisational 
routines in order to accomplish targets (Collis, 
1994). 
x Combined resources encompass organisational 
and managerial processes (i.e. co-ordination/ 
integration, learning and reconfiguration), specific 
asset positions (i.e. technological, financial, 
reputation etc.) and path dependencies (i.e. a 
ILUP¶VKLVWRU\7HHFHHWDO 
x The personal qualities of the entrepreneur are an 
important influence on the development of the 
firm (Casson, 2003)  
 
x RBV does not account for the possibility 
that the sustainability of rents is 
determined by the influence of 
competitive forces encountered by the 
ILUPµRXWVLGH¶RIWKHILUP3RUWHU0).  
In firm formation, prior knowledge of 
these competitive forces could affect the 
formation of the firm. 
x 'RHV QRW UHFRJQLVH WKH ³RXWVLGH LQ´
perspective regarding market structure 
(Spanos and Lioukas, 2001). 
x Strategy is seen as being driven from 
within the firm not as being driven by 
industry (Porter, 1980). 
x Managers or lead entrepreneurs could be 
limited in their choice of strategic 
alternatives by their framework of 
available resources.   
x Strong emphasis on using the firm as the 
unit of analysis, not the individual 
entrepreneur. 
x Open to influence from managers (or in 
this case entrepreneurs) with choices 
between market manoeuvring and 
resource building.  (In the early phases of 
formation the entrepreneur may not know 
what market sector to enter and will 
therefore devote time to building 
resources to address the market issue). 
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It is the identification of resources, opportunities and networks used by 
entrepreneurs (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000) relying on past experience which the 
RBV has failed to endorse.  Initially, the firm is not the instigator of resource creation.  
The entrepreneur and team therein mastermind the entrepreneurial act and creativity 
(Barney, 2001a) through a process to generate valuable resources whereby human 
capital resources become dynamic processes capable of combing resources to 
overcome barriers to commercialisation.  The resource which holds value for the 
potential new firm may be the human capital embedded in the lead academic 
entrepreneur and his or her ability to manipulate, choose and administer new resources 
using entrepreneurial ability (Penrose, 1972).  Penrose (1972) clearly demarcated 
entrepreneurial ability, which links to human and social capital, from other physical 
and organisational resources of the firm.  Entrepreneurial ability is defined as the 
capacity to identify and bring to fruition new combinations of existing resources.  
However, there is a lack of standardisation across the RBV literature concerning a 
definition for resources.  In addition, the literature implies that some resources have 
greater priority depending on phase of development of the firm (Brush, et al., 2001).  
The following section discusses resources in more depth and highlights empirical 
studies embedded in the RBV tradition. 
 
2.6.1 Resources 
From a RBV perspective, the firm is seen as an evolving entity balancing 
existing internal and external resources and developing new ones.  Resources may be 
anything that is a strength or weakness of the firm that can be tangible or intangible 
such as information, skilled people, finance, knowledge etc. (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
Tangible resources are those factors pertaining to financial capital or physical value 
such as plant equipment and stocks of new material (Grant, 1991).  Intangible 
resources are factors which are non-physical in nature.  ³,QWDQJLEOH UHVRXUFHV UDQJH
from the intellectual pURSHUW\ ULJKWV RI SDWHQWV WUDGHPDUNV «WUDGH VHFUHWV SXEOLF
knowledge such as scientific works; to the people dependent or subjective resources of 
know-how; networks; organisational culture and the reputation of product and 
FRPSDQ\´+DOOS Adopting this classification from Hall (1992) intangible 
resources can be further divided into two categories: assets and capabilities (or skills).  
If the intangible resource LVVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKHILUPµKDV¶LWLVVHHQDVDQDVVHWDQGLI
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the intangible reVRXUFH LV VRPHWKLQJ WKH ILUP µGRHV¶ LW LV D FDSDELOLW\ RU VNLOO
(Galbreath, 2005).   
 
Combinations of intangible resources give individuals distinctive character and 
abilities and includes achieved capabilities resulting in work ethics which may have 
both positive and negative effects on productivity (Becker, 1993a, b).  Bontis, et al., 
(1999) summarised these intangible resources as competencies (e.g. skills and know-
how; attitude, motivation and leadership qualities) and intellectual agility (e.g. ability 
to learn).  Some authors say that intangible resources, influenced by human capital 
input, are inimitable because they have a strong tacit dimension and are socially 
complex (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  Examples of socially complex combinations 
are firm reputation, networking knowledge and human capital itself (Carpenter et al., 
2001).  Being in possession or having experience of such intangible resources may 
give the entrepreneur competitive advantage over those who do not have similar 
resource profiles.  The possession of specific technical knowledge, for example, a key 
component of human capital for the lead academic and non-academic entrepreneur in 
the life science sector, may be unique to a situation, not easily appropriable and be 
useful for a certain period of time to yield competitive advantage (Dimov and 
Shepherd, 2005).  Academic reputation may have a similar effect.  Intangible 
resources tend to be difficult to observe and describe but have a significant impact on 
firm formation (Brüderl, et al., 1992; Bates, 1990; Gimeno et al., 1997).  Given that 
opportunity identification may be tacit, highly inimitable, socially complex, embedded 
in process and individuals, in-depth field work using a multiple case-study approach 
may offer a way to untangle an, as yet, understudied phenomenon of opportunity 
identification behaviour (Rouse and Daellenbach, 1999).   
 
Intangible resources may also assist the lead entrepreneur to acquire and 
develop additional organisational resources over time (Chandler and Hanks, 1998).  
Organisational, physical, financial and human capital resources may be acquired by 
the individual entrepreneur or accumulated by gathering other sources of resources to 
assist in the build up of further required resources e.g. the process of combining and 
organising resources as a new resource (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  µHow¶ the 
entrepreneur achieves this is perceived to be an important resource in itself.  The 
original technical and managerial knowledge that makes up the tangible and intangible 
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resources of the potential firm are usually held by the lead entrepreneur or founding 
team.  An expansion of this knowledge becomes the advantage to the firm.  
Entrepreneurs in emerging organisations must first assemble resources to build a 
resource base (Brush et al., 2001).  Resource bases are built on the foundation of both 
human capital experiences and social capital connections.  This observation is 
pertinent for a comparison of lead academic and non-academic entrepreneurs because 
the former may have no commercial legacy, be embedded in a traditional non-
commercial environment, and have little network access to required resource 
strengths.  The focus of this study is on the internal drivers (e.g. human capital 
resources and social capital connectedness) and how they lead to resource 
accumulation for opportunity identification leading to firm formation.  This is an 
important point because a substantial resource based literature of the firm links the 
accumulation of resources with competitive advantage but often fails to mention the 
source of the resources and assumes that some resources are more valuable than others 
without adequately explaining how organisations can access or develop such 
resources.   
 
According to Alvarez and Busenitz (2001) entrepreneurship related resources 
can be identified in their own right.  They identified three specific resources concerned 
ZLWKKXPDQFDSLWDOZKLFKWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUEULQJVWRDQHZILUPWKDWDUHFULWLFDOWR³WKH
creation of heterogeneous output through the firm WKDW DUH VXSHULRU WR WKH PDUNHW´
$OYDUH] DQG %XVHQLW]  S  7KH\ DUH WKH OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V XQLTXH
awareness of opportunities (e.g. information search); the ability to access and acquire 
the resources needed to exploit an opportunity (e.g. evaluation of needed resources) 
and the organisational ability to recombine homogeneous inputs into heterogeneous 
outputs (e.g. exploitation).  An expansion of these resources becomes the advantage to 
the firm.  The expansion of resources means that they can also take on another 
dimension.  They can be either static or dynamic (Lockett and Thompson, 2001).  
Static resources may be considered to be tangible resources which may be utilised as 
appropriate over a finite life.  Dynamic resources (e.g. the intangible resources) may 
UHVLGH LQ UHVRXUFHV VXFK DV DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FDSDFLW\ RU LQGLYLGXDO¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU
learning which will generate additional opportunities over time (e.g. exploitation or 
expansion of human and social capital).   
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2.6.2 Learning: A Dynamic Resource 
Individuals can develop their human capital through learning from experience 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Corbett, 2007; Mosey and Wright, 2007).  The interaction between 
human capital and information acquisition is about more than just what the 
entrepreneur knows but involves the process they go through to identify the 
opportunity and internalise new information (Corbett, 2007).  The entrepreneurial 
OHDUQLQJSURFHVVKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDV³WKHRXWFRPHRIDVHTXHQFHRIFKRLFHVDPRQJ
competing beliefs or actioQVZKRVHUHODWLYH LQIOXHQFHRYHUDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VGHFLVLRQV
LQFUHDVHRUGHFUHDVHRYHUWLPHDVQHZH[SHULHQFHVWDNHSODFH´0LQQLWLDQG%\JUDYH
2001).   
 
Erudition, gained from previous experience and performance, can be separated 
into tacit (know how) knowledge, the non-codified components of activity; explicit 
knowledge (know what), conveyed in procedures, written documents, educational 
institutions etc.; and social capital (know-who) (Anderson and Jack, 2002) extracted 
from the benefits from social structures, networks and membership (Portes, 1998; Liao 
and Welsch, 2003).  Learning and the knowledge it brings is therefore a complex 
resource which is intangible and systemic (Miller and Shamie, 1996) as opposed to 
tangible, discrete and property based.  The importance of intangible resources may be 
that they assist the lead entrepreneur to acquire and develop additional organisational 
resources (tangible and property based) over time (Chandler and Hanks, 1998).   
 
Recent empirical research revealed that an iQGLYLGXDO¶V DELOLW\ WR LGHQWLI\ DQ
RSSRUWXQLW\PD\QRWRQO\EHGHSHQGHQWRQNQRZOHGJH6KDQHEXWDOVR³XSRQ
the process through which individuals acquire and transform their information and 
NQRZOHGJH LH OHDUQLQJ´ &RUEHWW  S  :KLOVW ZH recognise that prior 
NQRZOHGJH DQG KXPDQ FDSLWDO DUH LPSRUWDQW µKRZ¶ WKDW NQRZOHGJH LV gained and 
DSSOLHGLVDOVRLPSRUWDQW.ROEµ([SHULHQWLDOOHDUQLQJ¶.ROEORRNVDW
three elements: existing knowledge, the process of acquiring new information and the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIQHZLQIRUPDWLRQLQWRQHZNQRZOHGJH0F*LOOHWDOµ+RZ¶
WKHOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUOHDUQVLVQRWRQO\OLPLWHGWRH[SHULHQFH µ$FTXLVLWLYHOHDUQLQJ¶
processes, such as gaining information by recruiting new team members, complement 
µH[SHULHQFH-EDVHG¶ OHDUQLQJ E\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR VRXUFH
resources (Keil, 2004).  Although recent research has indicated that learning-by-doing 
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(experience-based) may allow for the refining and development of individual as well 
as organisational capabilities, it is less suitable for building up initial knowledge and 
new abilities when embarking on a new enterprise or activity (e.g. it is time 
consuming).  Experience based learning may be restrictive, centring repeatedly on 
only one cycle of knowledge whereas acquisitive learning allows for the recruitment 
of resources from outside the realm of experience of the entrepreneur.  It has been 
shown that experience-based learning may lead to a cycle in which existing 
knowledge in one domain leads managers to strengthen activities in that domain alone, 
at the expense of other activities in which the firm has little experience (Levinthal, 
1996).  For example, Keil (2004) in his recent study of the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector, indicated that one firm under investigation 
repeatedly went for the option of acquisitions because it had no experience in joint 
ventures.  Only when managers realised that by focusing solely on acquisitions their 
business was missing out on opportunities did it start a programme to build up its 
capabilities in joint ventures.  This was an example of experience-based learning being 
LQWHUUXSWHG  $FTXLVLWLYH OHDUQLQJ PD\ LQFUHDVH WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DELOLW\ WR VRXUFH
resources through, for example, the recruitment of new team members who bring with 
them relevant and needed knowledge to form a spinout firm.  As such, team members 
may help build and spread knowledge within the spinout faster than if the 
inexperienced entrepreneur tried to build up knowledge from experience only.   
 
Experiential learning is seen as a cyclical concept hovering between experience 
DQGDGMXVWPHQWLQEHKDYLRXUV³/HDUQLQJE\GRLQJ´PRGHOVUHO\RQVROXWLRQVVRXJKWWR
problems by learning activity (Arrow, 1962).  Learning is thus seen as a cumulative 
and path dependent process (Costello, 1996), self reinforcing (Levinthal, 1996), based 
on existing expertise and knowledge.  The existing expertise is embedded in human 
capital and the expertise may affect future learning cycles.  The human capital of the 
academic entrepreneur championing an HEI spinout, for example, implies a higher 
level of education, a higher level of skills and knowledge and has been shown to imply 
a higher realisation for learning (Del Canto et al., 1999).   
 
Sarasvathy (2001) suggests that there are two ways in which nascent 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV FDQ SXUVXH RSSRUWXQLWLHV  8VLQJ µHIIHFWXDO ORJLF¶ HQWUHSUHQHXUV PD\
define targets loosely allowing for learning through experimentation and the use of 
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their abilities to discover and exploit various contingencies.  Here again, there is a 
reliance on what the entrepreneur already knows through their accumulation of human 
capital in the form of past education and expertise but the emphasis is on exploiting 
potential contingencies rather than prior knowledge (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2004).  
µ&DXVDOORJLF¶RQWKHRWKHUKDQGLQYROYHVFOHDUO\GHILQHGWDUJHWVDQGZHOOGHYHORSHG
plans.  The logic in this case is that the future can be predicted and the focus is on 
exploiting prior knowledge in the discovery and exploitation of opportunities.  
Causation relies on the entrepreneur exploiting their existing knowledge and works 
best within a static, linear environment where the future is somewhat predictable.  In a 
dynamic market such as life-sciences, effectual reasoning appears to be more 
functional since the entrepreneurs have to deal with an environment which is open to 
change and therefore difficult to predict.  Learning through effectual reasoning, 
therefore, plays an important role in the discovery of opportunities.  The tacit, non-
codified and specific nature of learning may be internally generated by both a capacity 
to use past experiences and to experiment with possible contingencies (Nonaka, 1994).   
 
Learning is tKXV D G\QDPLF UHVRXUFH ZKLFK UHVLGHV LQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V
capabilities to process new knowledge (Lockett and Thompson, 2001).  From a 
strategic point of view intangible resources, such as the ability to learn, are important 
because external competitors find such resources hard to detect and evaluate because 
they are invisible. Competitive advantage (or in this case value creation) comes first 
IURP WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V H[SDQGLQJ NQRZOHGJH EDVH DQG DEVRUSWLYH FDSDFLW\ &RKHQ
and Levinthal, 1990).  In other words, it depends on what the entrepreneur, and team 
members, has learned in terms of entrepreneurial capabilities such as opportunity 
identification and continuous innovation that transforms ideas (e.g. µLQSXWV¶) into 
potential firms offering KHWHURJHQHRXV µRXWSXWV¶ $OYDUH] DQG %XVHQLW] 
Resources alone are not responsible for value creation.  Learning and application are 
necessary and both types of learning are complementary and not competitive.  In this 
study both the human capital profiles of the lead entrepreneur and team members will 
be explored to monitor how their personal resource bases were expanded through 
learning.   
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2.7 The External Environment 
External environmental conditions can also shape the creation and discovery of 
opportunities, as well as access to resources required to pursue and exploit 
opportunities (Reynolds et al., 1994; Siegel et al., 2003a, b).  Organisations (or 
individuals) are viewed as entering transactional relationships with environmental 
factors because they cannot generate, internally, all necessary resources such as 
finance, technology and access to customers (Flynn, 1993).  The environment is seen 
as being the dominant factor in the development and survival of the firm.  The 
entrepreneur, even during the opportunity identification phase, will need a predictable 
uninterrupted supply to critical resources (Westhead, 1995).  Some entrepreneurs, 
perhaps those lacking in experience, need to adapt and / or move to more resource 
munificent environments to ensure business formation and development (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978).  Within a sponsored environment such as a science park, for example, 
lead entrepreneurs can address attitudinal, operational, resource and strategic barriers 
to opportunity creation, identification and pursuit by broadening their social networks.   
 
The external environmental context shapes or influences the starting resource 
configurations for opportunity identification and later developments of firm formation 
(Shane and Stuart, 2002).  Characteristics such as geographical location (DeGroof and 
Roberts, 2004) the characteristic of the HEI (Smilor et al., 1990; Grandi and Grimaldi, 
2003), the characteristics of the sponsored environment and proximity to HEI 
(Westhead and Batstone, 1998) have all been found to influence the opportunity 
identification process.  The individuals involved in the opportunity identification 
process are embedded in external environments which influence their access to 
resources and therefore influence their actions and outcomes of the processes they 
embark on.  If there is a parent organisation (e.g. the HEI), it will have its own culture, 
incentive systems, rules and procedures and may influence the opportunity 
identification process and access to resources (Moray and Clarysse, 2005) (Table 2.5).  
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs may emanate from a different external 
environmental context which may be influenced by different rules and offer a set of 
different resources.  Although the internal context may shape opportunity 
identificDWLRQ FUHDWLRQ DQG H[SORLWDWLRQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V VRFLDO QHWZRUN SRVLWLRQ
within the HEI or industrial context may also shape their propensity to source 
resources from the external environment.  Resource endowments, for example, 
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obtained from the parent organisation for the new firm at start-up have been found to 
KDYHDQ LPSDFWRQ WKH ILUP¶VDELOLW\ WRDFFHVV IXUWKHU UHVRXUFHV  Close involvement 
with the parent organisation and formal IP transfer has been perceived by other 
resource providers positively for the provision of future access to resources including 
financial capital (Carayannis, et al., 1998; Niclolaou and Birely, 2003; Hindle and 
Yenken, 2004).   
 
Table 2.5: Differences between an HEI and industry settings 
 HEI setting Industry setting 
Reward structure Priority based Property based 
Motivation Broad range of motivational 
factors (i.e. curiosity, esteem, 
financial) 
Profit 
Knowledge Sharing of knowledge 
(Intellectual Property (IP)) 
Protection of knowledge (IP) 
Form of cooperation Loose relations (couplings) Formal contracts 
Time horizon Long term Short term 
Role Knowledge production Knowledge exploitation 
Goal Novelty important Market important 
Management Academic freedom Hierarchical 
Adapted from Rasmussen (2007, p.23) 
 
The level and satisfaction of networking activity also affects the quality of 
experiential learning of the entrepreneur (Johannisson, 1986).  The importance of 
effective external networks lies not just in the reduction of transaction costs and the 
benefit of external economies but in the strengthening of local networks such as in a 
supportive environment (Flynn, 1993).  Local networks have been recognised as a 
source of entrepreneurial learning with the focus on individual entrepreneurial learning 
rather than collective learning (Szarka, 1990).  The lead entrepreneur may thus be 
embedded in a social structure which may create opportunity and stimulate learning.  
Social embedding assists the entrepreneur to use the specifics of the environment.  The 
literature indicates that both the identification and realisation of opportunity are 
FRQGLWLRQHG E\ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V UROH LQ WKH VRFLDO VWUXFWXUH -DFN DQG $QGHUVRQ
  3HUVRQDO VRFLDO FDSLWDO DFWV DV µJOXH¶ IRU QHWZRUNV DQG D µOXEULFDQW¶ WKDW
facilitates networks (Anderson and Jack, 2002).  Social capital, such as trust for 
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example, is just as important as the accumulation of resource stocks and internal 
capabilities (Casson, 2003).   
 
2.8 Critique of Theoretical Perspectives 
The RBV has until recently given little credence to the role of the entrepreneur 
in the entrepreneurial process (for an exception see Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  This 
includes the individual(s) involved in creating and combining resources to create new 
heterogeneous resources in new combinations alien to competitors in order to create 
competitive advantage.  Further, the RBV has not adequately explained endogenous 
resource acquisition and creation (Foss, 1997) (Table 2.6).  The RBV has also failed to 
HQOLJKWHQXV DERXW µZKHUH¶ UHVRXUFHV FRPH IURP µKRZ¶ WKHVH UHVRXUFHV DUH VHOHFWHG
DQGE\µZKRP¶*RGIUH\DQG*UHJHUVHQ,QWKHQHZILUPWKHUHLVYHU\OLWWOHWR
build on (e.g. no reputation, no traditions etc.) (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992) apart 
IURP WKH LQGLYLGXDO HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V UHVRXUFHEDVH LQIOXenced by past experiences and 
connections.  In addition, there is likely to be few social contexts within which 
resource decisions are embedded (e.g. firm traditions, network ties, regulatory 
pressures etc.) (Oliver, 1997).  Another criticism of the RBV has been directed at the 
VWDWLFQDWXUHRIWKHWKHRU\7KH5%9KDVQRWJLYHQGXHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHILUP¶VDELOLW\
to respond to changes in their external environment.  Due consideration to the context 
in which resources are sourced and exploited or whether they are more valuable in 
some contexts than others also needs to be given further consideration (Miller and 
Shamsie, 1996).  Human capital theory also fails to explain if the µvalue¶ of human 
capital remains the same throughout a process.  The literature implies that some 
resources have greater priority depending on phase of development of the firm (Brush, 
et al., 2001).  An inconsistency within the social capital literature is centred on the 
absence of an acceptable definition.  As a social condition it is assumed that the 
µvalue¶ of social capital will not remain consistent throughout the process.  A 
summary of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the theoretical perspectives 
aiding this study are offered in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 Strengths and weakness of theoretical perspectives 
Theory Reason for use Strength Weakness 
Human capital 
theory  
Progress / Productivity seen 
in terms of relevant specific 
and general human capital 
of the individual 
Acknowledges human 
capital heterogeneity 
Does not explain if 
human capital has the 
same value throughout 
the firm formation 
process  
Social capital 
theory 
Progress seen in terms of 
relevant networks, 
embeddedness and 
proximity 
Acknowledges social 
capital heterogeneity 
Does not explain if 
social capital has the 
same value through the 
firm formation process 
Resource-based 
view of the firm 
Progress explained through 
the identification of 
resources which drive the 
process 
Deals with 
heterogeneity 
Does not explain how 
and where resources 
are developed or the 
importance of 
resources at different 
stages 
 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter focused on an opportunity-based conceptualisation of 
entrepreneurship incorporating the individuals involved, the processes they encounter 
and the environment in which they behave.  It encapsulates a theoretical stance which 
is inductive to allow for the emergence of processes influenced by access to resources 
embedded in human capital profiles, from social conditions and from the external 
environment.  Promoting an interpretivist perspective, change is seen as a process 
which is not prescriptive but emergent.  The dimensions of change include the 
individual(s) in the form of the lead academic and non-academic entrepreneur, the 
entrepreneurial ownership team members and members who act as advisors but who 
do not hold equity in the potential firm; the processes involving information search 
leading to opportunity identification and the accumulation, leverage and management 
of resources for potential firm formation; and the influence of external environmental 
context in the form of sponsored and non-sponsored environments; all functioning 
over time.   
 
The construction of a resource base as an entrepreneurial challenge has been 
addressed by Brush et al., (2001).  /HDGHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VSURILOHV may reflect different 
relationships between prior knowledge and opportunity identification (Shane, 2000), 
between human capital and opportunity identification (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000), 
between learning and their ability to identify opportunities and coordinate required 
resources over a period of time (Corbett, 2007) influenced by networks of valuable 
relationships for conducting the entrepreneurial process (Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998).  
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A human capital perspective assumes that change may be dependent on past 
experiences culminating in specific and general experiences which may influence the 
identification, reconfiguration and access to needed resources.  Social capital is 
another component in line with human and financial capital (Liao and Welsch, 2003).  
Human capital theory is the starting point to observe what individual entrepreneurs 
bring to the process.  There is, therefore, a focus on the internal drivers leading to 
resource accumulation.  In addition, as the entrepreneurs move towards forming a 
team and forming a firm the RBV of the firm assumes that change is not solely 
dependent on outside factors but is based in organisational and human resources that 
are built over time through a process of learning either from experience or through the 
recruitment of team members.  However, it is recognised that some entrepreneurs may 
be unable to generate all necessary resources internally and may enter into a 
transactional relationship with the environment and that some external environments 
may be richer in resources than others.  To capture any relationship the external 
environment is monitored to see if it remains consistent throughout the process.  The 
static nature of past research is challenged by conducting longitudinal research where 
data is recorded in real time.  The real time analysis allowed for monitoring team 
member entry and exit and for the observation of changes in external environmental 
contexts.   
 
Since lead entrepreneurs must learn to seek resources, pick and combine 
resources to build future capabilities (Makadok, 2001), this chapter has also 
questioned the accumulation and leverage of resources through a learning and co-
ordination process.  Learning was expressed in different forms, seen as a capability 
H[SDQGHG HLWKHU WKURXJK µGRLQJ¶ RU WKURXJK WKH recruitment of people with the 
requisite skills and knowledge.  Human capital is thus seen as more than a 
competency; it is an intellectual agility demonstrating the ability to learn (Bontis et al., 
1999).  This ability to learn may manifest itself through the entrepreneurial ability of 
combining new resource bundles or resource configurations (Penrose, 1972).  In the 
entrepreneurial process resource productivity leads to overcoming barriers to 
commercialisation instigating a move between critical junctures (Vohora et al., 2004).  
If the individual lead entrepreneur is deficient in entrepreneurial ability or has 
restricted experience, then the recruitment of team members may lead to the search for 
alternative routines to development.  These individuals may bring additional or 
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complementary human capital and access to external social ties (Mosey et al., 2006) 
allowing for quicker learning, an increase in entrepreneurial ability and the 
identification and acquisition of needed resources such as finance, marketing or 
business advice.   
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Chapter 3: Conceptualisation 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a long tradition of exploring the causes of firm formation.  
7UDGLWLRQDOO\ UHVHDUFK KDV EHHQ µRXWFRPH¶ GULYHQ EDVHG RQ FURVV-sectional methods 
and analysis which freezes processes and the people involved at one moment in time.  
7KHRULHVIRFXVLQJRQµRXWFRPH¶ORRNIRUFDXVHV7KLVFDXVDODSSURDFKKDVEHHQSRRU
in generating theory.  Change within the process has not been explained.  This study 
will start with an opportunity-based conceptualisation of entrepreneurship, capturing a 
process driven procedure of change over time; a process encapsulating the 
identification of an opportunity, the individual(s) and the external environmental 
context (Bryant and Julien, 2001).   
 
Following a conceptual framework, modelled around themes from the 
literature, this chapter introduces the main themes.  Section 3.2 presents and 
summarises the model and themes. The human element is covered in Sections 3.2.1 
and 3.2.2 which reviews the individual entrepreneur, team members, their human 
capital and their social embeddedness within their environment.  The entrepreneurial 
process is outlined in Section 3.2.3.  Section 3.2.4 covers the external environment 
whilst a summary is offered in Section 3.3.   
 
3.2 Elements in the Conceptual Framework for Firm Formation 
The conceptual framework is divided into four themes to include the lead 
entrepreneur(s), the entrepreneurial team members, resource inputs during identified 
components of the entrepreneurial process (i.e. information search; resource 
accumulation and leverage; firm formation decision) and the external environment 
(Figure 3.1).  A dynamic rather than a static view of opportunity creation and 
exploitation will be presented.  Thereafter, the conceptual framework is developed and 
used to structure and guide this study.   
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Theme 1 deals with the intriguing issue of the lead entrepreneur, implying that 
this person may be different to the other entrepreneurial team members.  The 
importance of the lead entrepreneur cannot be underestimated because they are the 
driver behind the identified opportunity and work towards their vision of owning and 
managing a firm (Ensley at al., 2000).  Theme 2 explores the members of the 
entrepreneurial ownership team who may be made up of individuals directly known to 
the entrepreneur, those who hold equity and others who have advisory roles.  If the 
lead entrepreneur is deficient in certain resources, team member recruitment may be 
one possible route to overcoming barriers associated with resource leverage.  
Strengths and weaknesses of team starts are presented.  Encapsulating resources such 
as prior knowledge and experience, a resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and its 
importance in the opportunity identification process is presented.  The process of 
opportunity identification involving information search, evaluation and exploitation 
encompasses Theme 3.  Theme 4 discusses location and the influence of the external 
environment.  The following sections look at each element individually.   
 
3.2.1 Theme 1: Lead Academic and Lead Non-Academic Entrepreneurs 
In this study, as stated in Chapter one, the working definition of a lead 
academic entrepreneur will be one who prior to or during the creation of a new firm 
was an academic, clinician or researcher affiliated to an HEI (Samson and Gurdon, 
1993).  The lead non-academic entrepreneur is defined as the person who was 
previously employed within the same industry sector and who used their knowledge of 
that sector to identify opportunities.  The individual ± opportunity nexus postulates 
that individual differences exert an influence over who identifies and exploits an 
opportunity (Shane, 2004).   
 
Economic approaches to defining the entrepreneur have focused on 
explanations about the actions of entrepreneurs and their effect on the general 
economy (Galglio, 1997).  However, the economic approach has been criticised for 
ignoring characteristics associated with the individual entrepreneur by focusing on 
what effects their actions have on economic development, not µwhy¶ they act.  The 
JRDO IRU HFRQRPLVWV LV QRW WR SHQHWUDWH WKH ³EODFN ER[´ RU WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH
entrepreneurial action, only to reflect the effect of the action.  Psychological and 
sociological approaches, on the oWKHUKDQGKDYHFRQFHQWUDWHGRQµZK\¶HQWUHSUHQHXUV
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do what they do.  Within this approach, the entrepreneur becomes the unit of analysis 
and their traits (Aldrich, 1991) and characteristics become the key to explaining 
entrepreneurship as a phenomenon (Gartner, 1988; Shaver and Scott, 1991).  The traits 
of entrepreneurs have been described in the literature as those associated with 
propensity for leadership, conformity, autonomy, independence, aggression, tolerance 
to ambiguity, need for achievement, locus of control and risk-WDNLQJ hoEDúDUDQ
2004).  The traits approach to entrepreneurship, growing from a body of thought 
FHQWULQJRQSV\FKRORJ\LQWKH¶VKDVEHHQPXFKFULWLFLVHG$FHQWUDOFULWLFLVPof 
this era has been aimed at the poor definition of entrepreneurship (Gartner, 1989).  
Methodological inconsistencies based on inappropriateness and ill defined samples led 
Chell (1985) to conclude that most of the studies based on the trait approach to 
entrepreneurship were inconclusive suggesting a low correlation between the 
assessment of the trait(s) and actual behaviour.  In addition, defining the entrepreneur 
using attributes such as risk taking in the pursuit of opportunities without regard for 
available resources leads to confusion and tautology (Bruyat and Julien, 2000).   
 
At an individual level the individual traits of academic entrepreneurs have also 
EHHQH[DPLQHG 5DGRVHYLFK6DPVRQDQG*XUGRQ 0RWLYDWLRQDO µSXOO¶
DQG µSXVK¶ IDFWRUV WRZDUGV VSLQRXW ILUP IRUPDWLRQ, away from the HEI, have been 
attributed to needs for independence, challenge and financial reward (Roberts, 1991).  
The wish to apply results and to validate the usefulness of new discoveries whilst 
asserting independence, abating dissatisfaction with academic positions, and the 
attraction of greater financial reward have been cited as factors stimulating academics 
in the direction of firm formation behaviour (Smilor et al., 1990; Chiesa and 
3LFFDOXJD  6KDQH   $OWKRXJK WKH SUHVHQFH RI µVWDU¶ VFLHQWLVWV KDV EHHn 
positively associated with the creation of HEI spinouts (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; 
Powers and McDougal, 2005) it has been noted that a lack of business experience and 
management skills act as a potential barrier to the process (Radosevich, 1995; Samson 
and Gurdon, 1993; Vohora et al., 2004).  From a human capital perspective, prior 
experience and contact with potential resource providers such as suppliers, business 
development agencies and potential customers has been attributed to increasing the 
success of spinouts from HEIs (Bower, 2003; Grandi and Grimalidi, 2003; Mosey and 
Wright, 2007).  Having had prior contact with venture capitalists, for example, has 
been shown to increase the chances of support from these agencies (Shane and Stuart, 
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2002) and is seen as a form of instigating and developing strategic alliances 
(Carayannis et al., 2000).  Prior joint experience with other academic entrepreneurs 
has also been highlighted as a factor leading to successful spinout behaviour (Grandi 
and Grimaldi, 2005).   
 
Lead entrepreneurs have been defined by showing evidence of ownership (e.g. 
equity holding) and decision making capabilities and responsibilities for and within 
their firm ((QVOH\HWDOhoEDúDUDQDQGhoEDúDUDQHWDOEDUJXH
that classic entrepreneurial firms are associated with owners (i.e. principals) that 
combine residual risk bearing (i.e. ownership) and decision making (i.e. control) 
(Fama and JenVHQ  FLWHG LQ hoEDúDUDQ   2ZQHUVKLS ULJKWV KDYH EHHQ
seen as necessary for undertaking business ownership.  In addition lead entrepreneurs 
have been seen as the individuals exploiting a product, process or technology for 
which they were responsible for developing.  By converting their ideas into 
commercial opportunities they are creating value (Hindle and Yencken, 2004).  Thus, 
lead entrepreneurs have stronger entrepreneurial vision (i.e. they see what is not there 
better than other entrepreneurs), and they have greater self efficacy (i.e. they have 
greater self confidence to act on their visions to make them real) (Ensley et al., 2000) 
compared to other entrepreneurs.  Justification for identifying the lead entrepreneur as 
the principal unit of analysis in this study pertains to the fact that at the point of 
opportunity identification they may be the sole person with the technical information 
and vision to develop the idea.  The lead entrepreneur becomes the starting point for 
the exploration.  However, studies show that the establishment of knowledge-based 
firms are often developed by teams rather than by a single individual (Roberts, 1991; 
Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Clarysse and Moray, 2004).  An entrepreneurial team 
consisting of the academic inventor, other faculty members and / or experienced 
entrepreneurs has been found (Birley, 2002; Vanealst et al., 2006).  The use of 
external experienced entrepreneurs (surrogate entrepreneurs), from out with the HEI, 
has also been a strategy used for the formation of spinout firms (Radosevich, 1995; 
Franklin et al., 2001). 
 
3.2.2 Theme 2: Entrepreneurial Ownership Teams 
Research questions two, three and four are formulated to explore recruitment 
of team members which is presented as Theme two in the conceptual model (Figure 
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3.1).  For a lead entrepreneur with restricted knowledge, resources and skills the 
building of an entrepreneurial team might provide the lead entrepreneur with access to 
financial, social and human capital resources because of the diversity of its 
membership (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).  If the lead entrepreneur does not possess 
exploitative resources to address resource deficiencies, he or she may recruit 
additional entrepreneurial ownership team members who have the requisite human 
capital profiles with regard to technical, managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities, 
business ownership experience, product / process and market knowledge, legitimacy 
and social capital contacts (hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2003a; Matlay and Westhead, 2005; 
Anderson et al., 2007).  Faced with deficiencies in resources, team member entry is a 
viable option to pursue since entrepreneurs can fill skills gaps to facilitate the 
identification, evaluation and exploitation of an opportunity.  There is a recognised 
dynamic input and interaction with different individuals throughout the opportunity 
identification process (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; 
Clarysse and Moray, 2004; Vanealst et al., 2006).   
 
As the opportunity identification process expands, and complexities increase, 
so the centre of human capital resources for value creation may increasingly shift to 
the entrepreneurial team (Chandler and Lyon, 2001; Vohora et al., 2004).  Perhaps a 
OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V KXPDQ FDSLWDO PD\ KDYH GLIIHUHQW GHJUHHV of significance at 
different phases of the entrepreneurial process (Birley and Stockley, 2000).  Timmons 
(1999) extends this line of reasoning by assigning value to the lead entrepreneur who, 
seeking to strengthen their position, may choose a team start to capture a 
diversification of human capital.  A team approach to firm formation may alleviate 
resource constraints and increase access to experience and expertise (Roure and 
Madique, 1986; Eisenhardt and Shoonhoven, 1990; Li and Zhang, 2002).  Each 
member may bring different experiences (e.g. educational, functional, and industrial), 
which may be called upon.  Considering that there are sub-sets of the identification 
process, it is speculated that a degree of heterogeneity of human capital could be 
advantageous to the lead entrepreneur during the process (Cooper and Daily, 1977).   
 
TKHQDWXUHDQGFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHµHQWUHSUHQHXULDOWHDP¶may therefore alter in 
response to the changing needs of the lead entrepreneur (Clarysse and Moray, 2004; 
hoEDúDUDQ, et al., 2003a).  However, there is a gap in the knowledge base concerning 
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team membership.  The literature is not enlightening about µwhy¶µhow¶µZKHQ¶ and 
at µwhat phase¶ of development during opportunity identification lead entrepreneurs 
recruit team members to access, compensate and complement their own human capital 
endowment to assemble resources.  The development of an entrepreneurial team 
(Kamm and Nurick, 1993) may therefore be seen as a resource which can lead to the 
accumulation of other resources to exploit new technical knowledge such as marketing 
knowledge (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2003).  The knowledge resource held by the 
members of the entrepreneurial ownership team may be embedded in their human 
capital.   
 
Research into team starts has generally been positive by indicating an increase 
in firm survival rates (Zimmerman and Zeity, 2002) and sales growth (Chandler and 
Lyon, 2001).  The influence of an entrepreneurial team has been shown to have a 
positive influence on venture capitalists assessing business proposals (Cyr et al., 
2000).  Carter et al., (1996) exposing a number of start up behaviours found that the 
formation of start-up teams was a measure of serious intent by nascent entrepreneurs.  
Entrepreneurial teams are significant not only in their numbers within the life-science 
VHFWRU.DPPHWDOEXWDOVRLQWKHLULPSDFWRQILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFHDQGJURZWK
(Cooper and Bruno, 1977).  However, other studies have highlighted mismatches in 
human competencies between team members resulting in conflict and lack of cohesion 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Birley and Stockley, 2000).  Potential strengths and 
weaknesses of team starts are presented in Table 3.1.  Lead academic entrepreneurs 
also have additional peculiarities that make them distinct from other lead industry 
entrepreneurs.  Previous research has shown that their entrepreneurial ownership team 
members, for instance, have been made up of people known to each other from their 
HEI work where often the lead academic entrepreneur acted as the technical project 
manager prior to start up (Clarysse and Moray, 2004).  The entrepreneurial ownership 
team members, including the lead entrepreneur, have been found to have few contacts 
with non-technical people when they start a venture and show little  industry 
experience (Cooper and Daily, 1997).  Their human capital was homogeneous and 
social networks restricted.  This is supported by the findings of Meyer (2003) who 
established that a common deficiency of science based start-up firms was a tendency 
to focus on technical aspects to the detriment of the business side.  This indicates an 
over-reliance on technical specific human capital.  He called for new academic 
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Table 3.1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Team Starts. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Larger and more diverse access to human capital 
(Roberts, 1991; Roure and Madique, 1986; 
ÜçbaúDUDQHWDO 
Human capital amongst members may not be 
complementary (Clarysse and Moray, 2004). 
Human capital used to leverage social, financial 
and other forms of capital (Brush et al., 2001; 
Bergmann Lichenstein and Brush, 2001). 
Mismatch of competencies over time between the 
team and firm requirements (Birley and Stockley, 
2000). 
Increased human capital is linked to increased 
productivity (Becker 1993a). 
Difficulties in coordination and integration of 
team members may affect cohesion (Birley and 
Stockley, 2000). 
Equity holders have incentive to leverage their 
human capital to enhance firm progress 
(hoEDúDUDQHWDO 
No agreements needed over commitments of time, 
money, future direction, power etc. if the start is a 
solo start (Cooper and Daily, 1997). 
Potential management of resources through entry 
DQGH[LWRIPHPEHUVhoEDúDUDQHWDO.  
Heterogeneity in top management teams linked 
with conflict but with fast decision making 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) 
Increases firm survival (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002) through cohesion (Ensley et al., 1999). 
Future possibility of team member defection 
(Cooper and Daily, 1997). 
Team size and therefore diversity of skills is 
correlated to sales and sales growth (Chandler and 
Lyon, 2001). 
Academic entrepreneur may lack management 
skills to lead the team. 
Ventures founded by teams more likely to survive 
(Cooper et al., 1994) because the greater human 
capital contributed to the increased likelihood of 
growth for their ventures. 
Failure to clearly communicate goals between 
members can create problems and eventual 
³GLVDIIHFWLRQ´ EHWZHHQ PHPEHUV 7LPPRQV, 
1990). 
The entrepreneurial team is the single most 
important factor influencing professional 
investors to enter a firm (Cyr et al., 2000). 
 
Venture capitalists rarely consider a business 
proposal based on the talents of a single 
individual; rather, the skills of the entire venture 
team (Kamm et al., 1990) 
 
 
entrepreneurs to establish multiple partnerships in a variety of fields (e.g. financial, 
scientific, technological and international partnerships).  Reasons for the 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ QDUURZ UHVRXUFH EDse may be attributed to a lack of social networks, 
restrictions in exposure to commercial acumen and expectations from the HEI 
environment which emphasise different skills to that required for entrepreneurship.  
For instance, the HEI environment promotes a µSXEOLVKRUSHULVK¶FXOWXUHDPRQJVWLWV
members (Vohora et al., 2004) whilst opportunity identification leading to firm 
formation demands protection of ideas from competitors.  This contradiction in 
expectation, although promoted through government initiatives (Etzkowitz et al., 
2000; Shane, 2004; Mustar et al., 2006), creates challenges and barriers related to 
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opportunity identification, motivation for potential academic entrepreneurs to exploit 
an opportunity and access to advice and resources within the HEI for further 
commercialisation.   
 
The complexity of barriers facing lead academic entrepreneurs in particular 
show some of the challenges involved in researching opportunity identification, 
evaluation and exploitation.  The particular challenge of ideQWLI\LQJµZKHUH¶UHVRXUFHV
PD\ EH IRXQG DQG DFFUXLQJ UHVRXUFHV WKHUHDIWHU PD\ EH D IXQFWLRQ RI µZK\¶ WKH\
recruit entrepreneurial ownership team members or seek sources within their external 
HQYLURQPHQW+LQGOHDQG<HQFNHQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIWHFKQRORJLFal innovative start-
ups indicated that resource accumulation did not come from one individual.  The 
creation and exploitation of opportunities involved academics, students and other 
university staff.  Individuals, not immediately connected to the HEI external 
environment, may also take on central roles in identifying opportunities.  This 
KLJKOLJKWV D FRQFHUQ ZKLFK KDV QRW EHHQ IXOO\ DGGUHVVHG E\ WKH OLWHUDWXUH  µ:K\¶
µKRZ¶ do lead entrepreneurs connect with such resource providers?  This raises 
another debate within the entrepreneurial team literature.  The definition of team 
membership has been inconclusively debated (Cooper and Daly, 1997; Ensley et al., 
 hoEDúDUDQ HW DO   6WXGLHV IRFXVLQJ RQ HQWUHSUHQHXULDO WHDPV JHQHUDOO\
define team members in terms of status at start-up, ownership and control (Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven, 1990; Watson et al., 1995; Cooper and Daly, 1997).  Others have 
defined entrepreneurial ownership team members as those with an equity stake in the 
venture and who have a key role in the strategic decision making of the venture at the 
WLPH RI IRXQGLQJ hoEDúDUDQ HW DO D &RRQH\   However, as has been 
discussed, as well as equity holders, who have decision powers within the firm, there 
is also the role of non-equity holders to consider.  These members may provide 
business advice or offer network contacts to other advisors.  In this study, team 
members are broadly defined to encapsulate the lead entrepreneur, TTOs managing 
HEI transfers of IP to spinouts, surrogate entrepreneurs, members of research teams, 
business development officers from public or private bodies, venture capitalists, 
business angles and non-executive directors involved in the opportunity identification 
process.  To this end, a different branch of research has begun to explore the value of 
µRXWVLGHUV¶ RU QHWZRUN PHPEHUV WR WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO WHDP DQG WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO
SURFHVV  (QVOH\ HW DO  UHYLHZHG WKH UROH µRXWVLGHUV¶ SHUIRUPHG DQG WKH
 70 
profound influence they had on the development RI ILUPV  7KHVH ³RXWVLGHUV´ RU
³SULYLOHJHGZLWQHVVHV´Vanaelst et al., 2006) included paid professionals, consultants, 
outside directors and business advisors who offered support systems and brought 
needed information and skills to the venture (e.g. they provided skills not available 
within the firm).  The human capital they brought to the firm included specialised 
support (e.g. advisors for giving business advice, funding financial expertise, and 
marketing connections).  In this study the role of both equity holding and non-equity 
holding team members will be explored.   
 
3.2.3 Theme 3: The Entrepreneurial Process  
This section is linked to the opportunity-based perspective of the general 
entrepreneurial process conceptualised to run parallel with the specific, practical 
entrepreneurial experience for opportunity identification, resource accumulation and 
exploitation leading to firm formation in the life-science sector.  A link is drawn 
EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDO OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR VHDUFK IRU UHOHYDQW information 
leading to the identification of opportunities, and the various dimensions of lead 
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V VSHFLILF DQG JHQHUDO KXPDQ FDSLWDO WR DFTXLUH QHZ UHVRXUFHV DQG
combine them for the potential formation of a firm.  This is portrayed in Figure 3.1 as 
Search for Information, Opportunity Identification and the Decision to Create a Firm 
(Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001) identified as Theme 3.   
 
Entrepreneurial opportunities may be seen as those situations in which new, or 
previously unknown, goods, services, raw materials and organising methods are 
introduced and (potentially) sold at greater than their cost of production (Casson, 
1982) or introduced through the formation of new means, ends, or means-end 
relationship (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003).  Within the entrepreneurship literature there 
is a debate as to whether opportunities are discovered (Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000) or whether they are enacted and developed over a period of time during the 
entrepreneurial process.  In the life science sector, the opportunity is central because it 
involves formal research and for an academic entrepreneur the source of the 
opportunity is likely to evolve from HEI research.  However, little is known about 
how HEI research becomes perceived as an entrepreneurial opportunity and how the 
academic entrepreneurs are able to convert and develop the research into a viable 
business concept.  Shane (2004) intimates that technologies more likely to become 
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entrepreneurial opportunities are radical, tacit, early stage and early stage technologies 
with potential customer value which reflect strong technical advancement and that are 
protected by IP (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 2000; Nicolaou and Birley, 2003b; Pirnay et 
al., 2003).  At such an intense level of research the product or service can only be 
utilised when codified in a manner that others can understand (Rogers, 2001).  Since 
such a large share of the tacit knowledge is known only to the researchers, being 
included or central to the opportunity identification process seems paramount (Jensen 
and Thursby, 2001).   
 
The exploitation of opportunities, processes and the individuals involved has 
been given more attention than opportunity identification (Busenitz et al., 2003).  Less 
published research has focused on opportunity identification processes.  The process 
through which knowledge is converted to commercial venture has been studied from 
an economic and psychological perspective.  First, cognitive conceptualisations offer a 
logic where the individual create schemas that represent cumulative experience and 
these schemas (or mind maps) are used to help entrepreneurs focus on the most 
promising opportunities (Busenitz and Barney, 1997. Gaglio, 1997; Singh et al., 
1999); second, there are incentives to incorporate (Reynolds et al., 1991); and third 
entrepreneurs identify opportunities through awareness (Kirzner, 1979) creativity 
(Schumpeter, 1976) and through what Shackle (1982) referred to as imagination.  As 
stated already, this study involves itself more with the behaviour of entrepreneurs 
rather than their thinking.  In addition, this study explores the discovery and pursuit of 
opportunities rather than the outcomes (e.g. performance).  The setting in which these 
actions take place is outlined in two distinct market outlooks.  The first acknowledges 
that most markets are inefficient (or in a state of disequilibrium) and provide some 
individuals with opportunities to exploit these inefficiencies (Kirzner, 1979).  This is 
what Kirzner (1973) called alertness, where the logic presupposes that most 
opportunities are discovered through fortuitous circumstances because the ability to 
recognise an opportunity depends on the individuals unique knowledge set with 
respect to technologies and markets.  This alertness allows the entrepreneur to develop 
LQVLJKWVLQWRPDUNHWWUHQGVZKHUHDOHUWQHVVLVGHILQHGDV³WKHDELOLW\WRQRWLFHZLWKRXW
VHDUFK RSSRUWXQLWLHV WKDW KDYH EHHQ KLWKHUWR RYHUORRNHG´ .LU]HU  S  7KH
insight about the commercial value of the idea is the entrepreneurial opportunity.  
There is a flash of insight, which is superior to others governed by previous 
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µNQRZOHGJH FRUULGRUV¶ 1HOVRQ DQG :LQWHU   7KLV VXJJHVWV WKDW WKHUH DUH
YDULDWLRQV LQ SHRSOHV¶ DELOLW\ WR EH DOHUW DQG WKDW DELOLW\ LV GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH
individualV¶ KXPDQ FDSLWDO  $GRSWLQJ DQ $XVWULDQ SHUVSHFWLYH 6KDQH  IRXQG
that individuals with higher levels of prior knowledge (i.e. part of their human capital 
profile), were more likely to discover opportunities.  Thus, opportunity identification 
can be seen as the result of a collection and combination of personal, social, cultural 
and technological resources, which merge leading to the perception of a possible 
market (Fletcher, 2006).  Opportunities are identified or created imaginatively by 
combining individual experiences and subjective understanding in a complex way.  
.LU]QHU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULVWKHUHIRUHQRWRQO\DOHUWWRLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHPDUNHWEXW
also aware of the commercial value of the information (e.g. aware of the market 
opportunities).  Opportunities are also sometimes based on fortuitous manifestations 
rooted in the unique knowledge base of the entrepreneur which enables discovery 
when the entrepreneur is not actually searching (Shane, 2000).   
 
The other premise holds that if markets reach a state of efficiency (or 
equilibrium), the status quo will be broken by enterprising individuals introducing new 
products, approaches or systems which will destroy the equilibrium (e.g. a process of 
creative destruction) (Schumpeter, 1976).  These creative processing capabilities are 
what Schumpeter (1976) called creativity, where the logic is that searches for 
opportunities can be conducted only when relevant information about the technology 
and / or the market allows individuals to rationally define what they are seeking.  The 
result of such processes is a continuous supply of lucrative opportunities and a supply 
RIHQWHUSULVLQJLQGLYLGXDOVVHHNLQJOXFUDWLYHRSSRUWXQLWLHV (QWUHSUHQHXUV¶VHDUFKIRU
lucrative opportunities is influenced by an idiosyncratic dispersion of knowledge 
which is, in turn, influenced by individuals past experiences, occupation, on-the-job 
experiences and social relations, (e.g. specific and general human capital and social 
networksHWF7KHSRVVHVVLRQRIµXVHIXO¶LQIRUPDWLRQand knowledge), based in their 
human capital, influences the search for and decision to exploit an opportunity.  
However, the need to make the connection between specific knowledge and a 
commercial opportunity requires another set of skills which may not be widely 
distributed.  It has been found that two people with the same knowledge may exploit it 
differently.  In the study of spinout firms from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), for example, Shane (2000) found that prior knowledge of a 
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particular market increased the likelihood of entrepreneurs discovering an opportunity 
in that market.  This perception indicates that the ability of entrepreneurs to 
accumulate and use new knowledge or experience is dependent on existing knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  The implication is that entrepreneurs are able to 
combine both explicit knowledge (e.g. their formal technological knowledge from 
education and research) and other implicit knowledge acquired from elsewhere (e.g. 
information about markets).  The empirical results offered by Shane (2000) confirm 
theoretical speculations (Venkataraman, 1997; Ardichvili et al., 2003) that different 
types of prior knowledge have an impact on the way opportunities are identified.  Prior 
knowledge may, thereforHDIIHFWWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VDELOLW\WRUHFRJQLVHDQRSSRUWXQLW\
because of exposure to different experiences (Shane 2000).  Prior knowledge is crucial 
because it serves as a base for interaction with new experiences (Kolb, 1984) which in 
turn is used to understand and evaluate new stimuli (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
From this neo-classical perspective, searches for opportunities can be conducted only 
when relevant information about the technology and / or the market allows individuals 
to rationally define what they are seeking.  In addition, because there is time and 
resource costs involved with search and identification processes, entrepreneurs with 
more resources will be involved in more detailed search processes.  As such, it could 
be argued that the ability of an entrepreneur to search for information about market 
and technology trends leading to the identification of an opportunity may be a function 
of both their human and social capital.  The transferability of learned skills and 
networks from prior business ownership to the identification of a new opportunity 
(Cooper et al., 1989) may increase the desire to pursue the opportunity because 
learning, networking and experience may reduce the eventual costs of exploitation 
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000).   
 
3.2.4 Theme 4: The External Environment 
This section explores the influence of the external environment on 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DFFHVV WR RSSRUWXQLWLHV DQG UHVRXUFHV DQG ZK\ WKH\ PD\ UHO\ RQ WKH
external environment for resources.  This is presented as Theme 4 in the conceptual 
model in Figure 3.1.  The external environment, as an arena offering resources during 
the entrepreneurial process, may shape the creation and discovery of opportunities.  
For a resource deficient lead entrepreneur operating in a dynamic market, the 
development of resources is a process that will necessitate interaction with agencies in 
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WKHH[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQW'HOPDUDQG6KDQH7KHOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶H[WHUQDO
networks may thus contribute to firm formation since social relationships mediate 
economic transactions, confer organisational credibility (Granovetter, 1985; 
Johannisson, 1998; Mosey et al., 2006) and promote strategic alliances facilitated by 
the presence of an entrepreneurial team (Birley and Stockley, 2000; hoEDúDUDQ et al., 
2003a).  Taking into account that external networks constitute access to the acquisition 
of resources and information (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003b), the accumulation of 
practical skills and expertise, including team formation, may be socially complex 
(Carpenter et al., 2001).  Although a sponsored external environment may lower risks 
associated with under capitalisation, lack of information networks and liabilities of 
newness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Delmar and Shane, 2004), studies have 
disproportionately valued the sponsored environment for the birth and early survival 
of new firms and have assumed that firms remain in the same sponsored environment 
throughout their enterprise development.   
 
Examples of a sponsored environment, open to entrepreneurs in this study, 
were science parks and HEI incubator units (Westhead and Batstone, 1998, 1999; 
Lockett et al., 2003a; 2003b).  Such environments are described as supportive.  In such 
an environment the new venture is dependent on external interactions to amass 
necessary resources and business information (Birley, 2002).  External interactions 
may shape the creation and exploitation of opportunities by reducing uncertainty for 
inexperienced entrepreneurs (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Vohora et al., 2004).  Firms 
created by academic entrepreneurs, for example, may be attracted to the benefits of a 
sponsored environment to overcome barriers such as undercapitalisation in terms of 
finance and manpower and lack of information networks (Flynn, 1993; Mustar, 1997).  
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, may have been exposed to prior 
opportunities to build up networks, knowledge and skills culminating in potentially 
more diverse human capital than lead academic entrepreneurs.  Barriers facing 
academic entrepreneurs may be different to those encountered by non-academic 
entrepreneurs.   
 
Lead academic entrepreneurs are likely to be employed in an HEI environment 
especially at the opportunity identification stage, whereas lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs may come from an industrial setting and be exposed to an external 
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environment dictating alternative measures of success and offering access to different 
resources.  The initial differences in culture and working practice between industry 
and HEI environments is substantial and has been recognised as a potential barrier for 
academic entrepreneurs (Mustar et al., 2006) as they attempt to create an independent 
firm from their HEI.   
 
Opportunities in the HEI setting are emerging from academic, publicly funded 
research, guided by academics who may operate to a different scale of priorities than 
their industrial counterparts.  Some of these priorities may act as potential barriers to 
commercialisation.  Priority of discovery and peer recognition for discovery is central 
to the working life of the academic.  Commercialisation may be a sensitive area within 
the HEI (Ndonzuau et al., 2002).  Past research has found that academic entrepreneurs 
offer a range of motivations and reasons why they form firms to commercialise their 
knowledge and change from one culture to another.  Motivation has been expressed as 
an indication of seeking independence from HEI bureaucracy and as a source of fun 
(Smilor et al., 1990), as an indication of validating a new discovery (Shane, 2004) and 
as a way of demonstrating independence from the HEI to potential investors.   
 
Other operational and attitudinal barriers towards academic entrepreneurs 
forming firms from HEIs have been identified (Mosey et al., 2006).  Potential 
academic entrepreneurs may be working in an HEI environment where the HEI offers 
few contacts with the industrial world which may hamper the commercialisation of 
research through the formation of firms (Lambert, 2003).  Academics need to enhance 
and understand the skills of entrepreneurship.  Within the HEI environment TTOs 
have been exposed as having a poor understanding about legal and financial issues 
relating to the commercialisation of research and which was further hampered by a 
lack of their understanding of the HEI context which effected their interaction with 
potential academic entrepreneurs (Lockett et al., 2003).   
 
Academic entrepreneurs are thus embedded within an HEI context at 
opportunity identification which may act as a facilitating environment or one which is 
constraining (Nicolaou and Birely, 2003a).  The HEI context provides access to 
physical resources, such as laboratory space and specialised equipment (Main, 1997) 
and to specialist personnel (Smilor et al., 1990).  As a resource provider the HEI is 
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seen to increase credibly of the spinout firms (Grandi and Grimaldi, 2003) and its 
academic reputation to have an impact on the rate of commercialisation behaviour (Di 
Gregorio and Shane, 2003).  HEI policies and attitude towards the commercialisation 
of HEI knowledge also has a positive or negative effect on the process.  Well defined 
HEI strategies in support of commercialisation (Lockett et al., 2003), access to willing 
surrogate entrepreneurs with prior commercialisation experience (Franklin et al., 
2001) and early financial support in the form of HEI equity investment (DiGregorio 
and Shane, 2003) are found to encourage and support HEI spinout firm formation.  
HEI organisational support modes have been studied and the level of selection and 
support monitored.  Levels of HEI support have been associated with high growth 
rates (Roberts and Malone, 1996; Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; DeGroof and Roberts, 
2004).  Studies have returned mixed views on the effects of HEI policies towards 
supporting spinout development.  Cultural and informational anomalies have 
influenced HEI policy towards offering support towards entrepreneurial endeavours 
(Franklin et al., 2001) whilst limited or negatives effects of these policies have been 
found to influence the commercialisation and spinout behaviour of academics (Meyer, 
2003).  Internal HEI institutional structures have also been found to have a negative 
effect on the spinout process by slowing it down (Steffensen et al., 2000).  Physical 
property-based organisations like incubators (Autio and KLöfsten, 1998; Etzkowitz, 
2002; Main 1996), technology transfer offices (Franklin et al., 2001; Lockett et al., 
2003a; Lockett et al., 2003b) and science parks (Westhead and Storey, 1995; Siegel et 
al., 2003a, b) are reported to play an influential role in the stimulation and creation of 
spinouts. 
 
The formation of networks in the form of innovative milieu, such as a science 
park, can provide a context in which the entrepreneurs and their firms access and 
acquire resources (Felenstein, 1994; Westhead and Batstone, 1999).  Not only will the 
external environmental context offer access to tangible resources it may also, 
therefore, offer an opportunity of socialising through formal and informal network 
linkages.  In addition, there are recorded advantages and potential linkages and 
learning opportunities from proximity to similar firms and organisations with a 
technology focus (i.e. cooperation with HEIs) (Westhead and Batstone, 1998; 1999).   
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3.3 Summary 
The conceptual framework (Figure 3.1) allows for the observation of the 
entrepreneurial process prior to firm formation.  First, in Themes 1 and 2 the 
importance of centring attention on the individual(s) involved in the entrepreneurial 
process prior to firm formation prioritises the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis.  A 
human and social capital perspective gives insight into the resource base brought by 
the individual entrepreneurs and highlights areas of strength and weakness.  Without 
the individual(s) there would be no identification of an opportunity or the formation of 
a firm.   
 
Second, the conceptual model gives space to the investigation of the 
entrepreneurial process (Theme 3 WKURXJK DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RI µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶
HQWUHSUHQHXUV LGHQWLILHG WKHLU RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU FRPPHUFLDOLVDWLRQ DQG µKRZ¶ WKH\
potentially exploit their knowledge prior to the decision to form a firm.  Accumulation 
of resources (human, social, organisational, information search, financial and physical) 
to overcome specific barriers to commercialisation is centred on how entrepreneurs 
accumulate and manage needed resources.  Third, the general conceptual framework 
allows for the comparative examination of the two different types of entrepreneurs 
whose human resource profiles and access to social capital may be very different.   
 
Finally, with Theme 4, the influence of the external environment is 
investigated to establish the importance of the environment on access to resources and 
WR H[SORUH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ FKRLFH RI ORFDWLRQ LH RQ VSRQVRUHG RU QRQ-sponsored 
environments) since it has been established that opportunity identification may be a 
function of the interaction between the individual and the external environment.  Lead 
entrepreneurs may, for example, seek to maximise value or minimise their costs 
through their location decisions by researching the external environment for important 
resources.  The importance of effective external networks lies not just in the reduction 
of transaction costs and the benefit of external economies but in the strengthening of 
local networks such as in a supportive environment (Flynn, 1993).  Local networks 
have been recognised as a source of entrepreneurial learning with the focus on 
individual entrepreneurial learning rather than collective learning (Szarka, 1990).  HEI 
spinout firms, for example, may be at risk from undercapitalisation in terms of finance 
and manpower but potential sponsorship in a supportive environment may lower risks 
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by developing links between the spinout and potential information and resource 
networks.  Extant literature indicates that sponsorship is often directed at the formation 
of new organisations in high technology industries that operate in highly unpredictable 
markets (Flynn, 1993).  Since resource acquisition is a major source of uncertainty for 
lead entrepreneurs, sponsorship may provide an increased amount of available 
resources and lower the level of environmental uncertainty.  However, it has been 
noted that sponsorship, by reducing competitive disturbances and constraining the 
learning process, may produce unintended consequences by aiding the survival of 
organisations with potential weaknesses (Flynn, 1993).  There is therefore the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRIµEHQHYROHQWGHSHQGHQFH¶UHVXOWLQJIURPVSRQVRUVKLS 
 
Extending the RBV of the firm (Barney et al., 2001b) to a RBV of 
entrepreneurship (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001), this chapter has questioned how 
entrepreneurs build on their initial resource base (Brush et al., 2001) by exploiting 
their prior knowledge (Shane, 2000) through contingencies thereafter (McKelvie and 
Wiklund, 2004).  These contingencies and in particular the entrepreneurs ability to 
identify opportunities may be influenced by the entrepreneurs access to specialised 
and general human and social capital (Becker, 1993a; Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000; 
Anderson et al., 2007).   
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Chapter 4:  Research Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
An interpretive research tradition was selected to explore the presented 
research TXHVWLRQV  7KLV VWXG\ VSHFLILFDOO\ IRFXVHG RQ µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ LVVXHV  $
qualitative methodology was employed to gain access to data and to inductively build 
theory.  This chapter is structured as follows.  Methodological and philosophical 
issues surrounding social science research are presented in Section 4.2.  Research 
methods and instruments for gathering information focus on multiple case-studies 
described in Section 4.3.  Section 4.4 summaries the development of the research 
framework including the formation of questions for the interview guide and selection 
of cases for the pilot and the main studies.  Data storage and analysis, relying on a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package (NVivo), is also 
presented.  Building theory from cases is outlined in Section 4.5.  Section 4.6 offers a 
summary and themes for analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
 
4.2 Methodological Issues 
My research aspiration was to compare my conceptualisation of the firm 
formation process (summarised as Figure 3.1) to the data collected from lead 
entrepreneurs and thereafter to amend or to build the model and the supporting 
theories.  The conceptualisation grew from a review of the entrepreneurship literature 
associated with firm formation within the life science sector, especially firms 
originating from the HEI sector.  This part of the methodology provided a preliminary 
theoretical framework about the nature and leverage of resources in general and the 
role of human and social capital in particular.  The ensuing research was divided into 
two parts.  First, I had to identify and distinguish lead academic from lead non-
academic entrepreneurs; sponsored from non-sponsored external environments and 
young (i.e. those close to opportunity identification) from mature (i.e. those not close 
to opportunity identification) life science firms in a Scottish cluster.  No literature 
existed which listed and differentiated the entrepreneurs or their choice of 
environment or the phase of their firm development.   
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An electronic survey of a life-science cluster in Scotland allowed the 
categorisation of entrepreneurs, their location and phase of firm development.  A 
theoretical sample of life science firms was then established (Glaser and Strauss, 
1968).  Second, I gathered data from the people through semi-structured interviews 
about their skills, their connections, their location choices and their progress through 
the entrepreneurial process.  For a comprehensive understanding of the roles and 
interactions within the process of firm formation, a qualitative methodological was 
deemed most appropriate.  The aim of the research was to understand a process, not to 
measure contributions of key constructs.  The goal was to collect data to build a 
complete picture of the formation of a firm (Gartner, 1985), over time, which included 
the entrepreneurs, team members, non-equity members, the process of resource 
leverage and accumulation and the HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ interactions with the external 
environment set within their own µnatural¶environment (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).  
To achieve this an interpretive research tradition emphasising qualities of entities, the 
processes and meaning that occur naturally FDSWXULQJ VRFLDO DFWRUV¶ PHDQLQJV DQG
understandings of phenomena, was perceived to be fitting (Gephart, 2004). 
 
Qualitative research, which is associated with an interpretive research tradition, 
³addresses questions about how social experience is created and given meaning and 
produces representations of the world that make WKHZRUOGYLVLEOH´*HSKDUW, p 
455).  7KLV DSSURDFK DOORZHG IRU DQ H[SORUDWLRQ RI µKRZ¶ WKH participants in the 
UHVHDUFK YLHZHG WKHLU VLWXDWLRQ DQG µKRZ¶ WKH\ JDYH PHDQLQJ WR WKHLU H[SHULHQFHV
Their understanding of what was happening was that which was subjectively 
experienced (Cope, 2005).  Using the interpretive outlook my role as the researcher is 
viewed as one, not only to gather data and observe how often certain patterns occur, 
but to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that people put upon their 
experiences.  My role in this dynamic research process is to entice data from the 
entrepreneurs and then to actively entice the data to talk though reflexive, inductive 
analysis.  The research was data-driven (an inside-out view or a bottom-up driven 
process SULRULWLVLQJ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ personal accounts.  Such studies seek more 
interpretations and new associations such as preferences, associations and actions that 
are not easily described numerically and are specific to each case.  Capturing the 
individual nature of each case can uncover a variety and complexity of experiences 
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which, if not observed phenomenologically, could be overseen or trivialised by a 
positivist study (Cope and Watt, 2000).  Interpretive research thus inductively 
constructs social concepts using the words of social actors as the foundations of 
analytical induction (Gephart, 2004). 
 
By interpreting phenomena in terms of the meanings respondents bring to 
them, qualitative research offers a detailed view that goes beyond surface appearances 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).  It offers a systematic method for constructing knowledge 
DQG UHSRUWLQJ WKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ RSLQLRQV DQG YLHZV, in this case, to a series of open 
ended questions and replies on selected topics (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004).  
([SODQDWLRQV FDQQRWEH LPSRVHGEHIRUH WKHSKHQRPHQRQKDVEHHQXQGHUVWRRG µIURm 
ZLWKLQ¶ &RSH   'DWD ZKLFK in this case relied on the words of the 
entrepreneurs, is rich, complex and subjective and thus makes it a good candidate for 
the generation of theories (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
For the purpose of this study, and reflecting a general criticism of the positivistic 
paradigm, it was deemed impossible to treat people as being independent and separate 
from their social context.  3RVLWLYLVPFDQEHUHIHUUHGWRDVDQDSSURDFK³ZKLFKDSSOLHV
scientific method to human affairs conceived as belonging to a natural order open to 
REMHFWLYHHQTXLU\´ +ROOLVS The lead entrepreneurs, however, could not 
be understood without examining their perceptions of their activities in relation to 
opportunity identification, team member recruitment and their rationale behind 
locating on sponsored and non-sponsored environments.  To gather rich personalised 
descriptions of activities the highly structured research design, associated with the 
positivist paradigm, imposed potential threats to the results by not giving enough 
credence to the views of the individual entrepreneurs, thus ignoring potential relevant 
and interesting findings.  The world of µlived in¶ experiences does not correspond with 
the world of µobjective description¶.  Predictive knowledge gained from the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIJHQHUDOLVHGODZVZKLFKUHPDLQµWUXH¶WKURXJKRXWWLPHDQGVSDFHLVQRW
tenable within the interpretive research tradition (Guba and Lincoln, 2000).  
³4XDOLWDWLYHUHVHDUFKFDQprovide thick, detailed descriptions of actual actions in real-
life contexts that recover and preserve the actual meanings that actors ascribe to these 
DFWLRQVDQGVHWWLQJV´*HSKDUWS 
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The debate between paradigm stances is intense but the main concern for the 
UHVHDUFK DW KDQG ZDV WR LGHQWLI\ WKH EHVW WRRO IRU DQVZHULQJ WKH µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶
research questions posed in this study (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Yin, 1989).  
Marshall and Rossman (1999) outlined three considerations behind overall research 
strategy choice (Mason, 2002) involving first, the identification of the form of 
research question being asked, whether it be descriptive, exploratory or explanatory;  
second, the type of event the research is investigating and third whether the 
phenomenon under study is contemporary or historical in nature (Yin, 1989).  Miles 
DQG+XEHUPDQVWDWHGWKH³NQRZLQJZKDW\RXZDQWWRILQGRXWOHDGVLQH[RUDEO\
WR WKH TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ \RX ZLOO JHW WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ´ 0LOHV DQG +XEHUPDQ 94, 
p.42).  The interpretive approach was chosen over the positivist in this study because 
the nature of the research questions were exploratory (Miller and Glasser, 1998); 
because the event which the study covered was a process that involved changes 
relating to the opportunity, the people involved and the external environment; and 
because the study was approached from a longitudinal perspective, capturing a 
contemporary phenomenon, allowing for an examination of the continuous process of 
resource accumulation for opportunity identification leading to firm formation.   
 
The research process thus encapsulated discovery (Hughes, 1990; Grant and 
Perren, 2002).  A relativist stance was adopted such that the diversity of meanings is 
DVVXPHG WR H[LVW WKDW LQIOXHQFH SHRSOH¶V XQGHUVWDnding of the objective world 
(Gephart, 2004).  The qualitative approach fitted better with the inductive form of 
research (Cope, 2005) and only after there was the systematic interpretation of the data 
was it used to generate propositions about the social context (Glaser and Strauss, 
1968) for future research (Yin, 1984; Creswell, 1998).  In other words, the aim of this 
interpretive research is to bring the essence of experiences to describe underlying 
reasons for outcomes (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Cope, 2005).  The focus of the 
LQTXLU\ LV WKHUHIRUH ORFDWHG LQ WKHµFRQWH[WRIGLVFRYHU\¶UDWKHU WKDQ WKHµFRQWH[WRI
MXVWLILFDWLRQ¶*XEDDQG/LQFROQDQGDLPV WRXQGHUVWDQG WKHVXEMHFWLYHQDWXUH
of the experience from the perspective of those who experience it by exploring the 
meanings and explanations that individuals attribute to their experiences (Gartner and 
Birley, 2002).  The principal aim of the research is to go beyond the simple description 
and to work towards an interpretive explanation that will help account for the different 
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human and social capital resource profiles brought by lead entrepreneurs; µwhy¶ and 
µhow¶ they dealt with anomalies in their resource bases and µwhat¶ influence their 
location choices made to access resources.  This was to ensure that description was 
balanced with analysis and interpretation (Patton, 2002; Suddaby, 2006) and 
ultimately to create theoretical propositions that were embedded within the chosen 
cases.   
 
A longitudinal comparative multi case study approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) was 
considered better suited to study the broad research questions in this study 
investigating change, taking the people, the process and the context into account 
(Pettigrew, 1990).  Studying a changing process and the interplay between concepts 
influencing access, accumulation and leverage of resources is better studied from a 
longitudinal perspective (Leonard-Barton, 1990).  Hoang and Antoncic (2003) 
proposed that longitudinal studies are necessary to better understand the interplay 
between network development and entrepreneurship.  Having identified the call from 
literature to follow a longitudinal perspective, few examples were actually found.   
 
Whilst looking for details relating to the analysis of themes, data was examined 
and explored (Chell and Allman, 2003) through a process of constant comparison 
(Silverman, 2004) and analytical induction (Glaser and Strauss, 1968).  Within case 
and between case comparisons were made to determine and distinguish emerging 
patterns of similar and dissimilar behaviour.  Data from interviews were able to 
capture and make sense of many concepts that were relevant to opportunity 
identification leading to firm formation e.g. events, changing relationships, education, 
past experiences, thoughts, feelings and interpretations (Langley, 1999; Perren and 
Ram, 2004).  Such data were capable of capturing patterns of events and processes 
leading to the formation of a firm and the barriers and facilitators of that process.  To 
aid data analysis themes were identified from literature: the lead entrepreneur and 
team formation (i.e. networks, human capital, social capital); opportunity 
identification (i.e. information search, recognition, discovery, firm formation); the 
external environment (resource access, accumulation and leverage), and learning.  
Triangulation of data relied on multiple respondent interviews (Yin, 1989).  Analysis 
was further influenced by the multilevel theoretical approach and emergent themes 
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associated with qualities and weaknesses of the theoretical approaches described 
earlier (e.g. qualities and weaknesses associated with the RBV of the firm, human and 
social capital theory) (Figure 2.6).  The chosen theoretical perspectives linked to this 
study complimented the research approach because they allow for an inductive view of 
the data.   
 
The aim of the research was thus to move beyond mere description towards an 
interpretive explanation (Patton, 2002) by encompassing the who, why, how and when 
(Van de Ven, 1989) in the complex process of opportunity identification and resource 
leverage leading to firm formation.  Going beyond description by using theory as an 
underlying framework for both asking questions about the phenomena being studied 
and for probing the data for answers to those questions is recognised as important 
$OGULFK DQG %DNHU  *DUWQHU DQG %LUHO\  EHFDXVH ³«ZKHQ LW FRPHV WR
understanding the process of opportunity recognition, beyond descriptive mapping or 
OLQHDUPRGHOVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIKRZDQGZK\EXVLQHVVLGHDVµORFDWH¶ZLWKparticular 
individuals at particular points in time are still fairly under-GHYHORSHG´ )OHWFKHU
2006, p.436).  Looking for causal relationships encompassing the identification of an 
opportunity and the subsequent development of a firm may not be sufficiently 
explained by simply describing necessary conditions associated with the external 
environment but may be subject to individual influences of or access to resources.  
Observing the changing process leading to firm formation may reveal patterns that are 
necessary, although not sufficient for new firm formation.  The formation of the firm 
is thus a social process which develops over time and within a particular external 
environmental contextual setting.  As noted by Fletcher (2006), cultural, technological 
and societal changes affect human and organisational life in such a way as to make a 
particular study dependent on the time, place and human influence of that study.   
 
4.3 Case Studies 
There are a number of research methodologies, some of which lend themselves 
more favourably to one paradigm than another.  In Figure 4.1, different methodologies 
are listed under two main paradigms.  As Collis and Hussey (2003) indicate, the two 
paradigms are at extremities of a continuum and each methodology may move along 
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WKHFRQWLQXXPDFFRUGLQJWRUHVHDUFKHU¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODVVXPSWLRQV$OWKRXJKWKHUHLV
an array of qualitative methodologies including, ethnography (Humphreys, 1999), 
critical incidence (Chell and Allman, 2003), case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1989; 
Stake, 1998), grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
discourse analysis, focus groups, history, interpretive practice, participatory action 
research and clinical research (Hindle, 2004; Perren and Ram, 2004), a case-study 
method was appropriate for this study for a number of reasons.   
 
Figure 4.1 Methodological assumptions of the main paradigms 
  Interpretivistic                     Approach to social science                      Positivistic 
 
Associated methodologies 
Action research 
Case studies 
Ethnography 
Feminist perspective 
Grounded theory 
Hermeneutics 
Participative enquiry 
Associated methodologies 
Cross-sectional studies 
Experimental studies 
Longitudinal studies 
Surveys 
Adapted from Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p59. 
 
First, case-studies can be used to provide descriptions, test theory or, as in this 
study, generate or build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Second, the case-study is not a 
methodological choice but an indication of what is to be studied (Stake, 2000) and 
PD\ EH GHILQHG DV DQ ³HPSLULFDO LQTXLU\ WKDW LQYHVWLJDWHV D FRQWHPSRUDU\
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
usHG´ <LQ  S  7KLV VWXG\ IRFXVHG RQ FRPSDULQJ WZR GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RI
entrepreneurs (e.g. academic and non-academic) during the process of identifying 
opportunities, recruiting team members and choosing external environments as a 
means of leveraging resources for firm formation.  Third, ³the case-study approach 
allows the researcher to examine the phenomena of interest within its context, to tease 
RXWWUDFHDQGUHFUHDWHPHFKDQLVPVWKDWFRQQHFWHYHQWVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV´&KHOODQG
Allman, 2003, p.130).  Fourth, a case-study thus gives scope to seek information about 
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a process because it is an extensive examination of a single instance of a phenomenon 
&ROOLV DQG +XVVH\  RU ³D UHVHDUFK VWXG\ ZKLFK IRFXVHV RQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH
dynamics present wLWKLQDVLQJOHVHWWLQJ´(LVHQKDUGWS 
 
Case-studies have been labelled as exploratory research, used in areas where 
there is little knowledge or few theories.  However, several different types of case-
study have been identified.  There is the intrinsic case-study undertaken solely to 
understand a particular case; the instrumental case-study examines insights into an 
issue to draw generalisations and the collective case-study is an instrumental study 
extended to several cases (Stake, 1998).  )RU WKH ODWWHU ³Whey may be similar or 
dissimilar, redundancy and variety each important.  They are chosen because it is 
believed that understanding them will lead to better understanding, perhaps better 
theorising, about a still larger collection of caseV´ (Stake, 1998, p. 437).  White (1992) 
categorised case-studies for identity, explanation and control.  Hussey and Collis 
(2003) offer further categorisation, outlining case-studies to be exploratory research 
which may consist of descriptive, illustrative, experimental or explanatory elements.  
Each is used for different purposes (Table 4.1).   
 
The notion of the intrinsic case (Table 4.1) has been attributed to Stake (1998) 
and fits with an objective perspective because the purpose of the intrinsic case-study is 
not to come to understand some abstract concept but to undertake the study because 
Table 4.1 Types of case-studies 
Intrinsic Undertaken to understand a particular case 
Instrumental Examines insights into an issue to draw generalisations 
Collective Extends to several cases 
Descriptive Objective is to describe current practice 
Illustrative Illustrates new and possibly innovative practices adopted by particular companies 
Experimental Perhaps examines the difficulties in implementing new procedures in an 
organisation and evaluating the benefits 
Explanatory Existing theory is used to understand and explain what is happening 
 
of interest in the case (Stake, 1998).  Instrumental cases, however, fit with the 
subjective perspective, where a particular case is examined to provide insight into an 
issue or refinement of theory (Stake, 1998) (Table 4.1).  A parallel could be drawn 
EHWZHHQ WKLV H[SODQDWLRQ DQG WKH µH[SORUDWRU\¶ VXEMHFWLYH DQG µH[SODQDWRU\¶
(objective) cases outlined by Yin (1989) and betwHHQWKHµGHVFULSWLYH¶DQGLOOXVWUDWLYH¶
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VXEMHFWLYH WR WKH µH[SHULPHQWDO¶ DQG µH[SODQDWRU\¶ FDVH-studies (objective) (Table 
4.1).  However, the taxonomies are not clear cut and some overlap exists between the 
subjective and objective perspectives.  Exploration and explanation best describe the 
intent of this multiple case-study study each reflecting a unique history of past or 
current events, drawn from multiple sources of relational evidence concerning the 
people, the things they said, the external environment, involved institutions and the 
knowledge and experiences held by the people, over time (Leonard-Barton, 1990).   
 
There are, however, criticisms specifically against the case-study method.  
There are the pitfalls of complexity and the sheer quantity of information.  To avoid 
being labelled as inaccurate, biased and imprecise the researcher must be accountable 
for the claims and quality of the data.  The case-study, for example, should be 
systematically and rigorously conducted to account for human subjectivity.  In this 
study I tried to standardise my face-to-face approach and after initial introductions, 
guided the respondents into the interview.  Often the interview flowed according 
(more or less) to the interview guide with minimum prompting.  At other times 
respondents opted to talk of other issues or to pass comment on my proposed research.  
At these times, the importance of good listening skills and courtesy allowed the 
respondents to pass comment or judgement.  It could have been easy to allow personal 
views and influences to direct the findings especially in cases where respondents were 
highly critical.  To account for these weaknesses, the case-studies were conducted 
strategically yet with built-in flexibility based on the challenges faced in each 
individual circumstance in which the research took place.  The role of subjectivity was 
accounted for by critical self-scrutiny on behalf of the researcher and active reflection 
(Mason, 2002).  I did not make judgemental FRPPHQWRQ UHVSRQGHQWV¶FULWLFLVms of 
their HEIs, business development agencies, venture capitalists, lead entrepreneurs or 
of myself in one case where I probed for some evidence of management skills in a 
team made up of academics.  I UHFRJQLVHG WKDW LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ UHVSRQVHV FRXOG EH
influenced by my own bias or bias created by me in the interview setting.  In this case, 
bias referred to the ways I could have distorted data due to my own theories, values, 
agendas or pre-conceptions.  On another occasion, when I was asked if I would like to 
buy shares in one project I had to make clear to the lead entrepreneur that my role was 
a researcher and not a potential investor.  In another I detected some degree of 
 88 
discomfort and a lack of full transparency.  These observations were sparked by an 
over zealous optimism on half of a lead entrepreneur.  My suspicions were confirmed 
by information given by one team member near the end of his interview.  I therefore 
noted the variance that I might bring to the study.  Notwithstanding, a research 
framework was designed to make transparent the research process. 
 
In addition a debate has arisen as to whether a single case-study has more or 
less attributes than a multiple case-study approach (Eisenhardt, 1991 versus Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991).  Central to the debate is the role of methodological rigour stressing the 
importance of the composition of the research questions; the design of the research 
instruments; theoretical and sampling controls; and the creation of precise and 
measurable constructs in relation to multiple case-studies (Eisenhardt, 1991) as 
RSSRVHGWRWKHVWRU\WHOOLQJEHQHILWVDQG³WKLFNGHVFULSWLRQDSSURDFK´*HHUW]
of a single case-study (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991).  It has been argued that the complex 
description of a specific case, however, is less concerned with the development of 
generalisable theory.  As a precaution, a single case-study was dismissed because of 
the limits in generalisability and potential bias (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  A 
multiple case approach was preferred to argue external validity and help guard against 
any bias I might bring.  Additionally, each case was selected, as Yin (1989) stated, to 
either predict similar results (e.g. a literal replication) or produce contrary results but 
for predictable reasons (e.g. a theoretical replication) (Yin, 1989).  Within this study 
there was an opportunity for within and across case comparisons.  Working with the 
evidence from multiple case-studies forces researchers to seek new insights resulting 
in a theory building exercise ZKLFK³DWWHPSWVWRUHFRQFLOHHYLGHQFHDFURVVFDVHVW\SHV
of data, and different investigators, and between cases and literature (to) increase the 
OLNHOLKRRG RI FUHDWLYH UHIUDPLQJ LQWR D QHZ WKHRUHWLFDO YLVLRQ´ (LVHQKDUGW 
p.546).  The emphasis on comparisons between cases allows for replication logic 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) where each case-study serves as a replication, 
contrast and extension to the emerging theory.  The early formation of research 
TXHVWLRQV ³WLJKWO\ VFRSHG ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI H[LVWLQJ WKHRU\´ (LVHQKDUGW DQG
Graebner, 2007, p26) allowed an exploration of access and influence of accumulated 
resources across all cases.  In addition, because these multiple cases offer varied data 
based on respondent triangulation, the propositions were considered more robust.  The 
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multiple approaches also enabled a broader exploration of the research questions 
because the study was a comparative one.   
4.4 Research Framework 
Several stages were considered in the data collection process.  The research process 
included stages such as the selection of cases, preliminary investigations, data 
collection analysis and reporting (Siegel et al., 2001; Collis and Hussey, 2003).  Stake 
(1998) also outlined a summary of the major conceptual responsibilities for the 
researcher as conceptualising the object of study; selecting research questions; 
triangulating key observations and bases for interpretation; selecting alternative 
interpretations to pursue and developing generalisations and assertions about cases.  
Eisenhardt (1989) provided an outline for the structure of study and stressed the 
importance of defining research questions; case specification; flexible instrumentation; 
cross-case analysis and tactics; overlap of data collection and data analysis and use of 
literature.  Figure 4.2 outlines an overview of the data collection process.  Although 
shown as a linear model the process of conducting the research was not so rigid.  The 
purpose of such an explanation is to clarify the unit of analysis, come to terms with 
time, identify analytical themes, be precise about the techniques of data collection and 
display and make explicit the theory of method.  Having well defined research goals 
and questions and recognising the strengths and limitations of the chosen method of 
research also have implications for the level of analysis.  The overall process of 
capturing the complex reality of opportunity identification and subsequent search for 
resources is covered in Stages 1-10 in an effort to both simplify and make open the 
research process.  Crucially, the stages cover many of the key elements in the research 
process ± from the development of research questions related to gaps identified in 
extant literature in Stage 1, to outputs and the creation of propositions for future 
research in Stage 10.   
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4.4.1 Stage 1: Themes Identified from Literature  
Recommendations for generating or building theory from data ask for an early 
establishment of research questions to focus and guide the study (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 1997).  This is done to control the volume of information.  Research questions in 
this study, following the recommendations of Strauss and Cobin, (1998), were 
grounded in the literature surrounding the initial themes of interest based in 
opportunity identification, team formation and the external environment as illustrated 
in the contextual framework in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1).  During the process of 
conducting a literature review, based broadly around the topic of the 
commercialisation of knowledge from HEIs, several areas of interest, empirically, 
FRQFHSWXDOO\ DQG WKHRUHWLFDOO\ HPHUJHG  7KH SKHQRPHQRQ RI µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶
entrepreneurs leverage resources to identify an opportunity and to thereafter form a 
firm came to the fore.  Lacking in resources, entrepreneurs were found to 
accommodate their deficits through team formation or from sourcing resources from 
their external environmental context.  However neither had been studied specifically 
within the realms of a comparative study focusing on lead academic and lead non-
academic entrepreneurs within the life-science sector.  This was not done, however, to 
the exclusion of the possible emergence of new themes that might arise during the data 
collection process.  The core themes guiding this study, the factors influencing the 
identification and selection of the opportunity, the recruitment of team members and 
the external environment, evolved from an extensive literature review outlined in 
Chapters 1 and 2 (Stage 1: Figure 4.2).  None of the identified themes were considered 
in isolation.  The subsequent data collection process and analysis was guided by the 
research questions and data collection research framework.   
 
4.4.2 Stage 2: Development of the Interview Guide 
Stage 2 for the fieldwork entailed designing an interview guide and conducting 
pilot case studies to test the questions using face-to-face interviews.  The design and 
development of the interview guide was also directed by the themes identified from 
and grounded in the literature and also linked to the theoretical insights directing the 
study (Table 4.2).  The questions in Section 1 pertaining to opportunity identification 
were related to the human capital perspective and social capital.  Theoretical 
perspectives relating to Section 2, team formation, were dominated by a human capital 
perspective but access to people was linked to resource dependency.  The RBV was 
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associated with developments in section 3, the external environment.  Section 4 
revolved around issues of entrepreneurial learning and was linked to the human capital 
perspective.  (YHU\HIIRUWZDVPDGHWRNHHSWKHVHTXHVWLRQV³RSHQ-HQGHG´EHFDXVHWKLV
approach was deemed important for inductive study and to elicit from the participants 
their interpretation of given situations.  Table 4.2 outlines the questions in the initial 
interview guide.   
 
Supporting prompts, sourced from the literature, encouraged the interviewees 
to talk about their experiences, limitations, frustrations and successes in opportunity 
identification and exploitation during the entrepreneurial process (Appendices 1, 2, 3, 
and 4).  This was done to control the volume of data and as a control over the time to 
adequately cover all topics (Patton, 2002).  Respondents in the life-science sector were 
inevitably pressed for time and such an approach was appropriate for eliciting 
UHVSRQVHV ZLWK DV OLWWOH LQWHUUXSWLRQ WR WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V URXWLQH DV SRVVLEOH 3DWWRQ
2002).  The interview guide acted as an aide memoir (Appendix 5).  Flexibility was 
ensured to enable participants to air concerns about topics which they deemed 
important but not covered in the interview guide.  This proved particularly important 
in connection to changes in the external environment.   
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Table 4.2: Development of the interview guide 
Questions Type of  
question 
Section 1: Opportunity identification Theoretical 
perspective 
1. What factors influenced the identification and selection of the commercial idea 
(opportunity) behind the spinout firm? 
How            Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital  
2. What factors influenced the decision to form the spinout firm? Why           Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital 
                   RBV 
3. What factors (people and events) hindered the decision to form the spinout 
firm? 
Why           Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital 
                   RBV 
4. What challenges were faced when forming the spinout firm? How           RBV 
5. What influence did the university (parent organisation) have in the process of 
forming the spinout firm and commercialising the idea? 
How           RBV 
Section 2: Team formation  
6. What people assisted in the formation of the spinout firm?  Why      Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital    
7. What factors influenced the access to people to assist in the formation of the 
spinout firm? 
How         Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital 
8. What factors in your past work/education/training experience have influenced 
your ability to assist in the formation of a spinout firm? 
Why      Human 
                   Capital 
9. What factors influenced the changing composition of the people in the firm 
e.g. (entry) recruitment or (exit) dismissal of the people who assisted in the 
formation of the spinout firm? 
Why & How 
                   Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital  
Section 3: External environment  
10. What factors influenced the decision to establish the spinout in this 
environment? 
Why       Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital 
11. When did the move occur? When and where 
               
12. What challenges were faced when moving from the parent organisation to 
this environment? 
Why               RBV 
13. What advantages are gained for the spinout firm from this environment?   How           Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital 
14. What disadvantages are experienced for the spinout firm from this location? How               RBV 
15. Did the spinout firm use office space and laboratory equipment from the 
(university) parent organisation at formation? 
Why               RBV 
Section 4: Entrepreneur Learning  
16. What problems have you faced during the formation of the spinout firm and 
what and how did you learn from them? 
How           RBV 
                   Human 
                         and  
        Social Capital  
17. Would you have done anything differently? Why           RBV 
                Human 
                   Capital 
 
The interview guide comprised of four main sections: Opportunity 
Identification, Team Formation, External Environment and Learning.  The first section 
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contained questions about factors such as people, events and promotions that 
influenced the identification and selection of the commercial idea.  Section 2 was 
IRFXVHG RQ WKH WHDP PHPEHUV DQG µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ WKH\ ZHUH UHFUXLWHG DQG IURP
where.  Section 3 related to reasons for locating on sponsored or non-sponsored 
environment and access to resources thereafter.  The final section probed for 
information concerning how and a reflection on what the entrepreneur had learned.  
The research questions are identified through correspondence with those in the 
interview guide (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Correspondence of Research Questions to those in the Interview 
Guide. 
Research Questions Interview Guide 
Question 
¶+RZ¶GLIIHUHQWDUHOHDGDFDGHPLFDQGOHDGQRQ-DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
initial resource profiles? 
1,2,3,4,5 
2 µ:K\¶ GR DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-academic entrepreneurs form 
entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
6,7,8,9,10,11 
 µ+RZ¶ GR DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-academic entrepreneurs form 
entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
6,7,8,9,10,11 
 µWKHUH¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic entrepreneurs form 
potential entrepreneurial ownership teams?  
10,11,12,13,14,15 
5 µ+RZ¶ GR DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-academic entrepreneurs identify 
opportunities for creating a firm?  
1,2,3,4,5,6,7, 
 µ:KDW¶ W\SHV RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs identify? 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,16,17 
7. To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation activities 
related to the actual and perceived human capital characteristics of the 
entrepreneur/ entrepreneurial team? 
1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11 
7. To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation activities 
related to the actual and perceived social  capital characteristics of the 
entrepreneur/ entrepreneurial team? 
1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11 
 µ+RZ¶ GRHV WKH H[WHUQDO HQYLURQPHQW LPSDFW RQ WKH
HQWUHSUHQHXUHQWUHSUHQHXULDOWHDP¶VDFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHV"  
12,13,14,15,16,17 
 
4.4.2.1 Semi-structured In-depth Interviews for Data Collection 
The in-depth, or phenomenological (Cope, 2005) interviews necessitated a 
FDUHIXOFDSWXULQJRIµKRZ¶SHRSOHH[SHULHQFHVRPHSKHQRPHQRQ±µKRZ¶WKH\SHUFHLYH
it, describe it, feel about it, remember it, talk about it and make sense of it.  To gather 
such information requires the undertaking of an in-depth interview with the people 
who have experienced this directly (Patton, 2002).  The rationale for interviewing 
more than one person per organisation, using general observation and company 
literature, especially web sites, allowed for triangulation and confirmation of data.  
The richness of the ensuing data allowed for the inductive conceptualisation of 
opportunity identification and team recruitment within the context of sponsored and 
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non-sponsored environments.  Although interviewing was conducted using a guide, 
when new themes emerged, adjustments to the questionnaire allowed further probing 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  This is considered acceptable in studies which focus on theory 
building because the researcher is trying to understand each case individually and with 
as much insight as possible.  This opportunistic approach was taken advantage of to 
enhance themes supporting the emergence of resultant theory. 
 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews aim to give a rich picture of research 
description (Van Maanen, 1983; Silverman, 2004) and account of the perceptions of 
the interviewee.  The purpose of qualitative interviewing (Patton, 2002) is to capture 
how those being interviewed view their world, to learn their terminology, perceptions 
and experiences (Miller and Glasser, 1998).  Methodologically, the qualitative 
LQWHUYLHZ ³VWUHVVHV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI OHWWLQJ RQH¶V VXEMHFW XQIXUO LWV QDWXre and 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVGXULQJ WKHSURFHVVRI LQYHVWLJDWLRQ´ %XUUHOO DQG0RUJDQS
With this openness comes perspectives, information and ideas not documented in 
HDUOLHU UHVHDUFK HJ UHDVRQV µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXUV FKDQJHG WKHLU
external environments).  By sharing the subjective views of the interviewee, the 
researcher tries to make sense out of what is said.  Meaning is not merely elicited 
through apt questioning; it is ³DFWLYHO\ FRPPXQLFDWLYHO\ DVVHPEOHG LQ WKH LQWHUYLHZ
encounter.  Respondents are not so much repositories of knowledge as they are 
constructors of knowledge in collaboration with interviewers.  Participation in an 
interview involves meaning-making work´+ROVWHLQDQG*XEULXP p.141).   
 
The emergence of meaning-making activities of groups and individuals 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980) are of central interest to interpretive researchers, 
³VLPSO\ EHFDXVH LW LV WKH PHDQLQJ-making/sense-making/attributional activities that 
shape reality or validity and make sense of theiU ZRUOGV´ *XED DQG /LQFROQ 
S  1RW RQO\ DUH SHRSOH WKH SULPDU\ GDWD VRXUFH WKH\ DOVR SURYLGH WKH µLQVLGHU
YLHZ¶UDWKHUWKDQDQLPSRVHGµRXWVLGHUYLHZ¶0DVRQ(DFKFDVH-study is thus 
embedded in its own historical, social, political, and personal contexts and is focused 
on their own circumstantial uniqueness (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  The interview 
becomes the productive source of the knowledge (Kvale, 1996).  In this research 
entrepreneurs talked about past experiences, their reasons for choosing a certain 
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action, their reason for recruiting a certain team member and the rational behind a 
choice of external environment.  This process allowed for more complex and varied 
descriptions to be ascertained for analysis (Fontana and Frey, 1994).   
 
4.4.2.2 Interview Criticism 
There has, however, been criticism of interviews as a data collection method.  
7KH\KDYHEHHQFULWLFLVHGDVEHLQJIDOVHDQGOLPLWHGWREHLQJµFRQWH[WVSHFLILF¶ WRILW
WKHµUHDOLW\¶FUHDWHGLQ WKHLQWHUYLHZ³LQZKLFKERWKSarticipants create and construct 
QDUUDWLYH YHUVLRQV RI WKH VRFLDO ZRUOG´ 0LOOHU DQG *ODVVHU  S  :KHQ
HOLFLWLQJHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVDERXWµZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶WKH\GLGVRPHWKLQJLWZDV
difficult to perceive whether they attached a single meaning to their experiences 
(Silverman, 2004).  If someone else other than the researcher, for example, had asked 
the question would the response have been different?  The responses from the 
individual entrepreneurs and team members were treated as narratives which included 
not only an expression of experiences but also actions which required analysis 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 2004; Silverman, 2004).   
 
Throughout the study, reliability and validity of interview data presented 
specific challenges.  Documentary evidence and direct observation were two other 
tools used to supplement data from the qualitative interviews.  The aim of 
triangulation is to gather different types of information that might be cross-tabulated.  
This reduces the risk that conclusions reflect systematic biases or limitations of the 
interview method of gathering data.  The interviews, for example, were supplemented 
with documents offering factual information about individual firms and, to a lesser 
extent, complemented by direct observation during the actual interview process.  
When I was invited to interview three members within the same organisation the 
interviews tended to happen on the same day, which allowed some time for 
observation of group processes.  In addition, to give depth to understanding, other data 
sources were used to establish a line of interlinking evidence.  These included 
government documents, internal documents, publications, web sites, moods within the 
interview settings; the atmosphere in the environment, seeing working conditions first-
hand and observing informal / formal meetings (Yin 1989; Miles and Huberman, 
1994).  On two occasions I was shown a prototype of a potential product and on all 
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RFFDVLRQVWKHµIHHOJRRGIDFWRU¶FRXOGEHJDXJHGIURPWKHJHQHUDODWPRVSKHUHRI WKH 
interview setting.  In an attempt to verify accounts of interviews, web sites confirmed 
data such as dates of founding, addresses, changes of addresses, and contact names 
and numbers.  Company status and members was confirmed from documents of 
accounts from Companies House (www.companieshouse.gov.uk) whilst a few 
companies produced additional literature presented at interview.  One company asked 
me to sign a confidentiality clause.  In retrospect, better use may have been made of 
the archival material on each company and a corroboration of archival material 
presented.  This type of material, for example, could have been put to better use to 
identify past and present team members.  On the whole, however, this research relied 
on key informant triangulation.   
 
Using respondent triangulation infers that sets of responses can be checked by 
collecting and comparing responses from others.  Interviewing an array of team 
members involved exploring their multiple perceptions to clarify meaning and verify 
observations or interpretations.  By adopting this perspective it served to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomena of team membership was seen, 
opportunities perceived, location chosen and lessons learned.  Respondent 
triangulation was a means of checking not only the integrity of the inferences drawn 
from the data but also a means of discovering which inferences were valid and 
consistent or inconsistent (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983; Silverman, 2004).  
Conclusions were thus examined from more than one vantage point (Schwandt, 2001).  
Resulting themes were, therefore, both grounded in the literature and evolved as the 
data revealed itself.  Reliability was not fully focused on replication but on 
dependability (e.g. there was an agreement by all parties that the data made sense).  
Reliability was further improved through use of an internal research audit trail to make 
transparent how the data was obtained.   
 
Reactivity, on the other hand, was more difficult to control.  Within the 
interview situation what the interviewee says is always a function of the interviewer 
DQG LQWHUYLHZ VLWXDWLRQ  1HXWUDOLW\ RI LQIOXHQFH LV DQ LPSRVVLEOH JRDO  ³:KDW LV
important is to understand how you are influencing what the interviewee says, and 
how this affects the vaOLGLW\ RI WKH LQIHUHQFHV \RX FDQ GUDZ IURP WKH LQWHUYLHZ´
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(Bickman and Rog, 1998, p.92).  Strategies were therefore put in place in anticipation 
of these threats to validity and reliability.  Interviews were sought, as explained 
already, from three members of the same firm to elicit a degree of respondent 
triangulation.  The interviews were sought from the three respondents within their own 
office / lab setting and on the same day.  Respondent triangulation was gathered for 
cross checking data.  In this respect triangulation acted as a kind of navigation tool for 
surveying the data (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983).  To promote triangulation and 
UHOLDELOLW\ DOWKRXJK WKH OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU ZDV WKH µSULPDU\ XQLW RI DQDO\VLV¶ 0LOHV
DQG +XEEHUPDQ  DQG D µERXQGDU\¶ 6WDNH  VHW DURXQG WKH OHDG
entrepreneur, the specific people consulted went beyond the lead entrepreneurs and 
included the supporting entrepreneurial ownership team members.  A recognised 
concern in designing and conducting case-studies is the setting of a boundary around 
the unit of analysis and deciding what elements be include and which be exclude.  
How the boundary is set, and how the case is defined, and at what stage of the research 
process these definitions should be made, is also open to question.  Stake (1998), for 
examples favours early well-defined boundaries.  Ragin (1992) argues that such strict 
conceptual development early in the research may be restrictive whilst Miles and 
Huberman (1994) suggest that the researcher think intuitively, think of the focus and 
build outwards to define the case as early as possible.  In this study the lead 
entrepreneur was the unit of analysis and a boundary imposed early in the study.   
 
Although the entrepreneurs and team members offered data in real time on two 
occasions there was the barrier of retrospection and inaccuracies of recounting past 
events whilst recounting the opportunity identification phase.  The entrepreneurs re-
called their experiences about the opportunity identification phase retrospectively.  A 
fuller understanding, it is argued, can only be achieved by experiencing the contexts of 
HYHQWVWRZKLFKWKHUHVSRQGHQWUHIHUVLQµUHDOWLPH¶([SHULHQFLQJWKHDFWXDOSRLQWRI
RSSRUWXQLW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQLQµUHDOWLPH¶ZDVQRWSRVVLEOH In this study, a recognised 
limitation of retrospective data is the difficulty in determining accuracy of recall and 
cause and effect from reconstructed events.  Although studies have shown that 
participants in organisational processes tend not to forget key events (Leonard-Barton, 
1989) it is difficult to gauge the accuracy or importance attached to the process of 
opportunity identification by the individual entrepreneurs  ³7KHUHIRUH ZKHUHDV
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multiple retrospective studies increase the external validity of a research design, a 
longitudinal, real time study can increase internal validity by enabling one to track 
FDXVHDQGHIIHFW´/HRQDUG-Barton, 1989, p. 250).   
 
Notwithstanding, reflection of the opportunity identification process allowed 
the uncovering of the logistics which gave the event meaning and significance.  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH ORJLVWLFV LQ D SURFHVV RI FKDQJH ³UHTXLUHV GDWD RQ HYHQWV
interpretations of patterns in those events, when they occur in socially meaningful time 
cycles, and the logics which may explain how and why these patterns occur in 
SDUWLFXODUFKURQRORJLFDOVHTXHQFHV´3HWWLJUHZS7KHORJLVWLFVLQKHUHQW
in this research, covered the recruitment of entrepreneurial ownership team members, 
changes in external environment locations, mapped over three points in time.  Using 
the critical junctures model, outlined in Chapter 2, three of the identified junctures are 
used in this study to pinpoint the entrepreneurial process in general and resource 
requirements at these phases in particular (Vohora, et a., 2004).  None of the firms in 
this study had reached the venture sustainability phase.  The first point in time, 
opportunity identification, was discussed retrospectively whilst conducting the 
interviews for data collection in 2005.  The second, entrepreneurial commitment was 
mapped during an electronic survey of firms conducted in 2004, whilst the third, 
venture credibility, was recognised and noted during face-to-face interviews in 2005.  
Only two out of the three reference poLQWVZHUHFDSWXUHGLQµUHDOWLPH¶ 
 
4.4.3 Stage 3: Pilot Study  
)RU WKH SLORW VWXG\ µVQRZEDOOLQJ RU FKDLQ VDPSOLQJ¶ 3DWWRQ  IRU D
µFRQYHQLHQFHVDPSOH¶ZDVXVHGWRLGHQWLI\OLIH-science firms from contacts known to 
me.  Hence, for the pilot, all the cases were chosen from a personal network in and 
around the University of Nottingham (UK).  A convenience sample of four life-
science firms based in and around Nottingham was selected to test the interview guide.  
The selection of ten interviewees within the four firms was based on a conscious effort 
to target major decision makers and equity holders.  As outlined in Chapter 1, the 
working definition of the lead academic entrepreneur was an academic or researcher 
whose occupation, prior to playing a lead role in an enterprise start-up, and possibly 
concurrent with that process, was that of an academic, clinician or researcher, 
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affiliated with an HEI.  The non-academic entrepreneur was defined as a person who 
had previously been employed in the same industry sector and who used their 
knowledge of that sector to identify opportunities.  Team members were those who 
held equity within the firm, or were representatives of equity holders, such as a TTO 
working on behalf of an HEI who held equity, and who had decision making powers.  
The firms represented a cross section of different life-science firms from different 
backgrounds, locations and phase of development.  All interviews were tested face-to-
face except for one where a telephone interview had to be scheduled.   
 
A small convenience sample was deemed acceptable for the inductive, 
exploratory pilot study because there was a limited access to funding and time.  A 
novel typology of different entrepreneurs on different environments emerged.  In 
respect to the two types of lead entrepreneurs and the two differing external 
environments, a two-by-two conceptual typology was created to manage the 
categorisation of identified entrepreneurs.  Typology construction (Figure 4.3) helped 
identify, manage and compare data from four different scenarios.   
 
Figure: 4.3:  Typology of firms established from the electronic survey 
 
 
SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
NON-SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
A 
academic entrepreneur on a 
science park/incubator unit 
 
B 
academic entrepreneur on an 
independent site 
 
NON-ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
C 
non-academic entrepreneur on a 
science park/incubator unit 
 
D 
non-academic entrepreneur on 
an independent site 
 
Possible candidates were contacted and chosen using the same criteria as 
selecting the firms for the actual study which was identifying a firm from each 
quadrant of the typology.  Using a personal network representing contacts from the 
University of Nottingham Institute for Enterprise and Innovation (UNIEI), a 
representative from the Nottingham University Research and Business Support Group, 
and the Personal Assistant to the Director of a local business incubation unit geared to 
promote life-science firms, the identification of potential firms was established.  The 
latter was influential in gaining permission to approach firms on the sponsored site and 
promoting contact with firms wishing to locate on site.  Further assistance with the 
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identification of firms was established from secondary data.  This came from 
information on the web site for the Nottingham University Science Park and from the 
commercial web site of the local governmental business development agency.   
 
In total five firms initially agreed to participate and interviews were conducted 
over May to August 2004 (Figure 4.4).  Gaining respondent co-operation called upon a 
number of strategies.  The first point of contact with the firms was through the use the 
personal network of personnel and related actors as already stated.  Research intent 
and guaranteed confidentiality outlined in letters and phone calls was also offered.  
Thereafter, two firms originating from university backgrounds and located on a 
sponsored environment agreed to be interviewed (Firms A1 and 2, Figure 4.4);  
 
Figure: 4.4:  Typology of Firms for the Pilot Study 
 
 
SPONSORED ENVIRONMENT 
NON-SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
A 
1.Food: Firm created by academics in 
conjunction with the university to explore the 
DNA composition of food products.  Firm 
located within a department and using facilities at 
the university.  This firm was at the opportunity 
development phase. 
2.Lab Testing: Firm created by academics to 
offer laboratory testing facilities to other 
pharmaceutical companies.  Firm located on 
Science Park adjacent to the university.  
Connections to their university department 
strong.  This firm was at the sustainable phase of 
development and was re-locating to a business 
park in a conscious effort to professionalise their 
image to clients by distancing themselves 
geographically from the university. 
B 
3.Sustainable Firm: Firm created by 
academic entrepreneur to offer testing 
facilities.  Firm grew from the university and 
located on a non-sponsored environment.  
This firm was at the sustainable phase of 
development.  Ultimately the entrepreneurs 
from this firm were not interviewed. 
 
 
 
 
NON-ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
C 
4.Bio Process: Firm created by a non-
academic entrepreneur.  Firm grew from the 
experience and knowledge of one scientist with 
many years experience in industry.  Located in an 
incubator unit for biotech firms.  This firm was at 
the opportunity identification phase. 
 
 
D 
5.Animals: Firm created by a non-
academic entrepreneur.  Knowledge gained 
from industrial experience and previous start-
up experience from two scientists.  One had 
substantial industrial experience.  A previous 
start-up had been sold to large American 
company.  This firm is at the opportunity 
identification phase and wishes to locate in 
the incubator unit for biotech firms but is at 
present at an office location. 
 
one from a non-university background located on a sponsored environment agreed to 
be interviewed (Firm C4) and two representatives from a non-university formulated 
firm based on a non sponsored environment agreed to be interviewed (Firm D5).  
However, ultimately, the spinout firm from Nottingham University located on a non-
sponsored environment and led by an academic entrepreneur (Firm B3) declined to 
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invite the researcher for interview.  This firm was mature and trading.  The work 
schedules of targeted personnel did not accommodate time for interview.   
 
Using a stratified approach, contact was made with a target to interview five 
people per firm: 
 
1. lead academic or non-academic entrepreneur(s) 
2. equity holding team members 
3. non-equity holding network members 
4. staff from the commercial arm of the HEI 
5. and members of professional business advisory bodies 
 
The number of people interviewed varied between organisations and the target of five 
proved to be optimistic.  In only one firm were five people interviewed (Firm A1, 
Figure 4.4).  These included two academic entrepreneurs, one business adviser, a 
surrogate entrepreneur and a member of the HEI from the Technology Transfer Office 
(TTO).  In another two firms two people were interviewed (e.g. academic 
entrepreneurs and scientists) (Firms A2 and D5), whilst in the firm at the sustainable 
stage only one person had time to be interviewed (Firm C4, Figure 4.4).  In total ten 
people were interviewed.  No interviews were conducted with an academic 
entrepreneur on a non-sponsored environment (Firm B3).   
 
During both the pilot study over May to August 2004 and the main study over 
January to April 2005 I wished to generate consistency and understanding through 
analysis of the data across the four categories.  Rather than ensuring similar number of 
cases in each quadrant, theoretical sampling allowed for one case per quadrant.  Each 
identified firm was at a similar phase of development.  They had passed through their 
opportunity identification phase, but none of the firms in the main study were trading.  
However, access to identified organisations was difficult to negotiate.  This was a 
recognised weakness in the case-study approach.  In the main study different numbers 
of firms were sampled in each quadrant.  A new target of three interviews per 
organisation proved manageable and contact was normally and consistently made with 
the lead entrepreneurs and equity holding team members.  Some firms at early stages 
in development offered a limited choice of candidates for interview.  Membership was 
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often restricted and individual roles blurred.  For this reason, on two occasions, the 
OHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUVUHTXHVWHGWKDWµSULYLOHJHGZLWQHVVHV¶RUQRQ-equity team members, 
be interviewed because there were insufficient equity holders.   
 
After firms were identified, face-to-IDFHµTXDOLWDWLYH LQWHUYLHZV¶ZHUHXVHGDV
the main instrument for gathering data.  All interviews were taped.  The interview 
situation became the centre of production of meanings that addressed issues relating to 
the research concerns.  The goal was thus to analyse the way in which respondents 
considered events, the reasons they offered for doing so, and attributing meaning to 
their reasons.  It was anticipated that not all opportunities for commercialisation would 
have been identified in exactly the same way.  This primary data was for preliminary 
analysis and to test the data collection methods and tools.  The interview guide 
allowed for this flexibility but at the same time provided a structure for comparability 
between cases.  Key questions were identified but clarification and elaboration from 
the respondents was sought.   
 
4.4.4 Stage 4: Preliminary Coding and Analysis of the Pilot Study 
In examining the interview data, the first phase in analysis involved the full 
transcription of each interview.  All interviews in the pilot study were taped and 
transcribed literally.  Interviews were all face-to-face except for one where a telephone 
interview was conducted due to distance and workload schedules.  The interviews 
lasted from 45 minutes to 1 hour and 10 minutes and in total the interviews lasted 10.5 
hours.  In total 109 pages of transcript were produced.  All interviewees were initially 
asked for a 45 minute slot.  The interview was divided into four sections and often the 
seam between sections was naturally bridged by participants without prompting.  Most 
interviews took place in the offices of the interviewees but two requested that 
interviews be conducted at Nottingham University Business School (NUBS).  On 
average it took the researcher 6 to 8 hours to transcribe one interview.   
 
The second phase of the analysis of the pilot case-studies involved returning 
the transcripts to the interviewees for confirmation and accuracy (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985).  The transcripts were found to be too literal.  The literal versions were messy 
and sentences disjointed.  Interviewees inevitably tried to rewrite their scripts 
FRUUHFWLQJ JUDPPDU  7KLV GHWUDFWHG IURP WKH µVHQVH¶ RI WKH GDWD DQG ZDVWHG WLPH
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Later transcripts were, therefore, returned for confirmation as coherent synopsis.  
From the perspective of the researcher, transcription and the process of transcribing 
allowed for a familiarisation of each participant.  Each transcript was read several 
times and detailed notes made.  This initiated the first stages in content analysis.  
Qualitative data in the form of field notes made by the researcher immediately after 
each interview also permitted a familiarity and closeness with data.   
 
The transcriptions were then transferred in rich text to a computer assisted 
qualitative data analysis software package (CQDAS) called NVivo (Figure 4.5).   
 
Figure 4.5: NVivo:  Interview Transcript 
 
 
NVivo has been used as a technique for storing and analysing qualitative data 
(e.g. transcripts of intervLHZV  19LYR LV FDWHJRULVHG DV D µFRGH-based-theory-
EXLOGLQJ¶ SURJUDP GHVLJQHG WR VWRUH FRGH UHWULHYH DQG DQDO\VH WH[WV *LEEV 
With such ability it was possible for the researcher to divide the text into segments and 
to store each segment under a certain name (e.g. a node) (Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.6: NVivo:  All Nodes 
 
 
The link that was created between the text and code was then maintained, in 
order for more analysis to take place.  One strength of NVivo is that it can be used for 
theory building because it holds the connections between codes in order to develop 
more abstract categories (Figure 4.7).   
 
This assisted in a further stage in analysis, namely that of identifying themes 
that contributed to a deeper understanding of opportunity identification, team 
formation, learning and the influence of the external environment.  Data was analysed 
in a multi-stage process using a process of open coding, axial coding and then core 
coding (Gibbs, 2002).  Open coding reflected where the text within the transcripts was 
FDWHJRULVHGDQGJLYHQDµQRGHWLWOH¶ZKLFKUHIOHFWHGDJHQHUDOSKHQRPHQD7KHVHRSHQ
codes revolved around general themes identified from literature but also reflected new  
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Figure 4.7: NVivo:  Examples of Links 
 
 
themes categorised unGHU µIUHHQRGHV¶ ([DPSOHVRI IUHHQRGHV LQFOXGHGKXPRXU LQ
the face of risk; industrial/academic collaboration and links with the USA (Figure 4.8).  
µ$[LDO FRGLQJ¶ KHOSHG UHGXFH WKH QXPEHU RI FDWHJRULHV E\ UHILQLQJ GHYHORSLQJ DQG
relating categories to central themes.  Interviewees gave examples of skills brought by 
other members in their teams and highlighted the importance of human capital within 
the team, where it came from and to what use it was put.  At this stage quotes were 
presented and examples of questions offered which were used to interrogate the data to 
encourage the emergence of other concepts.   
 
7KH ILQDO VWDJHRI WKH DQDO\VLV LQYROYHG µVHOHFWLYHRU FRUH FRGLQJ¶ZKHUH WKH
intention was to relate all central categories into a theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  
This part of the analysis involved the clustering of data that confirmed emergent 
relationships.  As an experiment, and to emphasise the inductive approach to theory 
development, emergent theoretical propositions were written up from the data without 
due consideration being given to the theoretical perspectives influencing this study.   
 107 
Figure 4.8: NVivo:  Examples of Free Nodes with Script 
 
However, I had to constantly remind myself that the themes under study were linked 
to the reviHZHG OLWHUDWXUH  7KH µXQIROGLQJ OLWHUDWXUH¶ DOORZHG IRU GHYHORSPHQW RI
theory which, grounded in the data, meant that the resultant theory had stronger 
FUHGLELOLW\ DQG GHHSHU FRQFHSWXDO LQVLJKW  ³$Q HVVHQWLDO SDUW RI WKHRU\ EXLOGLQJ LV
comparison of emergent concepts, theory, or hypotheses with the extant literature.  
7KLV LQYROYHV DVNLQJ ZKDW LV WKLV VLPLODU WR ZKDW GRHV LW FRQWUDGLFW DQG ZK\´
(Eisnehardt, 1989, p. 544).   
 
Theory building was enhanced through the development of a coding and 
category structure within the NVivo program allowing quotes to be stored, matched 
for similarities or differences under headings or codes.  The initial number of headings 
were organised and reduced to create a more coherent structure.  Analytical closeness 
was demonstrated by quoting directly from the entrepreneurs and team members and 
through a process of self questioning used to disentangle quotes in search of a 
potential categories properties or dimensions.  This included looking for quotes 
identifying opportunities.  I then fished behind the narratives for reasons and 
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relationships leading to the identification of the opportunity.  Matrices of within and 
across case quotations were compared to emphasise differences (Figures 4.9 and 4.10). 
 
4.4.5 Stage 5: Revision of the Interview Guide 
The interview guide was tested pre-pilot for content validity on colleagues and 
reviewed by my supervisors.  Pre-testing the research instruments was completed for 
the detection of flaws, biases, vocabulary, timing and general understanding.  It also 
allowed for the revision of problem areas (Oppenheim, 2000).  During the pilot 
interviews, the interviewees were asked for their general impression of the interview 
guide.  Usually feedback extended beyond impressions of the contents of the interview 
guide to encompass pointers about the actual interview process and how questions 
were asked.  For example, after one of the earliest pilot interviews the interviewee 
stated that he felt that I could have been more inquiring in my style.  Listening skills 
improved and confidence increased throughout the process to ask more inquiring 
questions.   
 
Figure 4.9: NVivo:  Matrices 
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Figure 4.10: NVivo:  Matices and Script Example 
 
 
&KHFNV ZHUH DOVR PDGH RQ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ JHQHUDO UHVSRQVHV DQG QRQ-verbal 
responses.  Comments were collected about the general vocabulary used during the 
interview and words changed to make the inquiry clearer.  Accordingly, the interview 
guide was revisited several times and adjusted in accordance with feedback.  I was 
DVNHG ZKDW , PHDQW E\ RQH ZRUG RQ QXPHURXV RFFDVLRQV  7KH ZRUG µIDFWRU¶ ZDV
considered ambiguous and substituted with more descriptive words such as people, 
HYHQWVSURPRWLRQVHWFDQGWKHZRUGµVSLQRXW¶ZDVUHSODFHGE\µILUP¶EHFDXVHVRPH
entrepreneurs did not consider their firms to be spinouts from their parent HEI.  The 
original pilot survey used the terms university / non-university to describe the 
differences between companies.  This categorisation proved to be inefficient in 
describing the companies because companies based on university sites and led by 
academic entrepreneurs did not describe themselves as university spinouts.  The main 
reason for this contention lay with Intellectual Property (IP) ownership of which there 
were several combinations.  The inconsistency observed around issues of IP 
ownership made categorisation difficult according to the original division.  There was 
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consistency however, based on the status of the lead entrepreneur (e.g. academic or 
non-academic).   
 
The questions themselves however remained open ended.  The order of 
questions and the practicalities of using both digital and traditional cassette tape 
recorders explored.  Specific checks were made about the length of time allocated to 
questions and averages of time taken to answer questions.  The questions asked first 
were more general relating to factual information about the firm and the interviewee 
(e.g. length of service and role within the firm).  This was an effort to put the 
interviewees at ease.  The questions became more focused thereafter.  I then honed in 
on specific topics and inquired further about new issues as they arose.  The interviews 
were standardised in their presentation to the interviewees to allow for a 
harmonisation of general introduction, guarantee of confidentiality and research 
purpose.  The protocol took the following format.  I introduced myself, stated which 
institution I represented and the motivations behind my research.  The purpose of the 
research as part of a PhD programme was explained and how the data would be used 
was clarified.  A brief outline of the interview format was offered and how the data 
would be handled, maintaining confidentiality and anonymity.  Some of this 
information was volunteered prior to the actual interview date and permission to tape 
the interviews established preceding the meetings.  Reaction was gauged to the further 
request for the interviewee to check their interview transcript to confirm authenticity.  
At this stage an opportunity was offered to the interviewee to add to the transcript or 
make further comment.   
 
In an effort to overlap data collection and data analysis, transcriptions of 
detailed interviews were processed promptly and general observations and 
descriptions recorded.  Patterns were established both within cases and across cases.  
Dimensions or categories within cases were dictated by the type of environment in 
which it was located and by whom they were led (e.g. paired cases led by similar types 
of entrepreneurs but in different environments).  Listing similarities and differences 
between the cases forced me to look more closely at the cases.  These processes were 
conducted during and after interviews.  All the lead entrepreneurs had formed a firm 
but were still close to their opportunity identification phase of development.  All 
interviewees were asked to reflect on the process of opportunity identification using 
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re-call.  The entrepreneurs inevitably moved their stories forward to include events 
leading to firm formation.  The process was not tidy but this comparative case-study 
approach offered an iterative experience dictated to by an evolving and increasing 
interest in the firm formation process reflected in recent journal articles.  The process 
of data collection uncovered new themes and patterns within and between cases 
involving academic versus non-academic on sponsored versus non-sponsored 
environments.   
 
4.4.6 Stage 6: Email-Survey in Scotland  
Following on from the pilot study an electronic survey of life-science firms in 
Scotland was conducted.  The initial population of life-science firms in Scotland was 
identified from the following main data sources: Scottish Enterprise: Biotechnology 
Scotland Source Book (2003); Scottish Institute for Enterprise and MIT 
Entrepreneurship Centre, (2004); websites run by Scottish Enterprise (e.g. 
www.talentscotland.com).  Using this information a population of 125 independent 
and subsidiary life-science firms was identified in Scotland during the summer of 
2004.  A geographical boundary was set between the three cities of Dundee, 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, where there is recognised life-science activity (Forbes and 
Low, 2004).  Those firms lying north of Dundee and in the Borders or Islands were 
not contacted because time was limited.  The selection of cases for this study was 
governed by a boundary spanning exercise conducted early in the research process.  
This was done due to time, resource and travel limitations.  Only independent and 
subsidiary firms were targeted in the geographical confine.  Within this area 109 firms 
were identified.  The focus of the study identified lead entrepreneurs as individuals 
engaged in opportunity identification.  Independent firms were, therefore, sought and 
not multinationals or joint ventures.  Nine were eliminated (e.g. non-contacts) at this 
early stage because they were either multinationals or had no contact details available; 
websites were under construction and offered no information; access was denied to 
sites; incorrect URLs were provided; firms had stopped trading or there had been a 
misrepresentation of firm status (e.g. not life-science firms but were distributors or 
venture capitalists).  Contact was thereafter made with the 100 independent firms.  The 
survey related to visible firms listed in the selected trade directory which may not have 
related to the population of all life-science firms.  Nevertheless, this was not 
considered to pose a problem given the focus of this study.   
 112 
The survey included a covering letter requesting participation, stating the 
objectives of the survey, the purpose of the survey and guaranteeing confidentiality.  
The letter contained three questions and was used as a preliminary, exploratory tool to 
gather data from firms about origin, location and phase of development (Appendix 6).  
6XFK D GHVFULSWLYH VXUYH\ DQVZHUHG µKRZ PDQ\¶ TXHVWLRQV DQG SURYLGHG GHVFULSWLYH
information about the firms.  The purpose of the survey was to gather, name and 
allocate valid firms to each quadrant.  As in the pilot study, cases were linked to a 
theoretical sampling framework where the aim was to identify examples in each 
quadrant, not to have correspondingly equal numbers.   
 
The explanatory letter accompanying the survey ensured confidentiality and 
anonymity whilst at the same time establishing contact with one targeted member in 
the organisation (Appendix 6).  It was decided to administer the survey via email for 
convenience, speed and ease of access for both the researcher and the recipients.  The 
questions were factual and took only a few minutes to answer.  It was considered that 
there could be little misinterpretation of the questions because of the factual nature of 
the questions.  No control, however, was built in to check who answered the survey.  
Respondent identity was usually revealed through email signatures and noted if 
different from the original addressee.  Email was considered the most expeditious way 
of reaching the firms that were dispersed within and around a geographical triangle 
reaching between Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee.  Table 4.4 provides a timetable 
review of events leading to the design and implementation of the survey. 
 
Table 4.4:  Survey Design and Development 
Date Task 
May & June 2004 Identification of firms from secondary data (Biotechnology Scotland Source Book 
(2003); Scotland Institute for Enterprise and MIT Entrepreneurship (2004); Talent 
Scotland: www.talentscotland.com 
June/July 2004 Geographical division and coding of firms.  Boundary setting around a 
geographical triangle between Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee to control for time 
and travel restrictions using a population of 125 firms. 
July 2004 Design of email survey; accompanying statement of purpose and intent.  
July/August 2004 Sourcing of contact names and details of firms. 
Email distributed. 
August/September 
2004 
Email reminders and phone follow up. Collection of data.  Total number of 
respondents was 63. 
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The email survey was conducted to distinguish between firms in terms of 
origin, location and phase of development (Appendix 6) and led to a polarisation of 
cases e.g. :   
 
x Academic entrepreneur versus non-academic entrepreneur 
x Located on sponsored versus non-sponsored external environments 
x Phase of development of the firm   
 
This led to a four-way categorisation of firms as follows: 
 
x A: Academic entrepreneurs located on a sponsored environment. 
x B: Academic entrepreneurs located on a non-sponsored environment. 
x C: Non-academic entrepreneurs located on a sponsored environment. 
x D: Non-academic entrepreneurs located on a non-sponsored environment. 
 
4.4.7 Stage 7: Survey Results and Identification of Firms  
Thirty firms declined to participate or simply did not respond to follow on 
emails or follow up phone calls.  With the 70 respondents a typology of firms was 
developed identifying firms from different origins, located in different external 
environments and representing different phases of development.  During the process 
of categorising a further 7 firms were dropped because they were not life science 
firms.  Sixty-three firms remained in the valid sample.  The remaining 63 valid 
responses were then mapped onto the conceptual typology (Figure 4.11)   
 
Figure: 4.11:  Typology of life-science firms identified from the email survey 
 
 
SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
NON-SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
A 
Led by an academic 
entrepreneur on a science 
park/incubator unit 
29 
 
B 
Led by an academic 
entrepreneur on an independent 
site 
5 
 
 
NON-ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
C 
Led by a non-academic 
entrepreneur on a science 
park/incubator unit 
10 
 
D 
Led by a non-academic 
entrepreneur on an independent 
site 
19 
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Of the 63 valid responses, 28 were identified as valid respondents from the 
opportunity identification phase.  Figure 4.12 shows that 14 respondents were 
allocated to Quadrant A; in Quadrant B 1 respondent was allocated; six respondents 
were allocated to Quadrant C and 7 respondents were allocated to Quadrant D.   
 
Figure: 4.12:  Typology of valid respondents  
 
 
SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
NON-SPONSORED 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
ACADEMIC 
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NON- ACADEMIC 
ENTREPRENEUR 
 
C 
Led by a non-academic 
entrepreneur on a science 
park/incubator unit 
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D 
Led by a non-academic 
entrepreneur on an independent 
site 
7 
 
 
The main study relied on a theoretical sample (Glaser and Strauss, 1968).  
Since the purpose of the study was to build theory, not to test it, theoretical sampling 
was acceptable (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  The theoretical sample included 
cases that provided good comparison and were examples of polar types (e.g. academic 
and non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored external 
environments) to highlight potential differences or similarities (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) in a study of strategic decision making used this 
µSRODULVLQJ¶ WHFKQLTXH WR LQFOXGH FDVHV VXFK DV IRXQGHU YHUVXV SURIHVVLRQDO
management; high versus low performance; first versus second generation product and 
large versus small.  Comparing academic and non-academic entrepreneurs allowed 
FRQWDFW ZLWK VHYHUDO µOLNH¶ W\SHV RI HQWUHSUHQHXUV DQG DOORZHG IRU FRPSDULVRQV
EHWZHHQ µOLNH¶ DQG SRODU W\SHV RI FDVHV (LVHQKardt, 1989), forcing explanation and 
exploration for causal relationships (e.g. between past experience and present choices).  
Pettigrew (1990) suggests that an important guideline for choosing polar types is to 
select cases that may disconfirm patterns from earlier case-studies.  Another 
recommendation from Pettigrew (1990) is to consider the choice of case-studies where 
SURJUHVV LV ³WUDQVSDUHQWO\ REVHUYDEOH´ 3HWWLJUHZ  S  HJ DW D FULWLFDO
incident).  The intention was to choose case-studies at a particular phase of 
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development (e.g. the opportunity identification phase).  Theoretical sampling thus 
allowed a process of collecting data for comparative analysis.   
 
This will be discussed later but suffice to note that the sample was not 
representative of a population nor the results generalisable to a representative 
population.  Ultimately, each participant was chosen because they represented a 
unique position amongst academic or non-academic entrepreneurs located on 
sponsored or non-sponsored environments.  However, from the richness of the 
personalised data comes forth a weakness in the form of low reliability.  
Generalisation can only take place to the theoretical and not the statistical as can be 
done with quantitative data.  Notwithstanding, the cases were chosen to deliberately 
YDU\WKHFRQWH[WRIµKRZ¶GLIIHUHQWHQWUHSUHQHXUVGHDOWZLWKRSSRUWXQLW\LGHQWLILFDWLRQ
and the resources required for firm formation.  All of the cases were located in 
Scotland and governed by one blanket governmental policy towards the 
commercialisation of life-science knowledge.  The choice of cases across the four 
quadrants offered an opportunity for comparison and research to address the research 
objectives from four different perspectives.  These comparisons have not been dealt 
with in earlier research.  Earlier case-study research examined spinout firms from 
university and research institute backgrounds only.  None have looked at differences 
in the entrepreneurs leading firms from HEI and industry backgrounds.  However, as 
will be seen in the analysis, during the research several firms were fluid in their 
approach to the entrepreneurial process and re-visited the opportunity identification 
phase depending on availability of resources.   
 
4.4.8 Stage 8: Categorisation of Firms and Case Selection 
A one page letter of explanation, endorsed by my supervisors, was sent to the 
28 identified independent and subsidiary life-science firms outlining the purpose and 
nature of the academic research, guaranteeing confidentiality and requesting co-
operation (Appendix 7).  Full anonymity was also promised.  Thereafter, phone calls 
were made to support the initial request for interviews.  Nine lead entrepreneurs 
agreed to allow me access to interview three members of their organisations, including 
themselves (Figure 4.13).  In Quadrant A, 4 firms were interviewed; Quadrant B, 1 
firm was interviewed; Quadrant C, 1 firm was interviewed and in Quadrant D, 3 firms 
were interviewed.  Since the external conditions were considered to be similar over all 
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cases the numbers needed to be explored were deemed fewer.  Nine cases were 
deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of the research.  Less than four was considered 
LQVXIILFLHQW (LVHQKDUGW   ³%HWZHHQ IRXU DQG WHQ FDVHV XVXDOO\ ZRUNV Zell.  
With fewer than four cases, it is often difficult to generate theory with much 
complexity, and its empirical grounding is likely to be unconvincing, unless the case 
has several mini-FDVHVZLWKLQLW´(LVHQKDUGWS 
 
Figure: 4.13:  Typology of firms selected for study 
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In all cases the lead entrepreneur remained the main contact.  The contact with 
the lead entrepreneur was consistent during the initial email survey, during the time 
for organising interviews and during the interview session.  The lead entrepreneur also 
identified team members to be interviewed.  They were asked to identify team 
members who were equity holders and decision makers.  This request was mostly 
fulfilled but several firms had too few team members and in these cases the lead 
entrepreneur identified the TTOs or an influential board member as being significant 
contributors to the opportunity identification process.  This was accepted knowing that 
they did not fulfil the criteria set in the definition of an equity holding team member.  
Although a target of three people per firm was sought in two firms only two people 
were interviewed because either the lead entrepreneurs could not identify another 
suitable person to interview or other team members were inaccessible.  Lead 
entrepreneurs were contacted over a period of a year on a minimum of five occasions.  
The first was to complete the email survey; the second was to request cooperation in 
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the form of an interview; the third was to organise interviews and with whom; the 
fourth was to conduct the interview and fifth to confirm transcript manuscripts.   
 
4.4.9 Stage 9: Case-Studies in Scotland 
Gaining respondent co-operation and motivation to be interviewed called upon 
a consistent and clear communication and coordination with the nine lead 
entrepreneurs representing opportunity identification life-science firms at the time of 
the email survey.  Although the history of the movement of the companies is traced, 
the choice of companies was made according to their initial categorisation as a result 
of the email survey conducted in September 2004.  Face-to-face interviews were 
scheduled during a period January to April 2005.  Twenty five interviews were 
conducted on a one-to-one basis except for one occasion where a lead entrepreneur 
and team member from the same company had to be interviewed together because of 
time constraints.  Companies were given case numbers for ease of identification and 
anonymity and are summarised in Figure 4.14.   
 
Figure: 4.14:  Typology of firms at the time of the email survey 
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Fourteen of the interviewees were lead entrepreneurs.  The lead entrepreneurs were 
always the first to be interviewed.  Five interviews were with team members and three 
were with Technology Transfer Officers from three different HEIs.  Three interviews 
were conducted with non-executive board members (Table 4.5).   
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Table 4.5 Interviewees 
Company Lead 
Entrepreneurs 
Team 
Members 
Technical Transfer 
Officers 
Board 
Members 
Total 
Company 1 1 2   3 
Company 2 2  1  3 
Company 3 2  1  3 
Company 4 1 1  1 3 
Company 5 2  1  3 
Company 6 1 1  1 3 
Company 7 2    2 
Company 8 2   1 3 
Company 9 1 1   2 
Total 14 5 3 3 25 
 
A fuller description of each firm in relation to who led them, where they were located, 
the origins of ideas for commercialisation, an outline of their research and 
development and the role of the interviewee is offered in Table 4.6.  Table 4.6 shows 
that Companies 1, 5, 6, and 8 were involved in creating instrumentation for testing 
drugs, toxicity levels or for the separation of DNA.  Companies 2 and 7 were 
researching the creation of new enzymes or cell lines.  Two companies, Companies 2 
and 7 researched new and innovative devices for the dental and medical market whilst 
Company 9 was creating a new pesticide.  The origin of these opportunities and ideas 
was related to the past experiences of the lead entrepreneurs either through direct basic 
academic research, past industrial experience, past start up experience or from 
practical hands on experience like farming (Company 9).  Their location, either on or 
off a sponsored environment, is recorded as are any previous locations.  This aspect of 
the study revealed more changes once interviews were concluded.  The changes in the 
external environment were mapped.  All people interviewed and their roles within the 
firms recorded.   
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The longitudinal aspect of the study evolved after initial contact.  Real time 
data emerged at two points in time:  
 
x Venture credibility 1st phase identified during the electronic survey 
x Venture credibility 2nd phase identified during face-to-face interviews 
x Opportunity identification phase and entrepreneurial commitment phase were 
gathered retrospectively (Figure 4.15). 
 
Entrepreneurs experiencing early phases of firm formation were identified 
because a method to identify entrepreneurs at the point of opportunity identification 
proved difficult.  Approaching TTOs, attached to HEIs, and asking them to identify 
potential academic entrepreneurs was possible but the same method could not be 
replicated for non-academic entrepreneurs.  Firms close to the opportunity 
identification phase were identified from an electronic survey of life science firms 
established in and around central Scotland.  Following the cases in real time, 
WKHUHDIWHUDOORZHGIRUWKHPDSSLQJRIUHVRXUFHOHYHUDJHIURPWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶RZQ
human and social capital, from recruited team members and from the external 
environment.  Using such a method, the process of opportunity identification revealed 
itself not to be a one off event in the entrepreneurial process but one which was 
influenced by resource inputs and one which was often re-visited depending on 
resources allocation.  Data collection from each case took place over a period of a 
year.  Semi-structured in-depth interviews with the lead entrepreneurs and team 
members were substantiated with individual firm literature, where available.   
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4.4.10 Stage 10: Coding and Analysis of Data Collected in Scotland 
Additional demographic information relating to the individual firms was stored 
according to their status at the time of interview.  Information pertaining to their date 
of formation, date IP was registered, industrial sector and legal form of the firm (Table 
4.7).  All nine firms had been founded and formed between the years of 1997 and 
2003.  Two were founded prior to 2000 and the others between 2001 and 2003.  
Registration of IP, for the protection of new knowledge, normally occurred some years 
prior to firm formation.  Lead entrepreneurs reported spending time and resources 
protecting their knowledge with patent agents.  If there was a strong academic 
connection within the firm it was possible that the IP had been registered as part of the 
academic process prior to the conception of a commercial application or venturing.  
All nine firms were limited companies whilst one entered the AIM market during the 
duration of the study.   
 
Transcripts were returned to the interviewees for confirmation that they 
reflected an accurate description of the interview.  The interviewee was asked to add 
or subtract information at this stage.  All but eight interviewees returned their scripts.  
The transcripts were then converted into rich texts and transferred to NVivo, a 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CASQDAS) programme.  An 
advantage of the program was that it stored transcripts and simplified and speeded the 
mechanical aspect of analysis.  The program did not make conceptual decisions.  
Interpretation of the data was left to me.  Additionally, field notes and memos from 
individual interviews were transcribed based on reflections and observations made 
after each interview (Figure 4.16).  The chronological ordering of the data was vital in 
specific connection to the entrepreneurial process, external location, and the 
recruitment of team members. 
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Figure 4.16: NVivo Memo: The Drive Away from Academia 
 
 
During the course of the research some of the lead entrepreneurs experienced 
changes and progression in the entrepreneurial process because they were able to 
access resources to overcome barriers to commercialisation.  Sometimes this was 
accompanied by a change in the external environmental location.  Information 
pertaining to three points in time were identified first, through an electronic survey of 
the life-science firms completed in 2004 to confirm the origin of the lead entrepreneur 
(e.g. academic or non-academic entrepreneur), the location of the entrepreneur and the 
proposed opportunity (e.g. on a sponsored or non-sponsored environment) and the 
phase of entrepreneurial development (e.g. opportunity identification or not).  Second, 
during the time of face-to-face interviews in 2005, identified lead entrepreneurs and 
team members were questioned about their choice of environments and access to 
resources and reasons for choice of external environment.  It was during interviews 
that a third point in time was established (e.g. location at the opportunity identification 
phase).  It became apparent that there was a dynamic process in play whereby 
entrepreneurs changed environments.  These observed changes made for challenging 
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and interesting research because it was not anticipated.  Results may be a general 
reflection of the movement and progress of firms close to opportunity identification 
within the life-science sector.  Arranging data into chronological order allowed me to 
determine the cause for events over time.  One of the most obvious changes was seen 
when people moved from sponsored to non-sponsored environments and then back 
again.  Changes were mapped and a fuller discussion is offered in Chapter 7. 
 
Although none of the firms in the study reached the entrepreneurial phase of 
sustainability, they fluctuated between phases in the entrepreneurial process.  Mapping 
those changes chronologically indicated that the process was not linear but iterative.  
The data allowed a search for possible reasons to such events.  The reasons offered 
conjecture both for the success of crossing a critical juncture to a growth phase and 
also for the failure to cross a critical juncture to return to a previous phase in 
development.  The identification of sequences of events and rationale helped answer 
WKH µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶TXHVWLRQV VHW WRJXLGH WKH VWXG\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKKXPDQFDSLWDO
profiles, the recruitment of team members and the effect of the external environment 
RQHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶DFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHV 
 
Preliminary coding headings were created based on past literature to help give 
structure to the coding process.  Once a preliminary examination of the transcripts had 
been carried out, a process of open coding continued (Figure 4.17 and Figure 4.18).  
Open coding dealt with initial analysis by labelling and categorising phenomena as 
indicated by the data.  The concepts produced from this process allowed for a search 
of similarities and difference across the cases.  Open coding required the constant 
asking of questions by me about what, where, how, when, why etc.  Subsequently, 
similar incidents were compared across cases and grouped together.  Some examples 
of questions asked are: Why had a lead entrepreneur had chosen a particular external 
environment?  What resource benefits did they gain from it?  Who did they have 
contact with in that setting?  How did the lead entrepreneur gain access to that external 
environment?  When did they change their external environment?  What, (why and 
how) did they say they got out of it?  Similar incidents were given the same 
conceptual label.  This focused my attention to make links between data to reduce it 
and to link it to extant literature.   
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Figure 4.17: NVivo:  Tree Nodes 
 
 
Figure 4.18: NVivo:  Tree Nodes and Script 
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Although the research questions centUHGRQµZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶LVVXHVWKHDLPRI
FRGLQJ ZDV QRW QHFHVVDULO\ WR ILQG QHZ µFDWHJRULHV¶ DV LQ JURXQGHG WKHRU\ EXW WR
µFDWHJRULVH¶UHDVRQVIRUWKHVHHYHQWVKDSSHQLQJDQGWKHQWRVXEVHTXHQWO\PDNHFURVV-
case comparisons.  Main themes had been identified from the literature but there had 
been gaps or insufficient information provided to speculate why certain actions and 
events within the entrepreneurial process happened.  Most coding was done in-vivo 
and a new and extensive list of nodes created which looked for answers to the main 
research questions.  This group of nodes yielded some localised concepts specific to 
individual cases.  However, the next stage of axial coding allowed for a categorisation 
of nodes within similar cases and across cases.  Nodes were thus combined to make 
interconnected tree nodes and every effort was made to focus on the original research 
questions to centre results.   
 
Axial coding, exploring relationships between categories and consequences of 
the evolving concepts, was performed to look for causal reasons.  Some of the causal 
reasons could be linked to the prior empirical evidence, some to substantiate 
theoretical linkages to resource search, leverage and accumulation and some to 
expanding existing knowledge.  The connection of categories was done by linking 
codes to contexts, to consequences, to patterns of interaction and to causes.  The link 
that was created between the text and the code was maintained in the computer 
package allowing for more analysis and refinements to take place.  Axial coding 
therefore brought back together data by making connections between a category and 
sub-categories, between and across cases.   
 
Matrices and Sets were then created to compare attributes of the four different 
quadrants recognised in the typology of firms using different coding themes.  This 
allowed for cross-case analysis.  Within cases and between cases, groups of quotes and 
observations emerged in respect to the themes, which were the core of the study 
(Figure 4.19).  In this analysis, interviews were coded according to experiences during 
opportunity identification; during team formation; recording the resource benefits of 
locating in certain environments and exploring how learning was initiated during the 
opportunity identification phase of spinout firm formation.  Each experience included 
a number of concepts that were central and common to the respondents in the study 
and that characterised their experiences.  The subdivisions connected to each central  
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Figure 4. 19 NVivo: Sets (Past Education) 
 
 
concept facilitated a deeper understanding of each theme.  Whilst similarities and 
differences in the data were noted during axial coding, the phase of core coding 
allowed for the identification of core categories which systematically linked to the 
other categories, validating relationships across cases for further refinement of 
explanation and development.  Causal conditions were sought which related events 
leading to the core categories.  This process allowed for the conceptualisation of the 
theoretical framework as it brought codes, concepts and categories together.   
 
Education, for example, attributed to general human capital, not only was a 
necessary prerequisite for the discovery of an opportunity, through a process of 
experimentation and research, but also had a bearing on lead entrepreneurs ability to 
win backing from resource providers.  This was especially true of lead entrepreneurs 
who had gained full professor status.  Their academic status, education level and 
subsequently attributed reputation compensated for their lack of commercial 
experience when applying for first round funding from venture capitalists.  In terms of 
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the external environmental context, there was a general trend for lead academic 
HQWUHSUHQHXUVWREHµSXVKHG¶DZay from their original sponsored environments whilst 
non-academic entrepreneurs were attracted towards sponsored environments.  This 
observation resulted in movements between sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments.  Resource providers attributed the required movement away from 
sponsored environments to a potential over reliance, on behalf of the lead 
entrepreneurs, on easy access resources in a sponsored environment.  As a process, 
opportunity identification was seen as a phase which was re-visited on repeated 
RFFDVLRQV GHSHQGLQJ RQ UHVRXUFH DYDLODELOLW\  /HDG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SULPH LQLWLDO
motivations for forming a firm may have included the manufacture of a product, but as 
they developed their product and skills as entrepreneurs, their strategies for taking 
their products to market changed as did their actual products on several occasions.  As 
the lead academic entrepreneurs extended their market knowledge and increased their 
commercial understanding, for example, their aspirations for their potential product or 
process changed.  The final phase in the coding and analysis procedure was deriving 
propositions from the data which consisted of linking each proposition with supporting 
evidence from the data, in the form of quotations and then drawing out a more 
detached logic for more forward thinking.  This forward thinking included an 
evaluation and building or refining of the theoretical stances used to guide the study. 
 
4.5 Building Theory from Case Studies 
Building theory from case-study research as an inductive process is well 
documented (Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Cobin, 1990).  
A previous criticism of case-study method is that it has relied on combining 
observations from previous literature and experience without paying sufficient 
attention to the actual data generated (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In this research the data are 
used to provide description, prepare propositions and build theory.  Past research 
focusing on firm formation by academic entrepreneurs has failed to fully cover the 
opportunity identification phase of the entrepreneurial process leading to firm 
formation and has been preoccupied with the latter stages of growth.  Through the 
theoretical lenses of human and social capital theory and the RBV of the firm 
theoretical propositions emerged from the accounts of experiences offered by the 
individual entrepreneurs and team members.  This was done by being attentive to 
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VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHVZKLFKLQWXUQZHUH³DEVWUDFWHGLQWRWKHRUHWLFDOVWDWHPHQWVDERXW
causal relations bHWZHHQDFWRUV´6XGGDE\S8OWLPDWHO\WKHJRDOZDVWR
OLIW GDWD WR D OHYHO RI DEVWUDFWLRQ DERYH ZKDW WKH GDWD UHSUHVHQWV LWVHOI ³WR GHYHORS
µERWWRP-XS¶ LQWHUSUHWLYH WKHRULHV WKDWDUH LQH[WULFDEO\ µJURXQGHG¶ LQ WKH OLYHG-ZRUOG´
(Cope, 2005, p171).  The intent of the study was to build on theory, inductively, and 
enable a better explanation and understanding of the opportunity identification phase.  
Theory was emergent when patterns of relationships were recognised within and 
across cases and rested on the variety of contexts to which it held descriptive power 
(Cope, 2005; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  This interpretive practice was achieved 
E\ GHYHORSLQJ D µWUXVWZRUWK\¶ DFFRXQW RI WKH SKHQRPHQRQ LQ TXHVWLRQ /LQFROQ DQG
Guba, 1985).  Rich description played an important role in the process of inductive 
theory building through a continual and iterative relationship with the data.   
 
Another strength of building theory from case studies is that the resulting 
propositions may be used in future studies to test verifiability.  The inductive leads to 
WKHGHGXFWLYH³ZLWKLQGXFWLYHWKHRU\EXLOGLQJIURPFDVHVSURGXFLQJQHZWKHRU\IURP
data and deductive theory testing completing the cycle by using data (or the 
propositions resulting from data analysis) WR WHVW WKHRU\´ (LVHQKDUGW 
Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  Thus, an inductive model begins with observations 
leading to the building of theory through inductive reasoning.  From case studies 
theory building using the empirical data, from within, can be used to create theoretical 
constructs and propositions (Colquitt and Zapata, 2007).  The resultant theory and 
propositions are likely to be empirically valid because the proposition building process 
and the theory building process are intimately tied to empirical observations (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990).  Because the researcher is close to the data, the interaction with the 
actual evidence is likely to produce theory that reflects reasons for events described by 
the interviewees and interpreted by the researcher.  In other words, theories are not 
built with the actual activities or words spoken but through a process of analysing 
these indicators that are relationally and communally constituted and for which 
conceptual labels or themes are given.  
 
However, on the negative side, the volume of rich data exuded from the 
empirical evidence can yield theory that is overly complex.  It may be difficult to 
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assess which are the most important relationships and which are simply idiosyncratic 
to a particular case (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The generated theory itself may also be narrow 
and idiosyncratic.  Since case-study theory building is a bottom up approach, 
idiosyncrasies may impede the level of generalisation of the theory.  In this 
investigation, the theory building process relied on past literature and empirical 
observation as well as insight from the researcher to build theory around the inter-
related phenomena of resource profiles, opportunity identification and the external 
environment.  Additionally, data extrapolated about the external environment revealed 
unanticipated changes occurring over a period of time.  These changes in external 
environment are not adequately accounted for in the extant literature.  This study 
allowed for a detailed longitudinal inveVWLJDWLRQ RI µZK\¶ DQG µKRZ¶ HQWUHSUHQHXUV
chose and changed their environment.  The overall aim was to elicit good theory that 
was parsimonious, testable and logically coherent (Eisenhardt, 1989), grounded in 
strength of method and evidence so that resulting propositions could be further tested 
and verified by future research.   
 
Some researchers, in the extreme, claim that, for the purpose of theory 
building, research questions should emerge from the data rather than the data being 
guided by the research questions (for a contrary view see Suddaby, 2006).  In this 
case, the research questions were firmly established from extant literature.  This 
DSSURDFKOLHVFRQWUDU\WRFODLPVWKDWDVSDUWRIWKHLQGXFWLYHSURFHVV³WKHRU\-building 
research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and 
QR K\SRWKHVHV WR WHVW´ (LVHQKDUGW  p 536).  In this study, questions were not 
only linked to extant literature but also linked to several theoretical perspectives.  In 
my defence, this was seen to support the formulation and generation of formal theory 
building directly from data (Suddaby, 2006).  In addition, since the questions asked 
during the interview were based in the literature, criticisms of the case-study method 
that any attemSW WR EXLOG WKHRU\ LV OLPLWHG E\ WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V SUHFRQFHSWLRQV ZHUH
overcome (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The purpose of designing an interview guide was two-
fold.  One, it focused the study to cope with large volumes of data and two, it 
permitted me to identify potential and as yet, uncharted differences between different 
types of lead entrepreneur.  The concern was with the relationship between elements 
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DQGWKHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGµKRZWKLQJVZHUHGRQH¶UDWKHUWKDQµZKDWWKLQJVZHUHGRQH¶
(Fletcher, 2006).   
 
The final phase in the systematic ordering of data was the comparison of 
emergent theory with that of extant literature to probe for new and emerging patterns.  
³7\LQJ WKH HPHUJHQW WKHRU\ WR H[LVWLQJ OLWHUDWXUH HQKDQFHV WKH LQWHUQDO YDOLGLW\
generalisability, and theoretical level of the theory building from case study 
UHVHDUFK«EHFDXVH WKH ILQGLQJV RIWHQ UHVW RQ D YHU\ OLPLWHG QXPEHU RI FDVHV´
(Eisenhardt 1989, p.545).  Some data substantiated previous research whilst others 
were used to build new theoretical XQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KLVWKHRU\EXLOGLQJSURFHVV³ZDV
suited to efforts to understand the process by which the actors construct meaning out 
RIWKHLULQWHUVXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH´6XGGDED\S$SURFHVVRIFURVVFDVH
comparison and within case comparisons ensued, sifting through the narratives for 
individuals interpretations of processes, reactions to barriers, resources accumulation 
through team member recruitment and consequences of their actions.  Links between 
narratives, between and within cases, were made by identifying different or similar 
interpretations about similar events, processes and contact with team members.  New 
themes were also identified.  The theory building processes was managed using a 
software program NVivo, computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS), which stored all the narratives and made cross referencing and 
comparison accessible.  During each comparison, the program managed, dated and 
ordered each step and allowed notes to be attached to each decision for later reflection.  
The program did not direct the analysis but provided a system of storage and provide a 
means of keeping an audit trail for conceptual development (e.g. developing abstract 
thoughts into more clearly thought out ones).   
 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter outlined my key paradigm stance.  The interpretivist paradigm 
was selected to explore the research questions which probed for reasons behind a 
process influenced by human behaviour.  Using a process approach to the study the 
intention was to elicit from lead entrepreneurs a narrative interpretation of their actions 
and behaviour towards the identification of an opportunity leading toˈ but prior toˈ 
the decision to form a firm.  Relying on an interpretation of events, processes and 
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reactions to people a qualitative methodology allowed the interpretation of data 
provided (not imposed on) by the µsocial actors¶.  Accordingly, the methods used to 
gain access to information about opportunity identification, team membership and the 
external environment, consisted predominantly of a case-study approach using active 
interview techniques where participants were given an opportunity to answer 
questions guided by an interview schedule.  A grounded theory approach was rejected 
because empirical observation was initially framed in a conceptual model, influenced 
by prior research.  There was an awareness of what had gone before in terms of 
OLWHUDWXUHDQGWKHRU\6XGGDE\7KHRULHVDOORZLQJDQLQGXFWLYHRUµLQVLGHRXW¶
view of processes were identified relating to the resource strengths of human capital 
and the influence of social capital; the advantages of attracting and leveraging 
resources from a RBV perspective from within and from the external environment 
(e.g. information search and resource accumulation leading to firm formation 
behaviour).  The aim was build on theory from these theoretical perspectives and to 
build propositions which could be used for future deductive study.  The data, events 
and characteristics were related to the opportunity identification process through 
induction.  Theoretical explanations for the processes observed were elicited from 
observations about the data which matched already standing theoretical concepts but 
also sought new explanations.  As stated, three theoretical perspectives were used to 
capture different aspects of the multi-level process of opportunity identification.  This 
allowed a matching of theoretical perspectives to evolving empirical rich data in an 
interactive process.  Concerns about reliability and validity were emphasised centring 
on participant triangulation of information and to a lesser extent secondary data in the 
form of publications and general observation.  This chapter covered all aspects of data 
collection and analysis with respect to the pilot study, to pre-testing of the 
investigative tools, the electronic survey leading to the selection of cases and the 
process used to analyse the interviews. 
 
The following chapters present the findings, results and analysis of the case 
studies.  Chapter 5 covers the findings associated with people and are related to The 
Entrepreneur (Theme one) and Team Formation (Theme two) outlined in the 
conceptual model in Chapter 2.  Chapter 6 summarises the findings covering The 
Entrepreneurial Process (Theme 3) and explores how lead entrepreneurs identify and 
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exploit opportunities for firm creation.  The influence of the external environment on 
access to resources, Location (Theme 4) is the subject of Chapter 7.   
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Chapter 5: Case Analysis:  
The Entrepreneur and Team Membership  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the role of intangible resources (e.g. human capital and social 
capital) brought by and embedded within the individuals influencing opportunity 
identification is explored.  Cases are with regard to the typology presented in Chapter 
4 (Figure 4.14).  The following sections explore µpeople¶ associated with opportunity 
identification as the central theme and are structured as follows.  The conceptual 
model, as presented in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1) is reviewed in Section 5.2.  Section 5.3 
relates to lead entrepreneurs (Theme 1 of the conceptual model) giving a brief 
synopsis of their identified opportunities, their resource profiles and the external 
environment in which they locate.  A cross case comparison of resource profiles is 
offered in Section 5.4.  The entrepreneurial ownership team is considered in section 
5.5 (Theme 2) which concludes with a cross-case and between case comparison of 
resource profiles brought by individual members in Section 5.6.  Propositions are 
derived from the comparative and between case analysis.  Presented conclusions are 
summarised in Section 5.7.   
 
5.2 The Conceptual Model Re-visited 
Using the conceptual model as a guide (Figure 3.1), two themes will be 
explored.  The first concentrates on the individual cases and in particular the lead 
entrepreneur(s) (Theme 1) who were associated with and instigated the opportunity 
identification process.  The lead entrepreneur(s) in this study had, either individually 
or with the aid of team members, identified entrepreneurial opportunities, within the 
life-science sector, and in response all had chosen to start a new independent company 
to evaluate and potentially exploit their discovery.  A comparison of these 
opportunities allows for an exploration of individual resource profiles, perceived 
barriers to commercialisation and differences in individual approach.  Comparison 
helps to answer the following research question: 
 
Research Question 1: µ+RZ¶ GLIIHUHQW DUH lead academic and lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs¶ initial resource profiles? 
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Second, team formation (Theme 2) explores the role of social and human 
capital in relation to resource accumulation as it relates to team member recruitment 
and in particular µKRZ¶ WKH lead entrepreneurs knew of and knew where to look for 
team members.  In other words, how they supported their tacit scientific knowledge 
(e.g. know how) and their explicit knowledge conveyed in procedures (e.g. know 
what) with social capital (e.g. know-who) (Anderson and Jack, 2002).  In past studies 
team members have been identified because they held equity stakes in the business 
(e.g. entrepreneurial ownership team members) and had a key role to play in strategic 
decision-making during opportunity identification, in order to exploit their human 
capital (Ucbasaran et al., 2003a).  In this study that definition is extended to include 
non-equity holding members such as advisers and mentors or µprivileged witnesses¶ 
(Vanaelst et al., 2006) who sometimes work on behalf of an HEI or a governmental 
business development agency.  $FFHVV WR µSULYLOHJHG ZLWQHVVHV¶ WKURXJK D VRFLDO
network, increased some entrepreneurs understanding of the entrepreneurial process.  
Human capital, however, was influential in opening up social networks.  Comparison 
between lead academic and lead non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-
sponsored environments helps to explore the following research questions:  
 
Research Question 2 µ:K\¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
Research Question 3 µ+RZ¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
Research Question 4: µ:KHUH¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs find potential entrepreneurial ownership team members? 
 
5.3 Entrepreneur(s): The Context (Theme 1) 
Data ZDVJDWKHUHGIURPOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUVUHODWLQJWRµwhy¶, µhow¶and µZKHQ¶
they identified their opportunities for commercialisation.  It has been proposed that 
³ZLWKRXWGHYHORSLQJRUDFFHVVLQJWKHFDSDELOLW\WRFRPELQHVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJHZLWK
a commercially feasible offering that satisfies an unfulfilled market need, academic 
VFLHQWLVWVZRXOGQRWEHDEOH WRSURFHHG WRZDUGVFRPPHUFLDOL]LQJ WKHLU WHFKQRORJLHV´
(Vohora et al, 2004, p.161).  For this to happen, there has to be processes to develop 
new business concepts and processes to access and reconfigure resources for firm 
formation.  In my analysis of µZK\¶µKRZ¶DQGµZKHQ¶ this happened I shall present 
data (e.g. quotes from the entrepreneurs) in series of comparative quadrants.  These 
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µTXRWH quadrants¶ offer reflections on resource leverage and exploitation, and the 
influence of human capital on social capital (and vice versa) and their effect on 
resources accumulation.  Descriptive personal profiles of lead entrepreneurs are 
summarised from observed and spoken responses elicited during interview.   
 
5.3.1 Lead Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments  
With regard to lead academic entrepreneurs on the sponsored environments, 
four companies were studied in Quadrant 1 (Q1, Table 5.1).  Company 1 was 
considered a solo start founded by a PhD student at an HEI.  He was researching and 
developing a test kit to detect toxicity using florescent fungi as the detection medium.  
The technology was created during his PhD project.  Design faults in a similar 
product, identified at a trade conference, sparked the idea for his new product.   The 
founder owned the intellectual property (IP) attached to his technology.  An MBA 
student has since joined the company, as an equity holder, and brings experience from 
prior exposure in the pharmaceutical industry.  To help with market research another 
scientist from the same HEI was recruited.  The product is targeted at companies in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector and is a stand-alone unit that does not rely on 
external sources of power.  The company is based within the incubator unit of the HEI.   
 
Company 2 was founded by four people, three of whom were originally employees of 
the same HEI.  The fourth is an entrepreneur owning and managing a chemical 
business in the United States of America (USA).  Company 2 researches the 
development of a catalytic enzyme for the chemical industry (Q1, Table 5.1).  The 
technology was taken out of the HEI as an academic technology working in the 
laboratory with the intention of taking it to large-scale industrial manufacture.  
Negotiation over the use of the IP, attached to the bioprocess, was conducted between 
the entrepreneurial ownership team and the owners of the IP, the university and a 
pharmaceutical company presently employing the university on contract work to 
create the new catalytic enzyme.  Currently, the entrepreneurs are subsidising research 
and development work with contract research.  The company is using redundant 
laboratory space based within a department in the HEI.   
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Two clinicians working as academics within the same HEI formed Company 3.  
The development of their product, an instrument for detecting tooth decay, was the 
result of combined research at two HEIs.  Dealing with two HEIs was considered a 
barrier to commercialisation by the lead entrepreneurs because they had to negotiate 
with both HEIs over the use of the IP.  Opportunity identification took place within the 
scientific setting of laboratories of the two HEIs over a number of years (Q1, Table 
5.1).  The practising dental clinicians leading the project processed knowledge of the 
need for their product from their dental hygiene work, from their laboratory work and 
from their network of contacts, within academia and industry, met at technical 
conferences.  As dentists, they are potential end users of their product.  One industrial 
player, a toothpaste manufacturer, had offered to buy the license to their knowledge, 
confirming that there was a commercial interest in and a market need for their product.  
The company was incubated in the Technology Transfer Office (TTO) of the lead HEI 
and eventually relocated to a local technology park. 
 
Company 4 was founded by three clinicians working within the same hospital 
trust.  Their product, a vascular graft of revolutionary design and made of new 
material, originated from observations made by the lead entrepreneur, a surgeon, 
during laboratory research investigating blood flow (Q1, Table 5.1).  Negotiations 
with the HEI were conducted for use of the IP.  The need for the vascular graft was 
obvious to the doctors because there was a high failure rate of currently available 
products (i.e. measured by the number of amputations conducted).  They are potential 
end users of their own product.  Using new blood flow technology the clinicians 
developed a human prototype vascular graft.  To date the product has not been tested 
in humans.  The company was formed at the HEI and is being incubated on a 
technology park.   
 
5.3.2 Lead Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments  
In Quadrant 2, the latest version of Company 5 grew out of a previous 
commercial venture created by a biologist and an opto-electronics engineer working 
out of a garage (Q2, Table 5.1).  The lead entrepreneur (the biologist) and the engineer 
formed a company to combine their talents and skills.  The formation of a company 
enabled them to access local business development funding.  With the funding they 
were able to conduct experiments to further their understanding of the technology for 
 140 
instrumentation to test pharmaceuticals.  Although initial results were positive the 
company was short lived.  The lead entrepreneur (the biologist) moved to a new HEI 
and he assigned the Intellectual Property (IP) to the university.  Additionally, he 
sought the assistance of another academic and together they conducted more research 
and development on an instrument to test the effect of drugs using ethically donated 
human tissue.  Subsequently, Company 5 was created in a university department.  In 
parallel, the academics also offered contract research to the pharmaceutical sector to 
support the research and development of their own instrument.  After a short period of 
incubation within the HEI department Company 5 moved to a business park.  Once 
sufficient funding was raised the entrepreneurs moved back into an incubator unit at 
another HEI and resigned from their duties as academics at their original HEI.   
 
5.3.3 Lead Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments  
In Quadrant 3 (Q3, Table 5.1) an entrepreneurial ownership team consisting of 
two engineers and two academics founded Company 8.  Currently the engineers, who 
are the lead entrepreneurs, are involved in the design and development of a 
miniaturised tape product to allow for high-through-put information for DNA 
separation for use in laboratories.  Opportunity identification centred on the 
miniaturisation of a cumbersome laboratory process identified by the academics.  The 
academics remain full-time employees of the HEI and act as scientific advisors to the 
engineers who devote all their time to the formation and incubation of the company.  
Opportunity identification and initial company incubation began in a borrowed HEI 
laboratory.  Further development and prototype manufacture of the tape is now 
conducted at an industrial unit.  The academics in the team are examples of potential 
customers. 
 
5.3.4 Lead Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments  
Quadrant 4 housed three cases.  A lead non-DFDGHPLFµVHULDOHQWUHSUHQHXU¶KDG
liquidated his earlier firm, involved in the distribution of new technology equipment, 
to found Company 6 (Q4, Table 5.1).  The IP associated with the research, 
development and design of a new instrument to test drugs using scatter light 
technology, originated from the previous company.  A prototype instrument was 
available for demonstrations.  Using previous market knowledge and based on 
perceived customer need, the lead entrepreneur identified this type of instrument as 
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having market value.  The company recently moved from residential premises to a 
local technology park.   
 
Two scientists who had been made redundant from a large pharmaceutical 
company founded Company 7.  One had a background in molecular biology and in 
cell line development whilst the other scientist had a background in project 
management and diagnostic product developments, specifically with human 
monoclonal antibodies.  A global change in research strategy within the 
pharmaceutical sector meant that the majority of primary research was being licensed 
in from outside companies.  The two lead entrepreneurs took advantage of this 
knowledge.  Their underlying goal was to create special diagnostic products to treat or 
prevent infectious diseases.  To underpin the financial needs of the company, contract 
research services were offered to other bio-tech or bio-pharmaceutical companies 
involving the development of special cell lines (Q4, Table 5.1).  The lead 
entrepreneurs identified the market opportunity whilst working for their previous 
employer.  They incubated the company in residential premises and only after winning 
a contract relocated the business to sub-let laboratory space and, more recently, to an 
independent unit within the same science park.   
 
Three friends, an architect (the lead entrepreneur), a shepherd and a scientist 
founded Company 9, located on a hill sheep farm (Q4, Table 5.1).  They formed a 
company in response to the negative publicity associated with the ill health of farmers 
related to the use of organo-phosphate found in sheep dip.  None of the original team 
had business experience.  Recognition of the need for an alternative chemical led to 
preliminary testing.  Lacking in business experience the entrepreneurs opted for a 
managed model approach to the incubation of their company and hired a managerial 
company promoting early ventures.  Due to a lack of diligence over the filing of a 
patent, the lead entrepreneur dismissed the management company and hired a skeleton 
staff to run a reformed company.  Additionally, there was a product change.  Through 
further development and testing of their original compound, new products for the 
eradication of head-lice and mosquitoes have been produced but are, as yet, still 
uncertified.  Company 9 has relocated three times.  From the farm they moved to 
offices within the managerial company and thereafter they re-located to independent 
office space.   
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5.4 Cross-Case Comparison of Resource Profiles of Lead 
Entrepreneurs  
The following section explores and compares the resource profiles of lead 
entrepreneurs (Brush et al., 2001) at opportunity identification and helps answer: 
 
Research Question 1: µ+RZ¶ GLIIHUHQW DUH lead academic and lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs¶ initial resource profiles? 
 
All lead academic HEI entrepreneurs located on sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments were male and they were educated to doctoral level.  Three of the lead 
academic entrepreneurs were full professors.  Similarly, all the lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs, excluding two, had acquired a doctorate, but they had pursued a variety 
of professions.  Only one was a woman.  Companies 6 and 7 relate to scientists, 
Company 8 was an engineer and Company 9 was an architect.  Lead academic 
entrepreneurs focusing upon technological solutions leveraged knowledge acquired 
from PhD investigation, contract work or personal, basic academic research.   
 
Company 1 illustrates that a doctoral study led to a novel medium for testing 
toxicity (e.g. through the illumination of fungi).  7KHOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXU¶Vknowledge of 
WKH ZHDNQHVVHV RI FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV DOVR JDYH KLP FRPSHWLWLYH DGYantage.  
However, it was WKH OHDGHQWUHSUHQHXU¶V personal network interaction, more than his 
resource profile associated with education, which allowed access to valuable 
information.  His interaction with actors in the market place (Q1a, Table 5.2) and with 
other scientists allowed assessment of available testing kits on the market
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and access to glow in the dark genes.  He created these network bridges within the 
science community through exposure of his research to the academic community and 
accumulated a broader legitimacy for FRPPHUFLDOLVDWLRQ E\ ³JHWWLQJ WR NQRZ´ D
company in the States with whom he developed a reciprocal and mutually beneficial 
relationship.  Educational attainment, industrial contract research and subsequent 
developments stimulated two opportunities relating to the potential discovery of an 
intermediate chemical compound (Company 2).  Again, prior interpersonal interaction 
with industrial players sparked opportunities with commercial potential.  The 
importance of a network association between academics and industrial players has 
been recognised in earlier studies (Johannssion, 1998; Shane and Stuart, 2000; 
Nicolaou and Birley, 2003b).  In these two cases the academic entrepreneurs, although 
restricted to the non-commercial HEI environment, were able to develop social capital 
because of a proactive search for a specific product (Company1) and because of 
previous exposure to industrial contract work and previous connections with the 
industrial community established from prior work experience and through the network 
of a surrogate entrepreneur (Company 2).   
 
Companies 3 and 4 housed highly respected lead academic entrepreneurs who 
had honed their technical capabilities with regard to novel dental and medical devices 
(Q1b, Table 5.2).  Both entrepreneurs, who were potential end users of their new 
devices, constantly received feedback from patients about the weaknesses of current 
products.  In a study of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Shane (2000) 
found that prior knowledge of a particular market increased the likelihood of 
discovering an opportunity in that market.  This kind of knowledge was transferred 
from a technical and strategic perspective as lead entrepreneurs searched for 
information souUFHV WR VXSSRUW WKHLURSSRUWXQLWLHV 3ULRUNQRZOHGJH DERXWSDWLHQWV¶
problems, in the case of clinicians, influenced the opportunities they discovered and 
supports findings from Davidsson and Honig (2003) that demonstrated the importance 
of using specific human capital to identify opportunities.  The academic entrepreneurs 
had one major competitive advantage over non-academic entrepreneurs: they were 
both the inventors of a new technology, and, the potential end users.  A gap between 
the identification of D QHHG DQG WKH FXVWRPHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR FRPPXQLFDWH WKH QHHG KDV
been highlighted as a challenge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  In Companies 3 and 4, 
the academic entrepreneurs were the transmitters of new tacit knowledge (the need), 
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and at the same time the recipients of the new knowledge (the solution) (Nonaka, 
1995).  They were the people who identified the need and were able to articulate a 
solution.  They could identify gaps in the market relating to their area of expertise 
which allowed them to identify opportunities in that area.  Academic lead 
HQWUHSUHQHXUVWKXVKDGDQLQVLJKWLQWRPDUNHWQHHGVµIURPan insider¶SHUVSHFWLYHDQG
also displayed sufficient human capital (e.g. scientific knowledge) to seek solutions to 
these challenges.  However, embedded human capital relating to knowledge of their 
areas of speciality (e.g. their academic and research skills and expertise) was not well 
supported by a social network which extended to the industrial sector.  Connections 
with industrial players were known because of prior contractual work with an 
industrial player (Company 2) or through serendipitous meetings (Company 1) which 
increased their understanding of market knowledge.  However, the lead entrepreneurs 
of Companies 3 and 4 reported that their contact was restricted to meetings with 
industrial players at technical conferences.  In respect to commercial sector 
entrepreneurs the latter two companies displayed a lack of broad social networks 
(Westhead and Wright, 1998)   
 
Where their research concerned medical or dental technologies it was not 
unusual for the lead academic entrepreneurs to be working as clinicians in parallel 
with their academic career.  The academic reputation of the lead academic 
entrepreneur(s) acted as a positive influence on industrial players who often knew the 
academic entrepreneurs as academics or clinicians prior to their embarkation on an 
entrepreneurial career.  Their academic reputations acted as compensation to 
counterbalance a lack of reputation within the business community (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977) and increased their chances of gaining private equity.  This finding lies 
FRQWUDU\ WR 0RVH\ DQG :ULJKW¶V  ILQGLQJ WKDW QRYLFH academic entrepreneurs 
encountered structural holes to providers of equity finance and management 
knowledge.  In this study the likelihood of a firm winning private equity finance was 
related to the reputational attainments.  Similarly, in a recent study relating to 
IRXQGHU¶VKXPDQFDSLWDODQGWKHJURZWKRIQHZWHFKQRORJ\-based firms (NTBFs) in a 
sample composed of 506 Italian young companies (Colombo and Grilli, 2005), levels 
of education (i.e. general human capital) had a positive influence on raising finance.   
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With reference to Quadrant 2 the lead academic entrepreneur (biologist) and 
entrepreneurial ownership team member (engineer) in Company 5 selected a non-
sponsored environment at opportunity identification.  They originated from different 
HEIs and displayed a forte for basic research in their individual fields.  Both wished to 
test their ideas for a new technology whilst maintaining ownership of their IP (Q2c, 
Table 5.2).  In nearly all cases involving lead academic entrepreneurs, the HEI laid 
claim to all knowledge generated from their institutions.   
 
With regard to Quadrant 3, Company 8 is led by a non-academic entrepreneur 
who exhibited diverse technical and entrepreneurship-specific human capital (Q3d and 
e, Table 5.2).  He was known to and had prior connections to the national, 
governmental business advice sector (Scottish Enterprise).  This engineer selected a 
sponsored environment to acquire detailed knowledge of a scientific procedure.  A 
difference between lead academic entrepreneurs and non-academic entrepreneurs, on 
sponsored environments was noted.  Lead academic entrepreneurs with no commercial 
experience sought advice from the support structures within the HEI system.  Non-
academic entrepreneurs selected sponsored environments because they lacked 
technical scientific knowledge and needed to be in close proximity to the scientists 
during the opportunity identification process to define their product / process.  What 
the engineers lacked in the knowledge about the scientific process was compensated 
for by their specialist engineering knowledge and previous start up experience.  Their 
past successful start up experiences also gave them privileged access to known 
resource providers (e.g. business advisers and funders).  Networks and network 
structures represented facets of social capital that influenced the range of information 
available and attainable from previous contacts.  During the qualitative interviews 
with lead non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments it became evident 
that they gave credence to their past employment experiences and drew from their tacit 
knowledge strategies, customer preferences, an array of contacts including customers, 
suppliers and other industrial players (Brüderl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997; Brush 
et al., 2001).  Industrial specific knowledge gave distinctive competitive advantage to 
the lead non-academic entrepreneurs for value creation when forming the companies.  
The advantage came from previous business ownership, knowledge of the market, 
managerial experience and anticipation of market trends.   
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With respect to Quadrant 4, the lead non-academic entrepreneur relating to 
Company 6 did not require a sponsored environment because he had already 
accumulated business ownership experience and detailed industry know-how.  He 
amassed managerial capabilities and conducted in-depth evaluations of actual and 
potential customer needs (Q4f, Table 5.2).  Non-academic entrepreneurs relating to 
Companies 7 and 9 did not have any prior business ownership experience to leverage 
and had limited access to social networks outside their immediate environments, data 
which substantiated research on nascent entrepreneurs by Mosey and Wright (2007).  
The lead entrepreneurs relating to Company 7 had previous knowledge of the 
pharmaceutical industry (Q4g, Table 5.2).  Lead non-academic entrepreneurs in 
Companies 6 and 7 were educated to doctoral level and had substantial working 
experience within specialist areas of science.  The lead entrepreneurs associated with 
company 6 had accumulated knowledge about customer needs whilst in Company 7 
WKHLU DGYDQWDJH FDPH IURP KDYLQJ µLQVLGH¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV
and strategies from years of working experience.   
 
Similarities between the resource profiles of lead academic and lead non-
academic entrepreneurs related to their ability to identify opportunities, which were 
either connected to their research expertise or to their work expertise.  Lead academic 
entrepreneurs were often forerunners in their field of research and non-academic 
entrepreneurs possessed specialised expertise associated with prior or current work 
experiences.  Knowledge of their respective areas of research and work experience 
were utilised to identify opportunities leading to the development of a product or 
process.  More lead non-academic entrepreneurs had specific human capital pertaining 
to prior entrepreneurial experience.  Generally, in contrast to the superior technical 
human capital that the lead academic entrepreneurs possessed, human capital relating 
to managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities had to be sought from external sources.  
Similarity between the proposed new venture and past experiences, gathered from 
clinical or research exposure, allowed some lead academic entrepreneurs to build on 
prior relationships with relevant stakeholders.   
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These observations lead to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely to identify 
opportunities from their basic research and are technology focused whereas non-
academic entrepreneurs are focused on opportunities identified from market needs 
and market knowledge.   
 
Proposition 2: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than non-academic 
entrepreneurs to be potential end users of their identified opportunities.   
 
Proposition 3: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs are more likely to be known within 
governmental business advisory networks from their prior start up experience 
whereas lead academic entrepreneurs with less or no start-up experience are forced 
to rely on the advice offered by the HEI.   
 
5.4.1 Cross-Case Comparison of Location Choice of Lead Entrepreneurs  
On the whole, lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments had 
access to a greater number of information sources than non-academic entrepreneurs on 
non-sponsored environments.  Academic entrepreneurs were less likely to have 
network contacts to people with commercial knowledge and relied on the resources 
within their external environment (e.g. the physical facilities of the HEI and resource 
networks of the TTOs).  Non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments 
with entrepreneurial specific capital and with managerial experience from former 
employment systematically sought out information, both technical and commercial, 
from other sources (e.g. business advisory agencies and academics).   
 
There appeared to be differences between the two external environments.  Lead 
academic entrepreneurs generally located on sponsored environments because their 
research originated within the protected environment of the HEIs (Q1a, Table 5.3).  
They were encouraged by their HEIs and their technology transfer officers (TTOs) to 
use the facilities of the HEI which included incubator units and laboratory space.  
Additionally, TTOs were also responsible for accessing preliminary funding sources 
which were necessary for firm formation and market exploitation.  Their task was to 
synergise resource combinations using contacts within and outside the HEI.  This 
often took the form of introducing the local business development agency to the lead 
entrepreneur.  Generally, combining the resources held by the lead entrepreneur with 
those at the disposal of the business agency enhanced the chances of firm formation.  
Such linkages were positive in gaining access to people with experience in finding  
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funding, improving management within the firm and providing avenues for 
experimenting with new ideas. 
 
Thereafter, if the entrepreneurs chose to relocate, or were forced to re-locate, 
other forms of sponsored environments were considered, again recommended by the 
TTOs (e.g. science parks, technology parks).  The lead academic entrepreneur relating 
to Company 5 did not develop his technology within the confines of his HEI because 
he worked with another professional from another HEI.  Their aim was to test the new 
technology and not develop a product and for this reason they required ownership of 
their IP which was later assigned to a new HEI (Q2b, Table 5.3).  The lead non-
academic entrepreneur relating to Company 8 had previous start up experience and 
selected a sponsored environment because he had no knowledge of life-science.  He 
decided to remain close to the academic entrepreneurial ownership team members in 
order to gain access to basic and vital information (Q3c and d, Table 5.3).  Two out of 
the three lead non-academic entrepreneurs located on non-sponsored environments 
cited prior knowledge about markets and customer needs but chose non-sponsored 
environments (Q4e, Table 5.3).  Company 9, however, had no previous market, 
customer or commercial experience and started life as a farm project prior to a history 
of location changes (Q4f, Table 5.3).  Overall, non-academic entrepreneurs knew the 
value of seeking information prior to identifying and exploiting an idea.  One reason 
for this was that the opportunities identified by academic entrepreneurs were firmly 
anchored in their basic research work within the HEI whilst non-academic 
entrepreneurs based their opportunities on observing market opportunities.  Those 
academic entrepreneurs with greater leaning towards technical searches had to be 
encouraged and trained, through entrepreneurial fellowship training, to increase their 
searches because they were less aware of commercial needs and market requirements.  
This discussion suggests the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 4: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments have 
access to more physical, social, financial and business advisory resources than lead 
non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments. 
 
Proposition 5: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs wish to locate on sponsored 
environments to seek proximity to scientists during opportunity identification in 
order to identify and define their product whereas lead academic entrepreneurs wish 
to remain on sponsored environments because of the superior access to resources.  
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5.4.2 Cross-Case Comparison of Social Capital of Lead Entrepreneurs  
Some lead entrepreneurs increased their commercial knowledge by attending 
classes in business development (Company 1) and participating in a sponsored 
fellowship course in entrepreneurship, designed and facilitated by the HEI for post 
doctoral academics in the life-science sector interested in commercialisation 
(Companies 2 and 5).  Company 2 was also able to use the knowledge and skills of 
one of their lead entrepreneurs who was a practicing entrepreneur.  The Industrial 
Fellow brought to Company 2 useful managerial experience.  This tacit knowledge in 
management and supervision was gained whilst working in small autonomous units in 
a large company in the USA.  Both brought prior known contacts to the industrial 
sector and potential customers.  These knowledge based resources, in contrast to 
property based resources (e.g. machinery, equipment etc.), were tacit in nature and 
cannot be protected easily against loss or transference (Miller and Shamie, 1996).  
Combing and leveraging knowledge based resources and creating firm specific ties 
clearly adds value to the organisation (Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  These 
observations tie in neatly with the RBV of the firm which advocates that advantages 
and value creation accrues from the creation of unique bundles of resources that 
competitors are unable to imitate (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
 
The lead entrepreneurs in Companies 3 and 4 were not only highly qualified and 
respected academics they were clinicians and advisers in dentistry and medicine.  
They were, however, aware of their entrepreneurial limitations and cognisant of the 
importance of their entrepreneurial ownership team sourced through the help of 
business development agents (Q1a, Table 5.4).  Out of the body of academic 
entrepreneurs only one, from Company 5, had previous start-up experience but he 
admitted to attaching much importance to a piece of market research work sponsored 
by the governmental business development agency (Q2b, Table 5.4).  One of the 
findings in a recent study about serial, novice and portfolio entrepreneurs indicates 
that serial entrepreneurs may require support in terms of addressing market-related 
aspects when identifying business opportunities (Westhead et al., 2005).  This was 
substantiated from evidence from Company 5 whose academic entrepreneur, a serial 
entrepreneur, pinned importance on subsidised market research conducted by the local 
business development agency.  He was also open and willing to interact and network 
with industrial players who offered substantial market information.   
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Lead non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments came from an array of different professions.  The lead engineering 
entrepreneur in Company 8 brought with him very specific entrepreneurial human 
capital and skills associated with his profession.  His network with the business 
advisory sector was strong based on his past successful entrepreneurial experiences.  
The knowledge he lacked about the life-science sector was compensated for by the 
technical specific human capital of the two academics (Q3c, Table 5.4) whom he met 
at a networking conference between academics, business advisors and interested 
people.  We ma\VSHFXODWHWKDW³ZKLOHKXPDQFDSLWDOUHIHUVWRLQGLYLGXDODELOLW\VRFLDO
capital refers to opportunity´ (Burt, 1997, p339) and combining the two encourages 
leverage of other knowledge resources.  It may be suggested that lead entrepreneurs 
added value to their opportunities by coordinating people by building relationships 
with individuals in order to create combinations to help develop their opportunities.  
The diverse, credible and experienced entrepreneurial team in Company 8 had 
understanding of current and future market and customer needs (Q3c, Table 5.4).  This 
lead non-academic entrepreneur with a strong network of relationships was valuable in 
terms of having access to both information and resources for his firm.  He also 
attracted other high-performing individuals (e.g. the academics) and maintained a 
strong network ties with external stakeholders, creating knowledge platforms from 
which new resource combinations could emerge (Nonaka, 1994).  Several variations 
of the product were on the market, but they developed and targeted an improved 
model to satisfy the specific needs of additional customers.  The diversity of human 
and social capital within this team attracted business angel funding.  
 
The non-academic entrepreneur leading Company 6 had greater industry-
specific and entrepreneur-specific human capital than any academic entrepreneur and 
was therefore in an ideal position to spot a potential unbridled entrepreneurial 
opportunity.  His conduct was ruled by past employment, previous start up experience 
and a recent liquidation of his business.  These experiences allowed him to learn and 
practice managerial skills and monitor the actual and perceived needs of his potential 
customers.  Both his technical and market knowledge was strong.  Past research has 
indicated that entrepreneurs with prior business ownership experience can acquire 
assets relating to broader managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities, and they can 
leverage an enhanced reputation (if successful) to obtain additional resources 
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(Westhead and Wright, 1998).  On the downside, prior business ownership experience 
can lead to the acquisition of several liabilities such as over-confidence.  For the lead 
non-academic entrepreneur of Company 6, his inability to share and communicate his 
future plans and aspirations accurately disorientated people around him.  His over 
optimism painted inaccurate pictures of the status of the development of the potential 
product and the people available to promote the product.  Conversely, the lead non-
academic entrepreneurs relating to Companies 7 and nine, located on non-sponsored 
environments, with no prior business ownership to tarnish their reputations, utilized 
external agents from business development agencies and venture capital companies 
(Q4d and e, Table 5.4).  However, gaining information about such organisations was 
problematic for both these nascent entrepreneurs.  The lead entrepreneurs in Company 
7 were well versed in the management of contract projects but had no concept of 
commercialisation either from past experience or family input.  Experiences within a 
large pharmaceutical organisation did not expose them with relationships to managers 
or decision makers who could provide information about funding or management 
knowledge for new firms, a finding observed by Mosey and Wright (2007).  Similarly, 
the lead entrepreneurs in Company 9 had no previous start-up knowledge or exposure 
to commercialisation.  They also had no technical or scientific knowledge about the 
development of or the regulatory process of certification for a new chemical.  
Companies 7 and 9 relied on public sector sponsored development agency agents, to 
whom they were directed by friends and professional colleagues, to provide insights 
on how to address barriers to opportunity identification.   
 
Although it might have been speculated that lead non-academic entrepreneurs 
with past commercial experience might have had a greater depth and wider breadth of 
contacts and networks relating to social capital, the data indicates that academic 
entrepreneurs have greater access to resource providers.  Initially lead academic 
entrepreneurs were lacking in social capital in relation to access to business advisers 
and funders but with assistance from TTOs it became evident that their reputation 
attached to their significant levels of general human capital increased their capacity to 
access resource providers.  It would appear that it was their general human capital (or 
level of education and reputation) which increased their attractiveness to resource 
providers but that the resource providers, who were unknown to them, were 
introduced to them by TTOs.  In addition, the role of the TTOs was replaced by 
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surrogate entrepreneurs as the entrepreneurial process progressed, thus extending the 
lead academic entrepreneurs social network.  These observations suggest the following 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 6: Lead academic entrepreneurs¶ general human capital has a greater 
influence on enhancing their social network than lead non-academic entrepreneurs¶
general human capital influence on their social network.   
 
5.5 Entrepreneurial Team Membership: The Context (Theme 2) 
Although lead entrepreneurs were responsible for the identification of their 
opportunity because they generally had access to technological resources, they often 
lacked access to or knowledge about financial resources and had only a general or 
rudimentary idea of the potential market application.  They lacked knowledge about 
conducting detailed analysis of potential markets or what product or part of the 
product to present to the market.  Funding remained a constant challenge to 
inexperienced lead entrepreneurs with no knowledge of the investment sector.  There 
was, therefore, a need for lead entrepreneurs to access people with knowledge of the 
market place, management and connections to the investment sector.  The following 
section, therefore, presents data from lead entrepreneurs and their team members about 
how crucial resources were identified and how resources were sought through the 
recruitment of a variety of venture team members (Ucbasaran et al., 2003a).  As stated 
earlier, team members consisted of both those who held equity (entrepreneurial 
ownership team members) and those who did not (team members).  Prior research 
imposed a strict equity stake condition on the definition of entrepreneurial team 
membership (Ucbasaran et al., 2003a).  In this study human capital was given priority 
over the equity ownership definition to establish a resource network and exploitation.  
Research questions outlined below, pertaining to team membership, are answered in 
this section: 
 
Research Question 2 µ:K\¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
Research Question 3 µ+RZ¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs form entrepreneurial ownership teams? 
 
Research Question 4: µ:KHUH¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs find potential entrepreneurial ownership team members? 
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5.5.1 Lead Academic Entrepreneurs and Team Membership on Sponsored 
Environments 
Recognising their own limitations the lead academic entrepreneurs sought to 
recruit team members to compensate for deficiencies in business acumen.  With 
assistance from a mentor, provided by the HEI, an MBA student was recruited to 
Company 1.  This particular HEI promoted synergy between departments, securing 
dynamic research activity for commercialisation by actively seeking potential team 
members with commercial capabilities.  The recruited entrepreneurial ownership team 
member in Company 1 commented that when he joined the firm there was an over-
emphasis on the development of the product and perhaps not enough on the 
development of the market (Q1a, Table 5.5).  This substantiates past research which 
has recognised that lead academic entrepreneurs may have difficulties identifying 
opportunities with commercial application (Lockett et al., 2003).  The MBA team 
member brought valuable experience from the pharmaceutical sector, a network of 
contacts and a formalised approach to market research which was further assisted 
through the recruitment of another team member.  Her strength came from her 
scientific knowledge of the workings of the product, a vital attribute when talking to 
potential customers who are scientists themselves.  The combined human capital skills 
of the lead entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial ownership team members achieved a 
balance between commercial experience, scientific knowledge and marketing research 
skills.  Their competitive advantage came from their specific human capital based in 
both the novelty of their product, their scientific expertise, their rudimentary 
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHPDUNHWDQGWKHLUSURGXFW¶VSRWHQWLDODSSOLFDWLRQLQWKHPDUNHW7KH
heterogeneity of human capital at the early stages of the venture has been viewed 
positively because it enhances survival chances of the firm (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002). 
 
Company 2 was also made up of a diverse multi-disciplinary team, formed 
prior to firm formation, but their perceived main barrier to commercialisation was 
access to funding.  To address this gap in knowledge the team turned to the TTO.  The 
TTO prompted applications for government seed funding and for a sabbatical 
fellowship year of entrepreneurship training for the Post Doctoral student.  The 
Industrial Fellow, identified as the lead entrepreneur, used his social capital to win 
contracts for the service side of the company and used his entrepreneurial-specific 
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human capital, drawn from his prior industrial managerial experiences, to manage the 
company.  This particular team exhibited close social contact and relationships and 
exhibited high levels of trust and affinity towards each other, an observation supported 
by research on social capital from an organisational perspective (Leana and Van 
Buren, 1999).  The functional backgrounds of the members were complementary and 
displayed heterogeneity of human capital for the process of opportunity identification 
and opportunity evaluation.   
 
Motivation for forming Company 3 was prompted by the lack of available 
funding from traditional sources (e.g. government and charity sectors) for basic 
research.  With the co-operation of the TTO and business development agency the lead 
entrepreneurs were able to recruit a consultant who had substantial experience in 
nurturing spinout firms from other HEIs.  His contacts and expertise were instrumental 
in preparing the company for eventual floatation on the AIM market.  This µsurrogate 
entrepreneur¶ who had specific entrepreneurial experience and contacts within the 
investment sector was not initially taken on as an entrepreneurial ownership team 
member but as part of the management team.  Although both academic entrepreneurs 
(Company 3) criticised the two support organisations, the TTO and the local business 
development agency, it was through them that the introduction was made to the 
FRQVXOWDQW ZKR HYHQWXDOO\ EHFDPH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FKDLUPDQ  7KH FUHDWLRQ RI WKH
Company 4 was also in response to the lack of funding from traditional sources, an 
experience similar to that of the clinicians in Company 3.  The lead entrepreneur 
learned more about the investment sector by recruiting an experienced engineer who 
had substantial commercial experience.  Exploiting the experience and social network 
contacts of the recruited engineer and the presentation skills and reputation of the lead 
academic entrepreneur and his two colleagues, access to first round funding proved 
unproblematic.  Although the lead academic entrepreneurs effectively build ties with 
providers of business advice they were less effective in building direct ties with equity 
providers (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  This they did with assistance from surrogate 
entrepreneurs.  
 
However, companies 3 and 4 were both forced to London for their first round 
funding because the investment sector in Scotland was unwilling or unprepared to 
support the research and development of medical and dental devices.  This may reflect 
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a lack of maturity in the life-science sector in Scotland, an overzealous conservative 
approach to investment by venture capitalists in Scotland or indicate a lack of 
knowledge and understanding on behalf of the venture capitalists in Scotland serving 
life-science ventures.  On several occasions lead entrepreneurs commented that 
finding funding would have been easier if they had been based in Cambridge (UK) (or 
in more extreme comments) America.  These observations led to the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 7: Lead academic entrepreneurs developing medical or dental devises 
on sponsored environments are more likely than other lead academic entrepreneurs 
on sponsored environments to seek investment outside Scotland. 
 
The strengths of Company 4 lay in product development, internal financial 
controls and medical knowledge.  Their greatest liability was lack of managerial 
expertise.  As part of the opportunity evaluation process the investors appointed a part-
time CEO.  The CEO came from a blue chip medical company.  The needs of the new 
company and entrepreneurial team were not met by the experiences brought by the 
manager.  There was a mismatch of resource synergy (e.g. between the needs of the 
firm and the abilities of the appointed CEO).  This proved to have a long-term 
detrimental effect on the regulatory procedure for certifying the new product.  Over 
zealous venture capitalists forced inappropriate managerial team members upon the 
lead academic entrepreneurs giving rise to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 8: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than lead non-
academic entrepreneurs to experience a mismatch of resource synergy between their 
perceived needs and the ability of their investors to provide team members with 
matching skills.   
 
In addition, an observation from the lead entrepreneur in Company 4 indicated 
that there was a general lack of understanding about the medical device sector from 
the investors themselves.  The regulatory procedure proved tougher in terms of device 
safety and the level of investment, post-prototype testing.  No one in the 
entrepreneurial ownership team, or the investors foresaw this outcome.   
 
5.5.2 Lead Academic Entrepreneurs and Team Membership on Non-Sponsored 
Environments  
Prior to the formation of the second version of Company 5 the lead 
entrepreneur assigned his intellectual property (IP) to his new university and in return 
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agreed to an exclusive licence for the use of the IP.  Assigning the IP to the HEI was 
an astute strategy.  The lead academic entrepreneur attracted government funding for 
Proof of Concept prior to the formation of the company.  Access to such funding came 
from the TTO and was made available to the HEI not the entrepreneur or their 
company.  Proof of Concept funding allowed lead academic entrepreneurs to better 
develop their ideas, as a laboratory concept, prior to a commercial launch.  This was 
DQ H[DPSOH RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW SURYLGLQJ UHVRXUFHV WR DOORZ HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ VNLOOV LQ
research and development to be used towards establishing concept viability.  
Subsequently, what the entrepreneurs offered potential investors was a proven 
opportunity.  Non-academic entrepreneurs offered less developed concepts to their 
investors.  These two observations about IP ownership and Proof of Concept suggest 
the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 9: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to 
better develop their scientific concepts as commercial opportunities because of Proof 
of Concept funding.  
 
With regard to Company 5 the lead academic entrepreneur¶V LQGHFLVLYHQHVV
revolved around management and organisational issues.  For information about 
funding and firm formation he required further support from the TTO.  To compensate 
for lack of business acumen, the lead entrepreneur recruited a colleague as an 
entrepreneurial ownership team member who displayed good organisational ability.  
He was offered a place on an entrepreneurship fellowship course by the TTO.  The 
lead entrepreneur, on the other hand, used his time networking with people in the life-
science sector in Scotland.  Two members from a large pharmaceutical company were 
convinced to sit on their board to advise the entrepreneurs.  Having this level of 
expertise to hone in on was important to the entrepreneurs who recognised their 
limitations in knowledge about how to access their desired markets and how and 
where to apply for future funding.  The two board members brought status to the 
company because of their specific industrial human capital and established reputation 
(Q2b, Table 5.5).  In addition, a member of a business development agency authorised 
and commissioned a market research feasibility study by an independent company for 
Company 5.  The survey indicated a positive response their potential product.  This 
was important information for the lead entrepreneur who assigned much importance to 
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the outcome of the study.  The marketing survey instilled in the lead entrepreneur, a 
greater sense of purpose towards the development of the instrument.   
 
A speculative difference between the academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and 
non-sponsored environments may be that academic entrepreneurs viewed outside 
resource providers, from industry, as potential competitors whereas those on non-
sponsored environments saw them as potential co-operators or customers.  Clearly, the 
creation of a market is dependent on accessing resources held by outside stakeholders.  
There is a risk that the lead academic entrepreneurs, on sponsored environments, put 
constraints on the development of their concepts because of their suspicion.  In 
addition, the majority of academic entrepreneurs remained in full time employment as 
professors which challenged their resources and time allocated to firm formation.  
There was a conflict between their traditional objectives of education and basic 
research and the process of commercialisation.   
 
5.5.3 Lead Non-Academic Entrepreneurs and Team Membership on Sponsored 
Environments  
The two engineers leading Company 8 had a high capacity to process 
information.  They were able to use their specific entrepreneurial human and social 
capital to assess, access and leverage resources to conduct a survey of life-science 
firms and to gauge reaction to their consultancy firm offering advice on automation 
and miniaturisation of industrial processes.  Further, they were able to present their 
concepts to the academics within a medical research laboratory and third, in 
conjunction with the academics, to leverage social, financial, physical and 
organisational resources necessary to identify an opportunity for commercialisation 
and to thereafter incubate the idea (Q3c, Table 5.5).   
 
The stimuli for starting a business grew from the lead entrepreneurs¶ combined 
skills as engineers, their sales and marketing competencies and past entrepreneurial 
experience, all spurred by the threat of redundancy.  They possessed both general 
managerial human capital and specific entrepreneurial human capital.  The 
combination of the skill strengths each member brought to the team in the form of 
both general and specific human capital was recognised to be a major strength by 
suppliers of funding and potential customers.  The combination of academic, technical 
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and commercial experience worked in their favour when applying for funding.  When 
making presentations to business angels the combined team brought an array of 
success experiences from past commercial ventures and a well-grounded reputation so 
much so that the chairman from the business angels¶ company, investing in the 
company, volunteered to chair Company 8.  Being offered a chairman from the 
investors brought to Company 8 more entrepreneurial specific human capital.  The 
division of labour between the founding members was well defined.   
 
5.5.4 Lead Non-Academic Entrepreneurs and Team Membership on Non-
Sponsored Environments  
The lead entrepreneur forming Company 6 was a scientist with substantial 
working experience in the defence industry and also prior experience of starting and 
running his own company.  After liquidating a previous company in Wales, this serial 
entrepreneur re-located to Scotland to an area with a cluster of bio-tech and life-
science firms.  His knowledge of the availability of government grants and 
commercial loans was substantial.  Human capital was entrepreneurial specific and 
specific to the life-science sector but, he was liable to over-exaggeration (Q4e, Table 
5.5).  He recruited board members and shareholders from his previously liquidated 
company.  Generally, like lead academic entrepreneurs, lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs located on non-sponsored environments also tended to recruit 
entrepreneurial team members who were known to them through previous 
employment or business ownership exposures.   
 
The non-academic entrepreneurs leading Companies 7 and 9 had no previous 
start up experience and little exposure to the challenges of commercialisation.  
Although the lead entrepreneurs in Company 7 had ample scientific and technical 
human capital there was nothing in their backgrounds to indicate specific human 
capital representing experience in commercialisation.  Their understanding of the 
market place and future strategies of larger pharmaceutical firms came from their 
industrial specific human capital gained from their past employment experiences.  
However, for the practicalities of the process of start-up, including how to write 
business plans, they had to seek advice from the business development agency.  The 
lead entrepreneur in Company 9 was an architect with equally little exposure to the 
process of commercialisation.  Devoid of commercial specific human capital, the 
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architect¶V DFFRXQWDQW VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH\ FRQWDFW WKH ORFDO EXVLQHVV GHYHORSPHQW
agency for advice.  The lead entrepreneurs were then advised by the local business 
development agency to seek the assistance of another company versed in the 
promotion of early start-up companies.   
5.6 Cross-Case Comparison of Resource Profiles Brought by Team 
Members  
The following section explores and compares the resource profiles of 
entrepreneurial team members at opportunity identification.  Entrepreneurs seeking to 
develop their opportunities leveraged their entrepreneurial ownership team members 
with similar or diverse human capital.  Consistently, academic entrepreneurs located 
on sponsored environments made comment about the need to recruit team members 
with appropriate business acumen to compensate for their lack of understanding to 
allow access to resources, especially financial and social networks.  Lack of 
entrepreneurial specific human capital has been exposed as a potential barrier to 
commercialisation for scientists (Radosevich, 1995).  Inevitably, they were seeking to 
compensate for their lack of commercial understanding.  However, with the exception 
of Company 1, lead academic entrepreneurs recruited previously known team 
members from their current or former HEI (Clarysse and Moray, 2004).  Lead 
academic entrepreneurs with no previous business ownership experience, therefore, 
sought entrepreneurial ownership teams that were associated with human capital 
homogeneity.  Their teams had diverse knowledge relating to technology and science 
rather than products or markets.  The small entrepreneurial ownership teams (e.g. 2 to 
4 equity holders) were constrained by the amount of human capital at their disposal 
and this was not always overcome by recruiting appropriately qualified additional 
team members.  This was a barrier and could be overcome with a call for 
interdisciplinary teams with links to resources other than those associated with 
science.  These observations suggest the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 10: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than lead non-
academic entrepreneurs to focus on team homogeneity during the opportunity 
identification phase. 
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs had acquired diverse technical capabilities 
relating to several industry settings and not solely related to life-science research.  
This experience was crucial in identifying a potential opportunity, in forming a 
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business concept and developing networks with actors for external resources.  
Moreover, lead non-academic entrepreneurs, reporting prior business ownership 
experience, sought entrepreneurial team members with diverse human capital profiles.   
 
Financial resources were required to support product development and the 
protection of IP as well as the recruitment of appropriate management team members 
and other employees to develop the business idea.  Through the guise of TTOs, on 
sponsored environments, and business agencies, on non-sponsored environments, seed 
funding, offered through government initiatives, was crucial for opportunity 
identification progressing to evaluation.  Non-equity team members such as TTOs 
were vital because they guided entrepreneurs through the governmental funding 
application process and acted as representatives or custodians of the equity stake 
belonging to the HEI.  Typically, non-academic entrepreneurs used early stage, or seed 
funding, in a proactive way to support applications for future funding rather than more 
research focused lead academic entrepreneurs.  The lead academic entrepreneur 
relating to Company 4, for example, used the early seed funding to build a prototype 
whilst the lead non-academic entrepreneurs relating to Company 8 used finance to 
develop a business plan.  One speculative reason for the emphasis some lead non-
academic entrepreneurs put on funding expertise may be linked to their decision to 
locate on non-sponsored environments.  Lead entrepreneurs relating to Companies 6, 7 
and 9 were unable to leverage the support of a TTO from a HEI.  Interestingly, the 
lead non-academic entrepreneurs relating to Company 8 located on a sponsored 
environment but did not use the services of the TTO.  Lead academic entrepreneurs 
located on sponsored environments were eligible for public funding awarded through 
their HEIs, prior to the formation of their ventures.  This support was not available to 
lead non-academic entrepreneurs.  Academic entrepreneurs located on sponsored 
environments also benefited from lower cost bases due to reduced rents, access to HEI 
infrastructurH DQGRWKHU FRVW VDYLQJSULYLOHJHV  $QHQWUHSUHQHXU¶V ORFDWLRQ VHOHFWLRQ
therefore, impacted on the focus of resources available to create and identify 
opportunities.   
 
With regard to Companies 1, 2, 3, and 5 the lead entrepreneurs recruited and 
sought the assistance of non-equity holding team members, through the guise of the 
TTO or business development agencies.  These agents did not have detailed 
 165 
knowledge of the life-science sector and directed the entrepreneur toward more 
appropriate sources of professional advice and funding.  External agents encouraged 
the academic entrepreneur to utilize the network resources of surrogate entrepreneurs 
(Vanaelst et al., 2006).  These networks were used when finance was formally sought 
from venture capitalists and business angels.  Surrogate entrepreneurs with prior 
investment experience were able to address funding barriers to business development 
for lead entrepreneurs (Franklin et al., 2001).  Independent and external surrogate 
entrepreneurs, however, did not acquire from the outset an equity stake in the 
supported ventures.  A surrogate entrepreneur was attracted to Company 3 when the 
lead entrepreneur failed to secure government and charity funding but was, initially, 
recruited as a business consultant.  This individual subsequently became an 
entrepreneurial ownership team member and the chairman.  When the diversity of 
human capital within a team was limited at the opportunity identification phase, non-
equity holding members compensated for a lack of skills.   
 
The lead entrepreneurs in Companies 6 and 7 brought with them different 
experiences and skills to their firms.  The former brought entrepreneurial experience 
from previous business ownership whilst the latter brought scientific knowledge, 
knowledge of the industrial sector but little business acumen.  Entrepreneurial 
ownership team membership associated with Company 6 was precarious because of 
the geographical spread of team members associated with their previous company and 
their inability to relocate close to the new.  Data indicate that the lead entrepreneur 
shouldered most of the decision making and did not accurately share information well 
with the other team members.  Company 7 relied on the scientific knowledge and 
contacts of the two lead scientists and advice from the business development 
community, which they both found wanting.  Generally, it was reported that the 
business development agencies lacked experience in dealing with life-science projects. 
 
The lead non-academic entrepreneur in Company 9 had little knowledge of 
business or the regulatory process of certifying a new chemical.  Rather than learning 
from previous experience or bringing prior knowledge, the lead entrepreneur and team 
learned µby doing¶ which extended the time frame of opportunity identification and 
evaluation.  Although non-academic entrepreneurs had equal access to business 
development agencies, it was observed that they were less successful in being awarded 
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access to surrogate entrepreneurs.  It is unclear whether this observation was a result 
of a reluctance of business development agencies to introduce non-academic 
entrepreneurs to surrogate entrepreneurs or whether surrogate entrepreneurs had a 
preference for working with academic entrepreneurs.  This evidence suggests the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 11: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to 
gain access to µsurrogate entrepreneurs¶.   
 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings, from a qualitative analysis, of 
interviews with respondents from nine sets of entrepreneurial ownership teams 
H[SORULQJµZK\¶, µKRZ¶ DQGµZKHQ¶ teams were formed.  Lead academic entrepreneurs 
on sponsored environments expressed and manifest a preference for attracting and 
recruiting team members from within the HEI in which they worked.  In all cases, 
except one, (Company 1), entrepreneurial ownership team members were known to 
the lead entrepreneurs prior to the formation of a company.  Additionally, team 
IRUPDWLRQ SUHFHGHG FRPSDQ\ IRUPDWLRQ PDNLQJ RSSRUWXQLW\ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ D µWHDP
HIIRUW¶  7KHUH ZDV D JUHDWHU GDQJHU RI KRPRJHQHLW\ RI KXPDQ FDSLWDO ZLWKLQ WKH
academic entrepreneur led teams because prior human capital was overly represented 
by technological knowledge and little business acumen.  However, as Burt (1997) 
DUJXHG³ZKLOHKXPDQFDSLWDO LV VXUHO\QHFHVVDU\ WR VXFFHVV LW LVXVHOHVVZLWKRXW the 
VRFLDO FDSLWDO RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ ZKLFK WR DSSO\ LW´ %XUW  S
Entrepreneurial ownership team members with industry-specific human capital or 
commercial experience were introduced to the lead entrepreneurs by the TTOs.  The 
TTOs in turn were well connected to the local business development agencies where 
RWKHU µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶ UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV ZHUH PDGH  $OWKRXJK D JHQHUDO
criticism of the TTOs and the business development agencies was that they had little 
experience in the life-science sector, they did offer information and access to advice, 
funding and experienced entrepreneurs.  Their social capital allowed them access to 
higher returns on their human capital, suggesting and interactive effect between social 
and human capital (Burt, 1997).  This was particularly beneficial to the academic 
entrepreneurs during the entrepreneurial commitment phase.  Many of the other people 
that the TTO was associated with were resource providers connected to governmental 
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funding and advisory bodies, whose cooperation, coordination and support was needed 
(Granovetter, 1973).  However, over time, the TTO and their expertise became 
redundant and was replaced by expertise from other sources (e.g. surrogate 
entrepreneurs and investors).  This would indicate µdepreciation¶ in social capital 
(Lester et al., 2008).  The effect was not restricted to social capital.  772¶Vknowledge 
about key issues and the working of local authorities and funding for HEI commercial 
concerns was only relevant for short time.  It seems that the resources TTOs 
accumulate and bring to office are most valuable during the discovery and evaluation 
phases of the entrepreneurial process (Vohora et al., 2004) but during the process their 
social and human capital deteriorates.  7KHUHDIWHU µVSHFLDOLVHG¶entrepreneurial team 
members were used to exploit their commercial specific human capital.  Specific 
human capital related to prior knowledge and experience with venture capitalist and 
business angel investors.   
 
/HDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIRSSRUWXQLWLHVZHUHURRWHGLQWKHLU
academic research and knowledge of the market extracted from industrial players met 
through the academic and technical conference circuit or through contact with 
customers and end users if they had a dual entrepreneur / clinical role.  Although 
academic entrepreneurs were generally proficient at identifying opportunities for 
commercialisation, they recognised a need to develop capabilities to evaluate and 
exploit the idea as a commercial opportunity.  Important was the availability of people 
to fill the role of commercial evaluation.  Lacking in social capital and contacts with 
entrepreneurs who held experience in the life-science sector, the academic 
entrepreneurs had to rely on the contacts offered by outside team members such as 
business development agencies or TTOs.  Outside team members, who were not 
equity holders, held relevance during the opportunity identification phase and were 
usually appreciated for their knowledge and expertise in applying for government 
funding (e.g. Proof of Concept, SPUR and SMART awards).   
 
Recruited surrogate entrepreneurs were responsible for matching the 
entrepreneurs with appropriate sources and providers of investment.  With the 
availability of appropriately skilled and experienced surrogate entrepreneurs a key 
issue, the local business development agencies contacts with appropriate entrepreneurs 
ZDVHVSHFLDOO\YDOXDEOH$OWKRXJKWKHOHDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶FDSDELOLWLHVZHUH
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vital for opportunity identification, especially on a technical level, establishing market 
viability in the form of regulatory certification (for medical devices), for instance, was 
lacking and there was evidence to suggest that the TTOs and the entrepreneurs 
themselves needed to develop their capabilities in the management of such issues.  
This recommendation can also be extended to the venture capital company who 
funded the medical device company.  The nature of the commercial idea and the role 
RIKXPDQUHVRXUFHV LQSDUWLFXODU VHHPHG WREHDSHUVXDVLYH LQIOXHQFHRQ LQYHVWRUV¶
opinion about the new companies.  Again and again the need to have a well-developed 
and diversely qualified team was emphasised.  Both the quality and quantity of human 
capital held within the team determined further access to internal and external 
resources.   
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments also 
preferred team members who were previously known to them either through work 
connections or from previous entrepreneurial ventures.  Working with previously 
known colleagues had the limitation of not expanding available human capital to the 
existing entrepreneurial ownership team because generally colleagues came from 
similar backgrounds.  One lead non-academic entrepreneur provided evidence of bad 
practice being imported from prior entrepreneurial experience (e.g. over optimism).  
Prior business ownership can provide both positive and negative experiences.  Similar 
to academic led enterprises, non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments 
had access to the services and advice of local business development agencies.  This 
allowed access to government funding in the form of SMART and SPUR awards.  
However, there was an observed variation in the degrees of success between academic 
and non-academic entrepreneurs in their ability to win government funding.  It is 
difficult to gauge whether this is a reflection on the quality of advice from business 
development agencies compared to TTOs or a reflection on the ability of the non-
academic entrepreneurs to apply for funding. 
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments displayed least 
prior personal connections with team members and had to go through a search process 
to find potential members.  Relying on past contact with business agencies lead non-
academic  entrepreneurs could reply on their VRFLDO FDSLWDO UHIHUULQJ WR ³WKH sum of 
actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from, 
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WKH QHWZRUN RI UHODWLRQVKLSV SRVVHVVHG E\ WKDW LQGLYLGXDO´ 1DKDSLet and Ghoshal, 
1998, p 243) to get higher returns on their own specific human capital (Burt, 1997).  In 
one case this led to a synergy of heterogeneous human capital providing a commercial 
solution to a cumbersome laboratory process (e.g. opportunity identification).  The 
challenge was offered by academics and the solution provided by engineers.  The 
diversity of experience and skills in the team proved to be attractive to business angels 
who released their own Chairman to lead and manage the project during the 
entrepreneurial commitment phase.  He added substantial understanding of product 
development and general management.   
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Chapter 6: Case Analysis:  
The Entrepreneurial Process 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 explores the entrepreneurial process.  The process acknowledges the 
resources associated with Information Search leading to Opportunity Identification 
(e.g. discovery); Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management (e.g. evaluation) 
for eventual Firm Creation (e.g. exploitation) (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001).  These 
components of the entrepreneurial process are outlined in the conceptual model 
guiding this study presented in Chapter 3 (Theme 3).  Past literature has inferred the 
importance of the role of social networks (Hills et al., 1997; Mosey et al., 2006), and 
WKHHIIHFWRISULRUNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFH6KDQHRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ 
to identify, evaluate and exploit opportunities for commercialisation.  In this study it is 
speculated that the ability to do so may be a joint function of the nature of the 
opportunity in conjunction with the human and social capital characteristics of the 
entrepreneur(s).  During the study, opportunities rarely existed independently of the 
individuals involved or the specific context in which they operated.  There was a 
gradual maturation by the entrepreneurs to see a connection between their technology 
and a market need (or indeed vice-a-versa). In this chapter the following research 
questions presented in Chapter 1 will be explored: 
 
Research Question 5 µ+RZ¶ GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG OHDG QRQ-academic 
entrepreneurs identify and exploit opportunities for creating a firm? 
 
5HVHDUFK 4XHVWLRQ  µ:KDW¶ W\SHV RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV GR OHDG DFDGHPLF DQG QRQ-
academic entrepreneurs identify?  
 
Research Question 7: To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation 
activities related to the actual and perceived human capital characteristics of the 
entrepreneur / entrepreneurial team? 
 
Research Question 8: To what extent are opportunity identification and exploitation 
activities related to the actual and perceived social capital characteristics of the 
entrepreneur / entrepreneurial team? 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  Data from case studies are compared 
(e.g. lead academic and non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored 
external environments) and are presented in the series of µquote quadrants¶, allowing 
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between case and across case comparisons.  The entrepreneurial process is viewed in 
three phases to include data concerning information search and opportunity 
identification (e.g. discovery) (Section 6.2); data from entrepreneurs covering resource 
accumulation, leverage and management (e.g. evaluation) (Section 6.3) and finally a 
UHYLHZRI µKRZ¶GHFLVLRQVZHUH WDNHQ WR IRUP ILUPV (exploitation) (Section 6.4).  In 
section 6.5 a summary is presented.   
 
6.2. Discovery: The Context (Theme 3) 
Entrepreneurs identified opportunities by being alert to and noticing 
opportunities that the market presented (Kirzner, 1979).  The entrepreneur from this 
perspective was alert to the value of the information they gleaned from their 
environment but did not discover the opportunity from searching.  They were alert.  
7KH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR LGHQWLI\ WKHVH RSSRUWXQLWLHV ZDV LQIOXHQFHG E\ SULRU
knowledge and experience (e.g. general and specific human capital).  Prior 
information disseminated from work experience, education or other means, therefore, 
LQIOXHQFHG WKH SRWHQWLDO HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR XQGHUVWDQG LQWHUSUHW DQG DSSO\ WKH
new information in ways that others, lacking in the knowledge could not.  Differences 
EHWZHHQ OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DELOLty to recognise, discover or create an opportunity 
relied, in part, on their alertness related to prior knowledge associated with knowledge 
of their subject area; knowledge of markets; knowledge of ways to serve the market 
and knowledge of customer problems (Sarasvathy et al., 2003;  Shane, 2004).   
 
The human capital relating to the entrepreneur was critical in determining the 
extent to which the entrepreneur could know where an invention or intervention 
needed to be made.  The less prepared and experienced the entrepreneur, the more 
extensive their search for information.  Some entrepreneurs identified opportunities 
because they had superior abilities to process information and to scan and search their 
environment for opportunities (Shane, 2000).  They had better access to information 
about the existence of an opportunity because of the environment they inhabited 
(Shane, 2003) indicating superior social capital.  This breadth of human and social 
capital refers not only to the skills but also the social networks (connections and 
relationship) they possessed (Lester et al., 2008).  The ability to recognise, discover or 
create DQRSSRUWXQLW\PD\GHSHQGWKHUHIRUHRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VXQLTXHNQRZOHGJHVHW
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with respect to technologies and markets (Chandler et al., 2002) and social networks to 
information providers.  The human capital of the entrepreneur may be critical in 
GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU FDQ µNQRZ¶ ZKHUH DQ LQYHQWLRQ RU
intervention needs to be made.  However, the development of a technology often 
occurred before a commercial opportunity was perceived or identified.  In practical 
terms this translated into scientific research being conducted prior to a commercial 
application being identified from the research (e.g. technology was created prior to a 
known market application).  It could be argued that we might expect opportunity 
identification of a technology with commercial possibilities to precede development of 
the technology (i.e. as in opportunity discovery where demand exists but supply does 
not).  This study often found the contrary.  Development of the technological creation 
preceded the identification of the commercial opportunity or the discovery of a 
market.  This was especially true for academic entrepreneurs potentially indicating a 
deficiency in social capital.  In the case of academic entrepreneurs, skills associated 
with R&D were directed primarily at academic basic research.  These skills were only 
laterally transferred to the development of a commercial product when a commercial 
opportunity was identified.   
 
6.2.1 Information Search and Opportunity Identification: Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments 
Academic entrepreneurs identified opportunities for commercialisation because 
they were immersed in research and in all cases the technological source of their 
opportunity was rooted in their academic scientific exploratory work.  More often than 
not, the lead academic entrepreneurs were involved in scientific experimentation prior 
to identifying a market niche.  However, sometimes the market dictated what type of 
product or process was required (e.g. a recognised opportunity where there already 
existed a demand for the supply of a new product).  This could involve improvement 
of a product already available within the market (Company 1), the introduction of a 
novel product or approach to solving an already existing problem (Company 3) or the 
invention of a new medical device or instrument, combining different technologies 
(Company 4).  On the other hand, the delivery of a new chemical process (Company 
2) could be seen as an opportunity discovered since demand definitely existed but the 
supply of the new product of process had yet to be developed.   
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The lead academic entrepreneur (Company 1) did not indicate that he was 
searching for a business opportunity prior to his alertness of what was happening in 
the market or what products were available for toxicity testing.  This would suggest 
that the entrepreneur did not discover the entrepreneurial opportunity through search 
but through a process of recognition.  He recognised the value of his new information 
that he received through a combination of information (e.g. results from his PhD 
research; permission to use a licence to enhance his product and assessment of similar 
products on the market).  His own technological knowledge was used to evaluate his 
FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV, an issue associated with absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Leventhal, 1990).  Awareness of the market opportunity was related to the information 
he already possessed, which he had accumulated through his education and exposure 
to other academics.  Originally, he intended to offer a toxicity testing service to the 
chemical and biotechnology industry.  However, feedback from the industry indicated 
that need was for actual test-kits not a service.  This process of opportunity recognition 
proved to be iterative and not linear because prior knowledge leading to opportunity 
identification and an approach to evaluation and exploitation was overtaken by 
feedback from customers.  His access to the social network of customers came from 
prior knowledge of the pharmaceutical industry from one of his team member, 
recruited after firm formation, indicating that specific human capital was important for 
the recognition of the value of the technology but that market knowledge was 
influenced by strong ties to the pharmaceutical industry (e.g. social capital). 
 
Similarly, the lead academic entrepreneur, motivating the entrepreneurial 
ownership team in Company 2, not only understood the science and technology behind 
the proposed process of changing chemical compounds because he was a scientist, he 
also had 20 years industrial experience in the bio-science sector.  His experience 
allowed insight into the market, into what customers required and exposed him to the 
weaknesses of the scientific approaches of potential competitors trying to solve similar 
scientific challenges.  Prior specialist knowledge of the sector gave the lead academic 
entrepreneur competitive advantage.  The lHDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VRZQDELOLW\WR
discover an opportunity in the new process was enhanced by prior understanding 
DERXW µKRZ¶ WKH QHZ SURFHVV FRXOG EH XVHG WR FUHDWH D QHZ SURGXFW IRU WKH
pharmaceutical industry.  The solution to the scientific challenge was identified as the 
possible commercial opportunity.  In Companies 1 and 2 opportunities unfolded from 
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prior technical knowledge of potential products or processes.  In addition, the 
entrepreneurial ownership team in Company 2 knew the value of the new process 
EHFDXVHWKH\KDGSULRULQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHLUSRWHQWLDOPDLQFXVWRPHU¶VQHHGV4D
Table 6.1) an issue identified as creating value in previous literature (Shane, 2000).  
Prior knowledge of this need (e.g. demand) influenced the lead entrepUHQHXU¶VDELOLW\
to identify an opportunity and was supported by his technical ability to potentially 
develop the new process (e.g. a solution to a problem).  Prior knowledge thus bridged 
the relationship between the technology (development of a new enzyme) and the 
discovery of the entrepreneurial opportunity (e.g. demand definitely existed but the 
supply of the new product of process had yet to be discovered) (Sarasvathy et al., 
2003).   
 
The foundation of opportunity identification for Company 3 was 
technologically led.  Consequently, research was conducted towards the goal of 
patenting and protecting knowledge.  The variety of roles that the two, high-profile 
academics played covering, clinical, administrative, advisory, research, academic and 
entrepreneurial, exposed them to a diversity of people.  For example, at academic and 
technical conferences they had contact with both industrial representatives from the 
oral hygiene sector and other academics involved in similar research.  Contact allowed 
a search for information on market fashions and needs.  In their clinical capacity, they 
had direct contact with patients.  Those experiences allowed them to gauge patient and 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶QHHGIRUEHWWHUGHQWDOGHFD\GHWHFWLRQV\VWHPV7KHOLWHUDWXUHLQGLFDWHV
that people are more likely to receive new information that will provide a missing 
piece in recognising an opportunity if they have variation in their experiences (Shane, 
2003).  Having contact with a diversity of people allowed the lead entrepreneurs to 
recognise the demand in the market place for advancement in dental decay detection 
(e.g. for a supply of a new approach).   
 
The lead academic entrepreneur in Company 4 described the technology 
behind his artificial implantable graft as a platform technology (e.g. a recognised 
opportunity based on the supply of a new medical device).  Fluid flow technology was 
applicable to areas other than medical devices and was observed and detected prior to 
the identification of the commercial opportunity.  Movement of the fluid within the 
confines of vessels was the scientific discovery.  The new information was used to 
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develop a prototype for a new medical device because the lead academic entrepreneur 
was a surgeon who used graft implants as part of his work.  He was aware of the 
deficiencies of products on the market.  Similar to the dental device in Company 3, 
this prior information and knowledge about blood flow enabled him to recognise an 
opportunity in which to enter a known market (Q1b, Table 6.1).   
 
6.2.2 Information Search and Opportunity Identification: Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments 
Research and development for drug testing instrumentation was introduced to 
run parallel to the service side of the company (Company 5).  After moving from a 
non-sponsored environment to a sponsored environment, the TTO, attached to the 
HEI, stated that because the lead entrepreneur and team member were potential end 
users of the instrument under development, they were well aware of what the market 
had to offer and the limitations of available instruments.  Additionally both members 
were well networked into the academic sector to listen to feed back from the 
practitioners testing the instruments.  The two academics were close to the functioning 
market of instrumentation for testing pharmaceuticals.  Searching for and access to 
market information was part of their academic routine (Q2c,d,e Table 6.1).  Like 
&RPSDQLHV  DQG  &RPSDQ\  SURFHVVHG SULRU NQRZOHGJH DERXW FRPSHWLWRUV¶
products and demonstrated technological acumen through the (potential) discovery of 
a new supply of instrument.   
 
6.2.3 Information Search and Opportunity Identification; Non-Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments 
A synergy of ideas, talents and opportunities emerged whilst one of the 
academics, a prospective team member, was presenting information at a business 
networking function attended by one of the engineers (lead entrepreneur).  He 
immediately recognised the link between the aspirations of the academic, for future 
miniaturisation and automation of laboratory processes, and his own skills.  Once an 
opportunity was identified by looking for links between the modern needs of a post 
genomic laboratory and the skills of electronic engineers (e.g. a reliance on general 
human capital), the next step was to form a company.  The synergy of the recognised 
knowledge held by both the engineers and the academics drove the processes of 
technical innovation and market discovery (Kirzner, 1979).  No new knowledge was 
created but the process to be automated was only known to the scientists, whilst the 
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engineers held the solution (Q3f, Table 6.1) (e.g. there was both a demand and a 
supply) (Sarasvathy, et al., 2003).  It was not only diversity of knowledge which 
allowed the team to discover opportunities but synergy of knowledge, prior 
knowledge, education, work experience, social connections and prior entrepreneurial 
experiences (Venkataraman, 1997).  One of the academics reported that the formation 
of the firm was almost formulaic because he had already been through the same 
process involving another spinout firm headed by a different surrogate entrepreneur 
(e.g. exploitation of specific human capital).   
 
6.2.4 Information Search and Opportunity Identification; Non-Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments 
The benefits of past experience and exposure to commercial pressures, the 
experience of prior business ownership and ability to progress an idea to become a 
commercial concept manifest itself in a diversity of approaches for Companies 6, 7 
DQG 7KH OHDGHQWUHSUHQHXU LQ&RPSDQ\ZDV D µVHULDO HQWUHSUHQHXU¶ 8VLQJKLV
scientific knowledge, his past employment experiences and contact with previous 
customers linked to his former company, he was able to identify a need for an 
analytical instrument for the bio-pharmaceutical industry.  In his previous start up he 
very deliberately created a company involved in the distribution of current 
technologies establishing market intelligence (Q4g, Table 6.1).  The literature 
indicates that people in marketing jobs are often the first to receive information for 
opportunity identification because they hear customer preferences (e.g. issues such as 
shortage of supplies, problems with existing products or services or the need for new 
products or services) (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005).  In the case of Company 6, the need 
for a new product, and therefore a business opportunity, was identified prior to the 
formation of the company.  There was a search for market information prior to the 
development of the new analytical instrument.  Unlike academic entrepreneurs who 
centred their work around laboratory based research, this non-academic entrepreneur 
used his customer base to research the needs of the market place, prior to discovering 
the opportunity (e.g. the demand existed but the supply had yet to be discovered) 
(Sarasvathy, et al., 2003).   
 
The two lead entrepreneurs in Company 7 formed a company for the research 
and development of new cell-lines but also supplemented their research with contract 
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service work in bio-pharmaceuticals.  They identified a market need for the 
development of special cell-lines because there was a move away from diagnostic to 
therapeutic science in the pharmaceutical sector at large.  According to recent 
research, individuals with exposure to prior industry-specific human capital are in 
ideal positions to seize upon openings for business opportunities and to decide upon 
effective strategic decisions for new firm formation (Colombo and Grilli, 2005).  
7KHUHIRUH &RPSDQ\ ¶V exposure to the pharmaceutical industry offered them 
opportunity.  In this particular case, what the two lead entrepreneurs knew and 
understood was related to what they learned in the organisation in which they were 
formerly employed (Cooper and Bruno, 1977).  Their new business opportunity was 
both practically and strategically directly related not only to their scientific specific 
human capital but also to their knowledge of the pharmaceutical sector.  Their 
opportunity was discovered because there existed a demand for the supply of their yet 
undeveloped cell-lines (Sarasvathy, et al., 2003). 
 
Unlike the entrepreneurial ownership team founding Company 8, which 
consisted of the academics who presented a problem and the engineers who offered a 
solution, the members of Company 9 could only identify the problem (e.g. the ill 
effects associated with chemicals in sheep dip).  No one in the entrepreneurial 
ownership team had sufficient scientific knowledge to find a solution and neither was 
the regulatory process for certifying new chemicals understood.  In addition there was 
a fundamental lack of entrepreneurial experience.  The opportunity was not presented 
as a commercial one but rather a socially responsible reaction to the ill effects of 
chemicals (Q4h, Table 6.1).  As the idea of forming a company progressed the attitude 
towards finding a product with potential market utility became more of a necessity.   
 
6.2.5 Cross-Case Comparison at Discovery 
Lead entrepreneurs in Companies 1, 3, 4 and 8 reported a scientific discovery 
process which led to its incorporation into a product (e.g. for Company 4: novel 
information about fluid flow technology incorporated into a product which transported 
blood).  These entrepreneurs had developed particular knowledge through their 
exposure to education and experience in academia (or contact with academia in 
Company 8) and were therefore more likely to recognise entrepreneurial opportunities, 
within their realm of expertise, which involved and required a response to new 
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technological / scientific discovery.  Table 6.2, outlining the relationship between the 
entrepreneurial process and human capital, lists the companies numbered 1 to 9 and 
reflects the location status of the individual companies at the time of the electronic 
survey in 2004.  The human capital associated with discovery, evaluation and 
exploitation is presented by reviewing the past work, educational and market 
experiences of the lead entrepreneurs and their entrepreneurial ownership team 
members.   
 
Opportunities were often reactions to finding solutions for specific problems 
expressed in terms of dissatisfaction with the performance of products and activities in 
the market, or the absence of such products in the market (Q1b, Table 6.1) (Chandler 
et al., 2002).  Whilst lead academic entrepreneurs entered markets in response to 
recognised ZHDNQHVVHV LQ FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV Qon-academic entrepreneurs were 
more likely to investigate a market prior to the discovery or invention of a new 
product.  Those involved in the discovery of an opportunity were also more likely to 
be involved in contract work (e.g. Companies 2, 5 and 7).  Presented empirical data 
and theoretical insights suggest the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 12:  Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely to identify an 
opportunity through a process of recognition conducting scientific exploration (e.g. 
supplying products for which there is a known market) than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs who identify an opportunity through a process of discovery (e.g. 
identifying a demand with the supply of a product not yet fully developed).  
 
The lead academic entrepreneurs in Companies 2 and 5 searched for a new 
product or process for a specific customer problem.  However, they were still 
operating within their own sphere of knowledge and expertise.  They searched for 
appropriate information prior to meeting customer / product problems as part of the 
opportunity identification process.  A market opportunity was discovered first rather 
than an identified product that had potential market application.  Pharmaceutical 
testing instrumentation was the discovered market opportunity for Company 5 and in 
Company 2 the need for intermediary chemicals for the pharmaceutical industry was 
the discovered opportunity (Q1a, Table 6.1).  The process of opportunity identification 
came from a customer need and market opportunity.  All companies in Quadrant 1  
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were involved in the creation of new scientific discovery whereas lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs came from less stable backgrounds e.g. prior business failure (Company 
6), redundancy (Companies 7 and 8) and involvement in completely unrelated 
professions (Company 9).  Lead academic entrepreneurs held functional scientific 
knowledge which could be used to enhance existing products or create new products 
whilst non-academic entrepreneurs reacted to observed customer needs.  It could be 
argued that a more diverse and varied background led to the need to search for an 
opportunity rather than one presenting itself (Q4g, Table 6.1).   
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs were, therefore, more proactive in their 
search for an opportunity (Companies 6, 7, 8 and 9) than lead academic entrepreneurs.  
The non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments displayed a process of 
recognition related to their past work and business ownership experiences.  This 
manifested itself in an extensive gauging of customers needs in Company 6 where the 
original lead entrepreneur surveyed the environment for ideas from customers.  
Opportunity was led by customer need in Company 6.  In Company 7, the two lead 
entrepreneurs expressed the desire not to compete with the main players in their field 
and deliberately chose to research and develop cell-lines which would not be of 
interest to the large players.  Knowledge of the market allowed the entrepreneurs to 
avoid competition.  The entrepreneurs leading Company 9 could not rely on any past 
entrepreneurial experience and learned as they progressed.  The process was time 
consuming and there was and still is no definitive final product.  These observations 
led to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 13 /HDG DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ general human capital (relating to 
education) allows for an opportunity identification approach reliant on scientific 
discovery whilst lead non-academic HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶VSHFLILFKXPDQFDSLWDOUHODWLQJ
to prior working experience) allows for an opportunity identification approach 
reliant on recognising market demands.   
 
6.3 Evaluation: The Context (Theme 3) 
Having ascertained that the nature and extent of human capital endowed in lead 
entrepreneurs influences opportunity identification, human capital may also be a 
function in accumulating, leveraging and managing other resources (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000) (e.g. social, financial, physical and organisational) for the 
evaluation of the opportunity.  The small entrepreneurial teams (e.g. 1 to 4 members), 
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attached to each company, were constrained at evaluation by the amount of human 
capital at their disposal and this was overcome by recruiting additional team members 
(Table 6.2).  Entrepreneurs reported leveraging access to resources through networks 
of other actors known within their external environment and whose experience bridged 
the technical to the commercial.   
 
6.3.1 Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management:  Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments  
The accumulation of resources necessary to evaluate projects was often centred 
on proof of concept and development of prototypes, all of which had to be funded.  In 
Company 1, the lead academic entrepreneur, having attended business seminars 
offered and run by the HEI, was guided by the TTO towards applying for government 
funding, which allowed further research and development and greater in-depth market 
research.  In Company 2, the intention of the entrepreneurial ownership team was to 
fund their research from contract work.  A difference between Company 1 and 2 was 
that the entrepreneurial ownership team in Company 2 was in place prior to the 
formation of the firm.  Their reliance on contract research, to fund their own research, 
was criticised by the TTO who felt that they should have attracted more money to the 
company at the launch stage instead of simply relying on government awards.  Past 
research indicates firms undercapitalised at founding are less likely to invoke positive 
perceptions from future external stakeholders (Baum and Silverman, 2004), less likely 
to survive (Bates, 1990) and less likely to grow compared to those that obtained 
capital from external sources at early phases (Westhead, 1995). However, in the case 
of Company 2, the entrepreneurial ownership team did not wish to relinquish equity 
other than that given over to the HEI in return for the use of IP.   
 
Having no entrepreneurial experience, the two academics leading Company 3 
approached their resident TTO for advice.  Access to government funding allowed the 
launch of their company but detailed business plans and contact to business angels and 
venture capitalists came from a recruited surrogate entrepreneur who had a proven 
track record in spinning out companies from other HEIs.  His previous dealings with 
and social ties to venture capital investors reduced considerable risk for the resource 
providers because his prior successful contact had initiated a trusting relationship, an 
issue explored in the past literature (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).  The combination of the 
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business acumen from the surrogate entrepreneur and the technical knowledge and 
reputation of the two academic clinicians, contributed to the leverage and management 
of financial, regulatory and organisational resources for Company 3.   
 
Initially, there was a miscalculation of the gap between the skills and knowledge of the 
lead academic entrepreneur in Company 4 and what the company required for start-up.  
Using his reputation and the skills of an engineer with previous business ownership 
experience, the lead entrepreneur was able to attract substantial venture capital 
funding.  Less emphasis, however, was placed on the management of time, the 
management of testing the product and the management of the certification process.  
There was lack of understanding and a very weak tie to people who had that specific 
knowledge.  This deficit in human (and social) capital proved disastrous because 
LQYHVWRU¶V PLOHVWRQHV ZHUH PLVVHG 4D Table 6.3).  The testing and certification 
process, for example, involving animals, had to be conducted outside of the UK 
increasing costs substantially.  Company 4 were constantly trying to recover from 
these earlier episodes and could not access people with certification experience.  The 
process for moving from opportunity identification to evaluation was not uniform and 
linear.  Initial opportunities were revised over time.  Company 1 began with the 
concept of a service business model but revisited it once market intelligence had been 
accumulated to offer an individual test kit.  Team structure and function developed 
after firm formation and went through several iterations.  The reshaping of business 
models also perturbed Company 2.  The technology associated with Company 2 was 
understood and practiced prior to formation as contract work.  Their identified 
opportunity was market driven and their recognised options on future discovery were 
to manufacture the specific chemical or to consider selling / licensing the technique of 
production.  Academic contacts and industrial knowledge were embodied in the 
individuals in the team.  Investors gained early access to Company 4 by insisting on 
the introduction of a CEO from a blue chip company, who was not qualified to run a 
small start up.  Several changes of personnel disrupted research and development and 
proved costly.   
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6.3.2 Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management:  Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments  
After relocating to a new HEI, the lead academic entrepreneur in Company 5 
relied on government awards for proving the ethicacy of his product and for the early 
stages of start-up.  The lead academic entrepreneur also recruited the services of 
another academic who demonstrated entrepreneurial rigour in his work.  In addition, 
there was assistance from the national business development agency that sponsored 
market research and Proof of Concept (Q2b, Table 6.3).  Similar to the companies in 
Quadrant 1, there was a strong reliance on team members with managerial specific 
human capital and government agencies providing business advice.   
 
6.3.3 Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management:  Non-Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments  
The entrepreneurial team in Company 8 offered venture capitalists and 
business angels an idea for miniaturising a laboratory process with proof of market 
and proof of prior commercial management.  Out of all the case studies, this 
entrepreneurial ownership team interviewed as if they had scrutinised the identified 
opportunity, had considered how best to exploit the potential commercial value of the 
technology and had identified each indLYLGXDO WHDP PHPEHU¶V WDOHQWV DQG VNLOOV WR
speculate on the advancement of the product.  The unique combination of the diverse 
and individual skills of the lead non-academic entrepreneur and team members 
favoured competitive advantage (Q3c, Table 6.3).  The academics had technical 
specific capital with an established reputation within the science sector both in the UK 
and the USA.  The engineers also brought technical specific capital from an 
electronics engineering background with specific skills in manufacturing and sales.  
One member from each side of the divide had previous start-up experience.  They 
therefore started with higher-level organisational capabilities and imported a greater 
level of tacit knowledge that leveraged access to other human capital (e.g. ability to 
manage the process and relationships with capital providers).  Their investors offered 
their own chairman to sit on the board of Company 8.  Consistently this team met 
milestones set by government agencies awarding grants and targets set by investors.  
The engineers took the process a step further by experimenting with the manufacture 
of the actual production of their product.   
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6.3.4 Resource Accumulation, Leverage and Management:  Non-Academic 
Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored Environments  
In Company 6, the lead entrepreneur relied on his own specific prior 
entrepreneurial experiences to accumulate resources.  He brought with him technical 
capability drawn from his education in science, his working experiences in the 
Ministry of Defence as well as his prior start-up exposure.  He demonstrated a wide 
knowledge of the industry in which he hoped to function both in the USA and in the 
UK and was in the process of building a reputation amongst technical colleagues and 
representative in the venture capital community.  As a non-academic entrepreneur he 
was keen to extend his network of influence within academia and had made contact 
with a local HEI.  He built on his technical and social network resources to gain access 
to private equity, allowing him to develop the company infrastructure and to relocate 
to a sponsored environment.  
 
The founders in Company 7 possessed enough financial capital from their 
redundancy package, prior knowledge of the market (Q4d, Table 6.3) and sufficient 
specific human capital from past education and scientific work to offer themselves to 
the pharmaceutical world as a company seeking contract work.  Similar to companies 
lead by academic entrepreneurs, Company 7 offered a dual business model.  Along 
with a contract service they wished to develop their own cell-lines.  The starting 
endowments with which the two scientists began Company 7 rested extensively on 
their own human resources relating primarily to their skills claimed through education 
and past employment.  Recognising that they lacked business skills, they approached 
the business development agency and slowly built up their knowledge of sources of 
available funding (Q4e, Table 6.3).  The scientists did not manage to build on their 
technical and social ties to gain financial resources and were observed to have a 
limited social network.  They found it difficult to network.  Unlike academic 
entrepreneurs their access to business advice was poor possibly because they lacked 
access to a gatekeeper, a role played for academic entrepreneurs on sponsored 
environments by the TTOs.   
 
Company 9 offered an example of a lead entrepreneur who developed 
insufficient resources and network ties and presented with inappropriate human capital 
to move from the early stages of opportunity identification to the next.  The idea for 
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the opportunity was not well defined and the team members ill qualified.  The resource 
building process was ambiguous.  Business acumen was bought as a resource from the 
market place and thereafter the company holding responsibility had full responsibility 
for fundraising not only for the management of the company but also for the chemical 
testing and regulatory process.  All laboratory work was sub-contracted out to 
different research institutions.  Due to lack of diligence on the part of the management 
company a patent was filed on behalf of the company for a chemical for which a 
patent had already been filed.  This halted the entrepreneurial process and as a result 
Company 9 remained at the opportunity identification stage throughout the study.   
 
6.3.5 Cross-Case Comparison at Evaluation 
All lead entrepreneurs reported that attracting resources for evaluation was a 
challenge.  This phase required the entrepreneurs to not only identify future resources 
but also to learn how to access and manage them.  For those with little or no 
commercial experience, with a lack of understanding about their target market and 
with few contacts with finance providers and business advisers, this proved difficult.  
However, lead entrepreneurs, who had or were gathering an entrepreneurial team with 
diverse human capital, were able to develop and build on existing social networks.  
Table 6.4 outlines the relationship between the entrepreneurial process and social 
capital associated with discovery, evaluation and exploitation.  Data indicates weak 
and strong tie connections which are related and influenced by human capital at 
similar junctures (Table 6.2).  Weak ties with resource providers were evident in 
Companies 1, 3 and 5 in relation to fundraising.  The lead academic entrepreneurs 
provided the technical-specific human capital and market knowledge whilst recruited 
surrogate entrepreneurs, team members or TTOs, exploited their social capital to 
network with resource providers to attract funding (Mosey et al., 2006).  Social ties 
between TTOs and the local business development agencies were especially valuable, 
but sometimes not always appreciated (Franklin et al., 2001).  TTOs acted as 
µJDWHNHHSHUV¶ WR Rther resource providers (Johannisson, et al., 1994).  The lead 
academic entrepreneurs often committed considerable portions of their precious time 
(considering that they still were full time employees of the HEIs) to gain the 
commitment of these key team members.   
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For Company 1, headway was made through a personal introduction to an 
angel syndicate by a relative of the lead entrepreneur (e.g. a direct social tie).  
Companies 3 and 4 were forced to London to seek funding.  In both cases prior 
knowledge and specific human capital relating to venture capital provision came from 
surrogate entrepreneurs.  Other sources of early seed funding for opportunity 
identification included winnings from a business plan competition (Company 1), 
university equity (Companies 2 and 3), redundancy packages (Company 7), market 
research commissions from the governmental business development agency 
(Companies 5 and 8) and private equity (Companies 2, 6 and 9).  At the evaluation 
phase general human capital pertaining to technical knowledge was less valuable than 
social capital in relation to networks and ties with resource providers.  Such networks 
provided access to specific human capital relating to sources of general management 
skills, the development of prototypes, securing proof of concept and industrial 
contacts.  Human capital thus varies in advantageous value at different points during 
the entrepreneurial process and access to strong ties more important at the evaluation 
phase.  These observations give rise to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 14: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments who are 
involved in the research and development of medical and dental devices are more 
likely than other lead entrepreneurs to have or to be offered direct ties with 
surrogate entrepreneurs by resources providers. 
 
Proposition 15: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments who 
recruit surrogate entrepreneurs are more likely than non-academic entrepreneurs 
on non-sponsored environments to receive capital investment from external 
investment providers.  
 
Companies 7 and 9, non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored 
environments, displayed a distinct lack of sufficient entrepreneurial experience and 
had limited access to experienced advisors to guide them appropriately.  Future effects 
of early stage mismanagement can only be speculated, but for Company 9 their first 
product had to be discarded.  The effect of poor advice for the entrepreneurs in 
Company 7 meant that their own research had to be put on hold whilst the contract 
side of the operation took prevalence.  In addition, the failed merger with another 
company and the rejected application for funds from financial providers substantially 
weakened their already precarious organisation.  The two entrepreneurs 
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found themselves continually reassessing their situation.  This was especially 
necessary for realigning applications for funding from private, governmental and 
charitable sources.   
 
Lead entrepreneurs with the most education reported more access to venture 
capitalists and were the more successful in raising funds (e.g. those who were full 
professors).  Generally, these lead entrepreneurs were also responsible for the creation 
of unique IP associated with their product.  Past literature substantiates this 
observation that better educated entrepreneurs have more success gaining finance from 
venture capitalists (Shane, 2003).  This lies contrary to Westhead and Storey (1995) 
who found that firms which were reliant on intangible assets, such as education levels, 
had greater problems than other firms in obtaining capital.  Full professors added 
value to their applications because they were recognised leaders in their field of 
research.  Their findings were published in recognised peer reviewed journals.  Within 
their own HEIs they displayed managerial and administrative acumen by conducting 
extensive research programs.  Their applications for basic research funding to 
governmental and charitable bodies and their presentation skills helped with the 
application process for funding to potential investors.  Not only was their approach 
professional, they carried with them considerable individual reputation and the 
reputation from their respective HEIs.  Knowledge of the market and application of 
potential products did not pose a major challenge for most lead entrepreneurs.  Lead 
DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI RSSRUWXQLWLHV ZHUH URRWHG LQ WKHLU DFDGHPLF
research and knowledge of the market extracted from industrial players met through 
the conference circuit or through contact with end users who had dual academic / 
clinical roles.  The effect of further education and academic reputation prompted the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 16: Lead academic entrepreneurs who are full professors based on 
sponsored environments are more likely to attract venture capital funding than lead 
non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments. 
 
6.4 Exploitation: The Context (Theme 3) 
The possession of idiosyncratic information or beliefs leading to the discovery 
of an entrepreneurial opportunity (Kirzner, 1973) is not sufficient to attract resources.  
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As with the prior two phases in the entrepreneurial process, it may be anticipated that 
entrepreneurs with relevant experience, skills and connections will be better situated to 
exploit the opportunity than those without.  Those without must have the capabilities 
to access, choose and recruit those with.  Learning from other team members may 
allow the entrepreneurs to move towards firm formation (Kor and Mahoney, 2000).  
The entrepreneur must also have the capacity to persuade resource providers to release 
resources (e.g. financial, social, physical and organisational) and to convince them that 
their ability to combine these resources, will lead to a profitable outcome.  All lead 
entrepreneurs in this study exploited their opportunity by creating independent firms.   
 
6.4.1 Firm Creation Decision:  Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored 
Environments  
During the exploitation phase of the opportunity identification process 
involving the decision to create a firm academic entrepreneurs relied on the advice of 
the TTO.  Lead academic entrepreneurs were all forerunners in their field of academic 
research but were less comfortable with their entrepreneur roles.  The human capital 
resources that were lacking revolved around finance, organisational issues including a 
time commitment to the process, certification regulations, accommodation, the market 
and access to trained people.  These observations are substantiated by past research 
which highlights that inexperienced entrepreneurs may lack access, in the form of 
social network content (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003), to seed funding, industry 
knowledge or access to investment finance (Mosey et al., 2006).  It was anticipated 
that academic entrepreneurs would have difficulty building or identifying new weak 
ties to spot new opportunities (Burt, 1992; hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2003a) or set up strong 
ties with team members to access resources, distinct capabilities or social capital 
(Vohora et al., 2004).  Facing these barriers the human capital of academic 
entrepreneurs may effect the development of their social capital.  
 
The lead entrepreneur in Company 1 realised value from his PhD during the write up 
phase.  Winning a business plan competition forced him to form a company.  The lead 
academic entrepreneur accepted space within the HEI incubator unit but had 
reservations about forming the company so quickly.  He relinquished equity to the 
providers of the prize money and accepted assistance from two mentors who guided 
him through the process of applying for government funding.  Applying for 
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government funding was an action consistent throughout the firm formation process 
and was available to both academic and non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and 
non-sponsored environments (Q1b, Table 6.5; Q2c, Table 6.5; Q3d, Table 6.5).  
Application to business angels came after firm formation and with the assistance of a 
team member who had prior experience with the pharmaceutical sector.  Applying for 
venture capital or funding from business angels was sought after firm formation and 
those who were successful accessed people who had prior dealings with the providers. 
 
Company 2 was the only firm which did not rely on venture funding.  This 
firm supported itself through contract work.  The lead academic entrepreneur who was 
the Industrial Fellow had been inspired to question the possibilities of forming a firm 
within the HEI institution for a number of reasons.  0XFKRIWKHµSXVK¶FDPHIURPa 
surrogate entrepreneur operating in the USA who suggested co-operation between the 
HEI and his company.  In addition, the lead entrepreneur desired to exploit his 
previous industrial experience and the HEI offered accommodation and use of IP.  The 
literature indicates that prior business experience encourages opportunity exploitation 
by providing the necessary skills, information and trust (Larsson and Starr, 1993), to 
encourage resource flows through known social networks, in this case provided by the 
surrogate entrepreneur and the lead entrepreneur.  The surrogate entrepreneur provided 
knowledge of the market and contact with clients who required contract research.  The 
OHDG DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V ILUVW OLQH RI HQTXLU\ FRQFHUQLQJ ILUP IRUPDWLRQ ZDV
through the TTO who assisted with the applications for appropriate government 
funding and approved an Entrepreneurship Fellowship course for the Post Doctoral 
student.  As with Company 1 the academics changed their roles from academia to 
commerce after firm formation.  Only the full professor in the entrepreneurial 
ownership team remained a full time academic and acted as their science advisor.  He 
acted as a bridge between the world of commerce and the world of basic research 
whilst at the same time maintaining and increasing his academic reputation.   
 
Company 3 was formed and incubated within the HEI Technology Transfer 
Offices prior to mRYLQJ WR D WHFKQRORJ\ SDUN  7KH OHDG DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
frustration at not being awarded further government or charity funding to develop their 
technology spurred them to form a firm primarily to attract funding.  Their lack of 
social networks led the TTO to search for and recruit an experienced mentor (with the 
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assistance of the local business development agency).  Mosey et al., (2007) recognised 
that TTOs designed bridges to span structural holes between research and industry 
networks.  Access to funding, which led to the eventual launching of the company on 
the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was found due to the expertise and prior 
knowledge of the recruited mentor (Q1a, Table 6.5).  A deal was also struck with the 
HEI over the IP.  It was agreed that if the company reached a certain value or was 
floated on the AIM then the university would assign the IP to the new company.  The 
academics in Company 3 remained full time HEI employees throughout the process.  
Although they exhibited a lack of business acumen the leading academics were 
exposed to the logistics of conducting and managing international research projects 
(e.g. identification of research subject, applying for funding, writing proposals, 
managing funds and organisational skills).  Through these general experiences they 
were exposed to several aspects of business, not least, time management, as they 
juggled with their academic, advisory, clinical and commercial roles.   
 
The entrepreneurs leading Company 4, like the academic entrepreneurs in 
Company 3, formed a company as a reaction against the lack of funding from 
traditional sources for basic research (Q1b, Table 6.5).  Their HEI showed no interest 
in assisting with research either financially or practically, by offering laboratory space, 
or by giving easy access to their IP.  However, their private equity venture capitalists 
(3i), sought through a surrogate entrepreneur, failed to fully appreciate the full 
potential and value of the opportunity and did not adequately manage their investment.  
Important milestones were missed putting these potential high ability and value 
entrepreneurs and their high quality opportunity at risk.  Three of the team members 
remained in full time employment as medical personnel.  Academic entrepreneurs 
were loyal to their academic commitments.  In all the cases, the focus of the 
entrepreneurs changed from targeting support from the HEI to focusing on external 
resources important for business development once legitimacy and internal support 
within the HEI was established.  With reference to companies 3 and 4, the lead 
HQWUHSUHQHXUVH[SHULHQFHGDµSXVK¶DZD\IURPWKHLU+(,VIURPWKH772VWRHQFRXUDJH
independence.   
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6.4.2 Firm Creation Decision:  Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored 
Environments  
The lead entrepreneur in Company 5 had prior start up experience and learned 
commercialisation skills from his practical hands on experience (e.g. learning by 
doing) (Jovanovic, 1982).  Brief commercial exposure complemented what he had 
learned formally through education and exposure to market needs.  Assistance in 
building a business profile, attractive for government funding, was supplied by the 
TTO.  Their application for funding was considered timely because there were several 
schemes in the offing for entrepreneurs wishing to commercialise HEI knowledge.  
Through a process of extensive networking the lead entrepreneur extended his weak 
social ties, directly and indirectly, and successfully invited two members of a large 
pharmaceutical company onto the board of directors.  Davidsson and Honig (2003) 
recognise that human capital profiles of academic entrepreneurs may be enhanced by 
developing weak ties with industry actors.  Their recruitment attracted considerable 
positive press thus raising the profile of the company and added weight to their 
funding applications to governmental and private bodies (Q2c, Table 6.5).  The 
decision to form a company came after the success of Proof of Concept and whilst the 
lead entrepreneurs were still employees of the HEI.  They continued to successfully 
apply for government funding to further develop their research and development of the 
instrument and supplemented their income with contract work.  Unlike the academics 
leading Companies 3 and 4, once non-governmental funding was secured both 
academics in Company 5 resigned from their academic positions.   
 
6.4.3 Firm Creation Decision:  Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored 
Environments  
Company 8 offers an interesting insight into the process of forming a company.  
The non-academic lead entrepreneurs had previously formed another company 
offering consultancy and advice on automation and miniaturisation to the life-science 
sector.  Through this venture they met with two academics who became part of the 
entrepreneurial ownership team.  After an opportunity had been identified which they 
considered to have sufficient future value, they decided to experiment with the 
manufacture of a prototype product to ensure that there was sufficient evidence of 
proof of concept.  This they did by forming a company, which the engineers 
considered to be a spinout from their original consultancy company.  Since two 
representatives in the entrepreneurial team were potential end-users of the product 
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they had enough knowledge of the market, the future requirements of the market and 
DFFHVV WR FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV WR KDYH DQ LQLWLDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW WKHUH ZDV
sufficient promise in the market place for their application.  This particular team 
demonstrated they possessed relevant prior knowledge and specific capabilities to 
successfully develop opportunities, create value and generate potential returns.  The 
team also used their successful application for SMART and SPUR awards to further 
their search for future funding (Q3d, Table 6.5).  Crucial to the formation of the 
company was the observable division of labour.  The engineers devoted all their time 
to the formation of the company by setting out a strategy for fund raising, searching 
for suitable accommodation and for product dHYHORSPHQW7KHVFLHQWLVWV¶VNLOOVZHUH
relied upon as a form of advice and to give weight to presentations to investors and 
other members of the academic community.   
 
6.4.4 Firm Creation Decision:  Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored 
Environments  
The lead entrepreneur in Company 6 explained that his relocation to Scotland 
from Wales was encouraged by the local business development agency and by the 
local HEI who donated residential premises.  His access to investment came from 
applications made through the business development agency, bank and private 
investors sourced by a newly appointed non-executive board member.  Unlike lead 
academic entrepreneurs, access to people came from his own direct and indirect strong 
social ties (Granovetter, 1973) established during the formation and liquidation of his 
previous business.  The services of TTOs were inaccessible to non-academic 
entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments.   
 
The inexperience of the two scientists leading Company 7 made one of the lead 
entrepreneurs say that if he had to go through the experience of setting up a company 
again, he would be more focused on his own research rather than on the requests of the 
venture capitalists (Q4e, Table 6.5).  He felt that the research and development of their 
novel cell-lines to be more important than their contract work.  The financial benefits, 
he calculated, from such a strategy would be greater than relying on the services and 
potential support of investors.  The decision to form their own company was 
compounded by redundancy and the need to find an alternative to paid employment.  
The two lead entrepreneurs used their redundancy money to write business plans and 
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apply for funding from government and charity bodies.  However, knowledge of what 
and where to apply for funding both from the private and governmental sector was 
lacking and they were ill advised by local business advisory services.  In relation to 
resource providers their observable network structures were weak, their network 
content poorly defined and network governance, non-existent (Hoang and Antoncic, 
2003).  Exploiting their known industrial contacts they successfully tendered for 
contract work from the pharmaceutical sector relying on their own network and 
knowledge from their previous employment in the sector.  As soon as they won their 
first contract they moved from residential to a sponsored environment.   
 
Company 9 was formed because, following advice from his accountant, the 
lead non-academic entrepreneur sought guidance from the business development 
agency.  The lead entrepreneur stated that the formation of the company was a process 
that happened in stages.  At each stage he learned more about the process of forming a 
firm, about the process of regulatory practice, about patenting and about the need to 
find qualified people to carry the firm forward.  The dynamic entrepreneurial process 
was a learning-by-doing experience for him.  It did, however, rely on raising private 
equity and took considerable time to evolve (e.g. the initial idea for the formation 
started in 1996).   
 
6.4.5 Cross-Case Comparison at Exploitation 
The decision to form a company led by academic entrepreneurs relied on input 
from TTOs.  Apart from the lead entrepreneur in Company 4 all the entrepreneurs 
sought support and advice about the process of commercialisation, funding and the 
legal nuances of forming a firm from the TTOs, prior to and at formation.  During this 
phase the business proposal was examined and the technology scrutinised.  All 
academic entrepreneurs offered evidence that they had scrutinised the market and were 
able to gauge market needs.  This was often supported by formally funded market 
research.  The links gained through contact with the TTOs developed the personal 
capabilities, networks and experience of the lead academic entrepreneurs.  However, 
after firm formation, academics who were full professors were reluctant to give up 
their commitment as academics and tended to remain loyal to and in full time 
employment within the HEI and divided their time between academic and 
entrepreneurial demands.  Their specific research remained an academic priority.  
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There was some evidence of a firm-HEI linkage observed through an exchange of 
personnel (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978). 
 
All the academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored environments 
had gained access to industrial or commercial players connected to their field of 
research.  Contact was established through a number of avenues.  The lead 
entrepreneur in Company 1 established what competition was available for toxicity 
detection through attendance at trade fairs and conferences.  An industrial player 
commissioned the HEI housing Company 2 to conduct experiments to unravel a 
specific chemical process.  The industrial player released their IP to Company 2 in 
anticipation that they would discover the process.  Evidence of market need had 
already been demonstrated when a dental hygiene company approached the academics 
in Company 3 for a licensing option on their system for early detection of dental 
decay.  Industrial players also made contact with academics in Companies 2 and 3 at 
conferences.  The lead entrepreneurs forming Company 4 showed the least amount of 
understanding about how to maximise returns from their potential product.  These 
structural holes appeared to exist between their scientific network and the industrial 
network (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  They displayed the most inexperience in framing 
a decisive route to market and were exposed to inappropriate management supplied by 
their investors which did not bridge the structural hole.  The academic entrepreneurs in 
Company 5 appreciated the advice from the TTO prior to the formation of their 
company for access to funding but also had direct ties with the pharmaceutical sector 
and had formal market research commissioned by a division of the business advisory 
service.  The lead academic entrepreneur remained incentivised to included industrial 
members on his board (hoEDúDUDQ et al., 2003). 
 
For academic entrepreneurs on sponsored sites their well-developed 
technologies were often supported by a government led initiative (Proof of Concept).  
The fund, awarded to the HEI, allowed the potential entrepreneurs time to devote to 
the development of their concepts prior to exploitation.  Lead academic entrepreneurs, 
with narrow resource profiles, remained on more resource munificent environments to 
gain access to additional resources throughout the identification, evaluation and 
exploitation process (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978).  This compensated their lack of 
commercial expertise.  In addition, TTOs and/or business development agencies 
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partnered academic entrepreneurs with surrogate entrepreneurs or with more 
experienced entrepreneurial ownership team members (Vanaelst et al., 2006).  Few of 
the academic entrepreneurs brought with them commercial experience.  The 
entrepreneurs relied on the social networks of their advisors and mentors to gain 
access to people with relevant expertise.  The lead academic entrepreneurs, therefore, 
selected a sponsored environment to reduce uncertainty, to gain access to resources 
and increase their commercial legitimacy with regard to customers, suppliers, 
financiers, competitors and government agencies.  These observations led to the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 17: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely to have weaker ties to resource providers outside of their sponsored 
environment than non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments. 
 
The non-academic entrepreneurs on the sponsored environment had an array of 
capabilities in the form of prior entrepreneurial experience, a well balanced and 
heterogeneous mixture of human capital within the team, technical and commercial 
experience and a well researched market plan.  Through contact with business advisers 
they successfully won awards from government agencies, reaching desired targets in 
timely fashion and within budget.  More expertise was recruited when business angels 
RIIHUHG WKHLU FKDLUPDQ WR FKDLU &RPSDQ\ ¶V ERDUG  7he entrepreneur / investor 
relationship offered network benefits that were strongly positive and additive rather 
than simply overlapping (Mosey et al., 2006).  Such was the synergy of talents that the 
engineers experimented with the production and manufacture of products.  They were 
able to network with resource providers using their own social capital and contacts 
because both the engineers and the academics had prior start-up businesses experience 
and were known to and trusted by the investment community as reliable candidates.  
They, therefore, leveraged their reputation and track record to raise external finance 
and access to business support and advice.   
 
The non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments, on the other 
hand, were more market led and the resource more often lacking was scientific or 
technical expertise.  Their resource profiles often, but not always, included prior 
business experience with prior customer, market and finance knowledge.  These 
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experiences were gained from prior exposure.  In addition, several non-academic 
entrepreneurs reported experiences that prompted a reaction to threats such as 
liquidation or redundancy.   
 
Advisors and mentors from the business development community and private 
consultants were inexperienced in the life-science sector and offered inappropriate 
advice.  This was particularly true for the lead entrepreneurs in Companies 4, 7 and 9 
who had the least commercial experience.  Company 7, for example, was advised to 
apply for SPUR funding when the application process should have been made for 
SMART funding.  Both the inadequate levels of entrepreneurial experience and the 
inappropriate level of advice given by support agencies to guide and shape early 
business development affected the later developments of the companies.  To date, 
Company 9 has not surpassed the opportunity identification stage and the company 
has changed management and product on at least three occasions.   
 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter covered three components of the entrepreneurial process as 
outlined in the conceptual framework guiding this study and presented in Chapter 3.  
Summarised as Theme 3, the components covered exploration, evaluation and 
exploitation.  Analysis of the interview data from nine sets of lead entrepreneurs and 
their entrepreneurial ownership team members allowed for insights to be made about 
human capital and network factors that influenced the opportunity identification 
process.  Different forms of human capital were more or less useful during different 
parts of the opportunity identification process (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  Specific 
human capital affected the discovery or identification of opportunities but 
(commercial) exploitation of opportunities was governed by general human capital 
(Dimov and Shepherd, 2005).  Although this observation simply adds to the confusion 
over the importance of specific and general human capital at different phases of the 
entrepreneurial process (Corbett, 2007) from a RBV of the firm theoretical basis the 
unique bundle of resources associated with an advanced education suggests a unique 
source for value creation.  The results of the current study are perhaps applicable to 
clinicians who are specialists in contemporary medical and dental fields where specific 
human capital was insufficient to identify a potential opportunity.  Opportunities 
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involved new knowledge challenging the frontiers of extant medical and dental 
understanding.  In the life-science sector, when initially identifying an opportunity, 
general scientific human capital is not only important but a prerequisite.  What lead 
entrepreneurs had to learn was when to involve or recruit other team members with 
specific entrepreneurial human capital applicable to the evaluation and exploitation of 
their idea.  The interaction between the different human capital shows that it is not just 
µZKDW¶ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV NQRZV HJ general human capital) which is important but 
DOVR µZKR¶ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV NQRZ HJ VRFLDO FDSLWDO IRU DFFHVV WR SHRSOH ZLWK
specific human capital).  This observation is more applicable to lead academic 
entrepreneurs than non-academic entrepreneurs because the later were less likely to 
develop novel IP.  Both social and human capital appears to change value over time or 
µGHWHULRUDWH¶ RYHU WLPH /HVWHU HW DO, 2008).  Past experiences and interpersonal 
networks of lead entrepreneurs affect their current actions and access to people, 
influence their ability to create new networks to gather new information, and to 
influence others.    
 
Finding people with the appropriate human capital to successfully attract 
funding was a recognised barrier to commercialisation.  Other identified barriers to 
commercialisation extended to building managerial capabilities, discovering a route to 
market, evaluating what product to take to market and knowing the regulatory process 
of certification for medical devices and chemicals.  Initial stages of opportunity 
identification were pre-ceded by a phase which included interaction between 
potentially interested members.  The formative steps of evaluating an idea for 
commercialisation was biased towards the technical side and less towards identifying 
commercial value from skills and knowledge.  Entrepreneurs reported leveraging 
access to resources through networks of other actors known within their external 
environment and whose experience bridged the technical to the commercial.  The 
conference circuit (both technical and academic) frequented by academic and 
industrial payers offered an arena for searching for information related to 
opportunities; to meet industrial payers and to promote new companies.   
 
The findings of the qualitative analysis lent support to research results from 
previous studies, primarily in respect to the role of human capital and capabilities 
impacting on the entrepUHQHXUV¶ DELOLW\ WR LGHQWLI\ DQ RSSRUWXQLW\ DELOLW\ WR
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accumulate resources and the support, both real and potential, to form a firm.  Lacking 
in social capital and contacts with people who held experience in the life-science 
sector, lead academic entrepreneurs had to rely on contacts offered by outside team 
members (or privileged witnesses) such as government agencies and investment 
providers for legal and financial assistance (Vanlaest, et al., 2006).  TTOs and the 
business development agencies were instrumental in providing information and access 
WRJRYHUQPHQWDZDUGVEXWZHUHOHVVµGLUHFWO\¶LQYROYHGLQDVVLVWLQJHQWUHSUHQHXUVVHHN
contact with venture capitalists and business angels.  Expertise in finding funding from 
investors was accomplished through the use of surrogate entrepreneurs who had 
proven track records and had established network ties with finance providers.  With 
regard to Companies 3 and 4, venture assistance was sought from investors in London 
because of insufficient interest and / or experience in the local investment markets 
which may be a reflection that the life-science cluster in Scotland is still in its infancy.   
 
In this study the extent that social and human capital of the lead entrepreneurs 
and team members influenced the entrepreneurial process varied over time and phase.  
The social and human capital embodied in each lead entrepreneur and team members 
was an important determinant of attractiveness to potential surrogate entrepreneurs, 
investors and potential customers.  Data suggests that academic reputation and level of 
education (e.g. full professorship) are strongly associated with likelihood of positive 
opportunity identification and exploitation.  Rather than treating all the academic 
entrepreneurs and all the non-academic entrepreneurs as homogenous, data suggests 
that their human and social capital was quite unique and heterogeneous, and that 
heterogeneity was reflected in their access to and provision of outside resource 
providers.  Although the HEI and the act of commercialisation are meant to be 
separate entities and concepts, in reality they are highly connected.  Resource 
dependence theory has identified this to be the case (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978).  
Lead academic entrepreneurs were often able to exploit HEI resources even after they 
had officially left the HEI location.   
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Chapter 7: Case Analysis: Location 
7.1 Introduction 
During the process of data collection lead entrepreneurs changed geographical 
location moving between sponsored environments and from sponsored to non-
sponsored environments.  In this chapter, data relating to µZK\¶PRYHPHQWRFFXUUHGLV
discussed.  µ+RZ¶ HQWUHSUHQHXUV GLVFRYHU RSSRUWXQLWLHV JDLQ DFFHVV WR FULWLFDO
resources and deal with barriers to commercialisation may be shaped by their external 
environmental conditions.  The concept of the incubator organisation (or property 
based initiative) offering network services and support (i.e., a science park) is well 
documented (e.g. Westhead and Batstone, 1998).  Movement between different 
environments may occur because the perceived benefits gained from a one 
environment may be limited to a certain phase of the entrepreneurial process.  Data 
relating to the effectiveness of social networks outside of a supportive environment is 
missing from current research and research recording changes in external environment 
undetected in the literature.  This study provides fresh insights relating to the 
neglected theme of the movement of entrepreneurs and their firms between different 
environmental contexts.   
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  Section 7.2 reviews the impact 
different external environments have on access to resources relating to three critical 
junctures (Vohora et al., 2004) (e.g. opportunity identification; entrepreneurial 
commitment; venture credibility) (Theme 4 in Chapter 3).  Movement is mapped 
between sponsored and non-sponsored environments during these critical junctures in 
the entrepreneurial process.  Exploring external environmental conditions and the 
influence it has on access to critical resources helps answer the following research 
question:   
 
Research Question 8 µ+RZ¶ GRHV WKH H[WHUQDO HQYLURQPHQW LPSDFW RQ WKH
HQWUHSUHQHXU¶VHQWUHSUHQHXULDORZQHUVKLSWHDP¶VDFFHVVWRUHVRXUFHV" 
 
Section 7.3 offers a cross-case comparison of access to resources in sponsored 
and non-sponsored environments at the opportunity identification phase.  Section 7.4 
explores resource accumulation from different external environments at the 
entrepreneurial commitment phase.  The critical juncture called venture credibility is 
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covered in Section 7.5.  In some cases, entrepreneurs and their firms changed 
environment but remained at the same phase of development, or regressed, unable to 
source required resources because of deficient social capital or inadequate 
entrepreneurial capabilities.  TKHFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHµYHQWXUHFUHGLELOLW\¶LVEURNHQGRZQ
into 1st and 2nd phase because within this phase there was an increase in movement 
between environments (Figure 7.1).  The first phase of venture credibility generally 
reflected the maturation of the firm formation process manifest by a movement away 
from an HEI for academic entrepreneurs or a movement towards sponsored 
environments for non-academic entrepreneurs.  The second phase associated with 
venture credibility was linked with the winning of a contract, normally for a provided 
service, or the award of further investor funding (e.g. business angel of venture 
capital).  More movement of non-academic entrepreneurs between environments was 
recorded than academic entrepreneurs.  Propositions are offered and a summary 
presented in Section 7.6. 
 
7.2 External Environment: The Context (Theme 4) 
In this comparative longitudinal study, three development phases, or critical 
junctures, were identified (Vohora et al., 2004) (Figure 7.1).  µ:KHUH¶DQGDW µZKDW¶
MXQFWXUHWKHHQWUHSUHQHXUVZHUHµDW¶was identified, initially, from an electronic survey 
(2004) and latterly from interviews with the lead entrepreneurs (2005).  Location 
within the typology was recorded at these three critical junctures (Figure 7.1).  The 
first critical phase was opportunity identification (e.g. when the entrepreneur 
recognised a potential in a new discovery).  The second was entrepreneurial 
commitment (e.g. when the lead entrepreneur showed commitment to progressing the 
opportunity).  The third phase was venture credibility which tested the credibility of 
WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR H[SORLW UHVRXUFHV.  A fourth critical juncture was also 
identified; the threshold of sustainability, but none of the lead entrepreneurs in this 
study reached this phase.  According to the critical junctures model the lead 
entrepreneur guides the firm through growth phases by overcoming the challenges and 
resource restrictions of each critical juncture (Vohora et al., 2004). 
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7.2.1 Critical Junctures: Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored Environments 
7.2.1.1 Opportunity Identification 
Figure 7.1 shows that the academic entrepreneurs leading Companies 1, 2, 3 
and 4 remained on sponsored environments, although not their original sponsored 
environments, throughout the investigation.  Companies 1 and 2 stayed within the 
walls of their µSDUHQW¶ +(, HQYLURQPHQWV PRYLQJ RQO\ IURP ODERUDWRU\ VSDFH WR DQ
incubator unit (Company 1) and from a science department to rented HEI redundant 
laboratory space (Company 2) (Figure 7.2).  Opportunities for commercialisation 
generally grew from their research, conducted within their respective HEIs where they 
had substantial access to both physical and tacit resources (Lockett et al., 2003).  Two 
of the four lead academic entrepreneurs were practicing clinicians.  If the lead 
entrepreneurs had a clinical role, they were generally able to substantiate market need 
through observation of patients and feedback from other clinicians.  Access to the 
human capital associated with specific technical ability and scientific knowledge, held 
within the academic and student community, provided the lead entrepreneurs with a 
convenient way to share and test their ideas.  The bond between the entrepreneurs and 
their colleagues and students was strong and, as stated already, this social capital had 
both a positive and a negative effect on overcoming barriers at this opportunity 
identification juncture (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  A positive bonus was 
accessibility to specialised human capital in the form of  
 
Figure: 7.2:  Location at opportunity identification phase 
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scientific knowledge but a downside was the exposure to negative attitudes from 
colleagues concerning the commercialisation of publically funded research.  The 
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ethics of commercialising public knowledge has been identified as a barrier in the past 
literature (KLöfsten and Jones-Evans, 2000).  Initially, the challenge of discovering 
new knowledge and finding solutions to life-science problems or conducting 
industrially financed contract work was the primary motivation for pursuing basis 
research.  Market application and commercialisation was a later consideration 
facilitated by high levels of social capital centred outside the HEI science research 
environment (e.g. industrial contacts met on the conference circuit).  The prompt to 
establish a firm, for some academic entrepreneurs, was the cessation of funding for 
basic research from traditional sources, which was normally awarded to their HEI or 
department (e.g. Companies 3, and 4).   
 
Non-equity team members, such as TTOs or representatives from the business 
development agencies, were vital for giving advice about the logistics of starting a 
company and knowledge and experience of winning governmental grants and awards 
available for life-science start ups.  Initially, to compensate for a lack of specific 
entrepreneurial human capital, the lead academic entrepreneurs relied on the TTO to 
offer access to alternative sources of public funding and access to the people with 
investment knowledge (Q1a, Table 7.1).  However, in all cases, the relationship 
between the lead entrepreneur and the HEI changed during the entrepreneurial process.  
Relationships altered when first round funding from the private sector (e.g. business 
angels and venture capitalists) was required.  TTOs did not possess the necessary 
networks to introduce lead academic entrepreneurs directly to potential investors.  
Attention was diverted away from HEI support systems to local business development 
agents who were linked with experienced surrogate entrepreneurs and specialist 
investors (Franklin et al., 2001).  The research phase prior to opportunity identification 
appeared to be long, complex and publicly or industrially funded in all cases.   
 
Additional benefits gained from the HEI environment were expressed by both 
the lead entrepreneur and entrepreneurial ownership team members.  Some broadened 
their managerial capabilities by attending business classes and entrepreneurial 
fellowship classes offered by the HEI.  Proximity to fellow academics, who were 
potential end users of proposed future technologies and products, was considered an 
advantage, as was access to students, who were potential employees.
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Close physical proximity to potential team members allowed in-depth discussion 
about commercialisation, exploration of division of labour and roles within potential 
companies and identification of gaps in knowledge, prior to actual firm formation 
(Ensley et al., 1999; Bergmann Lichenstein and Brush, 2001; Ensley et al., 2002).  
Specific scientific knowledge held by the academics was considered to be paramount 
because the commercialisation process was enhanced by their impeccable, high profile 
academic reputations.  The close proximity of the incubator environment to HEIs also 
allowed academics to continue their academic work in parallel with entrepreneurial 
commitments.   
 
If the opportunity was identified within the HEI and the HEI offered 
incubation space, lead academic entrepreneurs commented on the ease of transition 
IURPEHLQJµDQLGHD¶WRforming a firm.  7KHUHZDVQRLQFRQYHQLHQFHRIVHHNLQJµQHZ¶
accommodation.  The physical capital and organisational infrastructure offered by the 
HEI was advantageous because of the recognition of market prices for the same 
facilities outside of the HEI.  Being associated with and sharing the same address as an 
HEI, with an internationally renowned reputation, boosted the image and reputation of 
the potential companies, compensating for newness and smallness.  Access to on-line 
scientific journals, access to laboratory space and an already existing infrastructure 
was also considered a bonus.  Entrepreneurs viewed the HEIs in a positive light in 
relation to the flexible allocation of rentable space.  Proximity to organisational 
facilities, other staff members and business advice eased the transition from 
opportunity identification to committing to entrepreneurial activity.  Network benefits 
for firms located on and off sponsored environments have been confirm by previous 
research (Lindelöf  and Löfsten, 2002; Storey and Westhead, 1995).  During the 
entrepreneurial commitment phase one lead academic entrepreneur chose to relocate 
from a non-sponsored environment to a sponsored environment (e.g. Company 5) 
(Figure 7.3).   
 
7.2.1.2 Entrepreneurial Commitment 
Entrepreneurial commitment came early to the lead academic entrepreneur in 
Company 1 because winning a business plan competition necessitated immediate firm 
formation.  The lead academic entrepreneur was coached in business plan 
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development by an MBA student who later became an entrepreneurial ownership team 
member.  The sponsored environment allowed the possible merging of two sets of 
complementary human capital resources (scientific and business expertise) held within 
two different HEI departments (e.g. the network ties providing access to resources) 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  A pro-active manager of the incubator unit acted as the 
network gatekeeper, introducing potential science candidates to business colleagues 
(Johannisson, 1998).  Commercial specific human capital held by the MBA student 
and networks known to the mentors allowed the lead entrepreneur in Company 1 to 
better understand market needs and to upgrade business plans. 
 
Figure: 7.3:  Location at entrepreneurial commitment phase 
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Advantages of the sponsored environment for the lead academic entrepreneur and 
entrepreneurial ownership team members in Company 2 revolved around the fact that 
the IP they used had been created within their HEI department (Q1a, Table 7.2).  They 
were familiar with the facilities, the people and the equipment.  Being located within 
the department allowed the professor to continue his academic career and serve on the 
entrepreneurial ownership team as a science advisor.  The external environment acted 
as the galvanising influence, supported initially by the TTO who guided the team 
towards sources of government funding and entrepreneurship training. 
 
A desire to create a separate identity from the HEI prompted Company 3 to 
move from one sponsored environment, the HEI, to another, a technology park.  In 
response to asking why the entrepreneurs moved to the technology park a 
representative from the TTO office suggested that it transmitted a message to the 
investment community that the entrepreneurs were committed to commercialisation.
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The change of environment by Company 3 illustrates an H[DPSOHRIDµSXVK¶IURPWKH
HEI authorities.  The TTO representative indicated that there had been an over-
reliance on the support facilities within the HEI and after four years a decision was 
taken to recommend a move from the sponsored environment of the HEI to an 
alternative supportive external environment.   
 
Company 4 also remained within a sponsored environment, the shift occurring 
from hospital laboratories to a technology park (Figure 7.3).  Exploiting his medical 
reputation, the lead academic entrepreneur reported few organisational difficulties in 
attracting government funding and local business enterprise finance to support the 
transition from the hospital to a technology park.  &RPSDQ\ H[SHULHQFHGD µSXVK¶
from the hospital environment to progress research and development activities because 
no facilities were offered within hospital premises.  The hospital environment was 
hostile towards the concept of commercialisation.  Access to a refurbished laboratory 
was provided by the business development agency which was also a stakeholder in the 
technology park.   
 
7.2.1.3 Venture Credibility 
Further changes in the external environment at the venture credibility critical juncture 
were considered with reference to two phases.  First phase of venture credibility 
relates to the synergy of social capital exploits and human capital relating to education 
and academic reputation in an endeavour to attract public funding to establish the firm 
(Figure 7.4a).  Phase 2 focuses upon the effect of additional funding or the winning of 
contact work and subsequent changes in external environment (Figure 7.4b).  
Company 1 did not change location and treasured access to the infrastructure that the 
HEI offered (Figure 7.4a).  Financial resources needed to overcome the venture 
credibility critical juncture were won through the combined efforts of the lead 
academic entrepreneur using a network of contacts known to his family and the 
recruited entrepreneurial ownership team member.  Social capital in Company 1 was 
important for the creation of the firm.  The lead academic had strong ties with resource 
providers outside of the HEI environment because of family connections (Granovetter, 
1973).  With access to funding they employed one scientist from their HEI to promote 
market research, funded attendance at trade shows, extended their research and 
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development by employing another scientist and sponsored students in PhD research.  
The latter could be viewed as a reciprocal advantage to the HEI because not only did 
Company 1 fund PhD research, the lead entrepreneur also accepted a lecWXUHU¶V
position to promote his area of speciality.   
 
Figure: 7.4a:  Location at venture credibility (1st Phase) 
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Relying solely on equity holding individuals and the HEI, the lead 
entrepreneur in Company 2 felt that to attract venture capitalists would be paramount 
WR ³JLYLQJ WKH ILUP DZD\´  $IWHU being awarded government funding for the initial 
start-up, they relied solely on income from contract research.  Remaining in the same 
sponsored HEI environment with security of future, released pressures of calculating 
future overheads and costs (Figure 7.4a).  The value of the services of the TTO to the 
lead academic entrepreneur in Company 3 were appreciated at the start of a long four 
year incubation period (Figure 7.4a) but were reported as frustrating towards the end 
 
Figure: 7.4b:  Location at venture credibility (2nd Phase) 
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of the relationship (Q1a, Table 7.3a).  7KLV ZRXOG VXJJHVW WKDW OHDG HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V
access to resources was influenced by their human capital (e.g. reputation and 
education) which was in turn extended into new areas (e.g. commercialisation) 
through their contacts within their social networks (e.g. TTOs).  However, the value of 
the resources provided by the TTOs was restricted to the opportunity identification 
and entrepreneurial commitment critical junctures.  Thereafter entrepreneurs were 
guided to new sources of direction from other resources providers (e.g. surrogate 
entrepreneurs and business development agencies).  This would indicate that there is 
deterioration in some social capital (Lester et al., 2008) and that, not unlike human 
capital, social capital has a different value at different critical junctures.   
 
As resources, both social and human capital can be extended and enhanced.  In this 
study access to specific human capital (e.g. that related to business) was enhanced 
through extending social network circles (e.g. access to surrogate entrepreneurs).  
Inexperience and criticism apart, it was through the TTO social network that the 
entrepreneurs were able to network with the business development sector.  These 
academics only had weak ties with actors located on the outside of their department 
who had specialist information about investment (Granovetter, 1973).  The 
entrepreneurs did not possess this social capital themselves.  Access to specific human 
capital relating to business acumen was guided by the TTO, who was part of business 
development agency network.  Through this network lead academic entrepreneurs 
made contact with surrogate, serial entrepreneurs who were able to introduce people in 
the investment sector.  Generally, lead acadHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VVRFLDOQHWZRUNGLGQRW
extend to surrogate entrepreneurs.  A µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶ ZDV UHFUXLWHG DV D
business consultant once Company 3 had moved to the technology park.  He had 
previously held equity stakes in several HEI spinout firms and had established 
contacts with corporate financiers.  This individual subsequently became an 
entrepreneurial ownership team member and the chairman of Company 3.  His 
NQRZOHGJHJDLQHGIURPSULRU+(,µVSLQRXW¶H[SHULHQFHDOORZHGJUHDWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQg 
of how best to integrate resources to create value.   
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Although Company 3 enjoyed the benefits of the technology park, the lead 
entrepreneur indicated that the relationship with his HEI would be used to further the 
research aims of his company (Q1a, Table 7.3b).  Whilst the business development 
agency provided laboratory infrastructure and early access to government funding, the 
lead entrepreneur and team members maintained their links with their HEI.  It could be 
speculated that the technical infrastructure of the HEI was superior to that of the 
sponsored environment of the technology park.  This finding highlighted a new and 
unrecorded relationship.  Some lead academic entrepreneurs, who did not resign from 
their academic positions, were able to mange their companies in sponsored 
environments external to the HEI and to manage research and development for their 
companies using the facilities within their sponsored HEIs (e.g. they contracted work 
to the university).   
 
Company 4, which experienced a hostile HEI, appreciated their 
accommodation on a sponsored technology park.  As a result of the lack of necessary 
human entrepreneurial human capital and social capital associated with commercial 
awareness and prior business exposure the lead entrepreneur relied on the business 
enterprise company to construct laboratory space to allow for the development of a 
prototype model of their medical device.  A summary of all movements at critical 
junctures is presented in Appendix 8.   
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7.2.2 Critical Junctures: Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored 
Environments 
7.2.2.1 Opportunity Identification 
Circumstances surrounding the opportunity identification process for the lead 
academic entrepreneur in Company 5 located on a non-sponsored environment were 
quite unique.  Combining their two areas of scientific expertise, two academics 
designed preliminary experiments for a device to test pharmaceutical drugs which 
were conducted in a make-shift laboratory (e.g. a non-sponsored environment) (Q2b, 
Table 7.1).  The lead academic entrepreneur assigned the IP to his new HEI (e.g. a 
sponsored environment) where he was offered employment.  Changing external 
environments did not immediately indicate that the lead academic entrepreneur had 
bridged the opportunity identification critical juncture to the next phase (e.g. to 
entrepreneurial commitment) (Figure 7.5).  He remained at the opportunity 
identification phase, relying on advice from the TTO and attracting government 
funding to test his idea¶s practical application and measure market need (Appendix 8).  
During this period of Proof of Concept, prior to firm formation, the lead academic 
entrepreneur recruited the assistance of another academic colleague from within his 
own department where they eventually incubated their company.  Specific technical 
capital was sought from other members of staff and students who were employed to 
conduct contract work.   
7.2.2.2 Entrepreneurial Commitment 
Although the laboratory facilities of their sponsored environment allowed them 
to develop their technology there was a conflict of interest.  Challenges which 
hampered the academic entrepreneur were conflicts with other members of staff and 
university organisations relating to the use of HEI facilities, the use of academic time 
and resources, ownership of intellectual property and rewards and violation of 
academic norms (Nelson, 2004) (Q1b, Table 7.2).  Conflicts of opinion between the 
OHDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUDQGDFDGHPLFVWDIIµSXVKHG¶&RPSDQ\5 out of the HEI to 
an industrial site.  By doing so they were able to demonstrate entrepreneurial 
commitment.  However, there were enormous disadvantages associated with the non-
sponsored industrial site.  They were some distance from their HEI where they both 
had academic responsibilities, far from their source of ethically donated human tissue, 
which they needed for their experiments and the laboratory facilities were basic.
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The fortuitous recruitment of two very experienced board members from a large 
chemical company was due to individual effort, not a benefit from the non-sponsored 
environment.  This action increased the credibility of their company (Q2b, Table 
7.3a).   
7.2.2.3 Venture Credibility 
It could be argued that Company 5 had to rely on their own human capital 
reserves and individual networking skills to compensate for the lack of resources at the 
non-sponsored industrial site.  The move was seen as a temporary measure.  Once seed 
funding was committed they resigned from their academic posts and dedicated their 
time to the development of both contract research and their drug-testing instrument 
moving to a sponsored environment within a new HEI with purpose built laboratories 
and easy access to their source of ethically donated human tissue (Q1b, Table 7.3b).   
 
7.2.3 Critical Junctures: Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Sponsored 
Environments 
7.2.3.1 Opportunity Identification 
The opportunity identification phase for Company 8 commenced in donated 
laboratory space located within an HEI (Figure 7.5).  Not only were the physical 
components of the laboratory used to assist in the development of the product, the 
actual functioning of the laboratory was studied by the non-academic entrepreneurs.  It 
allowed close proximity to the specific human capital held by the HEI academics, 
access to physical laboratory space and strengthened their relations with business 
development agencies for introductions to potential investors (Q3c and d, Table 7.1).  
One of the academics also observed that having the engineers in the laboratory was a 
good public relations exercise because visitors were introduced to the concept of 
commercialisation within the HEI environment (Appendix 8).   
 
7.2.3.2 Entrepreneurial Commitment 
In addition, they had good relations with a national networking agency who put 
them in contact with potential funders interested in the life science sector (Q4d, Table 
7.3a).  Close proximity between the academics and the engineers, allowed for a speedy 
development of a business plan and the subsequent application for funding from 
government sources.  During the initial entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture 
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Company 8 remained within the confines of the sponsored environment of an HEI 
laboratory (Figure 7.5).   
 
7.2.3.3 Venture Credibility 
Moving to an industrial site was considered to be cost effective and offered 
access to workshops for the production of a prototype.  The rent on the industrial site 
compared favourably to rental prices of units on neighbouring science parks, which 
meant that the company was close to a cluster of life-science firms.  In addition, they 
were within a reasonable distance from the new purpose built HEI research institute 
where the academic team members worked (Q3c, Table 7.2).  Finding incubator space 
for a small start-up was considered to a major barrier for commercialisation (Q3d, 
Table 7.3b). 
 
7.2.4 Critical Junctures: Non-Academic Entrepreneurs on Non-Sponsored 
Environments 
7.2.4.1 Opportunity Identification 
After liquidating his previous company and during the time of relocation, an 
HEI donated two residential premises to the lead entrepreneur of Company 6 to 
incubate his new firm (Q4e, Table 7.1).  The residential premises offered no other 
resources or advantages other than a physical address.  The lead non-academic 
entrepreneur in Company 6 moved from non-sponsored environments (e.g. residential 
properties) owned by the local HEI during incubation to a sponsored environment (e.g. 
technology park) (Figure 7.5).   
 
The opportunity identification phase relating to Company 7 occurred whilst the 
two lead entrepreneurs were employees of a pharmaceutical firm (Figure 7.5).  The 
threat of redundancy spurred them to consider setting up their own firm.  They 
predicted market trends within the pharmaceutical sector from management directives 
DWWKHLUFRPSDQ\¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVDQGZHUHDEOHWRDVFHUWDLQZKDWVHUYLFHVWKH\VKRXOG
offer as an independent company (Appendix 8).  Strategically, they identified which 
cell-lines to produce so as not to compete with major players within the same sector.  
Once redundant, further development through the opportunity identification phase was 
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conducted from their residencies as they prepared business plans and solicited 
business for contract work.   
 
The lead entrepreneur and entrepreneurial ownership team members 
relinquished responsibility for the day to day management of Company 9 from their 
farm premises when, after advice from their accountant, they sought counsel from a 
company which specialised in early start-ups (Q4f, Table 7.1).  This was considered to 
be a fully sponsored site because the company had specific knowledge about funding 
proposals, organisational expertise but had no experience of the regulations governing 
the testing of new chemicals.  All testing of chemicals was outsourced to different 
HEIs.  In this case, the external environmental context provided access to practical 
managerial tools and physical resources for the management of the company (Figure 
5).  The lead entrepreneur, however, was sceptical about the advantages to such a 
business model (Q4e, Table, 7.3a). 
 
7.2.4.2 Entrepreneurial Commitment 
Both the local HEI and business development agency were supportive of the 
OHDGHQWUHSUHQHXU¶V&RPSDQ\efforts to relocate and offered future collaborations 
and advice about funding and facilities on the local technology park (Q3c, Table 7.3a).  
Rather than the external environment being an influence on access to resources, the 
entrepreneurial human capital and social capital networks of the lead non-academic 
entrepreneur gained from previous business ownership experiences, guided the 
company through a process of applying for grant awards.  He also created network 
bridges within the science community through exposure of his research to the 
academic community and accumulated a broader legitimacy for commercialisation by 
³JHWWLQJWRNQRZ´DFRPSDQ\LQWKH6DWHVZLWKZKRPKHGHYHORSHGDUHFLSURFDODQG
mutually beneficial relationship (Delmar and Shane, 2004).   
 
The lead non-academic entrepreneurs in Company 7 formed their company and 
moved to a sponsored site only after they had won their first contract (Figure 7.5).  
They self financed the entire project.  A lack of social networks to develop business 
acumen led to a degree of frustration for the two lead entrepreneurs.  They had 
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difficulty in accessing reliable business development advice specifically for 
inexperienced, nascent entrepreneurs in the life-science sector.   
 
Claiming the management company to be incompetent, the lead non-academic 
entrepreneur in Company 9 recruited assistance from a new investor who represented 
the shareholders of the original company, dismissed the management company and re-
located the firm to office premises in the city centre (Figure 7.5).  The re-location not 
only indicated a change of external environment but also a reversal in the 
entrepreneurial process because a new product was brought on line for development 
(e.g. they reverted from entrepreneurial commitment to opportunity identification).  
The small city centre office offered few advantages other than providing a base and 
postal address.  The firm could not pass through the entrepreneurial commitment 
critical juncture because of a lack of resources and returned to the opportunity 
identification phase (Q4e, Table 7.3b).  Company 9 displayed an inability to 
conceptualise how a technological discovery could be applied to satisfy a real 
customer need and achieve proof of market.   
 
7.2.4.3 Venture Credibility 
There were obvious, necessary and important physical resources available 
through the sponsored environment for new life-science firms, which the two 
scientists in Company 7 appreciated.  Although they reported that the cost of renting 
space was expensive, the advantages of having custom build laboratories and access to 
supplies and purchases co-ordinated by the science park administration was 
considered practical.  For a small company with no credit record the advantage of 
having a science park purchasing department supplying their specialist needs eased 
administrative pressures.  Another advantage of sub-letting laboratory space was the 
flexibility of the lease (Q4d, Table 7.2).  Two weeks prior to the actual physical 
interview, the lead entrepreneur moved Company 7 from the sub let space to a 
dedicated laboratory and office space within the same science park which was to 
function as an incubator unit (Q3d, Table 7.3a; Q3c, Table 7.3b). 
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7.3 Cross-Case Comparisons: Opportunity Identification Phase  
The data indicate that lead academic entrepreneurs chose to remain within the 
environment in which their research was conducted to frame the opportunity further.  
For these inexperienced and nascent entrepreneurs on sponsored environments there 
was access to resources both physical and human from the tangible facilities of the 
environment and through the provision of tacit advice from the TTO.  Using their 
technical human capital, lead academic entrepreneurs were able to capitalise on their 
HEI social networks and familiarity with their surroundings, facilities and access to 
support services whilst their lack of business acumen was compensated for by the 
support offered by the TTOs.  Within the sponsored environment the relationship 
between human and social capital was mutually symbiotic (e.g. human capital had an 
effect on social capital and vice-a-versa).  Social capital facilitated the development of 
human capital by affecting conditions for exchange and development.  Human capital, 
within the same environment, was used or seen by resource providers as a status or 
measure to allow greater (or lesser) access to other social networks, unfamiliar to 
academic entrepreneurs.  The status, reputation RU µFUHGLELOLW\¶, as perceived by 
Anderson et al., (2007), DFWHGDVD³V\PEROLFHQWUDQFHUHTXLUHPHQWIRUHQWU\´WRVRFLDO
networks DQG ³DV D mechanism for maintaining JRRGZLOO´ ZLWKLQ WKH QHWZRUN
(Anderson et al., 2007, p262).  In agreement with past research this study found that 
µVWURQJQRUPV¶DQGµPXWXDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶ZLWKLQWKHDFDGHPLFFRPPXQLW\RIDQ+(,
exerted a powerful force influencing and promoting OHDG DFDGHPLF¶V research 
programs towards commercialisation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Mosey and 
Wright, 2007).  However, it was the bridging social capital linked to weaker ties to the 
resource community for specific commercial knowledge which was more important 
than the bonding social capital within a close network of strong ties within the 
academic community (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  In only one case (Company 5) 
ZDV WKHUH HYLGHQFH WKDW µDQ DFDGHPLF PLQGVHW¶ UHVWULFWHG DFFHSWDQFH of the 
commercialisation of publically funded research.  This self imposed restriction 
purposively blocked access to general human capital.  The discussion about level of 
support at opporuntiyt idneitifcation suggests the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 18: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to 
submit more developed concepts to venture investors because of their superior 
access to physical resources (e.g. laboratories), technical human capital (e.g. 
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scientists) social network capital (e.g. business advisers) and public funding (e.g. 
Proof of Concept). 
 
Lead academic entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial ownership team members 
UDUHO\µIXOO\¶UHVLJQHGIURPWKeir academic posts and close proximity to or within their 
HEI eased the time demands of their dual roles (e.g. academic and entrepreneurial).  
During the framing of the opportunity it was more likely for lead academic 
entrepreneurs on sponsored environments (e.g. HEIs) than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to resist a change to their external 
environment.  Lead academic entrepreneurs were employees on the sponsored 
environment.  Their proximity benefited both parties.  The HEI provided premises and 
TTO assistance, whilst the lead academic entrepreneurs provided academic services to 
the HEI, funded PhD student research and raised the profile of the HEI (Q1a, Table 
7.3b).  These observations give rise to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 19: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to 
have a reciprocal relationship with their resources providers at the opportunity 
identification phase.   
 
The lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments were at 
a disadvantage because their access to advice and resources was often determined and 
limited to business development agencies.  Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored 
environments had access to both.  Differences in access to, and acquisition of, 
business expertise also mirrored differences in access to the physical resources offered 
by the sponsored and non-sponsored environments.  Sponsored environments were 
better geared towards the needs of a life-science start-up (e.g. provision of laboratory 
space, supplies, specialist scientific equipment, expertise, electronic journals and 
biological waste disposal).  In respect of physical resources, all lead academic 
entrepreneurs located on a sponsored environment reported that they had access to 
laboratory facilities.  During incubation non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored 
environments reported that there was inadequate provision of laboratory space and 
consistently reported that funding from local business development agencies had to be 
used to refurbish premises to set up basic laboratory facilities (Q4d, Table 7.3b).  
Immediate access to personnel offering commercial advice and a physical 
infrastructure also allowed lead academic entrepreneurs choosing a dual business 
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model (e.g. development of their own product / process and their contract work) to 
pursue both activities.  Non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored sites had to 
devote time to setting up laboratories and give priority to their contract work.   
 
7.4 Cross-Case Comparisons: Entrepreneurial Commitment  
During the entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture all, bar one, lead 
academic entrepreneur were allocated space within the HEI to further develop their 
technology and progress applications for funding.  Company 1 was housed in a 
dedicated HEI incubator unit.  Company 2 rented redundant laboratory space within an 
HEI department and Company 3 used HEI laboratory space for research and the TTO 
office prior to moving to a technology park within the same city location.  Company 4 
had to move away from the hospital as soon as the incubation process started and 
rented laboratory space from the local business development agency on the local 
technology park.  Shared HEI laboratory space was organised for Company 5 prior to 
their move to a non-sponsored environment.  However, all academic entrepreneurs 
were aware of two issues surrounding their choice of sponsored location.  First, there 
was a time limit to their presence in HEI accommodation because there was concern 
about over reliance on HEI resources.  Second, there was their reaction to a change in 
culture.  Lead academic entrepreneurs experienced a transfer from one culture, where 
everything is prescribed and rule based (e.g. the HEI environment), to another one, 
where everything is open (e.g. the commercial environment).  Here their creativity was 
subjected to severe scrutiny from a business perspective.  7KH µFOHYHUQHVV¶ RI WKHLU
concept had little worth.  The success of their transition may be related to how they 
developed in terms of their ability to understand the external dialogue about their IP 
and creations once they were beyond the HEI environment and into the commercial 
world.  They constantly had to be aware of developing existing resources and 
developing new ones through the commitment of key individuals who would supply 
initial capital and knowledge to enable the lead entrepreneurs to progress their 
opportunities.  For this they relied on the leverage of social capital either from their 
own networks (Companies 1, 2 and 5) or through the networks of their investors 
(Companies 3 and 4).   
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Another issue emerged from the data relating to association with a location.  
The lead academic entrepreneurs in Companies 3 and 5 were aware of the shortfalls of 
an over identification with an HEI albeit for different reasons.  HEIs have a reputation 
amongst investors for being bureaucratic and difficult to work, especially in terms of 
negotiating rights to IP.  This was the reason offered by the lead academic 
entrepreneur of Company 3 for wishing to distance himself from the HEI.  He wished 
to establish independence (Q1a and b, Table 7.4).  In Company 5 the reason for the 
separation was associated with the negative mentality of fellow academic colleagues 
towards commercialisation opportunities (Q2c, Table 7.4).  The lead non-academic 
entrepreneur in Company 8 stressed the importance of the combination of academic 
and industrial skills in his team which was appreciated by their investors.  However, 
he made claim over the IP from the HEI because he was not an HEI employee (Q3d 
and e, Table 7.4).  The non-academic entrepreneurs leading firms on non-sponsored 
environments all made reference to the difference between academic entrepreneurs 
and themselves and claimed that the former often commercialised for the wrong 
reasons (Q4f, g and h, Table 7.4).  In general lead academic entrepreneurs left 
sponsored environments for negative reasons whilst non-academic lead entrepreneurs 
sought sponsored environments for positive ones.  These observations lead to the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 20:  Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more 
likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to be 
µSXVKHG¶ DZD\ IURP WKHir environments to promote independence during the 
entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture.   
 
Access to redundant HEI laboratory space was utilised by the non-academic 
entrepreneur leading Company 8.  The lead non-academic entrepreneur in Company 6 
did not have access to a laboratory until after the entrepreneurial commitment critical 
juncture when he moved to a sponsored environment.  Company 7 only sublet a 
laboratory on a sponsored environment once a contract had been won and found the 
lack of provision of suitable laboratory premises a barrier to company formation.  The 
managerial consultancy company responsible for Company 9 out-sourced all their 
scientific work to different HEIs.  Generally, all lead non-academic entrepreneurs 
commented that there was a general lack of adequate laboratory space for early 
development.  This discussion led to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 21: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs located on non-sponsored 
environments are more likely than lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored 
environments to change location because they need to access laboratory space at the 
entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture. 
 
7.5 Cross-Case Comparisons: Venture Credibility (1st and 2nd 
phase)  
On HEI sponsored environments, the TTOs were instrumental in introducing 
lead entrepreneurs to potential investors and surrogate entrepreneurs.  Investors have 
been traditionally very sceptical about new life-science start-ups and only participate 
when they feel there is a fully functioning balanced (business/technical) professional 
team in situ (Roure and Keeley, 1990; Cyr et al., 2000).  As a result, lead academic 
entrepreneurs relied on the greater entrepreneurial human capital and social networks 
of TTOs to access surrogate entrepreneurs and acquire resource endowments including 
seed funding, laboratory space and other human resources.  Lead academic 
entrepreneurs also had to recruit appropriately qualified personnel to convince 
investment providers that they had in place a responsible management team.  
However, they consistently displayed a lack of network capital allowing access to such 
people.  The TTO, often through cooperation with the business development agency, 
was responsible for introducing surrogate entrepreneurs to the lead academic 
entrepreneur.  The surrogate entrepreneurs had previous experience of HEI spinouts 
and brought strong networks of knowledge about the investment community.  In some 
cases surrogate entrepreneurs became entrepreneurial ownership team members and in 
one case, chairman (e.g. in Company 3).  The combination of these experiences and 
connections allowed for the integration of these resources to create value.  In addition, 
lead academic entrepreneurs who did not resign from their academic positions 
continued to mange their companies in sponsored environments external to the HEI 
and to conduct and finance contract industrial research for their companies using the 
facilities within their sponsored HEIs.  This revelation about exploiting two 
environments at one time leads to following proposition: 
 
Proposition 22: Lead academic entrepreneurs located on sponsored environments 
(external to their HEI) are more likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on 
non-sponsored environments to exploit two locations at one time. 
 
Non-academic entrepreneurs benefited from the services and network facilities 
on sponsored environments and were able to utilise the networks of the business 
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development agencies who were generally stakeholders in the sponsored environment.  
The sponsored environment, such as the technology or science park, offered 
companies space to set up a laboratory, a prestigious address and proximity to other 
life-science companies.  Company 7, once removed from their non-sponsored 
residential environment and situated on a sponsored environment, benefited from the 
services offered by a science park infrastructure dealing with other life-science 
companies.   
 
Contact with business angels for the lead non-academic entrepreneurs in 
Company 8, situated on a non-sponsored environment, was guided and strengthened 
by their prior business acumen not their external environment.  Funding for Company 
9 was sourced through the perseverance of the lead entrepreneur.  The change to a 
sponsored environment meant that he and his entrepreneurial ownership team 
members paid for the services of another company to manage their affairs.  However, 
Company 9 did not transcend the entrepreneurial commitment phase and by the end of 
the study had returned to the opportunity identification phase with a new manager, a 
new business model and a new product.   
 
7.6 Movement between Sponsored and Non-Sponsored 
Environments 
The recorded movement between sponsored and non-sponsored environments 
is perhaps the main contribution of this thesis and one which has not been documented 
before.  From a resource dependency perspective academic entrepreneurs were at an 
advantage during the pre-opportunity identification process because of their privileged 
access to an educational infrastructure with scientific research and facilities at its core 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Equipment and logistics were unmatched in non-
sponsored environments.  In all nine cases access to laboratories was necessary.  Lead 
entrepreneurs commented on the lack of suitable and affordable laboratory space 
outside of HEIs.  At the venture credibility phase it was observed that lead academic 
entrepreneurs often funded research within their own HEIs (e.g. contract research) in 
support of their own companies situated on other sponsored environments external to 
the HEI.   
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Sponsored environments provided entrepreneurs with an infrastructure that 
could be leveraged to access physical and human resources, which by definition were 
not available to entrepreneurs who selected non-sponsored environments.  It was at the 
venture credibility phase that lead academic entrepreneurs were encouraged (by HEI 
authorities) to leave their sponsored sites, not necessarily because they needed access 
to further resources but because the HEI wished to renounce their own incubator status 
DQG VXSSRUW  /HDG DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV YLHZHG WKHLU µIRUFHG¶ PRYH (sponsored 
environment to sponsored environment) as a demonstration of independence from HEI 
resource reliance (e.g. a forced transition).  Figure 7.6 offers a graphical representation 
of the relational movements between external environments.   
 
During the same phase, however, lead non-academic entrepreneurs were 
attracted to sponsored sites (non-sponsored to sponsored) to access physical laboratory 
space (e.g. a desired transition) (Figure 7.6).  Both lead academic and non-academic 
entrepreneurs selected sponsored environments where the local business development 
agency was a major stakeholder and where both reported a lack of laboratory facilities, 
DFRQGLWLRQUHFWLILHGE\WKHEXVLQHVVGHYHORSPHQWDJHQF\LWVHOI$µYROXQWDU\¶PRYH
out of an HEI environment was recorded rarely, indicating that the internal HEI 
sponsored environment offers lead entrepreneurs access to a familiar and established 
scientific infrastructure in terms of physical resources and specialist scientific human 
capital.  This specialist infrastructure remained consistently important to the lead 
entrepreneurs during all phases of the opportunity identification process and beyond.   
 
The instances where lead academic entrepreneurs moved voluntarily from a 
sponsored to a non-sponsored environment accounted for, in one case, the desire to 
own IP (e.g. a voluntary transition) (Figure 7.6).  The move was confounded by 
negative attitudes of other academics with strong views against the commercialisation 
of publicly funded research.  In general, however, there was resistance from academics 
to move away from the HEI sponsored environment to new sponsored environments.  
The case for non-academic entrepreneurs was different.  They desired to move to 
sponsored environments.  The one exception here was the company who experimented 
with a manufacturing process (Company 8) and required heavy industrial machinery 
rather than access to laboratory facilities.  I perceived that the move out of the HEI 
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was considered negative by academic entrepreneurs but the move to sponsored 
environments as positive by non-academic entrepreneurs.    
 
Figure 7.6: Relational Movements between Sponsored and 
Non-Sponsored Environments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.7 Summary 
The study at hand explored how the external environment influenced access to 
resources (physical, social, financial, technological and human capital) for enterprises 
created by entrepreneurs within sponsored environments compared to those created in 
a non-sponsored environment.  A novel conceptual typology mapping dynamic 
external environmental changes over time recorded location choices made by lead 
entrepreneurs during the entrepreneurial process (Figure 7.1).  Three critical junctures, 
in the iterative entrepreneurial process, were identified e.g. opportunity identification, 
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entrepreneurial commitment and venture credibility (Vohora et al., 2004).  Critical 
junctures have been identified in past empirical studies but the accompanying change 
in environment has not been subject to investigation or adequately reported.  This was 
a novel finding.  Appendix 8 illustrates how lead entrepreneurs encountered the three 
critical junctures and identifies where they were located during the three junctures.  
Data revealed that during a critical juncture entrepreneurs could straddle the two forms 
of external environment.  A change in location did not immediately communicate 
progress in the entrepreneurial process.  At times advancement was reported and at 
others entrepreneurs and their firms regressed to a past phase (Figure 7.5).   
 
To compensate for human capital resource profiles lacking in business acumen, 
four academic entrepreneurs selected a sponsored environment from the outset of the 
opportunity identification process.  This enabled lead academic entrepreneurs to 
leverage the resources, knowledge, reputation and contacts of the physical surrounds 
of the HEIs and their respective TTOs.  During the opportunity identification juncture, 
lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments set up dependent 
relationships with TTOs who were instrumental in providing business knowledge and 
contacts.  The TTOs had considerable control over access to resources, human, 
financial and social.  Academic entrepreneurs appreciated access to the specific human 
capital associated with business knowledge, access to sponsored business advisors, 
support in applying for government sponsored awards and the laboratory infrastructure 
offered by the HEI environments.  This close proximity to a nest of resources suited 
the lead academic entrepreneurs because they did not resign from their academic 
responsibilities during this early phase.  Their relationship with their respective HEIs 
was often reciprocal.  Although they exploited the scientific infrastructure they 
returned to the HEI teaching programs and provided funding for PhD projects.  These 
projects often had a direct bearing on their commercial work.   
 
Only one lead academic entrepreneur selected a non-sponsored environment.  
This entrepreneur asserted that the new technology required extensive preliminary 
testing, and during the process he wanted to maintain complete ownership of the IP 
which could have been more problematical if he worked in an HEI sponsored 
environment.  Sponsored environments were beneficial for academic entrepreneurs at 
the opportunity identification phase because the physical environment and human 
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capital infrastructure of the HEI institutions allowed access to laboratory equipment 
and infrastructure and specialist knowledge about sources of public funding to 
formulate their ideas for commercialisation.  However, once funding was required 
from a private source during the entrepreneurial commitment phase, the limited 
experience of the TTOs dictated that the lead entrepreneurs look for other sources of 
relevant human capital.  This was normally provided by members of the business 
development agencies, outside of the sponsored environment, who were networked to 
surrogate entrepreneurs with experience from previous exposure to the life-science 
sector (Franklin et al., 2001).  Surrogate entrepreneurs were very rarely invited to join 
a new firm when the firm was located within the confines of the HEI (exception was 
Company 2).  Recruiting a surrogate entrepreneur also triggered a change to the 
external environment as well as gaining access to private equity funding through the 
social network of the newly recruited surrogate entrepreneur.  This is in line with prior 
research highlighting the role of personal networks in the search for venture capital 
(Shane, 2004).  The data indicate that resources available to lead academic 
entrepreneurs within a sponsored HEI environment have restricted applicability to the 
opportunity identification phase only.  The knowledge and networks of TTOs was 
identified as limited and relevant to the phase of opportunity identification.  However, 
academic entrepreneurs remained on sponsored environments throughout the study, 
exchanging the sponsored environments of their HEIs for the sponsored environments 
of science or technology parks. 
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs generally strived to enter a sponsored 
environment and were aware that their academic counterparts had better access to 
equipment and facilities within their HEIs.  Their move was prompted by access to 
funding or the winning of contract work which necessitated access to laboratory 
facilities.  One lead non-academic entrepreneur selected a sponsored environment in 
order to gain access to resources relating to specific scientific human capital provided 
by academic team members but chose a non-sponsored environment for the venture 
credibility phase because his resource needs required access to manufacturing facilities 
(Company 8).  Conversely, three lead non-academic entrepreneurs were in non-
sponsored environments at opportunity identification.  The opportunity identification 
phase occurred whilst these entrepreneurs were employed by other companies 
(Company7), whilst operating a previous company (Company 6) or whilst making 
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observations about environmental issues (Company 9).  Three of the four lead non-
academic entrepreneurs progressed their entrepreneurial commitment phase from 
residential premises.  Their external environments offered little access to resources or 
networks.  Lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments relied 
on their own network of contacts to gain access to needed resources.  These 
entrepreneurs were market-focused from the outset, and they could leverage their 
diverse resource profiles associated with prior business experience as well as prior 
market, customer and finance knowledge.  However, at the venture credibility phase 
two moved to sponsored environments mainly for access to physical facilities such as 
laboratories, equipment and specialist services.  A trend amongst non-academic 
entrepreneurs was to seek co-operation with actors and premises within sponsored 
environments (Rod, 2006).  The data indicated that non-academic entrepreneurs are 
attracted to sponsored environments because of the superior provision of laboratory 
facilities, supporting infrastructure and closeness to other life science firms.  Access to 
sponsored environments often came during the venture credibility phase only after 
they had won a contract to conduct research for a third party.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
New business formation contributing to innovation is of central importance in 
entrepreneurship (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007).  The innovativeness of an opportunity 
is viewed as a measure of potential value (or wealth creating potential) (Shane, 2000).  
Innovative opportunities (i.e., new firm formation) can be shaped by the skills, 
experience, knowledge and resources of entrepreneurs and resource availability in the 
environments selected by entrepreneurs to identify, pursue and exploit opportunities 
(Reynolds et al., 1994; Westhead, 1995).  An entrepreneurs (or entrepreneurial 
ownership teams) knowledge about markets and technology is believed to shape the 
identification and exploitation of innovative opportunities (Shane, 2000).  Acquisition 
and processing of information and other resources by entrepreneurs is also perceived 
to shape opportunity identification, pursuit and exploitation (Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001).  Despite a growing body of studies focusing upon human and social capital 
profiles of technology-based entrepreneurs (Marvel and Lumpkin, 2007; Mosey and 
Wright, 2007; Shrader and Siegel, 2007; Wright et al., 2007), the resource profiles of 
technology-based entrepreneurs are poorly understood (Brush et al., 2001).  Studies 
have generally focused on academic entrepreneurs (Franklin et al., 2001; Zucker et al., 
2002; Wright et al., 2004; Lockett et al., 2005).  Most studies have failed to explore 
whether the resource profiles of academic entrepreneurs are narrower than non-
academic entrepreneurs. 
 
Another literature indicates that the formation of knowledge-based firms 
(which includes life-sciences) is more likely in resource rich environments with 
established mechanisms to provide firms with resources (Siegel et al., 2003).  
Resource dependence theorists suggest that entrepreneurs need to adapt and / or move 
to resource rich environments to ensure business formation and development (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) or survival (Westhead and Storey, 1995).  An example of such a 
type of environment in this study was the science park or HEI incubator unit which 
can be described as supportive or sponsored.  A sponsored environment provides a 
significantly higher and more stable level of resources for new firms (Mustar, 1997; 
Mustar et al., 2006).  A supply-side perspective suggests that opportunity 
identification can be shaped by a lead HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V resource profile or of those 
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recruited to the entrepreneurial ownership team, whilst a demand-side perspective 
suggests resource availability in the external environment.  This study has looked at 
the influence of both. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows:  Section 8.2 offers a general 
overview of the thesis and research methodology.  Section 8.3 presents the key 
research findings and interpretations relating to Themes 1 and 2 (e.g. the lead 
entrepreneur and team members).  Findings and conclusions are compared to extant 
literature where possible and used to build theory.  A synthesis of findings relating to 
the entrepreneurial process (Theme 3) is offered in Section 8.4.  Section 8.5 covers 
Theme 4 relating to the external environment and in the following section a synthesis 
of key findings is presented.  Implications for HEIs, practitioners, advisors and 
academics are outlined in Section 8.7 Section 8.8 highlights strengths and weakness of 
the qualitative study and Section 8.9 makes recommendations for future research.  
Finally, a summary is offered in Section 8.10. 
 
8.2 Thesis Overview 
Four major gaps in the past literature were identified.  The first involved the 
neglect of the use of the entrepreneur as the unit of analysis (Westhead and Wright, 
1998) and the second revolved around an observation that the opportunity 
identification phase of the entrepreneurial process has been under investigated (Bruyat 
and Julien, 2001; Sarasvathy et al., 2003).  The third was identified as an under 
representation of longitudinal, qualitative studies, anchored to opportunity 
identification, which followed entrepreneurs in real time (Gartner and Birely, 2002; 
Fletcher, 2006).  Comparative studies between entrepreneurs emanating from HEIs 
and those from industry were few and identified as the fourth gap (Westhead, 1997; 
Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Bower, 2003).  Focusing on the lead entrepreneur this 
study avoided an over emphasis on, and presumption made by many previous studies 
about, the existence of the firm.   
 
The purpose of the study was to unGHUVWDQGµZK\¶DQGµKRZ¶VRPHLQGLYLGXDOV
identify, create or discover (Sarasvathy et al., 2003) business opportunities 
(Venkataraman, 1997; Baron and Ensley, 2006).  Guided by insights from three 
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theoretical perspectives (Human Capital theory, Social Capital theory and the RBV of 
the firm), a novel conceptual typology of life-science entrepreneurs was presented 
relating to the HEI or industrial context and the sponsored or non-sponsored external 
environmental context.  Four types of entrepreneurs were conceptualized: academic 
entrepreneur located on a sponsored environment; academic entrepreneur not located 
on a sponsored environment; non-academic entrepreneur located on a sponsored 
environment; and non-academic entrepreneur not located on a sponsored environment.  
Differences and / or similarities were highlighted with regard to access to resources 
during the process of opportunity identification.  Resources, their availability and 
value, did not remain consistent throughout the entrepreneurial process and neither 
was the process linear.  
 
First, using human capital theory, specific and general experiences were 
identified as being beneficial to the entrepreneurs as they circumvented barriers to 
opportunity identification (Becker, 1993a).  Second, resource deficiencies were 
compensated through recruitment of team members hoEDúDUDQHWDODor from 
resources leveraged from the external environment surrounds (Mustar et al., 2006).  
Team members were either recruited from within the confines of the external 
sponsored environment or found in the wider society through the network auspices of 
mentors or advisors (Shane and Stuart, 2002).  Non-equity holding team members 
such as mentors and advisors were instrumental in finding qualified and experienced 
personnel, with knowledge of the life-science sector, to work with the lead 
entrepreneurs.  Advisors (e.g. TTOs) were often representatives of the HEI in which 
lead academic entrepreneurs were employed.  7KHVHPHQWRUVRUµJDWHNHHSHUV¶EULGJHG
the gap between academia and industry by representing the interests of the HEI, which 
often required an equity stake in the potential companies, whilst offering business 
advice to business naïve academic entrepreneurs.  Access to such a resource offered 
lead academic entrepreneurs competitive value added advantage at the opportunity 
identification phase.  In addition to specific (relating to prior entrepreneurial 
experience) and general (relating to education) human capital experiences 
entrepreneurs also reaped specific physical resource benefits from their external 
environments.  A critical junctures model conceptualised in the guiding framework 
(Figure 3.1) acted as a map to orienteer the entrepreneurial process (Vohora et al., 
2004).  In the longitudinal study critical junctures often, but not always, were 
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accompanied by a change in the external environment.  A change in external 
environment did not always signal progress towards firm formation. Reported changes 
in environment have been rarely recorded before. 
 
From a RBV of the firm perspective, value creation (rather than appropriation) 
was initially centred on the internal, embedded human capital resources of the lead 
entrepreneur prior to the bundling of other resources for firm formation (Barney, 
1991) (e.g. ability to spot an opportunity, ability to work co-operatively, ability to 
source seed funding).  In this study the construction of the new resources proceeded 
from personal resources (e.g. those centring on human and social FDSLWDO µLQSXWV¶
towards becoming organisatLRQDOUHVRXUFHVHJWKRVHFHQWULQJRQWKHILUP¶VUHVRXUFHV
µRXWSXWV¶ $OYDUH] DQG %XVHQLW]   Resources which were intangible and 
systemic (Miller and Shamie, 1996) (e.g. human and social capital) were much more 
influential during opportunity identification whilst tangible, discrete and property 
based resource (e.g. laboratory and financial resources) became more important as the 
commercial opportunity developed (Chandler and Hanks, 1998).  At the opportunity 
identification phase of the entrepreneurial process the lead entrepreneurs became the 
KXEUHVRXUFH³EXWQRWDOO«SRVVHVV(ed) the requisite combination or level of skills to 
JHQHUDWH UHQWV´ %DUQH\ HW DO E S  Lead entrepreneurs had to learn to 
combine tangible resources (e.g. access to technical personnel and physical scientific 
infrastructure) with intangible resources (e.g. knowledge, motivation, vision, drive) 
through a support network of contacts in academia and industry.   
 
Human capital theorists suggest that individuals with broader pools of human 
capital resources consisting of achieved attributes and skills (e.g. years of formal 
education, years of work experience, prior business ownership) will be associated with 
increased levels of productivity (Becker, 1975).  The behaviour of lead academic and 
non-academic entrepreneurs (and their firms) may, in part, be shaped by their human 
capital profiles.  The human capital profiles of lead entrepreneurs (i.e., inputs) may 
shape their ability to address opportunity identification issues (i.e., outputs).  An 
entrepreneur, for example, can compensate for his / her personal human capital 
deficiencies by attracting other individuals, through their social networks (Mosey and 
Wright, 2007), with more diverse human capital to join the entrepreneurial ownership 
team (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Cooney, 2005).  Enhanced human capital from prior 
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entrepreneurial experience may be interrelated with greater social capital associated 
with broader and deeper networks (Shane and Khurana, 2003).  Erudition gained from 
previous experience can be embedded in tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge and 
social capital (Anderson and Jack, 2002).  Entrepreneurs with past commercial 
experience may, therefore, have gained important resource-acquisition skills.  
Attracting additional equity partners into the entrepreneurial team can also enable a 
solo entrepreneur, particularly an academic entrepreneur with no prior business 
ownership experience, to accumulate specific human capital relating to managerial, 
technical and entrepreneurial capabilities required to identify, pursue and exploit an 
innovative opportunity (Matlay and Westhead, 2005; Ucbasaran et al., 2006).  
Entrepreneurs can also leverage their human capital to gain access to a predictable 
uninterrupted supply of critical resources (such as financial and social capital) (Cooper 
et al., 1994; Greene, 2000).  Entrepreneurial experience can add to human capital 
through enhanced reputation and increased networks and better understanding of, for 
example, the requirements of finance institutions.  Such entrepreneurs may have 
improved access through social networks to financial institutions such as banks, 
venture capitalists and informal investors, and obtain funds on better terms (Wright et 
al., 2007).  Entrepreneurs may, therefore, leverage their human capital to influence 
their social capital.   
 
In addition, entrepreneurial behaviour is exhibited in numerous external 
environmental contexts (Reynolds et al., 1994; Ucbasaran et al., 2001).  External 
environmental resource availability can promote new firm formation.  Relatively few 
demand-side studies have explicitly explored the issues promoting (or retarding) the 
identification, pursuit and exploitation of technology-based firms particularly in 
sponsored and non-sponsored environments (Westhead and Batstone, 1999; Löfsten 
and Lindelöf, 2003).  A sponsored environment fosters the formation and development 
of new firms (Flynn, 1993) and promotes formal and operational links between 
entrepreneurs and HEIs (Siegel et al., 2003).  Science parks and incubators adjacent to 
HEIs are sponsored environments.  They can reduce uncertainty for entrepreneurs, 
increase the legitimacy of inexperienced entrepreneurs, increase direct access to 
human, social and physical resources, as well as to facilitate access to other external 
sources of resources (Westhead and Storey, 1995, Westhead and Batstone, 1999; 
Mosey et al., 2006). 
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8.2.1 Research Methodology  
A discovery orientated phenomenological methodology was used to explore 
the meaning of the actions of practicing lead entrepreneurs (Holstein and Gubrium, 
2004).  Specifically, a qualitative case study methodology was utilized.  This inductive 
approach enabled rich and thick description (Yin, 1989) and permitted in-depth 
exploration of sensitive issues and processes (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  Case study 
data are frequently collected in order to present information relating to meanings and 
processes that have not previously been explored in any great depth (Van Maanen, 
1983).  Case studies can H[DPLQHEHKDYLRXUIURPWKHDFWRUV¶LHOHDGHQWUHSUHQHXUV
frames of reference, rather than imposing predetermined views of the researchers.  
Further, case studies enable causality to be explored and theory to be extended 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Prior to the interviews, theoretical constructs were identified ex ante from the 
literature reviewed.  As intimated before, with reference to supply-side issues a 
distinction was made between lead entrepreneurs employed in HEI (i.e. academic 
entrepreneurs) rather than industry contexts (i.e. non-academic entrepreneurs).  With 
reference to local demand-side issues, a distinction was made between lead 
entrepreneurs at the time of the interviews located on sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments.  No list of academic and non-academic entrepreneurs located on 
sponsored and non-sponsored environments engaged in life-science was published.  
Primary information had to be collected to identify types of lead entrepreneurs.  Data 
was gathered from lead entrepreneurs who operated firms in a life-science cluster.  
Names of firms located in the geographical triangle between Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Dundee in Scotland (Forbes and Low, 2004) was provided by Scottish Enterprise.  The 
sample frame related to a random sample of 100 firms in the trade directory (Scottish 
Enterprise, 2003) listed to be engaged in life-sciences.  To ascertain the academic 
context of each lead entrepreneur and to confirm the main industrial activity and 
location of each firm a structured questionnaire survey was designed.  In April 2004, 
the survey was e-mailed to individuals in 100 firms.  Seventy people responded to the 
survey (i.e., 70% response rate).  Respondents confirmed the identity of the lead 
entrepreneur in each firm.  Survey evidence enabled lead entrepreneurs to be allocated 
into the academic and non-academic categories, as well as the sponsored and non-
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sponsored categories.  In addition, the respondents confirmed whether the new 
ventures at the time of the survey were at the opportunity identification phase.  
Theoretical sampling was employed to select cases with different academic and 
sponsorship location contexts.  Nine lead entrepreneurs were identified.  These lead 
entrepreneurs had confirmed their life-science firms were at the opportunity 
identification phase.  Each lead entrepreneur was mapped on top of the conceptual 
typology of lead entrepreneurs.   
 
To unravel the µLQVLGHUV YLHZ¶ 'HQ]LQ DQG /LQFROQ  VHPL-structured 
face-to-face interviews were conducted between January and April in 2005.  Dyadic 
case studies were conducted in a structured reiterative approach to gather information 
from the lead entrepreneur and two further entrepreneurial team members in each firm.  
Each respondent typically provided a 45 to 60 minute interview.  Transcriptions of the 
interviews allowed general observations and description to be made (Pettigrew, 1990).  
Triangulation of statements from the three respondents in each firm enabled the 
response from the lead entrepreneur to be validated (Fetterman, 1998).  Analysis of the 
data from the case studies allowed the refinement of existing theoretical constructs in 
contrasting contexts (Wolcott, 1994), thus, extending theory relating to human and 
social capital accumulation in a variety of entrepreneur type contexts.  ³7KHPRYHPHQW
from relatively superficial observations to more abstract theoretical categories was 
achieved by the constant interplay between data collection and analysis that constitutes 
WKHFRQVWDQWFRPSDUDWLYHPHWKRG´6XGGDE\S 
 
Extension to existing theory was evaluated primarily from the richness of the 
GDWDDQG³WKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKLWSURYLGHVDFORVHILWWRHPSLULFDOGDWDDQGWKHGHJUHH
WRZKLFK LW UHVXOWV LQQRYHO LQVLJKWV´ &ROTXLWW DQG=DSDWD-Phelan, 2007, p1281).  In 
the process of theory building some data from this study replicated results from 
previous studies.  New and novel contributions, however, exposed themselves whilst 
the data was interrogated.  For example, during the process of collecting the data an 
unexpected but observable movement of the lead entrepreneurs between different 
external environments was recorded and mapped.  No mention of environmental 
exchange has been recorded in the literature exposing spinout firm formation.  It 
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appeared that different environments became more or less valuable at different times 
of the opportunity identification process.   
 
8.3 The Lead Entrepreneur and Team Members: Key Research 
Findings and Interpretation (Themes 1 and 2) 
This section provides further analysis of the key findings and interpretations 
and links findings to the theoretical perspectives guiding this study.  Some findings 
provide new knowledge and some confirm or contradict previous studies.  The 
following presentation is guided by the three main areas identified in the conceptual 
framework: the lead entrepreneurs and team members involved in the entrepreneurial 
process focussing on resources as a differentiator and value creator of the firm 
(Themes 1 and 2); the entrepreneurial process examined at three critical junctures 
(Theme 3), and third, the influence of the external environment on access to resources 
(Theme 4).  Propositions proposed in Chapter 5 are summarised in Table 8.1.   
 
8.3.1 The Lead Entrepreneur(s) (Theme 1) 
With reference to supply-side issues, owners of some life science firms faced 
liabilities associated with newness and smallness (Delmar and Shane, 2004).  
Academic entrepreneurs with considerable technical skills had narrower pools of 
human capital (Brush et al., 2001), particularly managerial and entrepreneurial 
capabilities and less connections to resource providers.  Conversely, non-academic 
entrepreneurs with broader managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities were able to 
compensate for their more limited technical skills with wider networks (Westhead et 
al., 2005).  Different starting configurations of resources (Westhead and Storey, 1995; 
Shane and Stuart, 2002) (e.g. human, technological, social, financial and physical) 
were identified.  Drawing on the resource based view of the firm (RBV) different 
resource configurations (access to, leverage and management) of resources highlighted 
differences between academic and non-academic entrepreneurs (Heirman and 
Clarysse, 2004; Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004).   
 
General human capital relating to scientific knowledge was paramount for the 
identification of an opportunity in the life-science sector confirming previous research 
findings (Bozeman and Mangematin, 2004).  Neither the lead entrepreneur nor 
subsequent team members in Company 9 exhibited such human capital and as a result  
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Table 8.1: Summary of Propositions from Chapter 5: 
The Entrepreneur and Team Members 
 
Proposition 1: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely to identify opportunities from 
their basic research and are technology focused whereas non-academic entrepreneurs are 
focused on opportunities identified from market needs and market knowledge.   
 
Proposition 2: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than non-academic 
entrepreneurs to be potential end users of their identified opportunities.   
 
Proposition 3: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs are more likely to be known within 
business advisory networks from their prior start up experience whereas lead academic 
entrepreneurs with less start-up experience are forced to rely on the advice offered by the 
HEI.   
 
Proposition 4: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments have access to 
more physical, social, financial and business advisory resources than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments. 
 
Proposition 5: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs wish to locate on sponsored environments 
to seek proximity to scientists during opportunity identification in order to identify and 
define their product whereas lead academic entrepreneurs wish to remain on sponsored 
environments because of the superior access to resources.  
 
3URSRVLWLRQ/HDGDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶JHQHUDOKXPDQFDSLWDOLHUHSXWDWLRQKDVD
greater influence on enhancing their social capital network than lead non-academic 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶JHQHUDOKuman capital influence on their social capital.   
 
Proposition 7: Lead academic entrepreneurs developing medical or dental devises on 
sponsored environments are more likely than other lead academic entrepreneurs on 
sponsored environments to seek investment outside Scotland. 
 
Proposition 8: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs to experience a mismatch of resource synergy between their perceived needs 
and the ability of their investors to provide team members with matching skills.   
 
Proposition 9: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments were more likely 
than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to better develop 
their scientific concepts as commercial opportunities because of Proof of Concept funding.  
 
Proposition 10: Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs to focus on team homogeneity during the opportunity identification phase. 
 
Proposition 11: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more likely 
than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to gain access to 
µVXUURJDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ 
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did not progress from the phase of opportunity identification during the whole study.  
Technological resources (Bower, 2003) associated with a product or process were 
either grounded in basic HEI research and manifest in IP contracts, or simply existed 
as tacit conceptual ideas as work in progress (Hindle and Yencken, 2004).  Social 
capital relating to networks of potential resources providers (e.g. financial and 
commercial contacts) (Brush et al., 2001) or relating to proximity to other life science 
firms (Westhead and Batstone, 1999) and relating to the benefits of different 
environments (e.g. sponsored and non-sponsored) (Westhead and Storey, 1995; 
Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2004) exposed differences in access to resources.  A comparison 
between the lead entrepreneur(s), in the four represented quadrants indicated that there 
was a tendency, not surprisingly, for lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored 
environments to have less entrepreneurial experience than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored environments.  Their inability to 
network with individuals with prior venture creation human capital directly was 
FRPSHQVDWHG IRU E\ WKH VRFLDO FRQWDFWV RIIHUHG E\ µSULYLOHJHG ZLWQHVVHV¶ VXFK DV
TTOs, on HEI sponsored environments, or the local business development agencies, 
on non-VSRQVRUHG HQYLURQPHQWV 9DQDHOVW HW DO   µ3ULYLOHJHG ZLWQHVVHV¶
EHFDPHYLWDOµWHPSRUDU\¶QRQ-equity) team members whilst information was sourced 
DQG UHVRXUFHV DFFXPXODWHG 7KH\ZHUH µWHPSRUDU\¶ LQ WZRVHQVHV )LUVW WKH\ZHUH
generally associated with one type of environment and second, associated with a 
certain phase of the entrepreneurial process.  When entrepreneurs changed 
environment or moved through a critical juncture to new growth phases their 
relationship changed or ceased with both the previous environment and with the 
TTOs.   
 
During this process lead academic entrepreneurs became eligible for 
governmental funding schemes (as did non-academic entrepreneurs).  They saw firm 
formation as a way to enhance their research knowing that colleagues or their 
institutions were potential end users of their product / process.  General human capital 
relating to education and level of education also had a positive effect on the 
willingness of finance providers to offer support.  This finding may be specific to life 
science entrepreneurs and lies contrary to findings by Davidsson and Honig (2003) 
who studied nascent entrepreneurs only.  The process of applying for funding at the 
opportunity identification and entrepreneurial commitment phases was guided by 
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TTOs.  TTOs were HEI representatives promoting an ever increasing emphasis on the 
commercialisation of HEI knowledge.  TTOs acted as gatekeepers between the non-
commercial HEI environment and resource keepers for the commercial world and as 
bridges builders between critical junctures of the entrepreneurial process.  At the 
venture credibility juncture, academic reputation also compensated for a lack of 
business acumen giving lead academic entrepreneurs credence with potential private 
investors.  In addition, Mustar et al., (2006) indicated that the reputation of the HEI 
from where academic entrepreneurs originate may also signal quality to both investors 
and / or potential partners.  This was an interesting finding.  Investors overlooked 
DFDGHPLF¶V EXVLQHVV LQH[SHULHQFH EXW SODFHG LPSRUWDQFH RQ DFDGHPLF, clinical and 
HEI reputations.  6FLHQWLVWV¶ KXPDQ FDSLWDO LQ WKH IRUP RI VFLHQWLILF NQRZOHGJH ZDV
converted to financial capital through firm formation (Bozeman and Mangematin, 
2004).  It seemed that the scientists (academic entrepreneurs) deployed scientific 
results as a form of technological capital to engage with investors and providers of 
financial capital.   
 
However, lead academic entrepreneurs sought experienced personnel or 
surrogate entrepreneurs with life-science exposure to PDQDJHSULYDWHLQYHVWRUV¶IXQGV
and achieve set milestones.  Typically, eminent academic entrepreneurs retained full 
time positions in academia and contrary to financial capital providers took no risk as 
their intellectual investment could not destroy their scientific and technological human 
capital.  In one case, commercial expertise came in the form of a managerial 
representative recruited by the supporting venture capital company.  Subsequently, 
there was a mismatch between the requirements of a new firm exploring the medical 
device market and the recruitment of a highly respected and experienced manager 
from a blue chip medical device company.  Wright et al., (2004) examined this 
relationship between spinoff firm and risk capital provider and found that access to 
resources was influenced by the capital provider.  The management of high profile, 
HPLQHQW VFLHQWLVWV¶ UHVHDUFK IRU FRPPHUFLDO JDLQ ZDV IRXQG WR EH ZDQWLQJ LQ WKLV
research.  Academics, on the other hand, who were only team members, exploited 
their human capital strategically as scientific advisors to their companies.  Social 
capital, more that human capital, played a significant role in networking lead 
entrepreneurs with experienced personnel but was enhanced by eminent academic 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ DQG VFLHQWLILF YLVLELOLW\ Jauged through publications and 
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exposure during the conference circuit).  Much of this capital especially at the 
interpersonal and social is embedded in social and professional networks.  This was 
particularly evident in the functional role of mentors, advisors, TTOs and business 
development agencies who used their network links to favourably establish alliances 
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003).   
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs who showed evidence of prior 
entrepreneurial specific experience, on the other hand, tended to seek out scientific 
specific expertise associated with their business opportunity from academics within 
HEIs and relied on the advice of sponsored development agencies.  Lead non-
academic entrepreneurs reported similarities between the opportunity identification 
process and firm formation process of their present situations to that of their venture 
start up experiences from the past.  Either they used their past experience as proof to 
potential investors that they had the necessary skills, or, in one case, demonstrated the 
adoption of bad practice and repeated this practice to their detriment.  Extant literature 
expresses the danger of the transfer of both good and bad practice from previous 
entrepreneurial experience. 
 
8.3.2 The Entrepreneurial Ownership Team Members (Theme 2) 
To avoid attitudinal, resource and operational barriers to opportunity 
identification, lead entrepreneurs chose to facilitate the formation of entrepreneurial 
teams with equity ownership (permanent) and non-equity (temporary) team members 
in the hope for results.  Ucbasaran et al., (2003) stated that such individuals provide 
the experience and knowledge that can be leveraged to address technical and business 
barriers to progression.  The theoretical sample of academic and non-academic 
entrepreneurs in the life-sciences confirms this general result.  However, it was 
observed in addition, that lead entrepreneurs with a narrow commercial resource 
profile, characterized as academic entrepreneurs, tended to select a rich resource 
sponsored environment to gain access to the resources in which they were themselves 
deficient but paradoxically in this such environments created entrepreneurial teams 
that re-enforced their narrow resource profile rather than broadening it when seeking 
to create and identify opportunities.  To avoid potential team conflict, lead academic 
entrepreneurs recruited academics with more diverse technical human capital rather 
than individuals with more diverse managerial, entrepreneurial or prior business 
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ownership skills.  Known academic colleagues were drawn into the entrepreneurial 
ownership teams to address technical barriers to product / process discovery (Clarysse 
and Moray, 2004).  A mismatch in the opportunity identification process was detected.  
The dearth of managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities within the entrepreneurial 
teams in several instances led to an inappropriate focus on research, product and 
process development.  Market, customer and financial issues were given insufficient 
attention by academic entrepreneurial ownership teams.  Sponsored environments 
appeared to have a paradoxically initial negative impact on the progression of 
opportunity identification.  There was a danger that the cushion of commercial support 
they provided in practice KDG WKH SRWHQWLDO WR XQGHUPLQH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR
progress through the entrepreneurial process.  Only one lead non-academic 
entrepreneur selected a sponsored environment and did so to broaden and enrich not 
narrow his access to human capital.  He wanted access to people with knowledge in 
the life-sciences. 
 
Moreover, lead academic entrepreneurs, aware of resource barriers, identified 
several network bridges to gain access to actors associated with financial resources, 
expertise and contacts.  Commercial barriers to opportunity identification were 
DGGUHVVHGE\XVLQJ µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ )UDQNOLQ HW DO  7KH\SURYLGHG
essential knowledge about investors specialising in the life-science sector at the 
venture credibility phase of the entreSUHQHXULDO SURFHVV  7KH ODWWHU µRXWVLGH WHDP
PHPEHUV¶ LQLWLDOO\ MRLQHG WKH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO WHDP DV QRQ-equity holders or as 
management team members.  Some surrogate entrepreneurs subsequently became 
equity holders and entrepreneurial ownership team members.  By encompassing 
organisational and managerial processes through the recruitment of new members, 
lead entrepreneurs were able to combine and reconfigure resources with existing assets 
(e.g. managerial expertise with gaining access to finance) to further progress their 
opportunities.  Exploiting and combining resources through organisational routines 
allowed the entrepreneurs to build their capabilities to progress through critical 
junctures (Vohora et al., 2004) an observation confirmed by Druilhe and Garnsey 
(2004) in their dynamic view of the entrepreneurship associated with academic 
spinoffs.  . 
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In marked contrast, three lead non-academic entrepreneurs focused from the 
outset on current and potential customer market needs and the size of the potential 
market(s).  They were market-focused from the outset and avoided sponsored 
environments where that focus might have been diluted with a broader more technical 
orientation.  Their entrepreneurial ownership teams were more likely to include 
individuals with managerial and entrepreneurial human capital, as well as prior 
business ownership experience.  Experienced entrepreneurs were encouraged to join 
the entrepreneurial ownership teams because they provided customers, suppliers, 
finance, market and industry knowledge and contacts, as well as commercial 
credibility.  Team members with experience dealing with market related issues were 
sought and valued.  The market led opportunity-orientated lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs recruited team members with technical capabilities.  The latter 
individuals provided additional knowledge to support new products or processes.  In 
some instances, academics were encouraged to join the entrepreneurial ownership 
team in order to link product and process development to the specific needs of 
academic end-users.   
 
8.4 The Entrepreneurial Process: Key Research Findings and 
Interpretation (Theme 3) 
The following three sub-sections outline human and social capital differences 
in accordance to the entrepreneurial process (Theme 3) encapsulating information 
search and opportunity identification (e.g. Discovery); resource accumulation and 
management (e.g. Evaluation) culminating in the decision to form a firm (e.g. 
Exploitation).  Propositions proposed in Chapter 6 are presented in Table 8.2.   
 
8.4.1 Discovery (Theme 3)  
Lead academic entrepreneurs displayed more control over the timing of their 
research and development process and tended to consider commercialisation only 
when IP rights covered their generated technical knowledge (even if it belonged to the 
HEI).  Lead non-academic entrepreneurs either had not created new intellectual 
property or considered the creation and protection of new IP as part of the 
commercialisation process.  Academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored sites, although 
rare, reported that their freedom from their institutions allowed them to claim the 
ownership of their IP.  In short, for the lead academic entrepreneur opportunity  
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Table 8.2 Summary of Propositions from Chapter 6: 
Entrepreneurial Process 
8.4.1 Discovery (Theme 3) 
 
Proposition 12:  Lead academic entrepreneurs are more likely to identify an opportunity 
through a process of recognition conducting scientific exploration (e.g. supplying 
products for which there is a known market) than lead non-academic entrepreneurs who 
identify an opportunity through a process of discovery (e.g. identifying a demand with the 
supply of a product not yet fully developed).  
 
3URSRVLWLRQ  /HDG DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ JHQHUDO KXPDQ FDSLWDO UHODWLQJ WR
education) allows for an opportunity identification approach reliant on scientific 
discovery whilst lead non-DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ VSHFLILF KXPDQ FDSLWDO UHODWLQJ WR
prior working experience) allows for an opportunity identification approach reliant on 
recognising market demands.   
 
8.4.2 Evaluation (Theme 3) 
 
Proposition 14: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments who are 
involved in the research and development of medical and dental devices are more likely 
than other lead entrepreneurs to have or to be offered direct ties with surrogate 
entrepreneurs by resources providers. 
 
Proposition 15: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments who recruit 
surrogate entrepreneurs are more likely than non-academic entrepreneurs on non-
sponsored environments to receive capital investment from external investment providers.  
 
Proposition 16: Lead academic entrepreneurs who are full professors based on sponsored 
environments are more likely to attract venture capital funding than lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments. 
 
8.4.3 Exploitation (Theme 3) 
Proposition 17: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more likely 
to have weaker ties to resource providers outside of their sponsored environment than 
non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments.  
 
 
identification came after the application and appropriation of IP whereas for the lead 
non-academic entrepreneur the exploration and discovery of the new knowledge was 
seen as part of the entrepreneurial process.  This observation suggests that the 
technological resources available to academic entrepreneurs on sponsored 
environments were superior or that of non-sponsored environments.   
 
Lead academic entrepreneurs, therefore, offered investors better developed 
ideas because their technical information search had to a greater extent been 
supplemented / supported with public funding, charity or industry backing.  Non-
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academic entrepreneurs did not have the privilege of being able to access funds, 
equipment and an infrastructure similar to an HEI and, therefore, had to contend with 
plans which included funding applications for basic research and development.  Lead 
academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, had evidence that their ideas were 
scientifically authentic because either they had accessed Proof of Concept funding 
from a government body, available only to HEIs and / or patent protection.  Being 
µIXUWKHUGRZQWKH OLQH¶ LQ UHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQW WHUPVDOORZHG WKHPWREHPRUH
efficient in their use of information when identifying both business opportunities and 
potential investors.   
 
.QRZOHGJH RI FRPSHWLWRUV¶ SURGXFWV RU SURFHVVHV DQG WKHLU ZHDNQHVVHV
sourced through trade fairs and technical conferences, also encouraged lead academic 
entrepreneurs to enter known market areas (Sarasvathy et al., 2004).  The use of, and 
search for sources of information was different for the lead academic and non-
academic entrepreneur.  In particular, academic entrepreneurs had access to the social 
network of contacts from the TTO; the academic community; industrial players met at 
conferences and sponsored business development agencies.  These contacts put them 
in a stronger position for sourcing information about markets and funding.  Non-
academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, had different information sources restricted 
to the business development agencies and contact with past customers, clients, 
suppliers and competitors.   
 
As stated in Chapter 6 some lead entrepreneurs identified their opportunities 
from their past experience and by being attentive to the market but not necessarily 
from searching for information (Shane, 2004).  This reflects the position of the lead 
academic entrepreneurs in the dental and medical device sector who both knew that 
there was a demand for their potential products for which there was currently no 
supply (e.g. opportunity discovery) (Sarasvathy et al., 2004).  Non-academic 
entrepreneurs faced with the prospect of redundancy were forced to search for 
information intensively.  Thus, the electronics engineers (Company 8), made 
redundant from the mobile phone sector, targeted the life-science sector only after 
intensive market research and networking with firms within the life-science sector, 
with the business development agencies and with representatives from academia.  
Their initial search was sponsored by a local business development agency supporting 
 254 
the observation from Chandler et al., (2002) that proactive search opportunities are 
recognised only when there are sufficient resources around for the search and 
discovery to be made.  In this particular case, information search facilitated the 
opportunity for co-operation between the engineers and academics.  An observed 
capability to combine scientific knowledge with a commercially feasible offering that 
satisfies an unfulfilled market need was demonstrated (Vohora eta al., 2004).  This 
particular team offered a product for which there was a known market (e.g. 
opportunity recognition) (Sarasvathy et al., 2004).   
 
8.4.2 Evaluation (Theme 3) 
Given the problems encountered by the lead entrepreneurs in their pursuit of 
commercially uncertain life-science opportunities at the entrepreneurial commitment 
phase, differences were revealed between the academic and non-academic lead 
entrepreneurs.  This was due in part to information asymmetries and the precarious 
process of acquiring financial resources.  In addition, lead academic entrepreneurs 
were motivated to form firms to access funding to continue their basic research, whilst 
non-academic entrepreneurs were often seeking funding to compensate an extrinsic 
experience in their life (e.g. as a reaction to redundancy or liquidation of a previous 
company).  All lead entrepreneurs whether academic or non-academic had invested 
equity in their own firms and all were eligible and had, to differing degrees of success, 
been awarded governmental seed funding.  At the entrepreneurial commitment phase, 
however, the barriers to reaching investors, either business angels or venture 
capitalists, were mainly overcome when the lead entrepreneurs were introduced to 
people with previous experience and contact with the investment sector (Vohora et al., 
2004).  Once that connection was made networks and knowledge of TTOs became 
redundant.  Lead academic entrepreneurs, generally, did not have previous knowledge, 
contacts or experience of dealing with investors.   
 
Lead academic entrepreneurs, therefore, relied on the assistance of surrogate 
entrepreneurs with prior contact with venture capitalists (Franklin et al., 2001; 
Vanaelst et al., 2006).  In the two cases, where the initial investment to exploit the 
opportunity was large, both lead entrepreneurs were forced to London to seek interest.  
Since the lead entrepreneurs did not possess the direct social ties to the investors the 
role of the surrogate entrepreneur was vital for the leverage and acquisition of 
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financial resources.  By recruiting the surrogate entrepreneurs the lead entrepreneurs 
were communicating to the investors their commitment to the opportunity (Vohora et 
al., 2004).  In the particular cases of medical and dental research the clinical and 
academic reputation of the lead academic entrepreneurs, who were renowned full 
professors, also demonstrated a degree of proven general human capital in technical 
and managerial excellence.  These particular entrepreneurs led and managed 
substantial research agendas for their HEIs.  Lead academic entrepreneurs could also 
demonstrate to investors a continuing relationship with their own HEI and evidence of 
a cache of qualified academics on their entrepreneurial ownership team.  Lead non-
academic entrepreneurs reported much less success in being offered access to 
surrogate entrepreneurs and in turn less success with applications for funding.   
 
8.4.3 Exploitation (Theme 3) 
The dependence on external resources through networks with advisory agents 
for public grants and awards shifted during venture credibility to a reliance of contact 
with private investors.  Lead academic entrepreneurs had greater access to support 
providers who had a wide range of commercial network exposure.  Only one academic 
entrepreneur reported a prior contact, through a family connection, where there was 
evidence of entrepreneurial behaviour.  Others relied on the efforts and extended 
network of surrogate entrepreneurs.  Overall, following firm formation, lead academic 
entrepreneurs experienced a withdrawal of support from the TTOs and access to the 
HEI infrastructure.  They were encouraged to change external environments in an 
effort to promote less dependence on the supportive infrastructure.  Full 
entrepreneurial commitment was rare amongst lead academic entrepreneurs, especially 
if they were full professors.  Managing the transition from being a publicly supported 
entity to becoming a commercially active venture was fraught with difficulty and 
uncertainty.  Those who successfully managed the transition relied on recruited team 
members with prior commercial experience and with prior relations with the investor 
sector.  The managerial capability of the lead academic entrepreneurs to guide this 
process was questionable and in one case the investors insisted on placing their own 
representative within the company. 
 
Non-academic entrepreneurs on sponsored and non-sponsored environments, 
on the other hand, displayed capabilities learned from past business ownership 
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experience which manifest itself in heightened levels of managerial capability.  
Managerial capability benefited entrepreneurs in framing an opportunity, from initial 
idea to firm formation.  Since these experienced eQWUHSUHQHXUVKDGµEHHQWKURXJKWKH
ORRS¶ DOUHDG\ WKH\ XQGHUVWRRG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI RUJDQLVLQJ UHVRXUFHV WDVNV DQG
people, delegation and division of workloads.  Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
ownership team members reported similarities between establishing their latest 
venture compared to prior venture creations.  However, those most disadvantaged 
were the lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments with no 
prior commercial experience.  Their access, even to public funding and grants, was 
curtailed by a reported lack of experience amongst business advisors guiding life-
science firms in particular.  Overall only one lead non-academic entrepreneur reported 
success in attracting private capital.   
 
8.5 The External Environment and Location: Key Research 
Findings and Interpretation (Theme 4) 
In the three sections below differences between external environments (e.g. 
sponsored and non-sponsored) and changes made by lead entrepreneurs in location are 
discussed in relation to the entrepreneurial process.  Many HEIs, normally with 
cooperation from local authorities, have established property based locations to 
encourage and facilitate the creation of firms emanating from HEIs (e.g. incubators 
and science parks) (Siegel et al., 2003a,b; Phan et al., 2005).  These spaces are 
considered sponsored or subsidised.  Difference in access to these physical resources 
and facilities may influence the entrepreneurial process (Clarysse et al., 2005).  
Propositions proposed in Chapter 7 are presented in Table 8.3.   
 
8.5.1 Location at Opportunity Identification Phase (Theme 4) 
At the opportunity identification phase lead academic entrepreneurs exploited 
the scientific and business support infrastructure and scientific human capital 
resources of their HEIs to develop their idea into a commercial opportunity.  Lead 
academic entrepreneurs generally located on sponsored environments because their 
research originated within the sponsored environment of HEIs which gave them the 
advantage of having access to familiar facilities, people and systems surrounding 
scientific exploration and business development.  If the academic entrepreneurs also 
worked as medical or dental clinicians, having contact with other clinicians eased the 
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process of gathering information about current products used on the market.  
Displaying higher rates of R&D is exemplified by a study conducted by Lindelöf and 
Löfsten (2004) which stated that firms with stronger links and networks with HEIs 
generally had higher R&D and growth rates.  In addition, if the HEI had a business or 
management school, TTOs were able to connect scientists with interested and 
experienced students completing their MBAs indicating interdepartmental networks 
recognised by Nicolaou and Birley (2003).  Current policy towards the 
commercialisation of HEI knowledge at national level allowed all lead academic 
entrepreneurs to apply for funding pre-firm formation for Proof of Concept and 
thereafter, for Smart, Spur and Co-investment awards.  HEI departments and incubator 
units offered laboratory facilities and networks to business advice, financial assistance, 
business training and contact with a known physical and social infrastructure (Mustar 
et al., 2006).   
 
The academic entrepreneurs appreciated proximity to other academics and 
students for advice, opinions and as a potential pool of employees.  As noted before, a 
disadvantage to the sponsored environment was the lack of diversity amongst potential 
team members.  On more than one occasion non-academic entrepreneurs commented 
on the access that academic entrepreneurs had to public funding early in the 
opportunity identification process which was not accessible to potential entrepreneurs 
outside of the HEI system.  Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments 
were more likely to establish good working relationships with resource providers than 
lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments because of the close 
proximity, assistance and networks advice given by the TTOs.  TTOs were 
particularly sensitive to the needs of their lead academic entrepreneurs.  Mustar (1997) 
also found that successful spinouts require to network with many different players and 
be integrated into networks allowing interaction with a variety of actors (e.g. the HEI, 
other enterprises, governmental bodies, technology programmes, customers and 
investors). 
 
All lead academic entrepreneurs and members of their entrepreneurial 
ownership teams, who were also academics, whether on sponsored or non-sponsored 
environments, were employed by the HEI to which they were attached.  At the 
opportunity identification phase few resigned from their academic posts.  It was only 
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at the entrepreneurial commitment phase that some lead academic entrepreneurs 
resigned from their HEIs.  All lead academic entrepreneurs who were clinicians 
remained full time employees of their HEIs throughout the process.  Generally these 
lead academic entrepreneurs were at the top of their academic and clinical careers and 
leaders in their chosen fields.  Their involvement in academia went beyond teaching 
and research to encompass advisory roles. 
 
Table 8.3 Summary of Propositions from Chapter 7: 
The External Environment 
8.5.1 External environment at the Opportunity Identification Phase (Theme 4) 
 
Proposition 18: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more likely 
than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to submit more 
developed concepts to venture investors because of their superior access to physical 
resources (e.g. laboratories), technical human capital (e.g. scientists) social network capital 
(e.g. business advisers) and public funding (e.g. Proof of Concept). 
 
Proposition 19: Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more likely 
than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored environments to have a reciprocal 
relationship with their resources providers at the opportunity identification phase.   
 
8.3.8 External environment at the Entrepreneurial Commitment Phase (Theme 4) 
 
Proposition 20:  Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments are more likely 
than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-VSRQVRUHGHQYLURQPHQWVWREHµSXVKHG¶DZD\
from their environments to promote independence during the entrepreneurial commitment 
critical juncture.   
 
Proposition 21: Lead non-academic entrepreneurs located on non-sponsored environments 
are more likely than lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments to change 
location because they need to access laboratory space at the entrepreneurial commitment 
critical juncture. 
 
8.3.9 External environment at the Venture Credibility Phase (Theme 4) 
 
Proposition 22: Lead academic entrepreneurs located on sponsored environments (external 
to their HEI) are more likely than lead non-academic entrepreneurs on non-sponsored 
environments to exploit two locations at one time. 
 
 
Resources relating to physical infrastructure were considered to be better 
within the sponsored environments of HEIs rather than on sponsored and non-
sponsored sites outside HEIs.  Laboratory refurbishments were required for all 
companies located on sponsored (non-HEI) and non-sponsored environments.  Non-
academic entrepreneurs who chose sponsored environments did so because they 
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lacked technical scientific knowledge and needed to be in close proximity to scientists 
during the opportunity identification process to define their product / process. 
 
8.5.2 Location at the Entrepreneurial Commitment Phase (Theme 4) 
During the entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture, all bar one lead 
academic entrepreneur were allocated space within the HEI to further develop their 
technical resources and to progress applications for financial resources.  Normally a 
time restriction on HEI incubator occupancy was issued to lead academic 
entrepreneurs.  Lead academic entrepreneurs were more likely to experience a µforced 
push¶ away from the protection of their sponsored environments by resource providers 
representing the HEI.  The µforced push¶ may have been be indicative of TTOs 
DVVHVVPHQW RI DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ HQKDQFHG UHVRXrce profile ascertained from 
their physical surroundings and social networks (e.g. access to private investor 
funding).  The lead non-academic entrepreneurs did not have access to a laboratory 
until after the entrepreneurial commitment critical juncture and only after they moved 
to a sponsored environment.  The managerial consultancy company responsible for 
Company 9, led by a non-academic entrepreneur, out-sourced all their scientific work 
to different HEIs.  Generally, all lead non-academic entrepreneurs commented that 
there was a general lack of adequate laboratory space for early research and 
development and desired access to a sponsored environment.  The difference between 
lead academic entrepreneurs and lead non-academic entrepreneurs, on sponsored 
environments, appeared to be that the lead academic entrepreneurs had no commercial 
experience and sought advice from the support structures within the HEI system 
whereas lead non-academic entrepreneurs had acquired diverse capabilities relating to 
several industry settings not solely related to life-science research and sought scientific 
knowledge.   
 
8.5.3 Location at Venture Credibility (Theme 4) 
Lead academic entrepreneurs located within the walls of an HEI reported a 
negative customer perception of their company and a negative perception from venture 
capitalists (Locket et al., 2003).  One academic entrepreneur reported a negative 
perception towards entrepreneurship from fellow members of academic staff as the 
incentive to move away from the sponsored environment of the HEI.  In general, by 
the venture credibility phase lead academic entrepreneurs had been asked to show 
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autonomy from the HEI by leaving the confines of the protected environment of the 
sponsoring HEI.  7KHPRYHZDVJHQHUDOO\µIRUFHG¶E\WKH+EI.  A voluntary shift was 
not recorded during this study.  However, bearing in mind that academic entrepreneurs 
rarely resigned from their academic positions, these entrepreneurs were able to 
subsequently buy R&D services and resources from their HEIs for their newly formed 
firms.  The entrepreneurs were acting as bridges between the world of academia and 
that of the R&D needs of their commercial firms in external sponsored environments.  
This observation revealed a functional diversity of roles played by many leading 
academic entrepreneurs which allowed them to take advantage of resources in both 
sponsored environments in parallel time (e.g. the external sponsored environment of 
the science park and the internal sponsored HEI environment).   
 
It was at the venture credibility phase that surrogate entrepreneurs, recruited at 
the entrepreneurial commitment phase as managerial members, became 
entrepreneurial ownership team members owning equity in their firms.  Surrogate 
entrepreneurs were an important source of commercial knowledge and skills 
confirming their importance in the entrepreneurial process (Franklin et al., 2001).  A 
new dimension was added.  Surrogate entrepreneurs took on different degrees of worth 
at different times in the dynamic entrepreneurial process.  An equity commitment 
cemented this direct network tie. 
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, reported that their need 
to be close to a life-science community which offered a physical infrastructure and 
supporting scientific services (e.g. biological waste-disposal) influenced their decision 
to move to a sponsored external environment.  In addition, on non-sponsored 
environments, where resource allocation was generally lower than that of a sponsored 
environment, lead entrepreneurs made progress through critical junctures relying on 
their own network of contacts (e.g. exploiting their own social capital) rather than 
relying on connections offered by outside mentors or business advisors.  Lead 
entrepreneurs acted as their own ambassadors without necessarily being directed or 
guided by non-equity team members.  Human capital alone was an insufficiently 
valuable resource to open doors to other resource providers in the form of tangible 
access to finance or intangible resources such as management and market experience.  
Shane and Stuart (2002) confirmed that social capital had an impact on fund-raising 
 261 
and that new venture founders with direct and indirect relationships with investors 
were more likely to receive funding.   
 
At the end of the study seven out of the nine firms had moved to, or had 
remained, on sponsored environments.  Only two of the nine firms chose non-
sponsored environments.  Company 8 remained on a non-sponsored site because they 
needed access to manufacturing rather than scientific facilities and the other because 
they did not transcend the entrepreneurial credibility phase to reach venture credibility.  
This firm returned to the opportunity identification phase and to small city centre 
office facilities (Company 9).   
 
8.6 A Synthesis of Key Research Findings and Interpretation  
The initial resource profiles of lead academic entrepreneurs and non-academic 
entrepreneurs were found to differ with regard to their entrepreneurship-specific 
human capital profiles which, in part, shaped the opportunity identification process.  
Lead academic entrepreneurs generally exhibited a product / process discovery focus, 
whilst lead non-academic entrepreneurs exhibited a more market led opportunity-
orientated focus.  In turn this influenced what kind of opportunity they identified 
(Table 8.4).  $FDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUVJHQHUDOO\ µGLVFRYHUHG¶RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRUZKLFK
there was a demand but no supply whereas non-academic entrepreneurs offered 
SURGXFWV IRU NQRZQ PDUNHWV DQG µUHFRJQLVHG¶ WKHLU RSSRrtunities (Sarasvathy et al., 
2003).  Lead academic entrepreneurs extended their basic HEI research into 
commercial realms and relied on their superior educational levels and biases towards 
technical knowledge (i.e. general human capital) to influence access and acquisition of 
business expertise and funding.  Their academic reputation overflowed into the 
industrial sector for which their ideas were relevant.  An example would be the dental 
device aimed at prevention of decay.  The device was of interest to the dental hygiene 
sector which saw the product as, at best, direct competition and, at worst, a threat to 
their own markets.  Data suggests that lead academic entrepreneurs with no 
commercial or prior business ownership experience leveraged their technica l 
capabilities to discover new products and / or processes.  Their resource profiles, in 
part ,  shaped the composit ion of  the entrepreneurial  ownership team.   
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Table 8.4: New Contributions 
Theme New contribution 
Theme 1 
Lead Entrepreneurs 
x Lead academic entrepreneurs are technology focused and lead 
non-academic entrepreneurs are focused on market needs 
x Lead academic entrepreneurs have access to more physical, 
people, financial and advisory resources 
x In the life-science sector specific scientific human capital and 
specific commercial human capital is a prerequisite to 
opportunity identification 
x Level of education is a significant factor in successfully 
attracting venture funding 
x Specific and general human capital have different value for the 
entrepreneurs at different junctures in the conceptual framework 
x There is a lack of experience amongst entrepreneurs and 
resource providers in Scotland to take a firm from conception to 
launch as a public company 
 
Theme 2 
Team Formation 
x Non-equity team members such as TTOs are vital because they 
guide entrepreneurs through the governmental funding process 
DQGDUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDQGFXVWRGLDQVRIWKH+(,¶VHTXLW\VWDNH
in the potential firm  
x Team are often formed prior to firm formation 
 
Theme 3 
Information Search; 
Opportunity 
Identification; 
Resource 
Accumulation; 
Firm Creation 
x There exists a vital pre-opportunity identification phase during 
which interaction between potential interested team members is 
conducted 
x The conference circuit frequented by academic entrepreneurs is 
a place:  
  To source information  
  To meet industrial players 
  To promote their companies 
x Funding from venture capitalists in Scotland for the life-science 
sector was not recorded during the study 
 
Theme 4 
External 
Environment 
x There is a bias from all entrepreneurs in favour of sponsored 
environments 
x There is a deficit of laboratory space in sponsored and non-
sponsored environments outside of the protected HEI 
environment for small firms 
x There occurred movement between environments during the 
course of the study which had not been recorded before.  Some 
moves were voluntary; some moves were imposed; some moves 
made to escape negative influences and attitudes of academics; 
some moves were deliberate 
x Lead academic entrepreneurs are able to manage their 
companies in sponsored environments external to the HEI and to 
manage research and development for their companies using the 
facilities within their sponsored HEIs 
x On non-sponsored environments, where access to resources was 
SRRU WKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶VRFial capital was more important than 
human capital for making contact with resources providers. 
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To avoid potential team conflict, academics with more diverse technical capabilities 
rather than individuals with more diverse managerial, entrepreneurial or prior business 
ownership skills were drawn into the entrepreneurial ownership teams hoEDúDUDQHW
al., 2003; Clarysse and Moray, 2004).  There appeared structural holes (Burt, 1972) 
between the academic research network and industry networks which may have 
constrained opportunity recognition (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  The technical and 
academic conference circuit as a potential platform for opportunity identification, 
networking and resource accumulation needs further investigation but was outside the 
remit of this research (Table 8.4).  Market, customer and financial issues, on the 
whole, were given insufficient attention by academic entrepreneurial ownership teams.  
Access to such specialist human capital was important at different times during the 
entrepreneurial process and not sourced within the confines of the HEI.  Normally 
surrogate entrepreneurs with prior exposure to the life science sector were recruited 
from networks of contacts known to resource providers within the HEI environment 
(i.e., TTOs).  It was observed that access to physical, social and financial resources 
was better within the confines of the HEI sponsored environment (Table 8.4).   
 
Lead non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, focused on current and 
potential market needs and their entrepreneurial ownership team were more likely to 
include individuals with managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities.  Moreover, lead 
non-academic entrepreneurs aware of resource barriers identified several network 
bridges to gain access to actors associated with financial resources, expertise and 
contacts.  In some instances, academics were encouraged to join the entrepreneurial 
ownership team in order to link product and process development to the specific needs 
of academic end-users.  In life sciences access to both general (relating to technical 
knowledge) and specific (relating to prior business experience) human capital was a 
prerequisite to opportunity identification (Table 8.4).   
 
As noted earlier, human capital (e.g. general and specific) has different 
significance and value at various phases before and after opportunity identification.  
Whilst lead entrepreneurs were searching for information, observations revealed that 
those with past managerial responsibility or past business ownership used greater 
numbers of information sources and were more intense in their networking with 
potential resource providers (e.g. lead non-academic entrepreneurs).  In three 
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identified cases the lead non-academic entrepreneurs exploited their specific human 
capital managerial capability to seek information and assistance in different ways.  
One exploited information from industrial players; another piggybacked a market 
survey of the life-science sector with firm formation; and yet another relocated his 
firm in order to network with an existing life-science biotechnology cluster.  
Interestingly, all three candidates had prior start-up experience and, therefore, brought 
with them proven entrepreneurial capabilities.  Their advantage rested in their ability 
to, not only source information independently of resource providers, but also to 
appreciate the value of the information and to exploit the information to their benefit.  
Lead academic entrepreneurs on sponsored environments, searched for less 
information because their opportunity centred on scientific discovery rather than 
information search.  They displayed a high technical capability and were less aware of 
the demands of, and access to, markets and market needs.  Several lead academic 
entrepreneurs were unsure about what product, or part of the product, or knowledge 
about the product, to offer to the market indicating a lack of initial information 
searching. 
 
From presented data, lead entrepreneurs spent considerable time, within their 
own original environments, discussing opportunities with colleagues, business 
partners and potential team members, prior to the identification of an opportunity.  
During this pre-opportunity identification process a team evolved (Table 8.4).  This 
pre-opportunity identification process has been understated in past research.  Within 
their respective external environments in which this pre-phase took place, whether in 
residential, HEI or business environments, an inventory of the stock of available 
resources was conducted and a general assessment of the feasibility of the opportunity 
tested.  The initial lead entrepreneur played a key role in providing required 
entrepreneurial capabilities for opportunity recognition (technical and / or commercial) 
and interacting within social networks to gain acceptance from and to add value to 
their opportunity.  Mentors or advisors were only sought after the intension to form a 
firm was discussed.  At pre-opportunity and during the process of opportunity 
identification these advisors literally became team members working on behalf of the 
lead entrepreneur to instigate progress in terms of legitimising the proposed firm or 
instigating funding rounds with governmental bodies.  The merging scientific human 
capital of the lead entrepreneurs and the specialist commercial human capital of the 
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advisors aided the process towards firm formation.  As the process progressed so the 
locus of entrepreneurial capabilities for value creation shifted from the initial lead 
entrepreneur to team members (Vohora et al., 2004).  However, the process was far 
from linear.  Data emerging from the qualitative interviews indicated that team 
members had to revisit prior phases to reassemble new or lost resources.  If, for 
instance, the team considered the identified opportunity as not viable, then they had to 
return to an information search pattern of behaviour and start again.  These re-visiting 
processes manifested themselves repeatedly at the firm formation phase.  The data 
revealed a number of reasons for these iterations (e.g. patents for potential products 
already existed; changes in team membership; industrial players made offers to buy 
licences to their knowledge; R&D experiments determined a change to the initial 
opportunity; financial backing failed to materialise; contract work was given priority 
over the development of the new opportunity).  The process was a constant looping 
backwards and forwards.  A standard linear process leading to firm formation did not 
emerge but, as observed by Druilhe and Garnsey (2004), this longitudinal study 
revealed that lead entrepreneurs experienced a dynamic entrepreneurial process.  
These observations have a significant effect on the original Conceptual Framework 
offered in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1).  Adjustments to the process and access to resources 
are now presented in Figure 8.1 which also summarises important contributions to 
theory building. 
 
From a human capital perspective, general human capital relating to scientific 
knowledge was fundamental in the identification of an idea in the laboratory.  
Specialist human capital relating to commercial issues allowed the potential of the 
idea to be tested for application in a commercial field.  To compensate for the lack of 
the latter, lead academic entrepreneurs were allowed access to mentors who 
supplemented their deficit in business acumen.  Non-academic entrepreneurs were less 
likely to generate IP and therefore generated ideas outside of a traditional laboratory 
setting.  These entrepreneurs, not surprisingly, relied on their past entrepreneurial or 
industrial experience and their knowledge built through network ties with equity 
financers, industrial partners, and potential customers (Mosey and Wright, 2007) or 
through the skills of other non-equity team members representing the business 
development sector.  As the manifestation of the identified opportunity strengthened  
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specific commercial human capital became less important and general human capital 
relating to levels of education became much more beneficial to the lead non-academic 
entrepreneurs (Davidsson and Honig, 2003).  The need for technical input became 
vital.  The complete contrary held true for academic entrepreneurs where their needed 
input was entrepreneurial.   
 
By the venture credibility phase non-equity team members were withdrawing 
support and became instrumental in motivating lead academic entrepreneurs to change 
WKHLUµRXWJURZQ¶HQYLURQPHQW (Table 8.4).  The withdrawal of TTO assistance was not 
due to conflict, as suggested by previous literature (Vanaelst et al., 2006), but as a 
measured and calculated strategy to withdraw support to enhance autonomy of their 
nurtured firms lead by academic entrepreneurs from their own institutions.  A number 
of changes in location were mapped and different reasons recorded.  The pull toward 
superior physical facilities offered on sponsored environments attracted non-academic 
entrepreneurs whilst academic entrepreneurs preferred to contract research for their 
companies back to their original HEIs where access to physical resources remains 
unmatched in any comparable sponsored environment external to the HEI (Table 8.4). 
 
8.7 Implications for Stakeholders 
The following sections consider the issues, events and processes for future 
reflection and potential implementation.   
 
8.7.1 Implications for Lead Entrepreneurs  
This study and previous literature suggests that firm success and survival 
benefits from a diversity of human capital.  Human capital necessities to identify, 
evaluate and exploit opportunities vary at different critical junctures in the 
entrepreneurial process.  Lead entrepreneurs, therefore, may want to work on their 
network of contacts to make themselves more open to potential members from diverse 
backgrounds.  Company 8 offered an example of an engineer (lead non-academic 
entrepreneur) and academics (team members) collaborating to create a miniaturised 
laboratory process.  The synergy of human capital in this case led to a prompt 
identification of an opportunity, a clear division of labour within the team, the 
establishment of a prototype, the beneficial exploitation of academic reputations to 
investors and promotion of the established company through the academic conference 
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circuit.  Research, however, tells us that academic entrepreneurs have a preference for 
recruiting like minded team members to reduce conflict.  Whilst recognising that 
human capital homogeneity exists at the opportunity identification phase, lead 
academic entrepreneurs would benefit from encapsulating team members whose 
human capital is complementary.  Lead non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other 
hand, would benefit from more open contact with HEIs relating to the use of facilities 
and access to business advice.  All non-academic entrepreneurs in this study did not 
have immediate access to laboratory facilities (e.g. a deficit in access to physical 
resources).  Company 8, lead by a non-academic entrepreneur, located the company in 
an HEI at the invitation and agreement of his academic team members and permission 
from the HEI.  Not only did this allow access to laboratory facilities but also allowed 
time to study the laboratory process to be miniaturised.  All lead entrepreneurs 
exposed to operating in sponsored and non-sponsored environments outside of the HEI 
environment reported a distinct lack of small laboratory space for new firms.  Future 
resource allocation needs to be considered by policy makers for the provision of such 
space.  HEIs may consider how they utilise their redundant laboratory space by 
considering leasing arrangements with non-academic entrepreneurs.   
 
8.7.2 Implications for the HEI 
The recent RYHU HPSKDVLV RQ ³WHFKQRORJ\ SXVK´ E\ +(,V QHHGV WR EH
monitored and routines within HEI institutions balanced between academic and 
market outputs and requirements.  Future commercialisation roles of HEI should be 
scrutinised (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).  Academic entrepreneurs associated with life 
sciences in particular may benefit from exposure to support routines that integrate 
internal HEI resources and external non-HEI resources for the exploitation of their 
identified commercial opportunities.  One preliminary possible network bridge may be 
offered through training.  Commercial training already exists within one HEI in 
Scotland.  The Enterprise Fellowship Scheme offers training to life-science scientists 
who are considering commercialisation.  Run in partnership with Scottish Enterprise 
(SE) and The Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE), the Enterprise Fellowships Scheme 
provides academic entrepreneurs committed to creating a firm with a year's salary, 
business training, development fund and access to networks of mentors, experts and 
advisors. It is now in its 10th year.  Two team members from Companies 2 and 5 had 
FRPSOHWHGWKLVVFKHPHDQGUHSRUWHGRQLWVEHQHILWVIRUµVWDUWLQJDFRPSDQ\¶)XUWKHU
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benefits from the course are difficult to gauge but would appear to mainly target µstart 
up.¶  The Enterprise Fellowship Scheme may provide a platform to provide greater 
exposure to actors from industry and the investment sector.   
 
More personal interaction with people with market knowledge may lead to an 
increased identification of new opportunities.  Academic researchers networking and 
interacting with industry players has been associated in the past with firm formation.  
Evidence of this was exposed when academic entrepreneurs reported meeting 
industrial representatives during the conference circuit where new knowledge was 
sourced relating to customer and market mechanisms.  Industrial practitioners were 
also able to gauge research portfolios from HEIs.  Information search exploiting the 
conference circuit may be a topic for future investigation.  This implies that new 
knowledge creation is not just dependent on the technology driven opportunity but 
also influenced by key industrial players in related areas.  Industrial players were 
perceived in this study to be the providers of funding for HEI research, as potential 
competitors to HEI created commercial knowledge or potential customers.  This was 
particularly true for lead academic entrepreneurs in the dental and medical device 
market.  Questions for future research might centre on µKRZ¶DQGµZK\¶OHDGDFDGHPLF
entrepreneurs source information and make network ties with actors from conference 
circuits.  
 
Policy-makers would do well to take measure of the importance of the student 
population within the HEIs.  On several occasions lead entrepreneurs paid tribute to 
the student population as being a source of specifically trained, potential employees 
but they could also stimulate the identification and development of opportunities for 
commercialisation.  Targeting students may increase the supply of potential 
entrepreneurs.  Following from this are the educational implications and 
considerations to be given to entrepreneurial specific education for the HEIs, the 
students and the TTOs.  Informal structures could be implemented to introduce 
DFDGHPLF VWDII DQG VWXGHQWV WR SUDFWLVLQJ DFDGHPLF HQWUHSUHQHXUV ZKHUH LQGLYLGXDOV¶
motivations and incentives could be discussed at networking events.  Networking 
events, hosted by a governmental body (e.g. Connect), were appreciated amongst the 
lead entrepreneurs interviewed for this study, especially at the early stages of the 
process.   
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Encouraging lead entrepreneurs to change their resource configurations as the 
opportunity identification process progresses could be done in several ways such as 
establishing cross-disciplinary entrepreneurial teams e.g. combining commercial 
(business schools) and technological (science faculties) with industrial competencies; 
co-operation with industry; promoting training for lead academic entrepreneurs and 
encouraging a cross mobility between industry and the HEI.  However, a question 
remains.  Should business school knowledge be taken to the scientists or the scientists 
taken to the business school?  Having a greater non-academic input could expose 
potential led academic entrepreneurs to the nuances of the commercial world outside 
of the protected environment of the HEI.  This study also revealed a beneficial 
relationship between Company 5 and a large chemical company which provided two 
experienced managers to sit on their board.  Their technical knowledge about the 
biological and engineering components behind the product, knowledge and experience 
of the market place and their known contacts within the sector proved invaluable to 
the lead academic entrepreneur.  This relationship widened his access to information, 
potential customers, raised the profile of his company prompting good publicity from 
the media and strengthening applications to funders.  Demonstrating the ability to 
attract well known qualified board members indicated to funders a strengthening of 
WKH FRPSDQ\¶V FRPPHUFLDO VSHFLILF KXPDQ FDSLWDO  The ability of experienced lead 
entrepreneurs to help build external networks indicates a future potential method of 
bridging structural holes between academia and industry.  However, critical attention 
needs to be given to the contentious issue of the commercialisation of research which 
has been funded from the public purse.  This study prompted questions about the 
ethics of the commercialisation of HEI created knowledge.   
 
The HEI sponsored environment was particularly valuable to lead academic 
entrepreneurs at opportunity identification because of the access to both commercial 
advice and specialised laboratory equipment and scientific personnel and a scientific 
infrastructure.  Non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, were attracted to 
sponsored environments and would have benefitted from earlier access to the R&D 
facilities within HEIs.  In this study, all non-academic entrepreneurs conducting R&D 
had to dedicate financial resources to refurbish laboratory space when they moved 
from non-sponsored to sponsored environments.  A theme for future consideration 
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might investigate greater cooperation between non-academic entrepreneurs and access 
to R&D facilities within HEIs.   
 
8.7.3 Implications for TTOs and Business Advisors 
There is scope for information providers (e.g. TTOs and business advisory 
agencies) to increase access to new information and networks from which 
informational advantages accrue.  Organisational capabilities are required of the 
information providers to increase resources such as entrepreneurial competence and 
market knowledge and to widen their links to providers of venture capital funding and 
specialists from the life-science sector (e.g. surrogate entrepreneurs, advisors, 
industrial players, governmental regulatory bodies).  This study, for example, revealed 
that those lead entrepreneurs in the medical and dental devices sector had to go to 
London to access venture capital (Table 8.4).  The investment sector in Scotland did 
not support such applications.  Both Companies 3 and 4 had recruited surrogate 
entrepreneurs whose experience may have been attained in regions of the UK where 
the life-science sector is in maturity.  TTOs could pro-actively encourage more 
DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVWRXWLOL]HWKHVNLOOVDQGNQRZOHGJHRIµVXUURJDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶
who are not seeking (from the outset) an equity stake in supported entrepreneurial 
ownership teams hoEDúDUDQHWDO9DQDHOVWHWDO.  TTOs and sponsored 
business development agencies need to widen their networks to identify appropriately 
H[SHULHQFHG µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ (Lockett and Wright, 2003)  µ6XUURJDWH
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶LQWKHOLIH-science sector are at a premium in Scotland and because of 
WKHLU UDULW\ D VFKHPH RI LPSOHPHQWLQJ D SHULSDWHWLF µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶
VFKHPH PLJKW EH LQYHVWLJDWHG  µ6XUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ ZHUH DWWUDFWHG to new 
ventures in Scotland having nurtured other life-science companies and could benefit 
QHZ FRPSDQLHV EHFDXVH WKHLU VSHFLDOLW\ LV LQ WKH µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ RI QHZ FRPSDQLHV
Three of the five companies led by academic entrepreneurs in this study reported the 
benefits of exploiting the specific human capital and social capital resources of 
surrogate entrepreneurs in terms of prior knowledge of and access to customers or 
investment sources.   
 
There is also a need to encourage learning and deliver training to the TTO and 
business development agency staff to deal with the dialectic setting of academia and 
industry (Lockett and Wright, 2005).  Lead academic entrepreneurs in particular 
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recognised the limitations of TTOs experience.  In the case of Company 3 it was 
recognised that no TTO had had the experience taking a firm public.  One option 
would be to invite relevant stakeholders from mature life-science clusters to impart 
their knowledge to other clusters that are not so well developed.  Another possible 
strategy could be to introduce industrial practitioners to academics early in the 
research process and to introduce academics to practitioners who are further down the 
line.  Advisors such as TTOs may also have a role in encouraging more academic 
entrepreneurs to consider from the outset the markets for their new products and 
services.  In this regard, practitioners advising lead entrepreneurs need skills not just in 
intellectual property protection, accessing governmental awards and financial 
feasibility but also in understanding how the diversity of human capital within a team 
impacts on the entrepreneurial process at different phases of that process.  In addition, 
information and networking activities, sponsored by practitioners, could encourage 
more academic entrepreneurs to address barriers to opportunity identification.  Lead 
non-academic entrepreneurs, on the other hand, would benefit from additional 
initiatives that encourage potential co-operation with academics.  The experience of 
engineers and academics coming together to form Company 8 is a flagship for all 
practitioners in terms of the successful merging of commercial human capital and 
technological human capital.  Non-academic entrepreneurs would also benefit from 
customers highlighting their needs to entrepreneurial ownership teams who can 
provide the required technical solutions.  Evidence from this research indicates that 
there is an influential learning cycle occurring when academic entrepreneurs network 
with industrial players (Companies 3 and 5) and that non-academic entrepreneurs 
benefit from the technical knowledge of academics (Company8).   
 
8.8 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study 
In addition to the recent proliferation in entrepreneurship research addressing 
opportunity identification (Shane, 2000; Sarasvathy et al., 2003), the influences of 
learning (Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Corbett, 2007) and human and social capital 
(Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Dimov and Shephard, 2005; Mosey and Wright, 2007) 
the observable changes in the dynamic external environment, UHFRUGHGLQµUHDOWLPH¶, 
may be considered as another component to the entrepreneurial process.  Conclusions 
must, however, be seen in the light of the particular context of the research and from 
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the view point of those being studied (e.g. the lead academic and non-academic 
entrepreneurs), the sector in which they operated (e.g. life-science) and the external 
environment in which they conducted the process (e.g. sponsored and non-sponsored 
environments).  The following sections highlight the strengths and weaknesses 
associated with the early boundary activities influencing definitions and 
conceptualisations.   
 
In this study, the entrepreneurial process was defined as one which involved all 
functions, activities and actions associated with the identification of an opportunity 
and the creation of an organisation thereafter to pursue it (Bruyat and Julien, 2001).  
Opportunity identification was defined as the result of a collection of personal, social, 
cultural, financial and technological resources, which merged leading to the perception 
of a possible product / process and a potential market (Fletcher, 2006).  Opportunities 
were created imaginatively by combining individual experiences and subjective 
understanding.  The relevance of human and social capital in understanding this 
process moved personal resources, such as education, prior business ownership and 
network ties, towards becoming organisation resources (e.g. a combining of these 
resources to create capabilities and add value to the process) (Druihle and Garnsey, 
2001).  Centring on these working definitions, this study set boundaries around the 
industrial sector to be studied, the types of entrepreneurs under investigation and the 
environments in which they operated.   
 
First, the investigation of the life-science sector encompassed all researchers 
and / or firms in the field of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, biomedical technologies, 
medical devices, food processing, environmental and biomedical devices (Smith, 
2004) and was chosen because it has been identified as growth industrial sector for a 
peripheral economy in Europe (i.e., Scotland) (Scottish Enterprise, 1994, 1996).  
Firms were involved in some form of R&D and suppliers of life-science equipment 
and service organisations eliminated.  In addition, since the external conditions were 
considered to be similar over all cases the numbers needed to be explored were 
deemed fewer.  However, future studies need to be more specific about which sector in 
life-science is being studied.  This would allow for a multi-resource examination of a 
narrower section of the literature (e.g. that associated with the research and 
development of medical or dental devices; ventures involved in DNA separation).  
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Further studies examining the impact of the phase of firm formation and resources 
accumulation for opportunity identification in these specific sectors of life-science are 
undoubtedly specialised and required.   
 
Second, my definition of the lead academic entrepreneur as an academic or 
researcher whose occupation, prior to playing a leading role in an enterprise start-up, 
and possibly concurrent with that process, is or was that of an academic, clinician or 
researcher, affiliated with an HEI (Samson and Gurdon, 1993) guaranteed a 
consistency in choice of lead entrepreneurs, who were the main unit of analysis.  The 
non-academic entrepreneur was defined as a person who was previously employed in 
the same industry sector and who identified opportunities in the life science sector.  
Third, the definition adopted for this study required team members to have jointly 
established the firm with the lead entrepreneur; to have a financial interest in the firm 
and direct influence on strategic choice in the firm (Ensley et al., 1990).  During this 
study, non-equity members such as TTOs were also considered members because of 
their importance to the process but only for a limited time.  The original definition 
should have made provision for the role of team members who are motivated not 
because of holding an equity stake but because their employers dictate that it is part of 
their job to support potential firms and to care take the HEI¶s stake in the business.   
 
Fourth, the emphasis on events and behaviour leading to opportunity 
identification lent itself to a process theory approach where explanation for change 
was based on information from the lead entrepreneurs and team members.  Change, 
including change in team membership, change in external environment, change in the 
opportunity identification process and changes in what product to offer the market 
unfolded as narratives were elicited from participants in the cases about the 
perceptions of events leading to opportunity identification.  Process theory 
encompasses behaviours and events where time ordering is critical to addressing 
µZK\¶µKRZ¶µZKHUH¶DQGµZKHQ¶questions.  Three complementary theories enhanced 
the study of the opportunity identification process.  The human capital perspective 
linked past relevant experiences of lead entrepreneurs, such as prior business 
ownership to their opportunity identification behaviour (i.e. a process).  Social capital 
theory determined that certain networks of relationships were valuable resources for 
conducting the entrepreneurial process (i.e. a condition) and lastly the RBV 
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SHUVSHFWLYHUHODWHG WKHHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶DELOLW\ WRGUDZRQand combine new resources 
leading to firm formation (i.e. an event).  In this light, the entrepreneur was seen as an 
evolving entity balancing existing internal and external resources and developing new 
ones.   
 
In this study the individual academic and non-academic entrepreneur 
encompassed the central unit of analysis because prior to firm formation and during 
the opportunity identification process, they were the main and sometimes the only 
resource.  Opportunities identified by lead academic entrepreneurs with sophisticated 
technical knowledge and with technology driven competitive advantage, suffered from 
a lack of complementary commercial capabilities and had to source these either 
through team members or from the external environment (Colombo and Grilli, 2005).  
During the course of the research, team members associated with the lead entrepreneur 
were interviewed to elicit additional views about the opportunity identification process 
(i.e., as in respondent triangulation).  The constraint of only collecting data from 9 
cases is recognised but since the study relied on theoretical sampling, each type of 
entrepreneur and type of environment was covered as illustrated in the developed 
typology (Figure 4.3).  However, based on the classification of the other firms 
identified during the initial email survey, results could be generalised to the 28 valid 
respondents identified as being close to the opportunity identification phase (Figure 
4.12).  Capturing further data on opportunity identification from these firms would 
have to be conducted retrospectively because it may be assumed that they have 
µchanged¶ since the time of the email survey.  In this study, the data was collected 
from personal interviews but a weakness of such an approach, when dealing with 
events in retrospect, is that people are open to bias, hindsight, rationalisations and 
memory flaws.  In future, interviews should be sought prior to the intention or 
consideration of entrepreneurial action.  This is perhaps feasible for the potential 
academic entrepreneur who is more easily identifiable than the non-academic 
entrepreneur.   
 
In addition, the research encompassed three critical junctures in the 
entrepreneurial process (e.g. opportunity identification, entrepreneurial commitment 
and venture credibility) (Vohora et al., 2004) even although the intention was to study 
entrepreneurs at opportunity identification.  This came about because the division 
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between the junctures and growth phases overlapped and progress from one to the 
other was not linear or in one direction.  Original identified opportunities were found 
to change or evolve over real time and the opportunity identification phase was 
persistently revisited.  Often this occurred when new market knowledge was 
uncovered.  It is speculated that if the entrepreneurs were interviewed again it is 
unlikely that their original plan, product or process would remain unchanged.  One 
outstanding issue for the lead entrepreneurs in the life-science sector which remained 
UHOHYDQW WKURXJKRXW WKH UHVHDUFK ZDV µZKDW¶ WKH\ VKRXOG FRPPHUFLDOLVH HJ D
completed product, a process, a prototype or a licence to their knowledge).  The lead 
entrepreneurs fluctuated between opportunity identification, evaluation and early stage 
exploitation because they were researching and developing a product or process which 
was not separate but part of the entrepreneurial process.  In addition, the investors 
financing R&D lacked access to managers with appropriate human capital to care-take 
certification and regulatory protocol (e.g. for medical devices).  This limitation may 
DOVR EH VHHQ DV DQ RSHQLQJ WR UHWXUQ WR LQGLYLGXDO µVXUURJDWH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ RU
implanted CEOs to research µKRZ¶ WKH\ VXSSRUW WKHLU ODWHVW YHQWXUH WR H[plore past 
records and to conduct human and social capital comparisons amongst these special 
and important µSULYLOHJHG ZLWQHVVHV¶ 9DQHDOVW HW DO   The experience of 
venture capital managerial expertise in Company 4, with networks of contacts to assist 
the lead academic entrepreneurs to participate in a domain in which the latter lacked 
autonomous expertise, proved to be futile and contrary to benefits presented in past 
research (Colombo and Grill, 2005).   
 
The omission to quantify financial related assistance may also be considered a 
weakness of this study.  In at least two cases, lead academic entrepreneurs were 
awarded substantial financial resources due in part to their academic excellence and 
reputation.  As indicated in the propositions, those with greater educational human 
capital and academic achievement were in a better position to acquire funds.  
However, there is a human capital factor to further explore when it comes to managing 
funding.  It would appear that, at these early stages, the lead entrepreneur who 
recruited people with relevant experience (e.g. surrogate entrepreneurs) were better 
equipped to use and manage funding appropriately and according to the requirements 
of the investors.  Further research exploring the importance of human capital in the 
management of financial capital warrants investigation.  This study offered an 
 277 
example of a major investor withdrawing support after agreed milestones in R&D 
failed to materialise.   
 
The reluctance of the investment sector in Scotland to provide funds to some 
entrepreneurs in this study is also worthy of further examination.  Where had the 
surrogate entrepreneurs in this study extrapolated experience and with what investors?  
As already stated the life science sector in Scotland is some 10 years behind that of the 
USA (Forbes and Low, 2004) and there will be by definition fewer surrogates with 
relevant experience.  The research did not measure progress or success in any 
quantifiable manner because the lead entrepreneurs and their firms were close to 
opportunity identification.  Initial funding was awarded through a government grant 
scheme and open to public scrutiny but this changed when presenting proposals to 
venture capitalists or business angels.  Outcomes depended on the social networks and 
specific commercial human capital attributes embedded in surrogate entrepreneurs 
who had prior investor contact. 
 
8.9 Recommendations for Future Research 
In this study sourcing surrogate entrepreneurs was a process conducted in 
conjunction with or exclusively by the business development agencies.  It was noted 
however, that recommendations were only made to lead academic entrepreneurs and 
non-academic entrepreneurs did not appear to be eligible for such offers.  Future 
research might study how it could be possible to link non-academic entrepreneurs, 
who may come from a predominantly scientific industrial background, to surrogate 
entrepreneurs.  Some non-academic entrepreneurs displayed as little business acumen 
as lead academic entrepreneurs but were respected scientists in their own right (e.g. 
scientists creating cell-lines).  Future studies should therefore focus on the differences 
between social capital and the role of surrogate entrepreneurs and relate this to their 
human capital derived from their past commercial experiences at different phases of 
the opportunity identification process to add to the debate about demand side issues.  
Such a study may reveal why non-academic entrepreneurs are excluded from 
surrogates networks. 
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Wealth creation multipliers associated with opportunities identified and 
pursued in the four conceptualized environmental contexts could be explored in the 
future and quantified.  Additional research is warranted to look at whether particular 
contexts are associated with higher levels of research productivity (Siegel et al., 2003) 
relating to the HEI and industry commercialisation process and the cost effectiveness 
of the opportunity identification process needs also to be monitored with reference to 
the four conceptualized contexts.  The time dimension relating to the entrepreneurial 
process is also attracting attention (Jones and Coviello, 2005) and linkages between 
access to resources and the speed of the entrepreneurial process measured.   
 
Recommendations made by other studies about entrepreneurs committing 
100% to their new start-ups are considered unappreciative of, and inappropriate for, 
the clinical, academic, advisory and administrative work of the academic 
entrepreneurs leading firms in this investigation.  Clinicians, for example, who were 
the lead academic entrepreneurs of such companies, did not and could not resign from 
their medical / dental jobs.  In their firms there was also a recognised lack of access to 
information and knowledge about the regulatory field specific to the testing of new 
medical devices which the clinicians and investors were not fully conversant with.  
Additionally, these firms required a much larger and higher initial investment.  
Cognisance of these differences and difficulties warrants examination.   
 
Another avenue for exploration is the comparison of benefits of experiential 
learning from within HEI environments where there has traditionally been a culture of 
support through TTOs, other academics and cross departmental co-operation, to 
external environments where no resource support for commercialisation was offered 
e.g. within a hospital trust.  It is difficult to imagine that the NHS can become 
involved in investing cash into product development and difficult to imagine how the 
NHS could negotiate effectively with interested HEIs as equal potential partners in 
medical research.  The introduction of commercialisation into traditionally non-
commercial environments may have negative consequences on science and the 
scientific discovery system.  Some studies have aired concern about the effect on 
culture and the use of public funding and facilities (Klöfsten and Jones-Evans 1999).  
Further investigation into the relationship between the non-commercial institutions, 
from which ideas and opportunities evolve, the lead entrepreneur, industry and their 
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industrial counterpart (see Siegel et al., 2007) may reveal uneven power relationships 
relative to commercial gain and academic recognition.  The dialectic relationship 
between academic and industrial culture could be given more attention if policy-
makers continue to support the commercialisation of HEI knowledge and if the culture 
of the entrepreneurial HEI continues (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).   
 
The use of a process-based study allowed a rich investigation of the reasons 
behind events and did not predetermine answers by offering a list of options.  In 
addition, this study observed changes over time and sought reasons for changes over 
time (e.g. changes to the external environment).  However, the use of theoretical 
sampling did not allow for generalisation of a statistical nature to be made across a 
predefined population.  The sample was a diverse array of life-science projects located 
within a recognised life-science triangle between Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee 
which was controlled by a national policy towards commercial activities in the sector.  
It provides, however, a useful foundation upon which the understanding of opportunity 
identification in the life-science sector is based and may be further advanced.  National 
and regional variations may influence how opportunities in the life-science sector are 
identified.  Notwithstanding, this study could be replicated in other countries.  
Extending it to the USA, for example, where the concept of sponsored environments 
and the commercialisation of HEI knowledge originated, may reveal influences from 
differences in culture, attitude towards entrepreneurship, policies and resources found 
in the external environment.   
 
In addition, there exists a fruitful opportunity for an investigation of human 
and social capital using a quantitative approach.  If, for example, human capital was 
categorised (e.g. entrepreneurial experience, prior business ownership, prior business 
formation, parental entrepreneurial influence, managerial experience etc.) additional 
knowledge could be garnered about the affect of human capital on opportunity 
identification within the four contexts (Colombo and Grilli, 2005).  Positive 
relationships could be measured between educational levels and opportunity 
identification, and educational achievement and access to and success in gaining 
venture funding.  Research question 9 could also be addressed quantitatively to 
LQYHVWLJDWH LI VSRQVRUHG HQYLURQPHQWV KDYH DQ LPSDFW RQ HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DFFHVV WR
resources.  Using a larger sample we would be able to measure access to and quantify 
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resources such as financial, physical, technical, marketing and business skills, people 
and social capital.  However, this was beyond the scope of this study because I used a 
phenomenological paradigm and theoretical sampling which led to the formation of 
propositions.   
 
8.10 Summary 
This study introduced a novel typology differentiating entrepreneurs and 
conceptualising different external environments.  Similar information did not exist 
prior to the electronic survey conducted to collect resource profiles of individual types 
of entrepreneur (e.g. academic or non-academic) and individual types of external 
environment (e.g. sponsored or non-sponsored) within the life-science sector in 
Scotland.  All participating entrepreneurs were close to opportunity identification and 
had not started trading.  The novel typology created to capture differences was 
extended to map the location changes recorded during the longitudinal study.  Change 
RFFXUUHGEHFDXVHVRPHPRYHVZHUHµIRUFHG¶HJthe push imposed by the rules of the 
HEI).  Some moves ZHUHµYROXQWDU\¶HJpulled towards resources).  At other times 
change was a reaction against negative influences from fellow academics to the 
commercialisation of HEI knowledge (i.e. voluntary) and some were deliberately 
planned and focused.  Some moves were µGHVLUHG¶EXWQRWHDVLO\DWWDLQDEOHas was the 
case with non-academics seeking sponsored environments (e.g. pulled toward 
resources).  Moves between non-sponsored environments were always seen as stop-
JDS RU µWHPSRUDU\¶ FKDQJHV )LJXUH 7.6).  Resistance to commercialising HEI 
knowledge from fellow academics is perhaps a reflection on a negative attitude 
towards entrepreneurship in Scotland which is less than other regions in the UK 
(Scottish Enterprise, 1994, 1996).  Mosey et al., (2006) has already claimed that 
unexploited structural holes exist not only between networks external to HEIs (Hoang 
and Antoncic, 2003) but between many academic and this has a negative impact on the 
university commercialisation process.   
 
Another significant contribution of this study is its reliance on a paradigm 
which gave the entrepreneurs and team members a voice to answer questions 
grounded in the literature about opportunity identification which has not been fully 
explored.  The dominant paradigm in entrepreneurship is positivistic (Gartner and 
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Birley, 2002) but this study adopted a phenomenological outlook searching for reasons 
behind actions and behaviours.  Opportunity identification was found to be pre-empted 
by a pre-opportunity phase whereby interested potential team members discussed and 
planned potential cooperation with the lead entrepreneur.  Although recorded as a 
research phase in prior literature (Vohora et al., 2004) this pre-opportunity 
identification phase was used to enhance firm formation possibilities, through social 
networking more than to enhance research and development of the potential product or 
process.   
 
Insights about specific and general human capital indicated significant 
differences in value at different times during the iterative opportunity identification 
processes.  Academic entrepreneurs exhibited an initial over reliance on general 
human capital, centred on their technological knowledge, at the opportunity 
identification phase prior to a realization that actors with specific human commercial 
capital were a requisite factor in the substantiation of their perceived idea.  Non-
academic entrepreneurs generally exhibited the contrary and began the process with 
strong specific human capital related to business experience which they had to support 
by searching for actors with general human capital relating to scientific knowledge.   
 
Social networking was found to be more dominant in lead academic and non-
academic entrepreneurs located on non-sponsored environments which indicated an 
exploitation of social capital and a broader social network (Mosey and Wright, 2007), 
RU DQ HOHYDWHG µVRFLDO FRQGLWLRQ¶ $QGHUVRQ HW DO .  This was based on prior 
business ownership and past network ties rather than an advantageous component of 
their human capital, a finding recently substantiated in research focusing specifically 
on the significance of social capital (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  Academic 
entrepreneurs on sponsored environments encountered structural holes between their 
scientific network and access to a commercial advisory network which constrained the 
opportunity identification process.  Regardless of whether the entrepreneur was 
academic or non-academic, prior business ownership was essential to learn about 
contact, establish relationships and become known to potential equity providers.  
Academic reputation and level of education influenced equity providers¶ decisions to 
support academic entrepreneurs with no prior business ownership experience.  No 
similar evaluation of non-academics¶ human capital was observed even although some 
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non-academic entrepreneurs were scientists.  This leads me to believe that it was 
reputation rather than educational attainment which influenced equity providers.   
 
In addition, the value of the resources provided through social network actors 
(like TTOs) was restricted to certain critical junctures.  Resources associated with start 
up (e.g. access to advisory services related to funding and legal issues) were important 
at opportunity identification and entrepreneurial commitment phases but thereafter 
entrepreneurs were guided to new sources of direction from other resources providers 
(e.g. surrogate entrepreneurs and business development agencies).  There was 
deterioration in some social capital (Lester et al., 2008) and that, not unlike human 
capital, social capital had a different value at different critical junctures.  
Consequently, the study enhanced understanding about the influence of not only 
human capital but the centrality of social capital to seeking and leveraging resources.   
 
On the basis of the findings further understanding of differences between lead 
academic and non-academic entrepreneurs has been made in terms of their access to 
resources and how this is influenced by human and social capital inputs and their 
access to supportive or sponsored external environments.  Several recommendations 
have been presented to both practitioners and a number of policy recommendations 
implied.  Whilst the information induced from the data did not quantify financial 
assistance, access to private investors was highlighted as being more difficult for the 
non-DFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXU+RZHYHUVXJJHVWLRQVDERXWµVRIW¶VXpport issues such as 
the provision of laboratory space and access to business advice were questioned.  
Based in the identified needs of lead entrepreneurs and the observation about the life-
science cluster in Scotland being in its infancy, recommendations about training for 
TTOs and business advisors were presented as was a heightened contact with 
surrogate entrepreneurs.  The study has offered points in an agenda for future research 
in the area. 
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Appendix 1:  The Literature behind the questions (Opportunity Identification) 
Question and prompts Theme Source 
OPPORTUNITY RECOGNITION   
1. What factors influenced the 
identification and selection of the 
commercial idea (opportunity) behind 
the spinout firm? 
Absorptive capacity determined 
E\ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU WHDP¶V
ability to exploit opportunities. 
Levinthal, 1996. 
People involvement The entrepreneur as the primary 
resource. 
Venkataraman, 1997 
³0DUNHW3XOO´ Entrepreneurial process Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001 
³5HVHDUFKSXVK´ Entrepreneurial process Shane, 2000 
IP capabilities University spinouts Druilhe and Garnsey, 
2001 
2.  What factors influenced the 
decision to form the spinout? 
Influence of Human Capital on 
opportunity recognition e.g. the 
ability to frame an idea and have 
potential market and customer 
knowledge. 
Bower, 2000 
What triggered the idea of founding 
the firm? 
Resources Nicolaou and Birley, 
2003a&b 
Who triggered the idea of founding the 
firm? 
Resource base importance Birley, 2002 
Did that person commercialise it?   
Why did they commercialise it?   
Who commercialised it? Why encourage 
commercialisation? 
Different routes to 
commercialisation.  Spinout 
development. 
Etkowitz, et al., 2000; 
Oatley, 1998. 
Franklin et al., 2001; 
Debackere, 2000; 
Davenport et al., 2002; 
Scottish Enterprise, 1996; 
Salzar and Georghiou, 
2002; Shane, 2002. 
Licensing versus Spinout.  Bower, 2002a&b; Bray 
and Lee 2000. 
Funding  Carlsson, 2002; Baum, 
2004; Lambert Review, 
2003. 
Technology transfer office  Carlsson, 2002; 
Digregorio and Shane, 
2003; Phillmore, 1999; 
Siegel et al., 2002; 
Vedovello, 1997; Jones 
Evans et al 1999 
University commercialisation policies  Lockett et al., 2003 
Business plan development  Gatewood et al., 1995 
3. What factors (people or events) 
hindered the decision to form the 
spinout firm? 
Over optimism Storey, 1997 
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4. What challenges were faced when 
forming the university spinout firm? 
Resource restrictions, resource 
deficiencies, barriers, surrogate 
entrepreneurship. 
Shane and Stuart, 2002; 
Brush et al., 2001; West 
and De Castro, 2001; 
Aldrich and Foil, 1994; 
Franklin et al., 2001. 
5. What influence did the parent 
company have in the process of 
forming the spinout firm and 
commercialising the idea? 
Resource accumulation. 
 
Resource accumulation. 
Capital  
 
Barney, 1986; Teece et 
al., 1994. 
Grant, 1991. 
Barney, 1991. 
Appendix 2: The literature behind the questions (Team Formation) 
Question and prompts Theme Source 
TEAM FORMATION   
6.  What people assisted in the 
formation of the spinout firm? 
Entry and exit of members of 
entrepreneurial; founder teams 
Ensley et al., 1999; 
Clarysse and Moray, 
2004; Gartner, et al., 
1994; Kamm et al., 1990; 
hoEDúDUDQ HW DO 
De Groof, 2002; 
Esienhardt et al., 1990; 
Roberts, 1991; Roure and 
Maidique, 1986. 
Where did they come from? Social networks Mustar, 1997 
How did you know them? Networks and social networks 
confer organisational credibility 
Johannison et al., 1998; 
Granovetter, 1973;1985 
What experience did they bring? Team survival. 
 
Sales growth. 
 
Previous experience of team 
members is a determinant of 
performance. 
Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002. 
Chandler and Lyon, 
2001. 
Chandler and Hanks, 
1991. 
What did they offer the firm?  The development of a team may 
be a resource. 
May offer marketing knowledge 
for the newly formed firm. 
Teams provide venture with 
access to finance, social and 
human capital because of 
diversity of membership. 
Roles within the team. 
 
 
Previous experience of team 
members is a determinant of 
performance. 
Resource accumulation and 
Kamm and Nurick, 1993. 
 
Grandi and Grimaldi, 
2003. 
Kor and Mahoney, 2000. 
 
 
 
Rogers et al., 2001;  
Carayannis et al., 1998. 
 
Chandler and Hanks, 
1991. 
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human capital  
Davidsson and Honig, 
2003. 
Were they equity holders? There are poor definitions of 
team membership. 
 
 
 
Role of non-equity holders. 
Definitions of entrepreneurial 
teams around ownership and 
control. 
A diversity of experience and 
heterogeneity in general human 
capital between team members 
fills competencies. 
Cooper and Daily, 1997; 
Ensley et al., 1999; 
hoEDúDUDQHWDO 
Cooney, 2005. 
 
Watson et al., 1995.  
Eisenhardt and 
Scoonhoven, 1990. 
 
Cooper and Daily, 1997. 
7.  What factors influenced the access 
to people to assist in the formation of 
the (university) spinout firm. 
  
8.  What factors in your past 
work/education/training experience 
have influenced your ability to assist 
in the formation of a spinout firm? 
Human capital benefits from 
having superior education. 
Ability to exploit opportunities. 
Knowledge about the sector and 
management lead to better 
predictive powers to more 
accurately predict the nature of 
the commercial potential of 
change in the environment. 
Resource accumulation and 
human capital. 
Becker, 1993. 
 
 
 
Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000. 
 
 
 
Davidson and Honig, 
2003. 
9.  What factors influenced the 
changing composition of the people in 
the firm (e.g. (entry) recruitment or 
(exit) dismissal of the people who 
assisted in the formation of the spinout 
firm? 
Changing composition of 
entrepreneurial ownership teams. 
Changing needs of the firm e.g. 
writing proposals, business 
plans, negotiating skills. 
Managerial competence. 
Need for a professional team in 
business and technical elements. 
hoEDúDUDQHWDO 
 
 
Mason and Harrison, 
2002. 
Storey and Tether, 1998. 
Roure and Keeley, 1990; 
Cyr et al., 2000. 
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Appendix 3: The literature behind the questions (External Environment) 
Question and prompts Theme Source 
THE EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
  
10. What factors influenced the 
decision to establish the spinout in this 
environment? 
Geographical proximity between 
biotechnology and universities. 
 
List of characteristics for a 
supportive incubator. 
Gibbons and Johnston, 
1993; Crosa et al., 2002. 
 
Etzkowitz et al., 2000; 
Meyer, 2003 
 
11. When did the move occur?   
12.  What challenges were faced when 
moving from the parent organisation 
to this environment? 
  
13.  What advantages are gained for 
the spinout firm from this 
environment? 
Local networks recognised as a 
source of entrepreneurial 
learning with the focus on 
individual learning not collective 
learning. 
Sponsored environments assist 
firms overcome barriers such as 
under-capitalisation and lack of 
information networks. 
Resource rich environments 
encourages knowledge-based 
firm formation. 
Tenant location choices and 
satisfaction with facilities on 
Science Parks. 
 
 
 
 
Universities as incubators 
Szarka, 1990. 
 
 
 
 
Flynn, 1993. 
 
 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Siegel et al., 2003. 
 
 
Löfsten and Lindelöf, 
2001;2002; Lindelöf  and 
Lindelöf   2002; Siegel et 
al., 2003, Westhead and 
Batstone, 1998; 1999; 
Johannisson et al., 1994. 
Lockett et al., 2003 
14.  What disadvantages are gained for 
the (university) spinout from this 
environment? 
  
15.  Did the (university) spinout firm 
use office space and laboratory 
equipment form the (university) parent 
organisation at formation? 
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Appendix 4; Literature behind the questions (Learning) 
Question and prompts Theme Source 
LEARNING   
16.  What problems have you faced 
during the formation of the spinout 
firm and what and how did you learn 
from them? 
7KH HQWUHSUHQHXU¶V DELOLW\ WR
learn. 
Internal dynamic capabilities 
allow firms to learn over time. 
 
Knowledge based resources may 
be intangible, tacit, non-codified. 
 
Accumulation of resources 
depends on particular 
organisational or managerial 
processes defined as 
organisational ability to 
integrate, build and reconfigure 
competencies. 
Organisational learning 
 
Non-planned learning 
 
Learning by doing. 
Choices amongst competing 
beliefs and actions. 
 
Experiential learning of 
entrepreneur happens through 
exploitation of networks and 
knowledge therein. 
 
Routines to learn routines. 
Static and dynamic routines for 
everyday actions and new 
actions in a volatile 
environment.   
 
Deakins and Freel, 1998. 
 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Penrose, 1972. 
 
Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993. 
 
Teece et al., 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kolb, 1984; Francis, 
1997. 
Cope and Watts, 2000. 
Baker et al., 2003. 
 
Minniti and Bygrave, 
2001. 
 
Johannissson, 1986. 
 
 
 
 
Nelson and Winter, 1982. 
Teece et al., 1994; 
Fernandez et al., 2000 
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Appendix 5:  Interview Guide 
Draft interview schedule 
 
The study will attempt to answer four research questions. 
 
x What processes are used by (academic) entrepreneurs involved in commercialisation of 
university (parent organisation) created knowledge through the formation of a (university) 
spinout firm at two growth phases (opportunity recognition and sustainability)? 
x µ:K\¶GRDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVIRUPHQWUHSUHQHXULDORZQHUVKip teams? 
x µ+RZ¶GRDFDGHPLFHQWUHSUHQHXUVIRUPHQWUHSUHQHXULDORZQHUVKLSWHDPV" 
x µ+RZ¶ GR H[WHUQDO VSRQVRUHG DQG QRQ-sponsored environments assist in the formation of a 
resource base for the (university) spinout firm? 
 
The interview schedule is developed in five parts. 
 
The first part contains a series of general administrative questions. 
 
7KH VHFRQG SDUW FRQWDLQV D VHULHV RI EDFNJURXQG TXHVWLRQV RQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ
opportunity identification. 
 
The third part of the schedule investigates the formation of the entrepreneurial team. 
 
The fourth part of the schedule investigates the influence of the sponsored and non-sponsored 
environment. 
 
The fifth part contains questions about learning. 
 
The interviews will be semi structured with minimal use of prompts using open-ended questions. 
 
 
 
 
(Opportunity Recognition) Pilot Interview Schedule 
 
PART 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
x Proposed project/firm name: 
x Address: 
x Parent organisation(s): 
x Industrial sector: 
x 5HVSRQGHQW¶V1DPH 
x Date of joining the firm: 
x Date of leaving the firm: 
x Reason for leaving the firm: 
x Job title(s) and function(s) of respondent: 
x Telephone number: 
x E-mail address: 
x Firm URL: 
x Date and time of interview: 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE FIRM 
x Legal form of the firm: 
x Legal founding date of the firm: 
x Date when project/firm research began within the parent organisation: 
x Description of main good/service/technology: 
x Current status of the project/firm: 
x Maturity of technology: 
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PART 2 
OPPORTUNITY RECOGNITION PHASE 
 
1. What factors influenced the identification and selection of the commercial idea 
(opportunity) behind the (university) spinout firm? 
x PROMPTS 
x People involvement 
x ³0DUNHWSXOO´ 
x ³5HVHDUFKSXVK´ 
x IP capabilities 
x Licensing/Patenting 
x Technology Transfer Office 
x University/parent organisation commercialisation policy 
x Funding 
x Parent organisation/university 
 
2. What factors influenced the decision to form the (university) spinout firm? 
x What triggered the idea of founding a firm? 
x Who triggered the idea of founding a firm? 
x Did that person commercialise it? 
x Why did they commercialise it? 
x Who commercialised it? 
x How was contact established with that person? 
x Who recognised the commercial market need? 
x Who had the business due diligence and planning skills? 
x Research project/Inventor/Event/Business experience 
x Licensing vs Spinout? 
x Government grant/competitions 
x Funding 
x Mentoring 
x Technology Transfer Office 
x University commercialisation policies 
x Parent organisation 
x Business plan development 
 
3. What factors (people and events) hindered the decision to form the (university) 
spinout firm? 
 
4. What challenges were faced when forming the (university) spinout firm? 
x Finance 
x Human 
x Technological (stage of development; awards; publications) 
x Organisational 
x Physical 
x Networking 
 
5. What influence did the university (parent organisation) have in the process of forming 
the (university) spinout firm and commercialising the idea? 
x IP protection 
x Finance 
x Equipment 
x Human 
x Social Networks 
x University Departments 
x University agencies 
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PART 3 
TEAM FORMATION 
 
6. What people assisted in the formation of the (university) spinout firm?  
x Where did they come from? 
x How did you know them? 
x What experience did they bring? 
x What did they offer the firm? 
x Were they equity holders? 
x What was their role? 
x What was their relationship to the firm? 
x Why were they recruited? 
x Why were they dismissed? 
x What was their educational background? 
x What was their motivation for helping form the firm? 
 
7. What factors influenced the access to people to assist in the formation of the 
(university) spinout firm? 
 
8. What factors in your past work/education/training experience have influenced your 
ability to assist in the formation of a (university) spinout firm? 
x Prior start-up experience 
x Managerial experience 
x Mentors 
 
9. What factors influenced the changing composition of the people in the firm e.g. 
(entry) recruitment or (exit) dismissal of the people who assisted in the formation of 
the (university) spinout firm? 
x Have there been changes in the team composition? 
x What factors influenced the formation of the team? 
x What factors influence the functioning of the team? 
x What factors influenced the shift of entrepreneurial capabilities from the 
venture champion to the entrepreneurial team? 
x Have there been changes in the roles of the people in the (university) spinout 
firm? 
 
 
PART 4 
THE EXTERNAL SPONSORED AND NON-SPONSORED ENVIRONEMNT 
 
10. What factors influenced the decision to establish the (university) spinout in this 
environment? 
 
11. When did the move occur? 
 
12. What challenges were faced when moving from the (university) parent organisation to 
this environment? 
 
13. What advantages are gained for the (university) spinout firm from this environment?   
 
14. What disadvantages are experienced for the (university) spinout firm from this 
location? 
 
15. Did the (university) spinout firm use office space and laboratory equipment from the 
(university) parent organisation at formation? 
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PART 5 
LEARNING 
 
16. What problems have you faced during the formation of the (university) spinout firm 
and what and how did you learn from them? 
x What structures did you put in place to resolve these problems? 
x Would you have done anything differently? 
x Did you adopt a different mindset? 
x Did it encourage you to recruit new members? 
x Did it make you more cautious? 
x Can you identify milestones/tasks/junctures during the formation of the firm? 
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Appendix 6:  Scottish Biotechnology Firm Email Survey 
 
Biotech Firm Profile 
Sir/Madam, 
The purpose of this questionnaire is for academic purposes only and all information will be 
kept confidential. 
I am a second year PhD research student at Nottingham University Business School (NUBS).  
My area of interest is entrepreneurship and I wish to identify biotechnology firms which have originated 
from universities, from industry or from other sources.  Additionally, I would like to establish in which 
environment they have located and the maturity of their product or service.  In total there are three (3) 
TXHVWLRQVWRDQVZHU&RQWDFWGHWDLOVZHUHSURYLGHGE\6FRWWLVK(QWHUSULVH³6RXUFH%RRN´ 
Your participation would be much appreciated.  Please write your answers in the spaces 
provided. 
 
1.  Which of the following options best describes the firm? 
 
a) Originated from a university (e.g. using university created knowledge and formed by an 
academic, researcher or student).   
b) Originated from industry (e.g. using knowledge created in industry and formed by an ex-
employee). 
c) Formed by an academic entrepreneur employed by the university. 
d) Formed by an entrepreneur not employed by the university. 
e) Other (please specify). 
ANSWER: 
 
2.  Which of the following options best describes the environment of the location of your firm? 
 
a) University incubator unit. 
b) Science Park. 
c) Managed incubator not located on a university. 
d) Industrial estate. 
e) Office location. 
f) Home address. 
g) Other (please specify). 
ANSWER: 
 
3.  Which of the following options best describes the phase of development of your firm?   
 
a) Research. 
b) Product/process development. 
c) Product/process testing. 
d) Business is trading and generating sales. 
e) Other (please specify). 
ANSWER:  
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Maris Bruce 
Research Student 
Nottingham University Business School 
Jubilee Campus 
Wollaton Road 
Nottingham 
NG8 1BB 
Tel: (mob) 07791 076998 
Fax: +44 (0) 115 846 6688 
Email: lixmhb1@nottingham.ac.uk 
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Appendix 7: Letter Requesting Face-to-Face Interview  
 
   
  Lixmhb1@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Date 
 
Dear Name of Recipient, 
 
RE: INTERVIEW REQUEST 
 
Thank you for responding to the e-mail survey sent to you in July, 2004 (Biotech Firm Profile).  I am 
extremely grateful for the information supplied relating to your business (i.e., origin, location and phase 
of development). 
 
My doctoral studies at Nottingham University Business School are focusing upon the development of 
biotechnology firms in Scotland.  I am particularly interested in how barriers to commercialisation are 
being addressed.  My research is exploring the resources and methods used by entrepreneurs to convert 
ideas into commercial products and services.  To encourage the wider commercialisation of knowledge 
by entrepreneurs in Scotland, I am seeking to identify various forms of best practice exhibited by bio-
technology firms. 
 
I am inviting a select group of entrepreneurs and firms to participate in my study.  My qualitative study 
will explore the roles and contributions played by equity holders and key decision-makers in bio-
technology firms.  Specifically, I will explore the contributions played by the key equity holders in the 
opportunity pursuit stage of commercialisation. 
 
I would be extremely grateful if you would agree to participate in the study.  You can trust me not to 
divulge your name or the name of your firm to anyone else.  I will ensure complete confidentiality.  
Code names will be allocated to respondents and only the code names will be reported in my doctoral 
dissertation.  If requested, Professors Mike Wright and Paul Westhead (Nottingham University Business 
School) will verify my doctoral student status and will confirm that collected information will be 
reported with the utmost care not to reveal the identity of each respondent.  The key findings of the 
study will be sent to all participants. 
 
Next week, I will personally telephone you.  I hope you will be able to recommend individuals from 
your organization who will share information relating to the development of your firm.  To ensure 
confidentiality, I would like to personally interview the key equity holders who you recommend to be 
interviewed.  I plan to personally conduct face-to-face interviews between January and April 2005.  In 
advance, many thanks for your assistance with regard to this important study. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
Maris Bruce 
PhD Doctoral Student 
 
 
cc. Professor Mike Wright 
      Professor Paul Westhead 
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